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ABSTRACT
Since the 1980’s, the Internet has steadily grown in size to deliver various services to an increasingly
large public, which amounts to billions of users as of the beginning of the 2020’s. As a consequence, its
infrastructure has considerably evolved too, which prompted the research community to investigate
the topology of the Internet at multiple levels. The highest level is the AS-level (Autonomous System),
an Autonomous System being a vast computer network operated by a single company, such as an
ISP (Internet Service Provider). Not only the way Autonomous Systems communicate with each
other has been investigated, but also their internal networks has drawn the attention of the research
community, as many works focused on the mapping and the modeling of the router-level, i.e., how
routers are interconnected either within a single AS or at the borders of adjacent ASes.
The Internet router-level has been investigated not only to discover its structure, but also to
understand its dynamics. Starting from the 2000’s, the research community focused on how the
routers balance the traffic between several links to handle the increasingly large amount of network
traffic, a process which is commonly denoted as load balancing (a form of traffic engineering).
Additionnal works on the router-level aimed at characterizing meshes of routers, i.e., routers that are
directly connected at the data link layer (or Layer-2) to manage a large number of links as if they were
a single router. In the meantime, the research community also explored other levels of the Internet to
complement router-level maps, such as a subnet-level, a subnet (short for subnetwork) being a group
of network interfaces that can contact each other directly at the data link layer.
This thesis aims at designing new topology discovery techniques to efficiently map the intra-
domain topologies of large networks by exploring their different levels and the relationships that
exist between these levels, all while dealing with the effects of load balancing. Three different levels
are investigated: the router-level, the subnet-level, and the hop-level. The hop-level characterizes
how routers or meshes exchange packets at the transport layer (or Layer-3), and can therefore be
used to study the internal forwarding of a network without extensively discovering its router-level.
Not only this thesis provides new topology discovery schemes to map each level, but it also
combines them to increase their accuracy. In particular, it introduces a new subnet inference method-
ology that takes advantage of alias resolution (i.e., the process of determining whether or not a group
or pair of network interfaces belong to the same device) to solve ambiguous scenarios, as well as a
topology mapping scheme that relies on both subnet-level data and alias resolution to build compre-
hensive hop-level maps of intra-domain topologies. Moreover, these maps can be interpreted with
bipartite formalisms to more easily study their topological features. All topology discovery methods
developed for this thesis are comprehensively elaborated and assessed in this document. The tools
that implement these methods (WISE and SAGE), their source code, and the data they could collect
on various Autonomous Systems are publicly available.
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he modern Internet is a vast and complex network of computers that deliver information
and various services across the entire globe. Communications between distant computers is
achieved by splitting the data to transmit into smaller chunks which are individually stored in
data (or network) packets. These packets are then transmitted, one after the other, from the source to
the destination, passing through multiple interconnected devices designed to send each received
packet towards the next device that will get it closer to its destination – or towards the destination
itself. Routers constitute the vast majority of such devices in the modern Internet, and could be
described as numerical high speed post offices, as they read the destination address of any packet
they receive on their ports to send them to the next device by picking the right outgoing port. This
way of exchanging data between remote computers is often referred to as packet switching [75].
Figure 1: The early topology of the ARPANET (December 1969) [94].
Theorized in 1964 [15], the packet switching paradigm was first implement by the ARPANET
(Advanced Research Projects Agency NETwork) in 1969 [63]. At the time, the ARPANET only consisted
of four university computers located in the United States that could exchange packets by interacting
through four interconnected Interface Message Processors (IMPs) [30], i.e., the ancestors of routers.
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Figure 1 illustrates the early topology of the ARPANET as of December 1969 [94], with the IMPs being
depicted by black dots. Being founded by the DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency),
the ARPANET was initially a US military project, but this would soon change: in 1972, Kahn proposed
to transform the initial ARPANET into an open communication network by defining the basic rules
that would allow computers to join the network regardless of its internal architecture [69]. Such a
network would not be controlled by any central authority, and would follow a best effort delivery
approach. These foundations would eventually lead to the creation of two of the most prominent
network protocols, IP (Internet Protocol) [102] and TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) [103], which
were both first introduced, along with the term Internet itself, by Cerf and Kahn in 1974 [25].
The technologies developed with the ARPANET were later reused by the NSF (National Science
Foundation; based in the United States) to create the NSFNET (NSF NETwork), which went online
in 1986 [107]. The NSFNET initially connected multiple US-based university campuses together in
order to allow researchers and engineers to gain remote access to the supercomputers of the time.
The network quickly became congested after going online for the first time, and went through several
significant hardware and software improvements to meet the demand, and eventually managed to
connect two million computers by 1993 [107]. As the NSFNET opened to private companies and the
general public in the early 1990’s, via the first ISPs (Internet Service Providers), it eventually became
the first backbone of the Internet as we know it. Figure 2 illustrates this backbone as of 1990 [42].
Figure 2: The backbone of the NSFNET (circa 1990) [42]. Black circles represent routers.
It is also in the early 1990’s that the HTTP (HyperText Transfer Protocol) protocol was designed
by Berners-Lee et al. to transfer formatted texts and various pieces of media over TCP/IP [17]. First
elaborated by Berners-Lee in 1989 at the CERN (Conseil Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire 1) in
Geneva (Switzerland), the HTTP protocol was subsequently introduced to the research community
then to the general public in 1991, effectively kickstarting the World Wide Web (WWW), i.e., the
information system providing various documents and pieces of media to the entire world through
1Also known in English as the European Organization for Nuclear Research.
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the Internet. The Web would eventually become one of the main selling points of the Internet to the
general public, to the point that both are usually confused together in most languages.
Due to the growing popularity of the Web and subsequent technological developments (such
as the rise of mobile devices), the Internet has become an extremely large and complex computer
network since the 1990’s: as of Spring 2021, more than 5 billion users were browsing between 40
and 50 billions of webpages indexed by the search engines Google and Bing [5, 32]. In 2020, the
Cisco company announced that 18.4 billion devices were connected to the Internet in 2018, and
forecasted that this number would rise to 29.3 billion devices by 2023 [27]. Because of its sheer size,
the Internet is structured, at the highest level, as a large number of interconnected Autonomous
Systems (ASes), a single AS being a computer network operated by a same organization with a
unified routing policy [64]. ASes are able to exchange packets between them with the help of BGP
(Border Gateway Protocol) [79], a protocol which allows each AS to advertise to its neighbors which
routes towards various parts of the Internet it can offer to them. This mechanisms allows each AS to
exchange packets with the entire Internet, as a packet exiting the AS will simply transit through other
ASes until reaching its destination.
Figure 3: CAIDA’s AS core (IPv4/IPv6 Internet) in January 2020 [24].
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In 2017, CAIDA (Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis 2) offered insight on the complexity
of the current Internet by illustrating an AS core, i.e., a graph that models how the Autonomous
Systems of the IPv4 Internet are interconnected [23]. CAIDA later released an updated AS core in
April 2021, the new render being representative of the IPv4/IPv6 Internet as of January 2020 [24].
Figure 3 provides a glance at this latest AS core and clearly demonstrates how much more complex
the Internet became over time, especially knowing Figure 1 and Figure 2 only illustrate a few routers.
Because the Internet is designed to allow any computer to join it regardless of its architecture [69],
how the Internet is actually structured has become a whole research topic on its own as it became
more complex. In particular, while a network operator administrating a specific AS may know all
the technical details of its own network, he may not be aware of the underlying architecture of the
neighbor ASes. And since no central authority administrates the entire Internet, its structure and
dynamics have become elusive, especially given that most (if not all) ASes do not provide public data
on their respective internal network. This is why the scientific community has elaborated various
data collection mechanisms to gain insight on how the modern Internet actually works, this specific
domain being often referred to as Internet topology discovery [37, 61]. Topology discovery aims not
only at explaining how the modern Internet actually works, e.g., to explain some of its temporary
issues [115], but also at gathering realistic data on how the Internet works in practice, so that this
data can be used to design and assess new technologies, such as new network protocols.
To study the modern Internet, the research community has naturally investigated the AS-level,
pictured by CAIDA’s AS core in Figure 3, since the dawn of Internet topology discovery. Typically,
each Autonomous System has a certain number of neighbors, i.e., adjacent ASes to which it will
forward network packets depending on the routes advertised by each of these ASes via the BGP
protocol [79]. The way an AS interacts with its neighbors has notably motivated the community
into establishing a classification that accounts for the economic relationships that exist between
adjacent ASes: a Tier-1 AS refers to an Autonomous System which exclusively acts as a provider to
its neighbors, and conversely, a Stub AS only behaves as a client to its neighbors. The Transit ASes
constitute a middle ground, as they can assume the role of a provider or be a client in respect of their
neighbors. Of course, the classification of an AS will partly be correlated with its role in the Internet:
for instance, Tier-1 ASes are usually providing a vast number of routes to (dozens of) thousands of
other ASes. Many works in topology discovery aimed at mapping the AS-level of the Internet [37, 61],
and in particular, a study conducted by Dimitropoulos et al. in 2006 investigated the discovery of the
inter-AS relationships [36]. The routing dynamics between ASes have a considerable impact on the
routing at the scale of the Internet, and in particular, a 2009 study by Magnien et al. demonstrated
that this may cause the observed routes to never be stable [82]. To better study the AS-level and its
dynamics, CAIDA publicly released a dataset about inter-AS relationships in 2013 [22]. In 2017, CAIDA
also computed a ranking of all ASes, based on their respective number of neighbors [2] (inferred from
various data sources), which notably served as a basis for their AS cores [23, 24].
2CAIDA is part of the University of California based in San Diego, California.
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Figure 4: A toy network as seen from the AS- and router-levels.
However, studying the AS-level only is not sufficient to explain how the modern Internet works.
To give a practical example, in June 2015, Telekom Malaysia (AS4788) announced routes towards
approximately 179,000 prefixes to Level3 (AS3549, a major Tier-1 AS), which accepted these routes,
causing a massive amount of traffic to be forwarded through AS4788. Because this AS did not have the
architecture to handle such a large amount of traffic, many packets were lost and the entire Internet
was slowed down as a consequence [115]. Such an example clearly demonstrates that studying intra-
domain topologies is also of importance to have an idea of the inner architecture of individual ASes
as well as the amount and type of traffic they have been built to handle. Intra-domain topologies
can usually be viewed from the perspective of the router-level, i.e., the routers that compose the
intra-domain network and how they are interconnected. Figure 4 illustrates both the AS- and the
router-level, with the large clouds depiciting individual ASes while the nodes represent routers. Note
that the grey routers correspond to the AS Border Routers (or ASBRs), i.e., the routers that handle
inter-AS connections via the BGP protocol [79].
Since the 1990’s, many strategies have been elaborated by the research community to map intra-
domain topologies. The most basic tool used for this purpose is none other than traceroute, which
has been developped by Jacobson in 1989 [119]. traceroute is able to discover the interfaces of the
intermediate routers that exist between the monitor (also called vantage point), i.e. the computer
where it runs, and the destination (usually represented by an IP address). To do so, it primarily relies
on the TTL (Time To Live) field of the IP header [102]. This field simply consists of an 8-bit integer
value which is decremented each time it arrives at a new device (e.g., a router). When the TTL value
drops to 0, and if the receiving device differs from the destination, the packet is not further forwarded.
Initially, the purpose of the TTL field is to prevent a packet from cycling indefinitely in the network
if it cannot reach its destination. Routers who receive a packet whose TTL value has expired (i.e.,
has dropped to 0) typically replies to the source with an ICMP time-exceeded reply, which the
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source will be one of the interfaces of the router itself, represented by an IP address [101]. By sending
UDP (User Datagram Protocol) [100] packets 3 to the target while increasing the TTL value at each
probe, a monitor running traceroute can collect the interfaces of each router on the way to the
destination, which is traditionally referred to as a traceroute path or route. Packets used to discover
network interfaces (in the case of traceroute) or other network properties are more broadly referred
to as probes. Figure 5 illustrates traceroute probing on a toy topology, where the circles depict
router interfaces and the arrows represent the traceroute probes and their respective paths. Many
topology discovery tools and systems have relied on traceroute to collect network paths and/or
discover router interfaces and map the corresponding router-level topology [18, 45, 83, 113].
Probe with TTL = 1
Probe with TTL = 2
Probe with TTL = 3





Discovered path: → 10.0.1.2 → 10.0.4.2 → 10.2.6.1 → 10.2.8.4
Figure 5: How traceroute works. Circles represent interfaces while arrows depict probes.
Because routers feature multiple interfaces, the research community has also designed ways to
identify whether two IP interfaces belong to the same router. This process of determining if two or
more IP addresses (router interfaces) belong to the same device is referred to as alias resolution.
Alias resolution is crucial for the accuracy of router-level maps, because a collection of network
paths discovered via traceroute probing from different monitors, or even from the same monitor,
may contain differing interfaces that belong to the same router. Therefore, bad or incomplete alias
resolution can suggest topologies that vastly differ from the reality [57]. Numerous alias resolution
methods have been designed by the community to identify routers since the 1990’s, with some of
these methods being embedded in larger topology discover systems [71–74, 86, 87, 113].
However, alias resolution is not the only way to discover routers that has been investigated over
time. Starting from the middle of the 2000’s, several works have taken advantage of IGMP (Internet
Group Management Protocol) [33] probing. This method relies on specific messages of the IGMP
protocol that allow to discover the interfaces and the adjacencies of a multicast-enabled router.
Though this method only works for multicast routers, it allows to discover both the interfaces and the
adjacent routers of a given router without performing alias resolution. IGMP probing has been used
to study inter-AS links [91], to map intra-domain topologies [97], and to infer Layer-2 equipement and
its influence on routers [90]. Unfortunately, IGMP probing has become obsolete due to the evolution
3Other tools may use protocols other than UDP to perform traceroute probing.
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of filtering policies [84], i.e., routing policies that are intentionally dropping packets matching certain
patterns as a way to reinforce the security of systems connected to the Internet. As a consequence,
alias resolution is still crucial to map the router-level of intra-domain topologies.
Starting from the 2010’s, many works have also explored other levels of the Internet to com-
plement the usual AS- and router-level perspectives. For instance, a few works have focused on
the identification of IXPs (Internet eXchange Points), i.e., network structures which were built to
facilitate the interconnection of multiple ASes (such as ISPs) to avoid relying on intermediate tran-
sit networks [13, 95]. Other works aimed at mapping PoPs (Points-of-Presence), i.e., demarcation
(sometimes physical) points where multiple differing networks share a connection [41, 109]. Finally,
multiple publications have put forward the topic of subnet inference, i.e., topology discovery meth-
ods that aim at identifiying subnets (short for subnetworks). A subnet is a group of devices (each
represented by one network interface) which are directly connected at the data link layer, i.e., they
can contact each other directly without having to send packets to one or more intermediate routers.
Subnets can constitute point-to-point links between routers (i.e., a physical link between two routers)
or LANs allowing multiple routers to reach each other in a convenient manner. As such, subnet
inference techniques have been proposed by the research community to annotate intra-domain
router-level maps with the subnets that connect the routers together [58, 70, 116, 118].
Though the topology discovery literature provide numerous techniques to discover various
network components, the very task of mapping intra-domain topologies remain challenging. In
particular, several alias resolution methods have proved to offer limited accuracy [126] or to be
difficult to deploy at the scale of the Internet [16]. Other methods have been rendered practically
impossible to use as a consequence of the evolution of filtering practices. In particular, alias resolution
methods [31, 86, 110] and traceroute variants [111, 112] based on IP options [102] have become
obsolete due to the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) recommending to drop all IP packets
featuring options since February 2014 [44].
One of the major challenges of topology discovery as a whole is traffic engineering . Traffic engi-
neering denotes a collection of methods that have been elaborated over the years by the networking
community to deal with the always increasing amount of traffic. One of the most common forms of
traffic engineering is load balancing , i.e., the process of sharing the packets to transmit between two
network locations among multiple paths, each path often consisting of multiple intermediate routers.
Different load balanced paths are usually preceeded by a divergence point, i.e., a device where the
disjointed paths begin, and can be followed by one or more convergence points, i.e., devices where
two or more load balanced paths rejoin. Load balancing allow networks to handle a large amount of
traffic without increasing the capacity of the links themselves, as replacing these links is usually a
costly operation for network operators.
Load balanced paths are a challenge for topology discovery because they can induce false link
discovery, i.e., the detection of network links that do not exist in the real world. For instance, two
consecutive traceroute probes can take disjointed load balanced paths, and as a result, the discov-
vii
INTRODUCTION
Figure 6: The false link discovery problem on a toy load balancer.
ered router interfaces will not correspond to an actual network path. Figure 6 illustrates this problem
with a toy load balancer consisting of three load balanced paths of the same length. In this figure, the
leftmost router represent a divergence point, the rightmost router model a convergence point, and
the grey circles depict the router interfaces detected via traceroute probing. The red edge depicts a
link that could be inferred from the discovered path which does not exist in the real network, while
the orange edge highlights an inferred link connecting two routers that do share a common link, but
not via the discovered interface (i.e., the grey circle on the rightmost router, or convergence point).
Since the middle of the 2000’s, several works aimed at identifying and characterizing load bal-
ancers in the Internet. Paris traceroute, introduced by Augustin et al. in 2006, is a traceroute
variant that manipulates the headers of the probe packets to stabilize the paths in per-flow load
balancers (i.e., to always go through the same load balanced path) [11]. By designing new algorithms
taking advantage of Paris traceroute, Augustin et al. could detect and study load balancers, and
highlighted the existence of symmetrical and asymmetrical load balanced paths [14]. Symmetrical
paths refer to load balanced paths that exhibit the same number of routers and links in respect of the
parallel paths within the same load balancers, much like the load balanced paths illustrated in in
Figure 6, while asymmetrical paths provide varying number of such components. As a consequence,
asymmetrical paths can notably alter the evaluation of distances towards remote interfaces as TTL
values, i.e., the minimal TTL value to get a reply from a target remote interface might vary at each
probe because of the asymmetrical paths. More broadly speaking, load balancing can impair subnet
inference [116] or suggest network structures that do not actually exist [85]. Finally, further research
with Paris traceroute demonstrated that, as of the begininng of the 2010’s, the vast majority of
traceroute paths will cross at least one load balancer [12].
Motivations
The main purpose of this thesis is to advance the state-of-the-art of topology discovery in at least
two research directions. On the one hand, this thesis will explore how multiple topology discovery
techniques can be best combined to complement each other. On the other hand, most topology
discovery methods elaborated for this thesis will address the problem of mapping a target network at
different levels while dealing with the effects of traffic engineering, specifically load balancing.
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MOTIVATIONS
The first research direction, i.e., combining multiple topology discovery methods together, is
motivated by the fact that many tools developped by the research community tend to focus on
very specific tasks. For instance, a whole branch of the literature of alias resolution focus on how
to best use the IP identification field of the IP protocol [102] to infer routers, and multiple alias
resolution techniques have been elaborated partly or solely on that basis [16, 73, 113]. Unfortunately,
alias resolution based on the IP identification field is not always possible, as routers may very well
implement different behaviours than those expected by state-of-the-art alias resolution tools to
handle this header field, as will be explored in this thesis. This makes dedicated tools, such as MIDAR
(Monotonic ID-Based Alias Resolution) [73], unable to handle specific scenarios of alias resolution.
However, combining multiple alias resolution techniques is not unheard of, as the topology
discovery systems Rocketfuel [113] and AROMA (Accurate ROuter-level MAp) [74] already comple-
mented methods based on the IP identification field with the analysis of DNS records, respectively in
2002 and 2007. The authors of PalmTree [117] (2011), an analytical alias resolution technique (i.e.,
discovering aliases by analyzing data such as traceroute paths a posteriori), presented their work as
a tool for complementing other alias resolution methods. Finally, the alias resolution tool APPLE (Alias
Pruning by Path Length Estimation) [87], which has been introduced to the community by Marder in
2020 4, also combines two different alias resolution methods (iffinder [71] and MIDAR [73]) with an









Figure 7: A toy subnet inference scenario where alias resolution could prove useful.
This first research direction could prove benefitial not only to alias resolution, but also to other
topology discovery topics. Several works in subnet inference identify subnets partly by identifying the
last router crossed before reaching subnet interfaces with the help of traceroute probes. Indeed,
several IP interfaces being associated with the same preceding router (interface) may very well be
on the same subnet [116, 118]. However, the last router before a specific subnet, also called ingress
router, may be reached through multiple paths as a result of load balancing. This may cause differing
4In fact, APPLE is posterior to the research work on alias resolution presented in this thesis.
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interfaces of the same router to reply to the traceroute probes. As a result, the ingress router is not
represented by a single, but by multiple router interfaces. By performing alias resolution on these
interfaces, it becomes possible to identify the ingress router by an alias list in order to continue
subnet inference with the traditional assumptions. Figure 7 shows a toy subnet inference scenario
where the ingress router before the subnet w.x.y.z/29 could appear as two differing interfaces
C and D. Aliasing these interfaces as {C ,D} would allow to accurately discover w.x.y.z/29. This
simple example suggests that alias resolution and subnet inference should not be seen as completely
separate, monolithic topics, as the former may be useful to the latter.
Figure 7 is, at the same time, an illustration of the purpose of the second research direction: map-
ping networks regardless of traffic engineering. Since previous work notably showed that traceroute
paths may never be stable and will almost always cross a load balancer [12, 82], some assumptions
made by state-of-the-art topology discovery tools need to be re-evaluated. Figure 7 already shows, in
particular, how the consequences of symmetrical load balanced paths could be handled to perform
subnet inference. A modern subnet inference methodology should also leave some room for the
effects of asymmetrical load balanced paths, as state-of-the-art subnet inference tools tend to as-
sume subnet interfaces from a same subnet will appear at similar distances in TTL values [116, 118].
Because of this assumption, the same tools struggle to detect subnets within a target domain where
asymmetrical load balancing is experienced (either within the target network itself or within an
intermediate network), a limitation which was already acknowledged by their authors [116].
The effects of traffic engineering, and more precisely load balancing, also impair the topology
mapping of a target network as performed by TreeNET [55]. TreeNET is actually the main contribution
of my master thesis, which I carried out just before this thesis (during academic year 2014-2015), and
is a subnet-based topology mapping tool that builds a tree-like map of a target network (hence its
name) using the routes (collected with Paris traceroute [11]) towards a collection of inferred subnets
(first collected with ExploreNET [118], then refined by TreeNET [55]). TreeNET takes advantage of
the idea that a collection of traceroute paths should be close to a tree-like structure, and therefore
uses the router interfaces found in each path as nodes of the tree while the subnets constitute leaves.
A direct benefit of this construction is that the internal nodes correspond to neighborhoods, i.e.,
network locations bordered by subnets located at most one hop from each other. Neighborhoods
correspond to the nodes of a hop-level topology, i.e., a graph representing how the routing occurs
within a given target network, knowing that a single node in such a graph might correspond to more
than one router, since routers can be sometimes be directly connected at the data link layer via
Layer-2 equipment [90]. The subnets bordering the neighborhoods can also be used to identify the
links between adjacent neighborhoods, as will be explored later in this thesis.
Though previous work in topology discovery evidenced that a set of traceroute paths will
be closer to a directed acyclic graph of the IP-level [98], TreeNET partially accounts for the effects
of traffic engineering by ensuring each node in the tree only features one predecessor, with this
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(b) As a tree (clouds depict subnets)
Figure 8: Mapping of a toy network as a tree with TreeNET [55].
allowing the internal nodes of a tree to correspond to more than one router interface, therefore
highlighting interfaces of routers potentially involved in load balancing architectures. This also
ensures neighborhoods located deeper in the tree are bordered by subnets whose routes feature
the same length and the same last hop(s). Figure 8 illustrates a toy network (Fig. 8a) as it would be
interpreted by TreeNET (Fig. 8b). The methodology of TreeNET will be detailed later in this thesis.
While the concept of neighborhood has a lot of potential to map hop-level topologies, a potential
that will be explored throughout this thesis, the methodology of TreeNET is not well suited to measure
complex networks where load balancing is frequently experienced. The internal nodes meant to
model router interfaces featured in (symmetrical) load balanced paths by representing multiple
interfaces can be difficult to interpret, while asymmetrical paths typically result in subnets whose
routes feature the same last hops ending up around differing neighborhoods because the length
of those routes vary. One of the main motivation of this thesis was therefore to comprehensively
elaborate neighborhood-based topology mapping while dealing with the effects of traffic engineering
in order to overcome TreeNET limits. A key challenge of this task lies not only in how to handle
traceroute paths in general, but also in how and when alias resolution should be used to find out
whether or not some router interfaces detected through traceroute probing actually belong to the
same device. As mentioned before, this is critical to achieve accurate topology mapping, as bad or
incomplete alias resolution may result in maps vastly differing from the real network [57].
Finally, while most of this thesis will present and assess new topology mapping methods, it will
also briefly investigate how the data collected with these schemes could be modeled to study more
easily the topological features of the measured networks. Indeed, the third and last main motivation
of this work is to expand the state-of-the-art with respect to the use of bipartite graphs in Internet
topology modeling. In graph theory, a bipartite graph is a graph where vertices are distributed into
two disjointed sets (or parties) such that each edge connects one vertex from the first party to a
vertex from the second party. An example of bipartite graph is illustrated by Figure 9. Bipartite
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α β γ
Figure 9: An example of bipartite graph. The first party consists of α, β and γ.
graphs have been widely studied by the scientific community, notably to model social structures,
such as those of file-sharing communities [66, 93, 124]. Because the Internet, at its core, consists of
routers interconnected by links or LANs which can be easily modeled by subnets, bipartite graphs
are naturally suited to model it. In fact, Guillaume et al. already mentioned using bipartite graphs
to model the Internet in 2006 [56], but it is not before 2013 that an actual bipartite model would
be introduced. That year, Tarissan et al. [114] proposed a model where the two parties respectively
represent Layer-2 devices (such as Ethernet switches) and routers, and thoroughly assessed it using
data collected via IGMP probing [83, 91, 96, 97]. One of the motivations of this thesis therefore lies in
exploring bipartite formalisms that include subnets in the model to better account for how routers
are connected within intra-AS topologies.
Main contributions
This thesis intends to advance the state-of-the-art by answering the following research questions.
1. Research question 1: Can multiple topology discovery methods be combined to improve both
the accuracy and the exhaustivity of the collected data ?
2. Research question 2: Can topology discovery methods be designed so that they can deal with
the effects of traffic engineering ?
3. Research question 3: Can the topology of a large target network be captured from a single
vantage point ?
4. Research question 4: What can we learn from the collected data if we are modeling the mea-
sured networks with bipartite/tripartite graphs ?
Research question 1, on combining multiple topology discovery methods, will be answered in
multiple ways throughout this thesis.
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• An alias resolution framework designed to select the most suitable method to a given scenario
will be introduced. This framework not only provides multiple state-of-the-art methods, but
also takes advantage of IP fingerprinting [121] to identify which methods can be used on a
given scenario and which one is the most suitable and/or accurate. When combined with
a space search reduction scheme, notably by taking advantage of the tree-like mapping of
TreeNET [55], this framework can offer accurate alias resolution while being lightweight in
terms of probing, as will be demonstrated with a validation on a groundtruth network [51].
Deployment of this framework in the wild from the PlanetLab testbed [8] will also be used to
re-assess the permeability of the Internet to various alias resolution methods [51].
• To advance the state-of-the-art of subnet inference, a new tool called WISE (Wide and lInear
Subnet inferencE) will be introduced [52]. This tool takes advantage of the aforementioned
alias resolution framework to better identify the ingress router of each subnet, therefore setting
it apart from state-of-the-art tools, which rely on ad hoc methods that do not consider other
topology discovery topics. Measurements in the wild from the PlanetLab testbed [8] with WISE
will demonstrate that integrating alias resolution in subnet inference is a sound idea [52, 53].
• Finally, the topology mapping tool SAGE (Subnet AGrEgation) will be presented [54]. This tool
combines subnet inference, traceroute probing and alias resolution to map a target network
as a neighborhood-based Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) that accounts for its hop-level topology.
Measurements on groundtruth networks will demonstrate the SAGE methodology can capture
snapshots of networks that are true to their actual topology [54].
• All in all, this thesis will elaborate holistic topology discovery. It consists of taking advantage
of the relationships that exist between differing topology discovery domains instead of viewing
them as completely separate topics.
Research question 2, which consists of determining how the effects of traffic engineering can be
dealt with, will also be commented on and answered to more than once in this thesis.
• In order to elaborate the methodology of WISE, the typical consequences of traffic engineering
regarding subnet inference will be characterized and quantified with the help of measurements
conducted on various Autonomous Systems (ASes) from the PlanetLab testbed [8]. By doing so,
it will be demonstrated that the effects of traffic engineering are not only unavoidable in the
modern Internet [12], but also vary considerably from one vantage point to another [52, 53].
• By taking account of these effects in the subnet inference methodology of WISE, it will be
demonstrated that it is possible to discover a majority of (sound) subnets regardless of the
vantage point and despite the variations in the observed effects of traffic engineering [52, 53].
• The methodology of SAGE will also be carefully elaborated throughout this thesis. First, the
basic concepts of SAGE (including the concept of neighborhood introduced with TreeNET [55])
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will be extensively described and assessed in order to demonstrate they are reliable enough to
use them as the building blocks of network graphs, despite these concepts relying on partial
traceroute paths [53]. Second, the complete methodology of SAGE will be described to show
how it can infer neighborhoods and their adjacencies, still using not only partial traceroute
paths but also alias resolution to detect convergence points of load balanced paths. Finally, by
measuring various Autonomous Systems in the wild from the PlanetLab testbed [8] with SAGE,
it will be demonstrated that SAGE can capture comparable graphs of a same target network, in
terms of both vertices and links, despite changing the vantage point [54].
Research question 3, on making the topology mapping methods efficient enough to easily capture
a large network, will be answered to both in an analytical and in a practical manner.
• The complete workflow of both WISE [52, 53] and SAGE [54] will be comprehensively described.
The main algorithms will be provided in pseudo-code, along with an analysis of their time
complexity. By doing so, it will be demonstrated that all the algorithmical steps of WISE achieve
a linear time complexity, and that the additional steps taken by SAGE to infer the hop-level
topology of a target network can be carried out in quasi-linear time. The time complexity
analyses will be completed from time to time by experimental data to show why the provided
algorithms are expected to behave well on average (if not all the time).
• WISE will be validated on two groundtruth networks to show that, not only it can outperform
previous state-of-the-art subnet inference tools (TreeNET [55] and ExploreNET [118]) in terms
of accuracy, but also in terms of total execution time, mostly thanks to its design. Deployment
of WISE in the wild will include measurements of large ASes 5 from a single vantage point on a
quasi-daily basis, a feature that will ease the comparison of the collected data [52, 53].
Finally, research question 4, about the possibilities offered by bipartite/tripartite graphs to study
the Internet topology, will be answered to at the end of this thesis.
• Data collected with SAGE from both the PlanetLab testbed [8] and the EdgeNet cluster [108]
will be transformed into neighborhood – subnet bipartite graphs. It will be subsequently
demonstrated that such bipartite graphs can offer insight on the role played by subnets, as well
as the shape of a network, its underlying structures (e.g., back-up links) and the local density of
its (major) components [54].
• Finally, a tripartite model, designed to better account for the devices involved in the topology
of a target network, will be presented and commented on. In particular, it will be showed that
such a formalism has the potential to offer a more accurate picture of the router-level of a
target domain while suggesting where Layer-2 equipment is likely to be used.
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comment on its limitations. Chapter 2 will subsequently introduce an alias resolution framework de-
signed to overcome the limitations of the state-of-the-art, notably by including IP fingerprinting [121]
in its methodology. Chapter 3 will conclude this first part with an evaluation of this framework on a
groundtruth network after including it in TreeNET [51]. Data collected in the wild with this frame-
work will be used to study the relationships between profiles of fingerprints and the alias resolution
methods selected by the framework. The same data will also be used to re-assess the permeability of
the modern Internet to state-of-the-art alias resolution methods.
The second part will extensively discusss subnet inference. Chapter 4 will first review the state-
of-the-art subnet inference methods elaborated up to this point, and comment on their merits and
limitations. Then, Chapter 5 will characterize and quantify various issues caused by traffic engineering
policies that can impair state-of-the-art subnet inference methods. Chapter 6 subsequently presents
a new subnet inference tool accounting for these challenges called WISE (Wide and lInear Subnet
inferencE) [52], and comprehensively describes its algorithms and their respective time complexity.
Chapter 7 will conclude this second part by validating WISE on two groundtruth networks while
comparing it with the state-of-the-art and by discussing measurements collected from various
Autonomous Systems from the PlanetLab testbed [8]. By doing so, it will be demonstrated that WISE
can usually discover the same subnets within a target network, regardless of the vantage point [52, 53].
The collected data will also be used to re-evaluate previous claims regarding the distribution of the
subnet prefix length in the Internet [53].
The third and final part, on network graph inference and modeling, will discuss not only topol-
ogy discovery methods aiming at mapping the hop-level of a target network, but also network
modeling with bipartite graphs. Chapter 8 will begin this part by reviewing the state-of-the-art re-
garding both topics. Then, Chapter 9 will discuss in detail the interpretation of traceroute paths,
i.e., how they can be best handled for topology mapping in the modern Internet. Chapter 10 will
subsequently introduce SAGE (Subnet AGgrEgation) [54], a new topology discovery tool that can map
the hop-level of a target domain while identifying the subnets that correspond to the network links.
Much like Chapter 6, this chapter will describe in detail all main algorithms and comment on their
respective time complexity. Chapter 11 will validate SAGE on two groundtruth networks by assessing
the links it discovered and will evaluate its ability to capture comparable graphs of a same target
network regardless of the vantage point, using, again, data collected from the PlanetLab testbed [8].
Chapter 12 will conclude this third part by discussing the opportunities offered by bipartite graphs
for studying the modern Internet, i.e., data collected by SAGE, notably from the EdgeNet cluster [108],
will be transformed into bipartite graphs, and the properties of these graphs will be commented on
to demonstrate they are consistent with the measured topologies [54]. A tripartite model, designed to
study the router-level and the presence of Layer-2 equipment, will also be briefly discussed.
Finally, a general conclusion will be provided at the end of this thesis to summarize its main


















INTRODUCTION TO ALIAS RESOLUTION
T
his chapter introduces the concepts and history of alias resolution. First of all, the main
definitions and motivations of alias resolution are presented (Sec. 1.1), along with a few
additional practical definitions that will be used throughout the entire thesis (Sec. 1.2). A
representative sample of alias resolution methods elaborated by the research community is presented
following this (Sec. 1.3). Applications of alias resolution, including scenarios for which state-of-the-
art methods are not always well suited, are discussed in Sec. 1.4. Sec. 1.5 concludes this chapter by
summarizing the limits of the state-of-the-art and introduces the research questions of this first part.
1.1 Main definitions and motivations
In topology discovery, an alias denotes an IP interface which belongs to the same device as another
given IP interface. In other words, for two given IP interfaces A and B , denoted in practice by their
addresses, A is said to be an alias of B if A and B are located on the same device. Therefore, from the
perspective of a measurement tool, two interfaces of an individual router should be aliases of each
other. Alias resolution therefore denotes the process of inferring whether two IP interfaces belong to
the same device or not.
Determining whether a couple or a group of IP interfaces correspond to the same device is
crucial to study the routing in the Internet. In particular, correctly identifying the routers of a given
Autonomous System (AS) is essential to study the behaviour and performance of its internal routing.
Furthermore, the data collected from different target domains can assist network protocol designers
with evaluating their new proposals on realistic topologies, either collected through measurements
or randomly generated so they feature the same characteristics as existing network topologies.
Traditionally, a network topology can be viewed as a graph where the vertices correspond to routers
3
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(d) Possible graph (with alias resolution)
Figure 1.1: A toy network where alias resolution helps to discover a reliable topology.
and where edges symbolize the links between them. In the real world, links correspond to the
connections between individual routers that do not include any intermediate router or a similar
Layer-3 device (i.e., acting at the transport layer in the network stack). As a consequence, routers and
the links between them are traditionally said to be the backbone of the Internet.
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1.2. ADDITIONAL PRACTICAL DEFINITIONS
A simple scenario showing the usefulness of alias resolution is given in Fig. 1.1. A toy network
consisting of six routers is first depicted in Fig. 1.1a, where black circles represent interfaces. In
Fig. 1.1b, the interfaces that could be discovered through probing are presented as plain circles
with each interface being denoted by a letter. Fig. 1.1c shows the graph that could be inferred from
the discovered interfaces without using alias resolution first, and Fig. 1.1d illustrates what could be
inferred if alias resolution is applied before creating the graph. In Fig. 1.1c, two additional vertices
(therefore two additional routers) E and G are portrayed with a total of four additional links (B ↔ E ,
E ↔ H , D ↔G and G ↔ H ). In fact, these links are duplicates of two real life links (C ↔ F and F ↔ H )
and could be said to be false links, as they do not completely correspond to actual links shown in
Fig. 1.1a. As Fig. 1.1d shows, alias resolution prevents inferring these additional routers and links
by aliasing together E , F , and G into one single identifier {E ,F,G}, leading to a graph which is a true
representation of the fact that there are as many routers and links as there are in the actual network.
To complement this toy example, it is worth noting that the importance of alias resolution has
already been comprehensively studied by the research community. In particular, a study conducted
by Gunes and Sarac in 2007 showed that incomplete or incorrect alias resolution can lead to drastic
changes in the properties of the discovered topologies [57].
1.2 Additional practical definitions
The main concepts of alias resolution can be completed with additional definitions and, for practical
purposes, these will be used for the rest of this thesis. When multiple IP interfaces are all found to
belong to one device, the list of these interfaces is referred to as an alias list, as each item in the list
constitutes an alias for the other items. Likewise, two IP interfaces that are alias of each other are
usually referred to as an alias pair.
Prior to performing alias resolution, the IP interfaces that could hypothetically be aliases for each
others can be referred to as alias candidates.
In the literature, alias resolution methods are often categorized into active methods and passive
methods. An active method consists of inferring aliases by actively probing the alias candidates,
while a passive method will rely on existing data or on data collected without directly probing the
alias candidates. Such is the case, for instance, of methods based on DNS records (see Sec. 1.3.5).
Finally, an interesting property for alias resolution is alias transitivity. Let us imagine a scenario
where three interfaces A, B , and C are alias candidates for each others. If it is possible to discover that
A is an alias of B , and if B turns out to be an alias of C , then A and C can be considered to be aliases
of each other as well, since it is impossible for B to be located on two completely separate devices.
1.3 State-of-the-art alias resolution methods
Since the early 2000’s, the research community has elaborated many alias resolution schemes. The
subsequent sections describe some of the most successful and prominent methods.
5
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION TO ALIAS RESOLUTION
1.3.1 ICMP Port-unreachable reply (iffinder)
One of the earliest active methods that was developed consisted of exploiting the Port-unreachable
message defined by the ICMP protocol [101]. A TCP [103] or UDP [100] packet targeting an unlikely
high port number is first sent towards an alias candidate. Subsequently, and due to the choice
of the port number, the destination router will most likely reply with a Port-unreachable ICMP
message. However, the source IP address of this message could differ from the address of the target
interface, notably because RFC 1122 [20] recommends using the address of the interface emitting the
Port-unreachable ICMP message as its source address. By sending a TCP or UDP probe to each
alias candidate and comparing the source IP address of the replies, it becomes possible to discover
alias pairs or lists. Elaborated around 2000 by K. Keys, the open source tool iffinder implements
this approach using UDP probes [71].
While accurate, this alias resolution method is dependent on the permeability of the target
network to TCP/UDP probes. Indeed, such probes can be either filtered by the target network itself,
either dropped by an intermediate router between the vantage point and the target domain. Moreover,
some routers can be configured not to reply with such a Port-unreachable ICMP message at all, as
a security measure against port scanning attacks. The extent to which this method could be used
nowadays is discussed in Chapter 3.
1.3.2 Sequence of IP identifiers (Ally)
In the standard for the IP protocol, the header of an IP packet includes a 16 bits-long identification
field [102]. The content of this field is usually referred to as an IP identifier or IP ID in the literature.
Originally designed to help reassemble fragmented datagrams, this field has become a major tool
for alias resolution. Indeed, a common implementation for generating IP identifiers simply consists
of using the lattest value of a 16 bits counter which is incremented between each sent packet. As a
consequence, consecutive packets sent by the same router will feature consecutive IP identifiers.
What makes this behavior interesting for alias resolution is that the counter used by a given router
usually remains the same for all of its interfaces.
The Ally component of Rocketfuel, elaborated by Spring et al. around 2002, is an active alias
resolution method that takes advantage of IP identifiers [113]. To test whether two IP interfaces
belong to the same device, two probes 1 are first sent to both interfaces. After receiving the respective
replies, containing the IP identifiers x and y , a third probe is sent to the interface that replied first (the
one which sent x) in order to get a third IP identifier z. If x, y , and z forms a sequence of consecutive
numbers while the delta between x and z is small enough, then both IP interfaces can be considered
to belong to the same router.
Although it is considered to be an accurate method, Ally needs, for a given set of alias candidates,
to test each possible pair to obtain complete alias lists. In other words, this method has a O (N 2) time
complexity for N alias candidates, discouraging usage on larger sets of alias candidates.
1Since the IP ID comes from the IP header, the encapsulated packet can be anything: UDP, ICMP, etc.
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1.3.3 IP identifier velocity (RadarGun, MIDAR)
To overcome the Ally computational cost while increasing accuracy, the research community has
explored another way to take advantage of the identification field of the IP header [102]. Instead of
collecting identifiers for each hypothetical alias pair, several probes can be sent to a given interface
in order to compute the IP ID velocity, i.e., the rate at which IP identifiers emitted by this interface
increase. Two IP interfaces can then be aliased providing their respective sequences show close
enough values and if the corresponding velocities can be used to predict identifiers of each other
with a delta that is small enough.
This approach, which still falls under the active category, was first put into practice by Bender et al.
with RadarGun in 2008 [16]. This approach was later improved by Keys et al. with MIDAR (Monotonic
ID-Based Alias Resolution) in 2013 [73]. MIDAR models IP ID sequences as time series and relies on
the monotonicity of each sequence to decide whether two IP interfaces are aliases of each other. Both
RadarGun and MIDAR achieve linear time complexity, i.e. O (N ) where N denotes the total number of
alias candidates, making both tools fit for large-scale alias resolution.
1.3.4 IP prespecified timestamp option (Pythia)
Another well known active method relies on the prespecified timestamp option of the IP proto-
col [102]. This option enables timestamp values from up to four IP interfaces to be queried using a
single probe 2. If the probe crosses a device which features one of the listed interfaces, a timestamp
value will be recorded for this interface. As a result, and to determine whether a subset of alias
candidates (up to four) belongs to the same device, a probe can be sent to one these candidates while
requesting timestamps for each of them. For instance, for candidates A, B , C , and D , a probe packet
will be sent to A while requesting timestamp values for A, B , C , and D . If the reply packet comes with
several timestamp values that are different but similar in range (or identical), then the corresponding
interfaces likely share the same clock, therefore suggesting they are located on the same device.
This active method was first introduced to the research community by Sherry et al. in 2010 [110].
It was thoroughly evaluated in 2012 by de Donato et al. [31], and Marchetta et al. introduced a
tool entirely based on this approach in 2013: Pythia [86]. Unfortunately, this method has become
problematic to use due to the options of the IP protocol being reevaluated as security issues over the
years. This issue was already highlighted in 2012 by de Donato et al. [31], and in particular, RFC 7126
(February 2014) recommended dropping any IP packet using the prespecified timestamp option [44].
1.3.5 Reverse DNS
A common passive alias resolution method consists of using reverse DNS, i.e., finding the DNS record
associated with a given IP interface. Indeed, DNS records often contain suggestions on the ISP, the
use and even the location of an IP interface. Therefore, similarities in DNS records for a set of alias
2Again, the IP datagram can encapsulate anything, since this technique relies on a feature of the IP protocol.
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candidates can suggest that these interfaces belong to the same device. This method is categorized
as passive since collecting DNS records does not require directly probing the alias candidates.
Reverse DNS has been used since the beginning of the 2000’s. Rocketfuel already took advantage,
in 2002, of the naming conventions of ISPs to distinguish backbone networks from PoPs (Points-
of-Presences) to accurately map the router-level of their networks [113]. The topology discovery
tool AROMA (Accurate ROuter-level MAp), elaborated by Kim and Harfoush in 2007 to improve the
Rocketfuel methodology in terms of accuracy, discovered links and probing work, includes actual
alias resolution through reverse DNS among its methods [74].
However, a study by Zhang et al. showed that some IP interfaces can be incorrectly named, which
can result in detecting false positives, i.e. alias pairs that do not correspond to actual routers [126].
More broadly speaking, as each ISP has its own naming conventions, reverse DNS can be difficult to
tune compared to systematic methods (e.g., based on IP identifiers). However, in 2019, Luckie et al.
introduced a machine learning-based approach able to ascertain regexes to match router names and
therefore discover alias pairs on the basis of DNS records [80].
1.3.6 Analytical methods (apar, kapar, PalmTree, APPLE)
While many alias resolution methods rely on active probing of the alias candidates, several other
techniques (aside those using reverse DNS, cf. Sec. 1.3.5) have explored the possibility of discovering
alias pairs by carefully analyzing the network topology rather than probing the alias candidates. Elab-
orated by Gunes and Sarac around 2009, apar (analytic and probe-based alias resolver) uses route
paths discovered via traceroute to analytically infer alias pairs [60]. This tool was later optimized
by K. Keys in 2010 and renamed kapar in the process [72]. Both tools could be considered as passive
as they rely on preexisting data.
In 2011, Tozal and Sarac introduced PalmTree, an alias resolution tool which takes advantage
of standard IP assignment practice to minimize the amount of probes, achieving a linear time
complexity (i.e., O (N ) with N alias candidates) [117]. Finally, APPLE (Alias Pruning by Path Length
Estimation), which was introduced in 2020 by A. Marder, relies on the return path lengths of the
probes and on multiple vantage points to filter potential alias pairs [87].
An interesting common denominator of PalmTree and APPLE is that all their respective authors
share the opinion that their analytical features should be used mostly to complement active methods
rather than to replace them. The benefits of such an approach were, in practice, demonstrated with
APPLE [87], as it combines its alias pruning method with iffinder and MIDAR to outperform both.
1.4 Applications of alias resolution
As already highlighted in Sec. 1.3, many works in alias resolution puts as much emphasis on efficiency
as they do on accuracy. More broadly speaking, many state-of-the-art methods either aimed at
decreasing the total number of probes required for accurate alias resolution, either achieved linear
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time complexity with respect to the total number of alias candidates. On the one hand, AROMA was
designed to drastically reduce the overall probing work required for topology mapping in respect
of Rocketfuel, including when it comes to alias resolution [74]. On the other hand, the alias reso-
lution tools RadarGun [16], PalmTree [117], and MIDAR [73] were all designed to have a linear time
complexity to outperform the Ally method [113], which suffers from a quadratic time complexity. It
should not come as a surprise that there is such a focus on efficiency, as topology discovery tools
often operate on large networks or large portions of the Internet, making large-scale deployment of
methods such as Ally difficult to envision.
However, alias resolution can also be very useful to shine light on simpler scenarios that will
be explored throughout this entire thesis. This section will give two practical examples where alias










Figure 1.2: A toy load balancing architecture.
A first practical application of alias resolution would be the detection of convergence points
while probing the router interfaces of a target network. In order to prevent network congestion where
there is an increase in traffic, network providers typically use architectures featuring multiple paths
to balance the load between multiple links, an approach which is traditionally referred to as load
balancing . Such an approach notably helps network operators to deal with increasing network traffic
without increasing link capacity. Research by Augustin et al. aimed at enumerating as many paths as
possible to quantify load balancing in the wild [11, 14] and highlighted the existence of convergence
points in the Internet, i.e., routers where load balanced paths converge. Multiple interfaces of these
routers can be revealed by the probing as a result of load balancing. For instance, a router where three
load balanced paths converge might reply with a different interface for each of these paths, just like
in the toy topology shown in Fig. 1.1. As a result, failing to identify these convergence points while
analyzing paths can lead to incorrect conclusions on the target network. A toy network that depicts a
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mesh of routers corresponding to a simplified load balancing architecture is shown in Fig. 1.2. In this
figure, plain black circles model the interfaces revealed by the probing. The set of interfaces D , E and
F as well as the set G , H and I belong respectively to routers R4 and R5. Without alias resolution, each
of these convergence points would be modeled by no less than three routers. Correctly identifying









Figure 1.3: A toy subnet inference scenario.
Fig 1.3 shows another toy network where the top router (R3) acts as a gateway to a subnet, i.e.,
a set of IP interfaces which can reach each other directly through a LAN. This subnet is depicted
by a large cloud, while the squares and circles symbolize subnet interfaces and router interfaces
discovered via network probing, respectively. Because of the multiple paths leading to router R3, both
of its interfaces C and D could appear in the collected data as the final interfaces crossed before
reaching the subnet interfaces. For a tool to try to discover the top subnet w.x.y.z/29 would require
identification of the gateway router, which would mean that it should be able to determine whether
C and D belong to the same device. Localized alias resolution can solve this issue.
In both previous scenarios, the sets of alias candidates can be implied from the collected data and
are fairly small. For such simple use cases of alias resolution, deploying solutions designed for large-
scale measurements would induce unnecessary large amounts of probes. In particular, in the case of
MIDAR, dozens of probes are sent to each alias candidate in order to compute a time series for each
candidate. In comparison, replicating the Ally method only needs three probes to test each alias pair.
Therefore, deploying large-scale solutions for such scenarios not only becomes questionable but also
means that a new approach which is better suited to small sets of alias candidates is required.
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1.5 Closing comments: towards a revisited alias resolution
As discussed in Sec. 1.3, several state-of-the-art alias resolution methods are difficult to use either
on a wide scale, or at all. For instance, methods based on the prespecified timestamp option of the
IP protocol are now virtually impossible to use as a consequence of the IP packets with options
being broadly filtered (cf. Sec 1.3.4), and the approach implemented by iffinder (cf. Sec. 1.3.1)
can be impaired by modern security policies (e.g., preventing port scanning attacks). As already
recommended by the authors of analytical tools (cf. Sec. 1.3.6), one way to mitigate the limitations
inherent to each alias resolution method would be to combine them.
Not only combining several approaches should be considered, but a modern alias resolution
scheme should also be designed keeping efficiency and minimal probing costs in mind. While several
state-of-the-art solutions are adapted for Internet-scale alias resolution (such as MIDAR, cf. Sec. 1.3.3),
they are too costly in terms of probes to solve simpler scenarios of alias resolution such as those
mentioned in Sec. 1.4. It should therefore be possible to analyze both large and small alias resolution
scenarios in linear time with as few probes as possible.
This first part of the thesis will address both aforementioned challenges by answering the follow-
ing research questions, with each subsequent chapter answering specific questions.
1. Can a methodology be designed to discover which alias resolution methods can be used on
a given set of alias candidates ? How ? Before even trying an alias resolution method, the alias
candidates should be analyzed to determine which methods are exploitable and which one is
the most likely to provide accurate results. These questions will be answered with a novel alias
resolution framework presented in Chapter 2.
2. How can the probing cost of this new methodology be reduced ? Minimizing the number of
probes sent per alias candidate is critical to achieve efficient alias resolution and to avoid
triggering security mechanisms. How this can be achieved will also be covered in Chapter 2.
3. How and when should the new methodology be used ? Is it accurate ? The best way(s) to use
the new methodology will also be discussed. The framework will also be assessed with the help
of a groundtruth network. Both these questions will be answered in Chapter 3.
4. To which extent can state-of-the-art methods be used in today’s Internet ? To answer this
question, a study will be conducted by deploying the alias resolution scheme designed to
answer questions 1 and 2 in the wild, i.e., from a measurement testbed. This study will be











A FINGERPRINT-BASED ALIAS RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK
T
his chapter introduces an alias resolution framework designed to address the two challenges
discussed in Sec. 1.5. This framework consists of fingerprinting alias candidates in order to
select the most suitable state-of-the-art alias resolution method, and therefore constitutes an
answer to research question 1 from Sec. 1.5. Sec. 2.1 first introduces IP fingerprinting by reviewing
previous work and presents the components of fingerprints for alias resolution. Sec. 2.2 describes a
probing scheme designed to collect the necessary data for fingerprints with as few probes as possible,
therefore answering research question 2 from Sec. 1.5. Sec. 2.3 presents how alias resolution can be
carried out after the fingerprinting and without additional probing. Finally, Sec. 2.4 concludes this
chapter by summarizing the advantages and perspectives of the new framework.
2.1 IP fingerprinting
2.1.1 Previous work
The idea of fingerprinting IP interfaces (or addresses) was first explored by Vanaubel et al. in an
attempt to recognize different router brands through probing [121]. For this purpose, they studied
the typical use of the Time To Live (or TTL), an 8-bit field found in the header of IP datagrams [102].
The IP protocol TTL field consists of an 8-bit unsigned integer value that is decremented each
time an IP packet crosses a router. Once a packet reaches a TTL value of 1, the router receiving
the packet drops it and then usually replies to the sender with an ICMP message featuring the
time-exceeded code [101]. Such a mechanism prevents a packet from being forwarded indefinitely
if it ends up cycling in a forwarding loop. In topology discovery, the TTL field is typically used to
reveal router interfaces on the way to some destination IP address, as each time-exceeded reply
will provide, as a source IP, one of the interfaces of the router that generated the reply. The classical
tool traceroute [119] sends a sequence of UDP probes towards a target IP address, starting with
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a TTL value of 1 and incrementing the TTL after each new probe until it obtains a reply from the
destination IP address, therefore revealing router interfaces on the way to the destination.
Though RFC 1700 recommends using 64 as the default initial value for the TTL field of any IP
packet [104], Vanaubel et al. discovered that this convention is not strictly followed by equipment
vendors. Indeed, the initial TTL values 32, 128, and 255 are also used, with 255 being the most
common, and the initial TTL value of a packet also varying in some cases depending on its nature.
For instance, at the time of their research (2013), Juniper routers running with the Junos OS typically
used 255 as the initial TTL value of time-exceeded replies but 64 as the initial TTL value of ICMP
echo-reply messages, i.e., replies to echo-request used to verify an IP interface is online [101].
To take advantage of this observation, fingerprints (or router signatures) were conceptualized
as n-tuples of values characterizing the behaviour of a router. The aforementioned research used
an even more specific definition: fingerprints are n-tuples of initial TTL values used by n different
types of packets. The notation <i1, i2, ... in> was introduced to denote a fingerprint of n values.
Consequently, the typical signature of Juniper routers running with Junos is <255,64>.
In addition to providing an insight on the vendor of a router, fingerprinting is easy to implement,
as it requires a minimal number of probes to compute the values for a given IP interface once the
interface has been detected. Vanaubel et al. used Paris traceroute [11] to discover router interfaces
and collect the final TTL values of the corresponding time-exceeded replies to assume the associated
initial TTL value. Several ICMP echo-request messages were subsequently sent (6 in total) to each
router interface to infer the second initial TTL value of the fingerprints. This inference is easy to
achieve in practice: as the vast majority of routes are less than 30 hops (i.e., more than 99%) [121], the
initial value can simply consists of the smallest value among 32, 64, 128, and 255 which is just above
the final TTL values of the time-exceeded and echo-reply messages. Using several echo-request
messages guarantees that the inferred initial value is consistent across multiple probes. When the
inferred initial value is inconsistent, it is deemed as unknown, and replaced in a signature by *. For
instance, the signature of an interface which the initial TTL value for time-exceeded messages is 64
while the initial TTL value for echo-reply is unknown will be <64,*>.
Using more than 10 millions of paths discovered via Paris traceroute by probing around one
million of target IP addresses, Vanaubel et al. studied the signatures distribution [121]. In particular,
they showed that the signature <255,255>, accounting for Cisco routers, represented more than
50% of all signatures, while <255,*>, <255,64> and <64,64> each accounted for slightly more than
10%. This trend still holds true today: among router signatures collected by Maréchal et al. in 2019,
almost 60% matched Cisco devices [88]. Though fingerprinting was later used by the same research
group to detect particular MPLS tunnels [120, 121], it also has potential for alias resolution. Since IP
fingerprints can be linked to equipment vendors, identical fingerprints can suggest alias pairs and
also what methods can be used. For example, if the behaviour of the IP ID counter tied to an interface
can be fingerprinted, a fingerprint can tell whether methods based on the IP identification field (cf.
Sec. 1.3.2 and Sec. 1.3.3) are viable or not for a given set of alias candidates.
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2.1.2 Fingerprints for alias resolution
As already established in Sec. 1.3, the research community has provided many different efficient
alias resolution methods, but these can be difficult to apply to all router interfaces in the Internet.
The classical tool iffinder (cf. Sec. 1.3.1) is a good example: despite being a very clear way to alias
two interfaces with each other, the various security policies regarding Port-unreachable ICMP
messages applied across the entire Internet drastically hampers it. Nowadays, it is recommended
that the iffinder approach should only be used to complement other alias resolution methods,
another approach that has been already put forward by other researchers (cf. Sec. 1.3.6).
IP fingerprinting can prove useful for alias resolution in two ways. First, fingerprints may be used
to reduce the space search even before deciding which method to use. Indeed, as fingerprints will
be derived from the behaviour of router interfaces, two interfaces exhibiting completely different
behaviour patterns cannot belong to the same device. For instance, it is very unlikely that the source
interface of an echo-reply ICMP message using the initial TTL value 64 will be found on the same
router as another interface that uses the initial value 255 for the same type of message. Second, the
characteristics of a fingerprint can suggest the most suitable alias resolution method for a set of alias
candidates. For example, when fingerprints advertise Port-unreachable ICMP messages could be
obtained, using the iffinder method is possible and should even be prioritized over other methods
because of how Port-unreachable ICMP messages directly suggest alias pairs.
In the best way to model the behaviour and compatibility with various alias resolution methods
of a router interface, a fingerprint can consist of the following components:
• the initial TTL value of the echo-reply ICMP message,
• the source IP of the Port-unreachable ICMP message (if any),
• the IP ID counter class,
• the existence of a DNS record,
• the compliance to the ICMP timestamp request [101].
The first component simply re-uses one of the two initial TTL values of the fingerprints intro-
duced by Vanaubel et al. [121]. The second component accounts for the possibility of getting a
Port-unreachable ICMP message from the interface. When receiving such a message is possible,
this component will appear in the fingerprint as the source IP found in the message. Otherwise, it
will be replaced with * to demonstrate that such a reply cannot be obtained from the vantage point
in use, therefore preventing the use of the iffinder method.
The IP ID counter class is a unique property specifically designed for IP fingerprinting. It consists
of a label that describes the observed behaviour of the IP ID counter tied to the interface. Given a
sequence of k IP identifiers (or IP IDs) collected in k packets emitted by the router interface, the
counter class will consist of one of the five following labels.
15
CHAPTER 2. A FINGERPRINT-BASED ALIAS RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK
• The healthy class will be attributed if the k IP IDs sequence is steadily increasing and features
no more than one rollover, i.e., reaching the maximum value of the IP identification field and
starting again at 0. The limit of one rollover makes it possible to take account of sequences
encompassing a counter overlap. Such a label means all alias resolution methods based on IP
IDs are viable.
• The fast class is attributed if the k IP IDs sequence does not consist of strictly increasing values
as a result of multiple rollovers, but such that it remains possible to estimate the velocity (or
IP ID rate) of the counter, e.g., as a range of values. It accounts for routers that process large
amounts of traffic and for which only velocity-based methods are viable.
• The random class refers to an IP ID counter that generates an IP IDs sequence for which
evaluating the velocity is impossible or requires modeling too many rollovers, suggesting that
IP IDs are randomly generated.
• The echo class denotes the case of an IP IDs sequence that simply repeats the IDs contained in
the IP datagrams sent to the interface in order to collect said sequence. E.g., if the values 2413,
2421, 2434, and 2455 (k = 4) are used in the probes sent to an interface labelled with the echo
class, the sequence obtained will also be 2413, 2421, 2434, 2455.
• Finally, if an IP IDs sequence could not be collected (due to connectivity issues, for instance),
the class is replaced with *.
The last two components reply with values of either "Yes" or "No" depending on whether the
interface has a DNS record and whether it complies with the ICMP timestamp request mechanism,
respectively. The timestamp request mechanism is an additional feature of the ICMP protocol [101]
created for devices to synchronize their clock. The inclusion of this mechanism in the fingerprints is
purely exploratory, as it does not disclose whether a specific alias resolution method is viable or not.
The relevance of this component will be commented on in Chapter 3 (Sec. 3.3.4).
An example of a fingerprint using the proposed components would be <64,*,Healthy,Yes,Yes>.
An interface with such a fingerprint uses 64 as the initial TTL in an echo-reply ICMP message, and
does not or cannot send a Port-unreachable ICMP message. It is fit for alias resolution methods
based on IP IDs or based on the DNS record, and replies to ICMP timestamp requests.
Listing 2.1: Example of fingerprints (with associated IP addresses) for alias resolution
1 0 . 0 . 1 . 1 − <255 ,10.0.1.1 ,Echo , Yes ,No>
1 0 . 0 . 2 . 1 − <255 ,10.0.1.1 ,Echo , Yes ,No>
1 0 . 0 . 2 . 6 5 − <64 ,* , Healthy ,No, Yes>
10 .0 .2 .1 29 − <64 ,* , Healthy ,No, Yes>
10 .0 .2 .1 93 − <64 ,* , Healthy ,No, Yes>
10 .0 .2 .2 25 − <64 ,* , Healthy , Yes , Yes>
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By sorting the fingerprints collected for a given set of alias candidates and putting them side by
side, it quickly becomes clear which candidates could result in alias pairs/lists and which methods
should be used to test an alias pair. Example 2.1 shows a toy scenario where six alias candidates are
fingerprinted prior to performing alias resolution. After fingerprinting, the candidates are sorted ac-
cording to their fingerprints. In this example, 10.0.1.1 and 10.0.2.1 can only be aliased with each
other, as their fingerprints show these IP interfaces uses a different initial TTL value for echo-reply
ICMP packets than other candidates. Moreover, the source IP of their respective Port-unreachable
ICMP reply is 10.0.1.1 in both cases, therefore strongly suggesting an alias pair. Likewise, the four
remaining candidates (10.0.2.65, 10.0.2.129, 10.0.2.193, 10.0.2.225) might result in an alias
list, as they have similar fingerprints suggesting that a method based on IP IDs is applicable to elicit
whether these candidates belong to the same router or not.
It should be noted that fingerprints do not necessarily need to be strictly identical. For instance,
it is possible that only a few specific interfaces of a router possess a DNS record. This is also demon-
strated in Example 2.1: among the alias candidates with the healthy IP ID counter class, 10.0.2.225
is the only one to feature a DNS record. Nevertheless, it can still be aliased with other IP interfaces
with the same IP ID counter class as long as an ID-based resolution method associates them. In fact,
only two components of a fingerprint can be used to exclude an alias pair: the (inferred) initial TTL
value of the echo-reply ICMP messages and the IP ID counter class. With extended fingerprints,
presented in the next section (Sec. 2.1.3), a third component that can exclude alias pairs can be used.
2.1.3 Extended fingerprints
The fingerprints introduced in Sec. 2.1.2 can be used on any IP interface, regardless of how it was
detected. Indeed, the fingerpriting process itself, as will be detailed in Sec. 2.2, requires very few direct
probes (typically ICMP and UDP probes) with the addition of one indirect probe (collecting the DNS
record, if any). However, in order to include the (inferred) initial TTL value of time-exceeded ICMP
messages (introduced in Sec. 2.1.1), such a message must first be obtained from the IP interface. In
previous work, these messages were easily obtained due to the discovery of router interfaces via Paris
traceroute. [11, 121] In other words, if the alias candidates were discovered through means other
than traceroute-like probing (e.g., by scanning IP prefixes with ICMP probes featuring large TTL
values), it might not be possible to obtain such messages, as it would require targeting an interface
found one hop further such that said candidates can reply with time-exceeded ICMP messages.
Hopefully, when the alias candidates are first discovered via traceroute-like probing, getting
time-exceeded ICMP messages from them becomes trivial, and the initial TTL value of such mes-
sages can be added to fingerprints. In order to stay true to the notation introduced by Vanaubel et al.
(see Sec. 2.1.1), this initial TTL becomes the new first component of a fingerprint. For instance, if the
router interface that corresponds to the example fingerprint <64,*,Healthy,Yes,Yes> presented
in Sec. 2.1.2 is first discovered via Paris traceroute [11], it can also be observed that it uses the initial
TTL value 255 for time-exceeded ICMP messages. As a consequence, the extended fingerprint for
17
CHAPTER 2. A FINGERPRINT-BASED ALIAS RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK
this interface will be <255,64,*,Healthy,Yes,Yes>. Extended fingerprints allow the exclusion of
additional alias pairs while reinforcing the idea that IP interfaces with similar fingerprints are from
the same device thanks to the additional component.
2.2 A probing scheme to collect fingerprints
This section describes in detail a probing scheme to both fingerprint alias candidates and perform
alias resolution on them. Sec. 2.2.1 first describes the typical uses of the framework. Secondly,
Sec. 2.2.2 presents the design of the probing scheme. Finally, Sec. 2.2.3 provides practical algorithms
and evaluates the time complexity.
2.2.1 Use cases
On paper, fingerprinting can be easily used on both a small and a large scale. In fact, it can be
used on specific small networks as well as on the scale of an entire autonomous system (or AS) or
more. Fingerprinting only requires a small constant number of probes on each alias candidate, as
the number of probes for a specific candidate is completely independent from which other alias
candidates it could be eventually matched with.
However, fingerprinting itself is not alias resolution and is only meant to prepare the actual
alias resolution by identifying subsets of alias candidates that are likely aliases of each others and
selecting the most suitable method to actually resolve them. Subsequent sections of this chapter
will nevertheless present a probing scheme that was specifically designed to allow simulatenous
fingerprinting and alias resolution. I.e., the data collected for the fingerprinting itself can be used
for the subsequent alias resolution to spare the need for sending additional probes. This feature is
especially important to reduce the probing overhead of active alias resolution methods, particularly
those based on the IP identification field of the IP protocol (cf. Sec. 1.3.2 and Sec. 1.3.3).
As a consequence, the probing scheme presented in subsequent sections will work best with small
sets of alias candidates, i.e., scaled to a single alias resolution scenario rather than an entire network.
If it was applied, for instance, to the entire Internet, the provided probing scheme would only be
useful to produce the final fingerprints, as the collected data would be insufficient for actual alias
resolution. Fingerprinting would therefore only be useful to reduce the number of alias candidates
processed by Internet-scale solutions such as MIDAR [73] (see also Sec. 1.3.3).
The methodology introduced in this chapter should therefore be either applied on small-scale
scenarios comparable to those in Sec. 1.4, or combined with space search reduction to apply it on
the scale of whole networks. In the context of alias resolution, space search reduction consists of
breaking down the initial set of alias candidates in many smaller sets by rejecting alias pairs that are
deemed impossible. For instance, trying to alias two IP interfaces located several hops away from
each other is difficult to justify. A method for space search reduction will be introduced in Chapter 3
in order to evaluate the entire alias resolution framework, but other practical methods for space
search reduction will be presented throughout this entire thesis.
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2.2.2 Designing and optimizing the probing scheme
Fingerprinting a single IP interface can be achieved in a few probes. Among the components pre-
sented in Sec. 2.1.2, the IP ID counter class represents the largest investment in terms of probes:
indeed, it requires the collection of k IP identifiers (or IP IDs) in order to attribute a class and later
compute a range of values for the velocity (or IP ID rate). The value of k can be tuned at will, but one
should use at least k = 4 should be used in order to obtain at least three time intervals, i.e., given
four IP IDs a, b, c, d (collected in this order), there will be one interval for each pair among (a,b),
(b,c) and (c,d). In order to collect k IP IDs, k probes are required. These k probes will be useful
for collecting k IP IDs, but they can be also useful to consistently infer the initial TTL value of the
echo-reply ICMP packets. I.e., if the initial TTL value inferred for each reply packet 1 is the same at
each probe, this initial TTL value will be the final value of the fingerprint, otherwise this value will be
replaced by * (such an approach has already been mentioned in Sec. 2.1.1). Therefore, computing
the IP ID counter class and the initial TTL value of echo-reply ICMP messages can be achieved with
k echo-request ICMP probes.
Given that collecting the three other components of a fingerprint requires a single probe for each,
fingerprinting can be achieved with a total of 6 direct probes on the IP interface when using k = 4:
• k = 4 ICMP echo-request probes (IP ID counter class and initial TTL value of echo-reply
ICMP messages),
• one UDP probe to obtain a Port-unreachable ICMP message (and the source IP of this
message),
• one indirect probe for the reverse DNS look-up (existence of a DNS record),
• one additional ICMP probe with a timestamp request (responsitivity to such requests).
While being inexpensive in terms of probes (tools such as MIDAR can send dozens of probes to
one IP address, see Sec. 1.3.3), fingerprinting is on paper not sufficient in itself for performing alias
resolution, as it only reveals which IP interfaces could be aliases of each others and what method
should be used. In practice, subsequent probing work is not required to use the iffinder method
(the interesting IP interfaces are already given in the fingerprints) or the reverse DNS approach (since
it is passive by design, cf. Sec. 1.3.5). Only methods based on the IP ID field (cf Sec. 1.3.2 and 1.3.3)
would require additional probing after collecting the fingerprints, but carefully scheduling the probes
used to pick the IP ID counter class can spare this additional effort.
An IP address and its IP IDs sequence can be expressed by the format "IP - a,b,c,d" where
k = 4 and where a, b, c , d are the collected IP IDs (in this order). Four IP interfaces featuring a healthy
IP ID counter can be probed in sequence. If these interfaces belong to the same router, sequences
comparable to those of Example 2.2 should be obtained. In this example, the IDs clearly form a
strictly increasing sequence when reading the sequences consequentially (first the sequence for
1For reminders, it consists in picking the smallest value among 32, 64, 128 and 255 greater than the final TTL value.
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10.0.2.65, then for 10.0.2.129, etc.), with the IDs being given in the same order as the probes
are used to collect them. However, such sequences are only useful for inferring the IP ID counter
class or using a velocity-based approach, as long as timestamps are recorded on reception of each
ID to later compute the rate at which IDs increase (for the sake of readability, such timestamps are
omitted from Example 2.2). Where the same ideas as the Ally component from Rocketfuel [113]
(see Sec. 1.3.2) need to be resued with the collected IDs, it must be possible to interleave IDs from
separate sequences to see if the resulting sequence is still strictly increasing.
Listing 2.2: Sequences of IP IDs (collected one at a time)
1 0 . 0 . 2 . 6 5 − 45 ,48 ,51 ,55
10 .0 .2 .1 29 − 56 ,58 ,59 ,62
10 .0 .2 .1 93 − 65 ,67 ,69 ,72
10 .0 .2 .2 25 − 73 ,74 ,78 ,81
One way to be able to interleave the collected IDs is by concurrently collecting the sequences
of IDs. Not only will this increase the probing rate, i.e., the number of probes sent for a selected
unit of time (per second, per minute, etc.), but this should also randomly create an interlaced order
among the probes. To keep track of the order in which the probes were sent, each collected IP ID
can be attributed a token, i.e., a unique number which is emitted by a shared counter on sending a
probe that is incremented after each request. 2 If a token is denoted by ti , a sequence of token/ID
pairs collected for a single IP can be expressed as "IP - ta;a,tb;b,tc;c,td;d" where k is still equal
to 4 and where ta ; a denotes the first token/ID pair (again, the timestamps that would be useful to
evaluate counter velocity are omitted for readability). An interleaving of two sequences is therefore
possible if interleaving the tokens of both sequences results in a strictly increasing sequence.
Listing 2.3: Sequences of IP IDs with tokens (collected concurrently)
1 0 . 0 . 2 . 6 5 − 1 ; 4 5 , 4 ; 5 5 , 9 ; 6 5 , 1 1 ; 6 9
10 .0 .2 .1 29 − 2;48 ,7 ;59 ,10;67 ,13;73
10 .0 .2 .1 93 − 5;56 ,6 ;58 ,14;74 ,15;78
10 .0 .2 .2 25 − 3;51 ,8 ;62 ,12;72 ,16;81
Example 2.3 shows sequences of token/ID pairs collected concurrently, with tokens ranging
from 1 to 16. In this toy example, the order of the pairs is semi-interlaced: as a consequence, there
are opportunities for interleaving sequences though this is not strictly possible for any pair of IP
addresses. In the example, the third IP (10.0.2.193) only sent the probe to collect its first ID after the
first IP of the set (10.0.2.65) sent a probe to get its second ID. While the sequences presented could
be said to be sufficient to obtain alias pairs (for instance, it would be easy to interleave the sequences
for 10.0.2.129 and 10.0.2.193), random network delays and random thread scheduling at the
2Implementing such a counter in practice requires, of course, a mutual exclusion mechanism. The delay induced by
such a mechanism should be negligible.
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vantage point could result, with larger sets of alias candidates, in one sequence starting after another
one has ended, preventing any chance of interleaving sequences for given pairs of alias candidates.
Therefore, to ensure that an interleaving of the token/ID pairs is always possible, the alias
candidates can be probed in waves. One ICMP probe is first sent to each of the target IP interfaces
within a short timespan to ensure that the subsequent replies are received relatively quickly as well.
As a consequence, the collected IP IDs should similar in value if the interfaces that sent them belong
to the same router and use the same IP ID counter. Ideally, the probes of a wave should be sent in a
pre-defined order with a short idle period (in milliseconds) between each, so that the replies coming
from one device arrive in the same order as the probes were sent. The order in which the probes
are sent is however up to the implementation: it can be randomized, static (i.e., always the same) or
updated after each wave depending on the time taken to receive the replies. After (and only after)
receiving a first IP ID from each alias candidate, a second wave of probes can be scheduled. The
third wave is scheduled after all replies from probes from the second wave have been received, and
so on for each wave, for a total of k waves. As a result, the sequences of token/ID pairs can all be
interleaved, so that it can be determined whether interleaving specific sequences of token/ID pairs
results in strictly increasing tokens and IP IDs (with the exception of counter overlaps).
Listing 2.4: Sequences of IP IDs with tokens (collected in waves)
1 0 . 0 . 2 . 6 5 − 1 ; 4 5 , 6 ; 5 8 , 9 ; 6 5 , 1 5 ; 7 8
10 .0 .2 .1 29 − 2;48 ,7 ;59 ,12;72 ,16;81
10 .0 .2 .1 93 − 3;51 ,8 ;62 ,11;69 ,14;74
10 .0 .2 .2 25 − 4;55 ,5 ;56 ,10;67 ,13;73
Example 2.4 shows the same toy scenario as in Examples 2.2 and 2.3 but using waves of probes
to ensure the sequences of token/ID pairs can be interleaved at least in respect of the tokens. As
a consequence, the first token of any sequence will be smaller than the second token, which will,
in turn, be smaller than the third token, and so on. If the associated IP IDs also form an increasing
sequence, then it can be assumed that the corresponding alias candidates belong to the same device.
Listing 2.5: Sequences of IP IDs with inconsistent tokens (waves scheduling)
1 0 . 0 . 2 . 6 5 − 1 ; 4 5 , 7 ; 5 8 , 9 ; 6 5 , 1 5 ; 7 8
10 .0 .2 .1 29 − 2;48 ,6 ;59 ,11;72 ,16;81
10 .0 .2 .1 93 − 3;51 ,8 ;62 ,12;69 ,14;74
10 .0 .2 .2 25 − 4;55 ,5 ;56 ,10;67 ,13;73
Though scheduling probes in waves guaranteeing an interleaving of tokens is possible in theory,
such a probing scheme can, in practice, suffer from network delays. Even if the scheduling includes
small delays between probes, so replies from a same device come in the same order as the probes
that were sent to it, random network delays can result in the probes not reaching their targets in
the expected order. As a consequence, token/ID pairs can conflict with each other and prevent a
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consistent alias resolution. Example 2.5 shows another toy scenario where the IP IDs emitted by one
device are not received in the same order as the initial probes due to network delays. In particular,
tokens 6 and 7 in the second wave and tokens 11 and 12 in the third wave conflict with their IP IDs
despite source interfaces belonging to the same router. As a result, it would be impossible to produce
a single alias list with all four candidates.
This issue can be mitigated with a simple correction heuristic: after receiving all replies from a
given wave, the corresponding token/ID pairs are sorted in ascending order in respect of the IP IDs.
The sorted pairs are then reviewed, and if two consecutive pairs are found to have IP IDs with similar
values but have tokens in the reverse order, then the tokens are rearranged to ensure the final tokens
are ascending in the same way as the IP IDs. This is done in practice by moving backwards (in the
sorted pairs) the token of a pair that appears to be in the wrong place.
2.2.3 Practical algorithms
The key to implementing the probing scheme of Sec. 2.2.2 in an elegant fashion is to carefully design
the data structures that will store all the details tied to each probe and how they will be handled as
the probing takes place. In particular, the data of a single ICMP probe should be collected as an IP ID
tuple, i.e., the gathering of
• the probed alias candidate,
• the token emitted prior to sending the echo-request message,
• the IP ID contained in the echo-reply message,
• the final TTL value contained in the echo-reply message,
• a timestamp value recorded at the reception of the echo-reply message.
The k tuples collected for a specific alias candidate can be stored progressively in a data structure
that abstracts them, e.g., in an object-oriented fashion. Before that, the tuples produced by each wave
of probes as presented in Sec. 2.2.2 should be treated with the correction heuristic before storing
them within the data tied to each alias candidate. After the k waves, the complete list of tuples of
each alias candidate can be post-processed to infer the initial TTL value of echo-reply messages
(using the final TTL values of each of the k echo-reply messages) and pick an IP ID counter class.
Algorithm 1 summarizes the probing strategy for fingerprinting, given a list of alias candidates
T , the parameter k previously introduced in Sec. 2.1.2 and the previously proposed data structures.
Most of this algorithm formalizes how the IP IDs are collected for all alias candidates with the probing
scheme elaborated at Sec. 2.2.2, therefore ensuring that the data is sufficient for both fingerprinting
and state-of-the-art alias resolution methods based on IP IDs (lines 2–11). For simplicity’s sake, the
alias candidates are considered to be treated in the algorithm in an object-oriented manner, allowing
fingerprint data to be stored progressively using a number of different methods, as illustrated by
the processIPIDs() method at line 11 which reviews the previously collected IP ID tuples. Such
22
2.2. A PROBING SCHEME TO COLLECT FINGERPRINTS
Algorithm 1 Fingerprinting a set of alias candidates
Require: T , list of the target alias candidates
Require: k, the total of IP IDs collected per candidate
1: procedure FINGERPRINT(List<IPEntry> T , Integer k)
2: i ← 0
3: for i < k do
4: newTuples ← PROBEINWAVE(T )
5: TOKENORDERHEURISTIC(newTuples)
6: for tuple ∈ newTuples do
7: candidate ← tuple.getTarget()
8: candidate.pushIPIDTuple(tuple)
9: i++





a method can compute, for instance, the initial TTL value of echo-reply ICMP messages, but can
postpone the selection of the IP ID counter class to a preliminary step of the actual alias resolution
(see Sec. 2.3). By doing so, the process of collecting the IP ID data can be completely separated
from how it is interpreted for alias resolution. The moment when the IP ID counter class is selected
depends on the implementation.
Methods for storing fingerprint data are also specifically touched on in the procedures mentioned
at lines 12–14. Each of these procedures is meant to collect a single fingerprint component for
each alias candidate found in T , using at worst one single direct probe for each. For instance, the
procedure at line 12 replaces the process of sending a UDP probe with an unlikely high port number
to each alias candidate and recording the source IP of the Port-unreachable ICMP reply (if any). By
the end of the fingerprint() procedure, the objects initially listed in T will have recorded all the
fingerprint data as well as sequences of IP IDs for suitable alias resolution methods. In the case of an
extended fingerprint (see Sec. 2.1.3), the procedure remains unchanged, as the initial TTL value of
time-exceeded messages can be inferred from replies obtained at the time of discovering the alias
candidates, i.e., prior to calling the fingerprint() procedure. The technical details of the probing,
such as how the probes are sent in practice (e.g., with multithreading), are left to the implementation.
Algorithm 2 details the correction heuristic used to fix any potential out-of-order token/ID pairs.
The general approach is simple: after sorting the token/ID pairs following the ascending order of
the IDs (cf. line 2), a first loop reviews the pairs to identify successions of pairs where the tokens
are decreasing instead of increasing along with the IDs (lines 5–29). If a mismatch is found, the
algorithm proceeds with a second nested loop that will go through the sorted list in reverse order
to move the problematic token until it matches the sequence of IDs (lines 17–27). This nested loop
stops as soon as the tokens are increasing again, and the algorithm resumes the main loop right
where it stopped. Of course, such a task only makes sense when reviewing token/ID pairs that do
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not correspond to echoed IDs (i.e., the IP ID in the reply is the same as in the probe), as shown at
lines 10 and 19, and if the difference between two consecutive IDs is small enough to consider they
are part of a sequence. This is emphasized in Algorithm 2 with an additional parameter maxDi f f
(used at lines 14 and 22), which can be set with a relatively small value such as 100. Indeed, an
implementation of the whole alias resolution framework should give the user the possibility to tune
the maximum difference between two consecutive IP IDs via a parameter, as well as the possibility to
tune the probing parameters that are not shown by Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 2 Correction heuristic (fixing out-of-order token/ID pairs)
Require: T , a list of tuples collected during a single wave
Require: maxDi f f , maximum difference between two consecutive IP IDs
1: procedure TOKENORDERHEURISTIC(List<IPIDTuple> T , Integer maxDi f f )
2: T .sort(IPIDTuple::compareByID)
3: iterator ← T .begin()
4: prevTuple ←;
5: for iterator 6= T .end() do
6: tuple ← iterator.getContent()
7: if prevTuple == ; then
8: prevTuple ← tuple
9: continue
10: if prevTuple.isEcho() or tuple.isEcho() then
11: prevTuple ← tuple
12: continue
13: diff ← tuple.getID() − prevTuple.getID()
14: if diff ≤ maxDi f f and tuple.getToken() < prevTuple.getToken() then
15: reverseIterator ← iterator.previous()
16: prevBis ← tuple
17: for reverseIterator 6= T .begin() do
18: tupleBis ← reverseIterator.getContent()
19: if tupleBis.isEcho() then
20: break
21: diffBis ← prevBis.getID() − tupleBis.getID()




26: prevBis ← tupleBis
27: reverseIterator ← reverseIterator.previous()
28: prevTuple ← tuple
29: iterator ← iterator.next()
2.2.4 Time complexity analysis
The total number of alias candidates can be first expressed as N . The probing scheme developed
in Sec. 2.2.2 and formalized in Algorithm 1 should have a time complexity of strictly O (N ) if the
correction heuristic (Algorithm 2) is not used, and should stay close to O (N ) if the heuristic is
implemented.
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As already discussed in the beginning of Sec. 2.2.2, only a small but constant number of probes
will be sent to each of the N alias candidates. The part of Algorithm 1 that collects IP IDs for all N
candidates should be proportional at worst to O (N ) as well. Each wave of probes will send a single
ICMP probe towards each of the N candidates and store the resulting tuples (no tuple being produced
for unresponsive targets). If using suitable programming techniques or paradigms (in this case, the
object-oriented paradigm), storing the tuples can be done in constant time regardless of the target
candidate (O (1)). Of course, as the algorithm should collect k IP IDs per alias candidate, there will be
a total of k waves. Nevertheless, k can be considered negligible: it should be recommended to try to
avoid probing each alias candidate for IP IDs more than necessary, both to avoid triggering security
mechanisms at the side of the target domain and to reduce the overall probing cost. Typical values of
k would be below 10, starting ideally at four IP IDs per alias candidate (cf. Sec. 2.1.2).
The correction heuristic detailed by Algorithm 2 should have a worst case scenario of O (N 2)
due to the two nested loops, with the main loop processing up to N tuples (no tuple is recorded for
unresponsive candidates) and the nested loop processing at worst an number of tuples proportional
to the current iteration. However, the worst case is highly unlikely: this would require all IP IDs to
come in the order opposite to the tokens, in addition to having no echoed IP IDs at all. In practice,
the nested loop will only start running for a small subset of pairs, and should only result in small
displacements of a few tokens. The heuristic as a whole is therefore expected to have a negligible
effect on the overall time complexity of the probing scheme from Sec. 2.2.2.
To assess this, five measurements with SAGE [54] were run from a server located at the Montefiore
Institute 3 in April 2021. SAGE is a topology discovery tool that embeds an implementation of the alias
resolution framework presented in this chapter and that will be described and evaluated in detail in
subsequent chapters. The five target networks of the measurements were the network of the ULiège
itself and four autonomous systems (or ASes) of varying sizes: AS12956 (Telefonica Global Solutions,
Tier-1), AS13789 (Internap Holding, Stub), AS224 (UNINETT, Stub), AS6453 (TATA Communications,
Tier-1). While these measurements were performed, SAGE was set in a slightly verbose mode, i.e., a
mode in which the tool prints more details about its algorithmic steps in the console output. These
additional details include the number of token reorderings induced by the correction heuristic. Using
some Python scripting to process the console output, it became possible to quantify the frequency of
the token reorderings and how many tokens, on average, were rearranged when reordering occurred.
Metrics ULiège AS12956 AS13789 AS224 AS6453
Scenarios with token reorderings 4.84% 7.58% 2.23% 3.93% 8.06%
Mean number of reordered tokens 0.6666 8.44 0.6875 3.6634 1.0287
Mean number of alias candidates 15.6666 38.1733 30.5 8.4231 18.6781
Table 2.1: Quantifying the correction heuristic by measuring five target networks with SAGE.
Table 2.1 shows the results of the heuristic assessment for the five measurements. The first metric
quantifies how many alias resolution scenarios evaluated by SAGE had to reorder tokens in order to
3planetlab1.montefiore.ulg.ac.be, a.k.a. Montefiore-Fry.
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mitigate the effects of random network delays. The second and third metrics quantify, among the
scenarios where reorderings occurred, how many tokens where reordered per wave and how many
alias candidates were involved on average. While there were a sizeable number of scenarios where
reorderings occurred, with up to 8% while probing AS6453, the number of tokens being reordered
appeared to be negligible or small with respect to the total number of alias candidates (since there
will be as many token/ID pairs as there are candidates). This was especially striking with AS6453,
which featured the highest ratio of scenarios with reorderings, yet only had one rearranged token
in a wave targeting 18 alias candidates on average. The worst case in the table appeared to be the
measurement of AS12956, where approximately 8 tokens were rearranged while probing an average of
38 candidates, i.e., 21% of the token/ID pairs in slightly fewer than 8% of all alias resolution scenarios.
This shows that token reordering was only occasionnally necessary, even when network delays were
experienced on a regular basis while probing. As a consequence, the practical time complexity of
the heuristic presented at Algorithm 2 should be very close to O (N ) despite a worst case of O (N 2),
meaning the entire probing scheme still scales linearly with the number of alias candidates even with
the correction heuristic.
2.3 Practical alias resolution with fingerprints
As already discussed in Sec. 2.1.2, fingerprints allow hypothetical alias lists to be quickly highlighted as
well as how they can be resolved. In particular, two alias candidates can be deemed as compatible if
their fingerprints provide the same initial TTL value(s) (one for regular fingerprints, two for extended
fingerprints as defined in Sec. 2.1.3) and the same IP ID counter class (as defined in Sec. 2.1.2), the
other components being indicative of what methods could be used or exploratory. Alias candidates
can therefore only be aliased if they are compatible with each other.
Due to the notion of compatibility implying that fingerprints must be equal to some extent, an
easy way to detect compatible alias candidates consists of sorting the initial candidates in respect
of their fingerprints. For instance, the fingerprints can be first sorted according to the initial TTL
value of echo-reply ICMP packets (or time-exceeded replies in the case of extended fingerprints,
cf. Sec. 2.1.3), then according to their IP ID counter class, and so on. The exact policy for sorting
fingerprints is up to the implementation: what matters is that the sorted fingerprints naturally
highlight contiguous sets of compatible alias candidates (much like Example 2.1).
Moreover, with the probing scheme presented in Sec. 2.2, the fingerprinting process normally
collected enough data to replicate many of the methods already discussed in Sec. 1.3. No less than
four methods are described in subsequent sections: an alias resolution method based on the source IP
of Port-unreachable ICMP packets (Sec. 2.3.1.1), an Ally-like alias resolution scheme (Sec. 2.3.1.2),
an IP ID velocity-based method (Sec. 2.3.1.3), and a DNS heuristic (Sec. 2.3.1.4). The systematic
selection of a suitable alias resolution method for a set of compatible candidates is explained in detail
in Sec. 2.3.2. Finally, a generic algorithm for building alias lists is briefly described in Sec. 2.3.3.
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2.3.1 Individual methods
2.3.1.1 Source IP of Port-unreachable messages
With fingerprints, reusing the alias resolution approach of iffinder (cf. Sec. 1.3.1) is immediate.
Given a set of compatible alias candidates where fingerprints feature a value other than * as for
the source IPs of the Port-unreachable replies, an alias list can be easily built by grouping the
alias candidate with fingerprints displaying the same source IP. For the sake of completeness, an
implementation of this method in the context of fingerprinting-based alias resolution should consider
the two following scenarios.
• An implementation should make sure that the source IP of a Port-unreachable message
appearing in a fingerprint is not simply among the other alias candidates, in case that candidate
was configured not to reply to UDP probes.
• More broadly speaking, an implementation should also consider the possibility that not all
interfaces of a router will be configured to reply to UDP probes, i.e., it should later verify
whether an alias list first obtained on the basis of Port-unreachable messages can be further
aliased with other candidates using another method.
The second scenario means that replicating the iffinder method will more or less create pre-
milinary alias lists which will be completed later with other methods. For the sake of accuracy, current
implementations of the whole alias resolution framework presented in this chapter only consider
completing such alias lists with methods based on IP IDs. In fact, these approaches are the most
reliable next to replicating the iffinder approach, while other methods could be considered as a
"best effort" way to make up for the impossibility of using more reliable methods. This way, alias
lists built partially or completely on the source IPs of Port-unreachable replies are always the most
likely to be true to the target domain.
2.3.1.2 Ally-like method
One of the most well known alias resolution methods based on the IP identification field, the Ally
method (cf. Sec. 1.3.2), consists of a sequence of three probes in its simplest form. Given two alias
candidates, a first probe is sent towards each candidate within a short timespan, each reply coming
with a separate IP ID, named respectively x and y (x arriving first). A third probe is then sent to the IP
interface that replied first (i.e., the nterface that emitted x), resulting in a third IP ID z. If x, y , and z
forms a strictly ascending sequence with a small delta between x and z, then both candidates can be
considered to belong to the same device.
With the probing scheme presented in Sec. 2.2, a sequence of at least four IP IDs is available for
each alias candidate (except when said candidate is unresponsive). Moreover, these sequences can
be easily interleaved thanks to the tokens and the probing in waves. As a result, it is possible to reuse
the same ideas as Ally on two compatible candidates, as long as two conditions are met.
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• Both alias candidates must feature the healthy IP ID counter class, i.e., they must have a strictly
increasing sequence of IP IDs with at most one rollover.
• It must be possible to interlace the associated sequences with respect to the tokens.
Thanks to the collection of IP IDs with waves of probes (cf. Sec. 2.2.2), the sequences of IP
IDs collected for each alias candidate are naturally easy to interlace, meaning the only remaining
condition is that both candidates must have the healthy IP ID counter class. When these conditions
are met, both candidates can be considered to be aliases of each other if a sequence created by
interlacing the associated sequences is still consistently increasing (with some tolerance with respect
to rollovers). In fact, to put a strong guarantee on the alias pair, two ways of interleaving are checked:
e.g., given two sequences a1,b1,c1,d1 and a2,b2,c2,d2, one can check sequences a1,b2,c1,d2 and
a2,b1,c2,d1. If both sequences are strictly ascending and features at most one rollover, then both
alias candidates are alias of each other. As at least four IP IDs are collected per candidate, this means
this approach works with the equivalent of eight probes, while Ally only uses three, making the
former more thorough than the latter.
Algorithm 3 shows the Ally-like alias resolution of two alias candidates featuring healthy IP ID
counters. The algorithm works in two major steps systematized in two loops. The first loop (lines 6–
23) checks that the IDs are increasing along the tokens at each index, i.e., each wave, and makes
sure at most one rollover happens. The second loop (lines 24–39) compares the sequence of IDs
while interleaving them on the fly, i.e., lines 27–31 look for the first possibility for interlacing while
lines 27–31 review the other scenario, with both being checked at the same loop iteration. Again,
at most one rollover should happen here, though line 37 allows for up to two rollovers: this is due
to the effects of the rollover being seen in both interleaved sequences, since the loop is checking
two sequences at the same time. If all loops can be completed, then c1 can be considered as an
alias of c2 and vice versa, as all return false instructions correspond to cases where problematic
rollovers violate the consistency of a sequence (obtained with interlacing or not). Like Algorithm 2,
the provided pseudo-code features an additional parameter maxShi f t to fine-tune the resolution.
This parameter expresses the largest accepted shift in a sequence upon a rollover, ensuring sequences
with rollovers are handled correctly.
Though Algorithm 3 is only designed to resolve two alias candidates, it can be easily extended
to sets of alias candidates thanks to the property of alias transitivity (cf. Sec. 1.2), i.e., a reference
candidate can be picked from the compatible candidates, with each subsequent candidate being
compared to it to build the final alias list. New candidates will also be aliases of previous candidates
by transitivity. It is also possible to compare an unresolved candidate with each individual candidate
that is already part of an alias list, to put a stronger guarantee on the result, but this means replicating
the O (N 2) time complexity of Ally if N denotes the number of IP addresses found in the final alias
list. Hopefully, since the resolution itself does not require additional probing and only amounts to
some additional computational work after the probing, the quadratic complexity would have only a
minor effect as it would not change any probing overhead.
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Algorithm 3 Ally-like resolution of two candidates (healthy IP ID counters)
Require: c1, the first alias candidate
Require: c2, the second alias candidate
Require: k, the total of IP IDs collected per candidate
Require: maxShi f t , the maximum shift in the IP ID sequence upon a rollover
1: function ALLYMETHOD(IPEntry c1, IPEntry c2, Integer k, Integer maxShi f t )
2: tokens1 ← c1.getTokensArray()
3: I Ds1 ← c1.getIDsArray()
4: tokens2 ← c2.getTokensArray()
5: I Ds2 ← c2.getIDsArray()
6: i ← 0
7: nbRollovers ← 0
8: for i < k do
9: if tokens1[i ] < tokens2[i ] then
10: if I Ds1[i ] > I Ds2[i ] then
11: diff ← (65535 - I Ds1[i ]) + I Ds2[i ]
12: if diff > maxShi f t then
13: return f al se
14: nbRollovers++
15: else
16: if I Ds2[i ] > I Ds1[i ] then
17: diff ← (65535 - I Ds2[i ]) + I Ds1[i ]
18: if diff > maxShi f t then
19: return f al se
20: nbRollovers++
21: if nbRollovers > 1 then
22: return f al se
23: i++
24: i ← 0
25: nbRollovers ← 0
26: for i < k −1 do
27: if I Ds1[i ] > I Ds2[i +1] then
28: diff ← (65535 - I Ds1[i ]) + I Ds2[i +1]
29: if diff > maxShi f t then
30: return f al se
31: nbRollovers++
32: if I Ds2[i ] > I Ds1[i +1] then
33: diff ← (65535 - I Ds2[i ]) + I Ds1[i +1]
34: if diff > maxShi f t then
35: return f al se
36: nbRollovers++
37: if nbRollovers > 2 then
38: return f al se
39: i++
40: return tr ue
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2.3.1.3 IP ID velocity method
The sequences of IP ID values as collected with the probing scheme demonstrated in Sec. 2.2.2 can
also be used to evaluate the velocity of the IP ID counters that emitted them, as long as a timestamp
value is recorded when an IP ID value is collected (as suggested for the tuples described in Sec. 2.2.3).
By computing the difference between the timestamps recorded for two successive IP IDs, delays
between two successive IP IDs can be computed. Though it is unlikely these delays will correspond
precisely to the delay experienced at the side of the target interface, as they measure wall clock time
at the side of the vantage point, they can be considered as a best effort approximation of the actual
delay. Using both the IP ID values and the delays makes it possible to estimate the IP ID rate, i.e.,
how fast the IP ID counter that emitted the IP IDs is increasing over time. Two (compatible) alias
candidates who show comparable or identical rates can be considered to be the alias of each other.
Several state-of-the-art alias resolution methods (see Sec. 1.3.3) rely on this approach rather than on
IP ID sequence interleaving (i.e., Ally-like) as this simplifies the probing work: any alias candidate
can be probed with a constant number of probes regardless of which candidate it will be aliased with.
In other words, tools based on this approach can achieve a linear time complexity.
However, due to the typical use cases of the present alias resolution framework (cf. Sec. 2.2.1) and
the probing scheme itself, alias candidates with fingerprints featuring the healthy IP ID counter class
will already have been processed with the help of the Ally-like method (cf. Sec. 2.3.1.2). Therefore, a
velocity-based method should be considered if and only if the alias candidates have neither the echo,
nor the healthy IP ID counter class (cf. Sec. 2.1.2). As a reminder, this can occur when a sequence of
IP IDs features no echoed IP IDs and more than one rollover at the same time. It is possible, however,
to attempt to compute a range for the IP ID rate of each of these candidates, which allows to alias
two compatible candidates if their respective ranges of IP ID rates overlap each other. The final IP
ID counter class of an alias candidate will depend on whether a consistent range of IP ID rates can
be discovered: if this range can be computed while modeling a fairly low number of rollovers, the
candidate will get the fast IP ID counter class, otherwise it will get the random IP ID counter class.
This alias resolution can be systematized in two steps: the estimation of the IP ID rate within a range
for each candidate, which also results in picking the IP ID counter class between fast and random,
and the subsequent comparison of these ranges if the candidates get the fast class.
Figure 2.1: Schematic view of the variables used for estimating IP ID rates
Estimating an IP ID rate requires modeling potential additional rollovers not seen with the probes
and is carried out as follows. For every pair of consecutive IP IDs (denoted as ii and ii+1) in a sequence
and the timelapse between those IP IDs di , a variable xi can be considered to model the number
of additional rollovers that occurred between ii and ii+1, xi = 0 meaning that no rollover occurred
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if ii+1 > ii . It also means that exactly one rollover happened if ii+1 < ii . Fig. 2.1 illustrates these
variables and unknowns for a sequence of k IP IDs, with the value 65535 denoting one additional
rollover (for reminders, 65535 is the largest possible value for an IP ID). To find all xi , a fixed number
of additional rollovers is first assigned to x0, i.e., the number of additional rollovers for the two
first IP IDs. Then, using this x0 and the known IP IDs and delays, k − 2 equations are solved to
find the number of additional rollovers that occurred between the other pairs of successive IP IDs.
Equation 2.1 formalizes the typical equation necessary to find the value of xi , the variable denoting
the number of additional rollovers that occurred between the IP IDs ii+1 and ii , assuming each pair of
successive IP IDs resulted in a negative delta (i.e., ii+1 < ii ). The expression equates the rate observed
for the first pair (left) and the other pair (right), as the rate should stay quasi-constant over short
periods. When a pair results in a positive delta (i.e., ii+1 > ii ), ii+1 + (65535− ii ) should be replaced
with ii+1 − ii so the number of times the IP ID counter was incremented is accurately expressed.
(2.1)
i1 + (65535− i0)+65535×x0
d0
= ii+1 + (ii −65535)+65535×xi
di
One way to find solutions for these equations is to find a real solution for each xi (except x0,
previously set) and rounding them up to the closest integer in order to stay true to the real world, as
additional rollovers must strictly be modeled by naturals multiplied by 65335 (i.e., 65535, 131070,
196605, etc.). To do so, a formula deriving from Equation 2.1 can be used to compute xi . The de-
velopment of Equation 2.1 to the resulting formula is shown at Equation 2.2. It should be noted,
at this point, that this equation is written as if there were only negative deltas (i.e., ii+1 < ii ) in the
sequence of IP IDs, but if one of the pairs of IP IDs results in a positive delta (i.e., ii+1 > ii ), any sum
ii+1+(65535−ii ) must be replaced with ii+1−ii in the development. These sums are handled linearly,
which means that there is no change the overall development. For reference, Equation 2.3 shows the
formula obtained if there are only positive deltas.
(2.2)
65535×xi + ii+1 + (65535− ii )
di
= 65535×x0 + i1 + (65535− i0)
d0
⇔ 65535×xi + ii+1 + (65535− ii ) = di × (65535×x0 + i1 + (65535− i0))
d0




+ di × (i1 + (65535− i0))
65535×d0
⇔ xi = di ×x0
d0
+ di × i1 +di × (65535− i0)
65535×d0
− ii+1 + (65535− ii )
65535
(2.3) xi = di ×x0
d0
+ di × i1 −di × i0
65535×d0
− ii+1 − ii
65535
For consistency’s sake, it must be checked that each rounded xi is sound by checking it is positive
(negative rollovers do not exist) and that the rounding error is reasonably low enough (e.g., below
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0.25). Tolerating some rounding error is sound since the IP ID rate of the counter tied to some device
will not be strictly constant in the real world, although this error should not be too large: for instance,
having half a rollover as a result of an equation means the model does not fit well enough to allow
for the observed sequence of IP IDs. Each time a rounded xi value either is negative or has a large
rounding error, the value of x0 is increased by one and all k −2 equations are solved again. The
equation solving ceases if all the rounded xi values are positive and only have small enough rounding
errors or if x0 reaches a pre-defined upper value for the number of additional rollovers (e.g., 5). If the
former is the case, an IP ID rate vi is computed for each pair of successive IP IDs, and the minimum
and maximum vi are kept as the boundaries for the range of the IP ID rates of the alias candidate.
Equation 2.4 shows how each vi can be computed after obtaining the xi values, assuming ii+1 < ii
(negative delta). However, if the upper limit for the number of additional rollovers is reached, the
alias candidate receives the random IP ID counter class as a way to tell that the candidate is more
likely to be generating random values than producing a sound sequence of IP IDs, even at a fast rate.
(2.4) vi = ii+1 + (65535− ii )+65535×xi
di
Algorithm 4 formalizes, in pseudo-code, the estimation of the IP ID rate for a given alias candidate
c, provided it has a sequence of k IP IDs, and two additional parameters acting as upper boundaries
on the number of (additional) rollovers and the rounding error, respectively. After setting some
variables, the main loop (lines 7–36) starts and sets a first value for x0. The inner loop (lines 13–33)
solves the k − 2 equations, each iteration solving an equation (lines 14–24), ensuring each time
whether it handles a positive or a negative delta, and computing the resulting vi as long the rounded
xi value is consistent (lines 25–32). After exiting the main loop, as a result of successfully finding
consistent xi or reaching too many additional rollovers, the algorithm ends by attributing the final IP
ID counter class to the alias candidate and assigning the resulting vi (lines 37–41). In the pseudo-
code, the creation of the range is assumed to have been carried out using the assignIPIDRates()
method. The counter classes are also denoted by RANDOM_COUNTER and FAST_COUNTER constants for
the sake of readability (an implementation should also uses constants for the same purpose).
After estimating the IP ID rate as a range for each alias candidate not falling into the echo/healthy
categories, not only can they receive their own final IP ID counter classes (fast or random), but also
their additional data regarding IP ID rates can be used for actual alias resolution. Two alias candidates
featuring the same initial TTL value(s) and the fast IP ID counter class can be considered to be
compatible and can be eventually aliased if their respective ranges of IP ID rates overlap each other.
An additional guarantee on an hypothetical alias pair can be added by ensuring it is possible to match
IP ID values within a range from either sequence using the rates (or the sequence of tokens) from
the other sequence. Whether such an heuristic should be used and how it can be implemented and
fine-tuned are left to the implementation.
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Algorithm 4 Evaluating the IP ID rate of an alias candidate (neither echo, neither healthy)
Require: c, an alias candidate with neither the echo neither the healthy IP ID counter class
Require: k, the total of IP IDs collected per candidate
Require: maxRoll over s, an upper boundary on the number of rollovers
Require: maxEr r or , an upper boundary on the estimation error
1: procedure ESTIMATEVELOCITY(IPEntry c, Integer k, Integer maxRoll over s, Float maxEr r or )
2: I Ds ← c.getIDsArray()
3: del ay s ← c.getDelays()
4: x_0 ← 0
5: v ← new Float[k −1]
6: success ← tr ue
7: for x_0 < maxRoll over s do
8: if I Ds[1] > I Ds[0] then
9: v[0] = (I Ds[1] − I Ds[0] + 65535 ∗ x_0) / del ay s[0]
10: else
11: v[0] = (I Ds[1] + (65535 − I Ds[0]) + 65535 ∗ x_0) / del ay s[0]
12: i ← 1
13: for i < k −1 do
14: x_i ← (del ay s[i ] / del ay s[0]) ∗ x_0
15: if I Ds[i +1] > I Ds[i ] then
16: x_i ← x_i − ((I Ds[i +1] − I Ds[i ]) / 65535)
17: else
18: x_i ← x_i − ((I Ds[i +1] + (65535 − I Ds[i ])) / 65535)
19: if I Ds[1] > I Ds[0] then
20: x_i ← x_i + (((del ay s[i ] ∗ I Ds[1]) − (del ay s[i ] ∗ I Ds[0])) / (65535 ∗ del ay s[0]))
21: else
22: x_i ← x_i + (((del ay s[i ] ∗ I Ds[1]) + (del ay s[i ] ∗ (65535 − I Ds[0]))) / (65535 ∗ del ay s[0]))
23: roundedX ← ROUNDVALUE(x_i)
24: roundingError ← ROUNDINGERROR(x_i)
25: if roundedX > 0 and roundingError ≤ maxEr r or then
26: if I Ds[i +1] > I Ds[i ] then
27: v[i ] = (I Ds[i +1] − I Ds[i ] + 65535 ∗ roundedX) / del ay s[i ]
28: else
29: v[i ] = (I Ds[i +1] + (65535 − I Ds[i ]) + 65535 ∗ roundedX) / del ay s[i ]
30: else
31: success ← f al se
32: break
33: i ← i + 1
34: if success 6= f al se then
35: break
36: x_0 ← x_0 + 1
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Finally, it is worth noting that estimating the IP ID rates of a set of alias candidates is achievable
immediatly following probing (cf. Algorithm 1) in order to obtain the final IP ID counter classes as
soon as possible. This is because the actual alias resolution, achieved by comparing the ranges, is,
more often than not, the final step of the entire framework (i.e., after selecting a suitable method, cf.
Sec. 2.3.2). Due to the parameters k and r being fixed and small, it can also be assumed the IP ID rate
estimation is achieved in constant time (O (1)) regardless of the scenario of alias resolution.
The case of two alias candidates with the random IP ID counter class leaves out few possibilities:
either there is a source IP from a Port-unreachable ICMP packet (cf. Sec. 2.3.1.1) for each candidate
implying the alias pair (or a single one, equal to the IP of the other candidate), or there is a DNS
record for each candidate such that a reverse DNS heuristic (cf. Sec. 2.3.1.4) can be used to make
sure the alias pair remains sound. Otherwise, there is no viable method for alias candidates with
the random class, other than considering that having similar fingerprints is enough to alias them.
When there is no other option, such a choice can arguably constitute a best effort approach if the
alias resolution scenario allows it. This specific question is discussed in Sec. 2.3.2.
2.3.1.4 DNS heuristic
The last alias resolution method that can be implemented with the proposed framework relies on the
available DNS records collected through reverse DNS look-up. The fact that an alias candidate has a
DNS record does not prevent compatibility with other candidates that do not have such a record (cf.
Sec. 2.1.2) and is rather indicative of whether a DNS-based heuristic can be used or not. Moreover, as
already discussed in Sec. 1.3.5, alias resolution methods based on DNS records tend to be difficult to
tune or may lead to false positives as a consequence of DNS misnaming. A recent study, however,
explored the possibility of using machine learning to automatically tune a DNS-based scheme [80].
Due to these hurdles, reverse DNS is only considered as a last resort method in the context of this
framework, i.e., when no other method can be used.
The method in this context simply consists of the following heuristic: given a set of compatible
alias candidates all having a DNS record, the associated DNS records are split into substrings at
the . symbol and compared with each others in respect of the substrings. For instance, the DNS
record if-ae-47-2.tcore1.fr0-frankfurt.as6453.net is split into 5 substrings: if-ae-47-2,
tcore1, fr0-frankfurt, as6453 and net. If all chunks of two DNS records are equal, except the
first one, it can be assumed that they belong to the same device. For example, the DNS record
if-ae-37-4.tcore1.fr0-frankfurt.as6453.net can be considered as being on the same ma-
chine as the former record, since they share the same suffix .tcore1.fr0-frankfurt.as6453.net.
This approach is further justified by the fact that a common convention among most network opera-
tors consists of writing details about a network interface in the very first part of the DNS record, while
the rest of the record usually represents a device and/or a location, as illustrated by both example
records. This heuristic should nevertheless be used with caution, because other naming conventions
made by network operators can easily result in false positives.
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2.3.2 Selection of an alias resolution method
As mentioned at the start of Sec. 2.3, the actual alias resolution starts by first sorting the alias
candidates to highlight contiguous subsets of compatible candidates. As already mentioned, two
candidates are compatible when their fingerprints bear the same initial TTL value(s) and IP ID
counter class. In the next step, a suitable alias resolution method is selected for each subset according
to the values found in the fingerprints so that the selected method is as accurate as possible.
As a consequence, the selection of an alias resolution method is, in practice, a prioritization of
methods previously described in Sec. 2.3.1. Such a prioritization can of course be freely tuned to
the needs of the implementer depending on whether a method has been modified to improve its
accuracy (e.g., if the reverse DNS method reused regexes generated by previous research work [80]),
but this chapter will present one that was used for the entire course of the research that led to this
thesis. In its simplest form, the prioritization suggested in this chapter will consider the methods of
Sec. 2.3.1 in the following order.
1. The method based on the source IPs of Port-unreachable packets (Sec. 2.3.1.1) will be con-
sidered first, due to the way in which it directly suggests alias pairs.
2. Next, the Ally-like approach (Sec. 2.3.1.2), which is usually very reliable with alias candidates
whose fingerprints exhibit the healthy IP ID counter class.
3. When none of the above can be used, and if the IP IDs collected for each candidate can still
be used for velocity estimation (Sec. 2.3.1.3), i.e. resulting in the fast IP ID counter class, alias
resolution by associating ranges of IP ID rate that overlap each other can still be performed.
4. When none of the above can be used, and if DNS records are available for alias candidates, the
DNS heuristic (Sec. 2.3.1.4) will be used.
5. If no method at all can be used, it will be up to the implementation to decide whether it should
alias together candidates with compatible fingerprints as a best effort approach or not.
In addition to this prioritization, two main challenges must be addressed. The first challenge to
address is how to handle the results of the iffinder-like method (i.e., item 1). Indeed, whether or
not such a method produces alias pairs/lists, it is quite probable that the results will be incomplete: a
candidate left out by the resolution might very well be an alias of other candidates through other
methods, while an alias pair/list built through this method could also be incomplete (this was already
shortly discussed in Sec. 2.3.2). Both cases are handled as follows.
First, when an alias candidate is not successfully aliased to any other candidate via the source
IP found in its fingerprint, it is put back onto the list of remaining alias candidates but with the
source IP of the Port-unreachable reply being masked. I.e., it is temporarily over-ridden with the *
value so that the candidate can be put through other alias resolution methods (i.e., by skipping the
35
CHAPTER 2. A FINGERPRINT-BASED ALIAS RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK
iffinder-like approach). Second, when an alias pair/list is successfully produced by the iffinder-
like method, it is later considered to be merged with another alias pair/list obtained by the Ally-like
method. In this scenario, a merging only occurs if the Ally-like method confirms the alias pairs/lists
can be merged. Indeed, the initial alias pairs/lists obtained with the iffinder-like approach may be
incomplete, as not all interfaces of a device will reply to UDP probes. Technically, this means it could
be merged with other candidates through any other method, but for the sake of accuracy, current
implementations of the framework only attempt merging with alias pairs/lists obtained with the
Ally-like method to guarantee that the final alias list(s) are as true as possible to the target domain.
Compatible alias candidates 
(similar fingerprints)
Source IP of port-unreachable reply ?
Has the healthy IP ID counter class ?
Has the fast IP ID counter class ?
Has an echo/random IP ID counter ?
Has a  for the IP ID counter class.


















Has a DNS record ? DNS heuristic
Yes Yes
Has a DNS record ? DNS heuristic
Yes Yes
Depending on the scenario (and other 
elements hinting alias pairs/lists), group 
by similar fingerprint (or not)
No
No
Figure 2.2: Practical selection of an alias resolution method as a flow-chart.
The second challenge lies in deciding what to do when there is no suitable alias resolution method
available. In this situation, aliasing candidates for which no method can be used can be avoided, or
they can be aliased on the basis that they feature compatible fingerprints. The decision is ultimately
up to the implementation, but can be discussed depending on the context. Though the overall
framework was designed to handle small scenarios of alias resolution (cf. Sec. 2.2.1), the former
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decision could be preferred to the latter if the resulting alias pairs/alias lists have an influence on
subsequent algorithms. For instance, if alias pairs/lists play a role in mapping a network topology (cf.
chapter 10), alias resolution results as accurate as possible could be used to avoid grouping together
alias candidates when they feature compatible fingerprints but are not suited to any available method.
On the contrary, grouping candidates unfit for any method can be acceptable in scenarios where
there are already strong hints that the alias candidates might be aliases of each others anyway, such
as in some scenarios of subnet inference (cf. Sec. 5.1.3 of Chapter 5). Whether aliasing candidates
unfit for any available method should be considered will be discussed in all subsequent parts of this
thesis where the present alias resolution framework is involved.
Figure 2.2 shows an exhaustive flow-chart of how alias resolution methods described in Sec. 2.3.1
are typically selected in the context of this thesis. This flow-chart naturally features the previously de-
scribed prioritization, but also includes the aforementioned nuances regarding the alias pairs/listed
built on the basis of source IPs of Port-unreachable packets and regarding the alias candidates for
which no practical method can be used. It should be noted that the summing junctions in the flow-
chart are essentially there to connect the results to the overall output (a set of alias pairs/lists), though
they are actually mutually exclusive: if a set of compatible candidates is handled with the Ally-like
method, it will not be put through the velocity-based method or the DNS heuristic afterwards.
2.3.3 Building alias pairs and alias lists
Finally, one final algorithmic detail will be reviewed: how to build alias lists, given that the individual
methods (Sec. 2.3.1) were described to resolve two alias candidates at most. The generic algorithm
to build an alias list using these methods is formalized by Algorithm 5. Given a set of compatible
alias candidates, best handled as a list (named candidates in this instance), and a selected method
(denoted by method in this case), the first candidate on the list can be picked as a reference candidate
to which any subsequent candidate will be compared (line 5). Then, a loop will process the remaining
candidates (lines 7–25), with each iteration attempting to alias the reference with the current candi-
date (line 10). If the method concludes the reference is an alias of the second candidate, the latter will
be put in a side list aliased, which will be used later to build the final alias list (line 11). If the method
concludes that the alias pair does not make sense, the second candidate will be moved to a second
side list with candidates on which the method should be tried again to find more alias pairs/lists
(line 13). When the candidates list becomes empty, the loop will build an alias with the reference
candidate and the aliased list (if not empty), relying on the property of alias transitivity (cf. Sec. 1.2),
as shown by lines 15–20. Afterwards, it will refresh the candidates list and the reference candidate if
there is more than one excluded candidate in order to allow the loop to start again and build more
alias pairs/lists, cf. lines 21–25. It is worth noting that, due to the generic nature of Algorithm 5, a
practical implementation might need additions depending on the selected method (such as the
pair/list merging mentioned in Fig. 2.2). Whether it should make a census of unaliased candidates
(e.g., by allowing single item alias lists) is also up to the implementation.
37
CHAPTER 2. A FINGERPRINT-BASED ALIAS RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK
Algorithm 5 Building alias pairs/lists
Require: candi d ates, a list of compatible alias candidates
Require: method , an object modeling the selected alias resolution method
1: function BUILDALIASLISTS(List<IPEntry> candi d ates, AliasResolutionMethod method)
2: aliasLists ← new List<Alias>
3: aliased ← new List<IPEntry>
4: excluded ← new List<IPEntry>
5: reference ← candi d ates.front()
6: candi d ates.pop_front()
7: for candi d ates.size() > 0 do
8: next ← candi d ates.front()
9: candi d ates.pop_front()




14: if candi d ates.size() == 0 then
15: if aliased.size() > 0 then





21: if excluded.size() > 1 then
22: candi d ates.copy(excluded)
23: excluded.clear()
24: reference ← candi d ates.front()
25: candi d ates.pop_front()
26: return aliasLists
2.4 Closing comments on the framework
In this chapter, an alias resolution framework based on IP fingerprinting was introduced. Using
this framework makes it possible, not only to discover what are the most suitable alias resolution
methods for a given set of alias candidates (cf. Sec. 2.3.2), but also to already collect enough data
to perform actual alias resolution, as detailed in Sec. 2.2. Such a methodology was designed for
small sets of candidates, principally because a single wave of probes while collecting IP ID values (cf.
Sec. 2.2.2) can take more time with more candidates and be more often subject to network delays
or counter rollovers. As such, to deploy the framework at the scale of a whole network, the alias
candidates must first be properly identified. Chapter 3 will present a topology discovery tool with a
mapping methodology that acts as a form of space search reduction (as defined in Sec. 2.2.1) for alias
resolution, a context in which the framework presented in this chapter is a competitive solution, as
will be demonstrated with a groundtruth network (in Chapter 3). Finally, Chapter 3 will also quantify
fingerprints collected in the wild from the PlanetLab testbed and compare the results with previous
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T
his chapter comprehensively evaluates the fingerprint-based alias resolution framework
previously introduced in Chapter 2. A first implementation of the framework, combined
with space search reduction (as defined in Sec. 2.2.1), is first presented in Sec. 3.1 and is
subsequently used to assess the framework in Sec. 3.2, where the implementation is validated on
a groundtruth network while being compared with other state-of-the-art tools. These two sections
answer research question 3 from Sec. 1.5. Sec. 3.3 subsequently answers research question 4 by
discussing observations with the fingerprints introduced in Sec. 2.1.2, using data collected from the
PlanetLab testbed on numerous Autonomous Systems during the course of 2017. Finally, Sec. 3.4
concludes both this chapter and this first part by reviewing the key contributions and discussing how
the methodology of the framework could prove useful for the future of alias resolution.
3.1 The first implementation with space search reduction
3.1.1 Space search reduction with TreeNET
The framework presented in Chapter 2 was first implemented in the IPv4 topology discovery tool
TreeNET [55]. It was also assessed with the help of this first implementation, as will be discussed in
Sec. 3.2 and Sec. 3.3, though it has also been included (with slight improvements over the years, cf.
Sec. 3.1.2) in several other tools that will be discussed in subsequent parts of this thesis. TreeNET
was used for the first implementation of the framework mainly because it was developed prior to
the research work presented in this thesis 1 and provided an off-the-shelf space search reduction
solution to apply and assess the whole methodology [51].
1TreeNET was the main contribution of my master thesis, which I presented during academic year 2014-2015. The
first paper on TreeNET [55] presented an improved version of this work.
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Thanks to its subnet-based network mapping methodology, TreeNET naturally highlights network
places that could consist of one or several routers (possibly interconnected with the help of Layer-2
equipment). These places are called neighborhoods, and are formally defined as network locations
bordered by a set of subnets that are all located at most one hop away from each others. TreeNET
identifies these locations within a target network by building a tree-like map using subnet-level data
and (Paris) traceroute [11] paths collected towards each inferred subnet. In the tree, route paths
are modeled by successions of branching out nodes, each denoted by the corresponding route hop,
while subnets act as the leaves. Subnets that share a common route should therefore be inserted
under the same internal node, which therefore amounts to a single neighborhood.
A collection of traceroute paths towards a target network are usually closer to a directed acyclic
graph than to a tree, as a consequence of forwarding dynamics and load balancing [14, 98]. In other
words, a same hop can feature several predecessors within traceroute paths, while the tree format
implies there can be only one. To solve this issue, TreeNET allows the construction of multi-label
nodes, i.e., nodes that model several router interfaces observed at the same hop count that can all act
as the parent to subsequent nodes. Multi-label nodes account for parts of the network topology where
several paths are leading to the same endpoints. They therefore ensure that subnets with differing
routes but which are the same length and end with the same last hop(s) can be gathered under the
same internal node, and therefore the same neighborhood. This construction also guarantees any IP
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(b) As a tree (clouds depict subnets)
Figure 3.1: Mapping a network as a tree with TreeNET.
Figure 3.1 presents a toy network (Fig. 3.1a) and how it would be interpreted with the tree
formalism implemented by TreeNET (Fig. 3.1b). In Fig. 3.1a, the plain-line circles denote interfaces
that can be seen with (Paris) traceroute measurements, while the grey clouds represent subnets.
The upmost subnet symbolizes a larger subnet that acts as a LAN between the routers identified by
the interfaces A, B , C , and D . In Fig. 3.1b, the internal nodes labeled with router interfaces C , D , and
E depict neighborhoods that are representative of the target network thanks to the introduction of
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the multi-label node {A,B}. In particular, subnets under E have different routes (starting with either
A, either B) but share the same last hops and length, which is why they are found around the same
neighborhood. The same goes for subnets from C . The black arrows in Fig. 3.1b show a subnet which
was identified as encompassing another route hop (i.e., it is within the subnet prefix), suggesting
that this subnet is the link between two successive neighborhoods. For example, the subnet with the
route A,D is identified as the link between the neighborhoods identified by D and E .
A benefit from discovering neighborhoods lies in the fact that the surrounding subnets can
encompass interfaces which can be identified as router interfaces as well. Indeed, a subnet should,
in theory, always feature at least one interface located on the router that provides access to it from
the perspective of the vantage point. Usually, these interfaces can be distinguished from others
because they require one hop less to obtain an echo-reply message from them 2. Therefore, for
each neighborhood, both the router interfaces detected in the gathered subnets and the route hop(s)
denoting the neighborhood can be combined to build a list of alias candidates. Because of how they
were located by TreeNET, these interfaces should not be aliased with interfaces belonging to other
neighborhoods. In other words, the discovery of neighborhoods acts as a space search reduction
for alias resolution: rather than considering all router interfaces discovered via the traceroute
measurements or all responsive IPs together, (much) smaller scenarii can be resolved separately.
To do so, TreeNET implements the fingerprint-based framework presented in Chapter 2, as it was
tailored to resolve small alias resolution scenarios while using only a few probes. Figure 3.2 pictures a
neighborhood as discovered by TreeNET and the alias resolution scenario that results from it.
Neighborhood
Subnet Subnet Subnet Subnet
Interface hypothetically on the router leading to a subnet
Interface appearing as the last hop before the subnets
Figure 3.2: Alias resolution scenario resulting from a neighborhood discovered by TreeNET.
The intricate details of the methodology of TreeNET regarding subnet inference and neighbor-
hood discovery are out of the scope of this part of the thesis. However, TreeNET and related topics (in
particular, subnet inference and neighborhood discovery) are discussed in more detail in subsequent
chapters. The same chapters also introduce other practical alias resolution scenarios (some being
reminiscent of Sec. 1.4) and space search reduction methods. In other words, the fingerprint-based
alias resolution framework acts as the generic tool for alias resolution in this entire thesis.
2These interfaces are also called contra-pivot interfaces. A thorough definition will be provided in Chapter 4.
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3.1.2 Remarks on the implementation(s) of the framework
Before moving to the assessment of the framework on a groundtruth network (Sec. 3.2) and to the
evaluation of fingerprints collected from the PlanetLab testbed (Sec. 3.3), there are several important
points to make regarding the implementation(s). Indeed, the framework presented in Chapter 2
corresponds to its final version, i.e. its state at the time of writing this manuscript, but the data used
to produce the results showed in the subsequent sections was collected with earlier versions.
The main differences between the final version (notably found in SAGE [54], cf. Chapter 10) and
the implementation in TreeNET lie in the handling of alias resolution methods based on the IP
identification field. Though the probing scheme introduced in Sec. 2.2 was already definitive in
TreeNET, there were two main differences when it came to the actual methods.
• First, the Ally-like method in TreeNET differs from the lattest implementation: rather than
taking advantage of the collection of IP IDs in waves (cf. Sec. 2.2.2), the method at the time
still assumed that the sequences of IP IDs could not necessarily be interlaced in respect of
the tokens. It therefore first looked for tokens that could lead to an interlaced sequence, then
verified the interlaced sequence in a manner that was much closer to the original Ally. The
improved method was designed in early 2018.
• Second, there was no fast IP ID counter class, though the velocity-based method was already
available. In fact, the velocity estimation (cf. Sec. 2.3.1.3) was performed on all candidates
labelled with the healthy IP ID counter class and resulted in replacing the healthy class with
the random class when no satisfying estimation could be achieved. Then, when the former
Ally-like method (see above) did not find an opportunity for interleaving sequences, the
implementation simply replaced it with the velocity-based . The fast class was later created as a
consequence of the refreshed Ally-like method (cf. 2.3.1.2), because the improved framework
was tuned to not try this approach when alias candidates had sequences with more than one
rollover. The fast class was therefore created to set apart random IP ID counters from counters
for which IP ID rate estimation was still possible.
These two differences are still present in the last version of TreeNET, for which the source code can
be browsed on the dedicated public GitHub repository. 3 Additionally, the latest version of TreeNET
does not feature extended fingerprints (cf. Sec. 2.1.3), which were added in other tools in late 2019.
Finally, it should be noted that the framework as implemented in TreeNET considers the space
search reduction sufficient to motivate aliasing candidates on the basis of having similar fingerprints
when no available method can be used (see also Sec. 2.3.2). In particular, it aliases by default all
(compatible) candidates for which the fingerprints feature the echo IP ID counter class and no
source IP from Port-unreachable packets (i.e., *), with one small exception: when DNS records are
available, it uses the DNS heuristic to exclude alias pairs.
3https://github.com/JefGrailet/treenet/
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3.2 Validation on a groundtruth network
3.2.1 Groundtruth and measurement methodology
To assess the framework introduced by this thesis, TreeNETwas deployed in April 2017 to measure the
entire network of the University of Liège, consisting of a /16 IPv4 prefix combined with two additional
/24 prefixes used by the backbone. The measurement was conducted from a single vantage point
within the network 4: indeed, firewalls completely shield the vast majority of the network from
outside probing. With the friendly help of the SeGI (Service Général d’Informatique, i.e., IT services of
the University), the alias lists and pairs discovered by TreeNET could be confronted with the actual
routers of the network at the time, therefore a groundtruth 5, in order to quantify
• the true positives, i.e., how many discovered alias pairs were true to the groundtruth,
• the false positives, i.e., how many discovered alias pairs were not in the groundtruth,
• the true negatives, i.e., how many pairs of interfaces were not alias in both cases,
• and the false negatives, i.e., how many pairs of interfaces were not alias in the measurement
but actually are in the groundtruth.
Using the responsive IP interfaces detected by TreeNET as input, MIDAR [73] (see also Sec 1.3.3)
was also deployed from the same vantage point in order to collect alias pairs on its own to later
compare the results of both tools. Finally, (Paris) traceroute paths were collected towards all
responsive IP addresses previously detected by TreeNET in order to later feed them to kapar [72], an
analytical alias resolution tool (see also Sec. 1.3.6). The comparison with kapar was motivated by the
fact that TreeNET is partially an analytical solution, due to how it capitalizes on its network mapping
methodology to reduce the search space for alias resolution.
An important point to make before presenting the results of the validation is that the network of
the University of Liège was well suited for alias resolution methods based on the IP identification
field (cf. Sec. 1.3.2 and Sec. 1.3.3) at the time (part of the equipment has been updated since then). As
a consequence, the present validation assesses the efficiency and accuracy of the probing scheme
used by the fingerprint-based framework (cf. Sec. 2.2) and the accuracy of the space search reduction
method (cf. Sec. 3.1) rather than assessing the ability of the framework to make the most of each alias
resolution method. This particular point will be however discussed in the next section (Sec. 3.3).
4From the former WiFi network ULg-Secure.
5Even if the topology of ULiège network has evolved since 2017, both in structure and equipment, the details of the
groundtruth will not be provided for security reasons.
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TreeNET MIDAR kapar
True positive rate 81.78% 98.14% 0.19%
False positive rate 0.22% 0.29% 0.12%
False discovery rate 3.6% 3.65% 91.67%
Precision 96.39% 96.35% 8.33%
Accuracy 98.6% 99.6% 94.47%
Duration of the alias resolution 3’45" 1h47 A few seconds
Duration including preliminary probing 1h56 2h28 2h12
Total of probes during alias resolution 1,948 532,172 0
Total of probes (with preliminary probing) 146,015 659,985 176,786
Table 3.1: Validation of TreeNET, MIDAR and kapar on the ULiège network (April 2017).
3.2.2 Validation results
Table 3.1 provides the results of the validation performed in April 2017 with TreeNET, MIDAR and
kapar on the network of the University of Liège. The first part of the table provides the ratios of
true and false positives to the total of alias pairs found in the groundtruth, completed with the false
discovery rate, the precision, and the accuracy. For reminders, if the number of true positives are
denoted as #T P and the amount of false positives by #F P , the number of true negatives as #T N and
the number of false negatives by #F N ,
• the false discovery rate is equal to #F P#T P+#F P ,
• the precision is equal to #T P#T P+#F P ,
• and the accuracy is equal to #T P+#T N#T P+#F P+#T N+#F N .
The second part of Table 3.1 provides some metrics in respect of the probing and the execution
time. In particular, it shows how many probes where used during alias resolution (this includes the
probing scheme of the fingerprint-based framework) and how many probes were sent in total. The
first time metric provides the total execution time during alias resolution, while the second time met-
ric provides the total execution time if all preliminary probing is taken into consideration. Therefore,
the total time for TreeNET included scanning the network to find responsive IP interfaces, inferring
and post-processing subnets, and building the tree-like map with the help of (Paris) traceroute – in
addition to the alias resolution step. The total time for MIDAR was the sum of the execution time of the
algorithmic step of TreeNET finding responsive IP interfaces and MIDAR execution time. Finally, the
total execution time and total of probes for kapar amount to the discovery of responsive IP interfaces
by TreeNET plus the collection of traceroute paths towards them.
The main highlight of Table 3.1 is that the combination of space search reduction and the
fingerprint-based framework rivals MIDAR in terms of accuracy and is drastically more economic in
terms of probes. Indeed, less than 2,000 probes were used by TreeNET for its own alias resolution
step, for a total run time of less than four minutes, while MIDAR took almost two hours and sent more
44
3.2. VALIDATION ON A GROUNDTRUTH NETWORK
than half a million probes in total. Moreover, prior to its alias resolution step, TreeNET collected
additional useful topological data, such as subnet prefixes and the tree-like mapping, i.e., data that
MIDAR did not provide. The amount of probes used to collect this additional data was still way below
the total amount used by MIDAR: to make a census of responsive IP addresses, discover subnets,
and record traceroute paths towards them, TreeNET sent 144,067 probes, meaning the total was
equal to 146,015 probes if the probes used for alias resolution are added. In a nutshell, TreeNET sent
more than three times less probes than MIDAR whilst collecting more data. Moreover, TreeNET used
a generous timeout value while probing for responsive IP interfaces, i.e., equal to two and an half
seconds, meaning its total run time could have been even shorter. Finally, it is worth noting that
MIDAR sent an average of 37 probes to each alias candidate during its second stage, i.e., during which
time it estimated the speed of the IP ID counters tied to each candidate, while the probing scheme
of the fingerprint-based framework only required 6 direct probes for each candidate (cf. Sec. 2.2.2)
unless temporary network failures lead to additional probes. The alias resolution as implemented in
TreeNET also featured a slightly better false positive rate, false discovery rate and precision.
However, the TreeNET column in Table 3.1 also shows a lower ratio of true positives than in the
MIDAR column. A careful look into the alias pairs and lists discovered by TreeNET shows that, for
some large alias lists, one or two interfaces were missing, therefore leading to many alias pairs being
absent from the true positives. Further investigation showed that the few interfaces missing from
the large alias lists were actually found at different hop counts than all other interfaces during the
probing. Therefore, the problem here was not the alias resolution framework itself, but the space
search reduction method. In fact, the method is prone to suffer from the effects of traffic engineering,
such as asymmetrical paths in load balancers, or from the effects of network (mis)configurations. In
the case of the ULiège network, the unexpected hop counts were the result of network redirections.
By manually fixing one of the largest alias lists in the data produced by TreeNET, the true positive
rate rose to 85.07%, clearly demonstrating that the accuracy of space search reduction is critical to
achieve accurate alias resolution with the fingerprint-based framework.
Finally, it goes without saying that kapar is not well suited to this scenario. Indeed, most if not
all its correct aliases were found in the backbone of the network, and moreover, our groundtruth
data does not contain all of it, which is why the true positive rate is so low. Therefore, using kapar
in roughly the same conditions as TreeNET (or a comparable tool) should be avoided. Instead,
discovering alias pairs with kapar should at the very least involve measurements from multiple
vantage points (as already suggested by their authors) or be combined with active methods, as
suggested by similar research (cf. Sec. 1.3.6) and as already done in practice by TreeNET.
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3.3 Study of fingerprints in the wild
This section studies fingerprints, and more broadly fingerprint-based alias resolution, using data
collected from various networks from the PlanetLab testbed with TreeNET during the course of 2017.
Sec. 3.3.1 presents the target networks as well as how they were selected and measured. Subsequent
sections study the properties of the collected fingerprints and discovered alias pairs: Sec. 3.3.2
discusses the distribution and correlation of the initial TTL value of echo-reply packets and the IP
ID counter class, Sec. 3.3.3 evaluates the distribution of alias resolution methods across discovered
pairs and Sec. 3.3.4 comments on compliance with the ICMP timestamp request mechanism. Finally,
Sec. 3.3.5 evaluates the space search reduction provided by TreeNET.
3.3.1 Deployment on the PlanetLab testbed
During the first semester of 2017, TreeNET was deployed from the PlanetLab testbed in order to
measure 20 different Autonomous Systems (or ASes), each from a single unique vantage point. These
20 ASes were selected for their size, i.e., how many attributable IP addresses their IPv4 prefixes
covered, and their classification by the research community. As a reminder, ASes are categorized into
either Tier-1, either Transit or Stub, a classification that accounts for the economic relationships
between ASes: Tier-1 ASes only act as providers to other ASes, while Stub ASes are exclusively clients
to other ASes, Transit ASes being both clients and providers to other ASes.
Due to their relationships with other ASes, the topology of a Tier-1 can differ vastly from the
topology of a Stub AS, even if the former has fewer attributable addresses than the latter. The
criterion of the size is nevertheless important in the case of TreeNET, because a network with
too many attributable IP addresses can prove too difficult to measure on a regular basis, especially
if this network has a high responsitivity to probes (i.e., large amounts of subnets are detected).
As a consequence, the largest ASes measured with TreeNET usually have less than 1.5 million of
attributable IP addresses. Probing an entire network from a single vantage point facilitates the
construction of a tree-like map (all traceroute paths will have the same root).
Table 3.2 lists the ASes probed with TreeNET from PlanetLab during the first semester of 2017. A
dataset provided by CAIDA 6 was used at the time to learn the ASes classification, while the Hurricane
Electric BGP toolkit [4] provided the IPv4 prefixes associated with each one. It goes without saying
that the column providing the attributable IP addresses of each AS only gives the amount at the time,
as the prefixes (and topology) may have changed since then. For instance, at the time of writing, the
total amount of attributable IP interfaces of AS224 announced by the Hurricane Electric BGP toolkit
was equal to 1,050,112, which is slightly less than the aforementioned 1,115,392. Note how Table 3.2 is
also split in two: the top half corresponds to ASes that were measured once every few days, while the
bottom half accounts for ASes that were measured on a daily basis. Finally, the first column is meant
6https://data.caida.org/datasets/as-relationships/
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Index ASN Name Origin Category Attributable IPs
1 109 Cisco Systems USA Stub 1,173,760
2 10010 TOKAI Communications Japan Transit 1,445,376
3 224 UNINETT Norway Stub 1,115,392
4 2764 AAPT Limited Australia Transit 993,536
5 5400 British Telecom UK Transit 1,385,216
6 5511 Orange S.A. France Transit 911,872
7 6453 TATA Communications USA Tier-1 656,640
8 703 Verizon Business USA Transit 863,232
9 8220 COLT Technology UK Transit 1,342,720
10 8928 Interoute Communications USA Transit 827,904
11 12956 Telefonica Global Solutions Spain Tier-1 209,920
12 13789 Internap Holding LLC USA Transit 96,256
13 14 Columbia University USA Stub 339,968
14 22652 Fibrenoire, Inc. Canada Transit 76,288
15 30781 Jaguar Network France Transit 45,312
16 37 Navy Net. Info. Center (NNIC) USA Stub 140,544
17 4711 INTEC, Inc. Japan Stub 17,408
18 50673 Serverius Holding B.V. Netherlands Transit 61,696
19 52 University of California USA Stub 328,960
20 802 University of York Canada Stub 71,936
Table 3.2: Autonomous Systems probed with TreeNET during the first semester of 2017.
to attribute a unique integer to each AS in order to make it easier to identify them in subsequent
figures, as each of these figures illustrates results for all 20 ASes at once.
3.3.2 Distribution and correlation of initial TTL and IP ID counter class
First, the distribution of the typical values for the initial TTL value of echo-reply packets and the
distribution of the IP ID counter classes were comprehensively studied. As previously explained,
these values are considered as strictly discriminating in the alias resolution framework (cf. Sec. 2.1.2),
i.e., they are used to build subsets of alias candidates that could be aliased with each others, therefore
excluding alias pairs before even using a method.
Figure 3.3 shows the distributions of the initial TTL value and of the IP ID counter class among
fingerprints collected for the 20 ASes from Table 3.2, as stacked bar charts, denoted in the figures by
their respective index in the far left column. The data used to build the figure comes from measure-
ments that were started on April 14, 2017. This data is also representative as the observed properties
do not change significantly if the same AS is measured on a different date. It is worth noting that
Fig. 3.3b does not mention the fast IP ID counter class, since it was created after the measurement
campaign discussed in this chapter (cf. Sec. 3.1.2). Figure 3.3 also does not consider the fingerprints
of alias candidates for which the probing was unsuccessful (i.e., they did not reply to probes while
fingerprinting them).
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Figure 3.3: Distributions of fingerprint features among the target ASes (April 14th, 2017).
Several interesting observations can be made from Figure 3.3. The first is that, as already high-
lighted by Vanaubel et al. in 2013 [121], the initial TTL values 64 and 255 were by far the most common
in Fig. 3.3a. There were noticeable shares of fingerprints with the initial value 128 in almost every AS,
with the exception of AS14 (13; Columbia University) where roughy 20% of the fingerprints included
this value. Interestingly, the initial value 32 also appeared frequently in this specific AS and accounted
for slightly less than 10%. Another observation to make is that, in both Fig. 3.3a and Fig. 3.3b, the
distributions of either component varied greatly from one AS to another. For instance, the echo IP ID
counter class was either overwhelmingly common, evenly distributed with respect to the healthy
class, or in the minority, with the random class being noticeable in all cases. What is however striking
in both Fig. 3.3a and Fig. 3.3b is how the distributions have the same appearance, especially when
looking at the initial TTL value 255 and the echo class. This would suggest the echo and healthy IP ID
counter classes were correlated with the initial TTL values 255 and 64/128, respectively.
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Figure 3.4: Correlation between the initial TTL value and the IP ID counter class (April 14th, 2017).
Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of fingerprints providing both the initial TTL value 255 along
with the echo IP ID counter class and fingerprints featuring both the initial TTL values 64 or 128 along
with the healthy counter class, respectively, using the same data and format (stacked bar charts) as
Figure 3.3. Fingerprints that did not fall into these categories were accounted for as others in the figure.
The resulting distribution strongly suggests there was indeed a correlation between both values,
though this correlation was not as strong in all ASes: see for instance the case of AS2764 (4; AAPT
Limited) where more than 50% of the fingerprints did not fall into either category. This particular
case was however more of an outlier, as the correlation was observed for roughly 80% (sometimes
more than 90%) of the fingerprints in all other ASes, which is an important result. On the one hand,
given how specific profiles of fingerprints should correspond in the real world to different brands of
equipment (according to Vanaubel et al. [121]), this would suggest that the suitability of a router to
specific alias resolution methods (in this instance, methods based on the IP identification field of the
IP protocol) could also be linked to its vendor. To some extent, this proves that using IP fingerprints in
the context of alias resolution is sound. On the other hand, this could suggest probing heuristics that
would reduce the total number of probes sent towards a target network. For instance, if the initial
TTL value of echo-reply packets sent by some router interface is quickly identified as 255, it could
be assumed there is little chance this router interface could be aliased through methods based on IP
IDs (cf. Sec. 1.3.2 and Sec. 1.3.3), therefore avoiding subsequent probes to collect sequences of IP IDs.
3.3.3 Distribution of alias resolution methods
Figure 3.5 shows the distribution of the alias resolution methods that led to the discovered alias
pairs/lists, reusing the same format and data as the previous figures. Again, the stacked bars have a
similar shape to previous figures, but a closer look shows that there were actually clear differences:
for instance, in Figure 3.5, 50% of the alias pairs/lists found in AS13789 (12; Internap Holding LLC)
were discovered with the Ally-like approach, while Fig. 3.3b shows more than 60% of the fingerprints
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Figure 3.5: Distribution of alias resolution methods used to discover alias pairs (April 14th, 2017).
found in this AS featured the healthy counter class, suggesting not all candidates associated with
these fingerprints could be aliased. Furthermore, several distributions only included small amounts
of alias pairs/lists resulting from the DNS heuristic only: this corresponds to alias candidates that
could not be properly fingerprinted due to unresponsivity to echo-request probes, and for which
DNS records could be collected (for reminders, reverse DNS does not require direct probing, cf.
Sec. 1.3.5). As a consequence, the framework could only attempt alias resolution with the DNS
heuristic, resulting in some additional alias pairs/lists.
Overall, the methods based on IP IDs and the aliasing of candidates with similar fingerprints and
comparable DNS records were the most commonly used methods, with one notable exception: in
the case of AS10010 (2; TOKAI Communications), almost 30% of the alias pairs/lists could be inferred
via the iffinder-like method (cf. Sec. 2.3.1.1). The same method was however completely unused in
all other cases. This does not mean the iffinder-like method was only suitable to AS10010: indeed,
there is a fair chance that UDP probes were filtered on their way from the PlanetLab testbed to
the target networks, completely preventing the use of such a method. Interestingly, almost all the
PlanetLab nodes used in 2017 were international nodes 7, with the exception of one European node 8
used to measure AS10010. From 2019, more European nodes could be used to conduct measurements
of various kinds, resulting in more alias pairs/lists being discovered with the iffinder-like method
in all kinds of networks. The same observation was possible with measurements performed from the
EdgeNet cluster, which replaced PlanetLab starting from mid-2020 [99? ]. All in all, these observations
suggest that mimicking iffinder [71] remains a credible option for alias resolution. In fact, research
carried out later than the work presented in this chapter still involved iffinder [87].
7denoted at the time as PLC, for PlanetLab Central. They became more and more difficult to use over time.
8denoted as PLE, for PlanetLab Europe. Most PLE nodes were difficult to use before a large update in 2019.
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The main conclusion to draw from Figure 3.5 is that using a single alias resolution method has
become highly unrealistic. As already discussed in the previous paragraph, iffinder (cf. Sec. 1.3.1)
should only be used to complement other methods as it cannot be self-sufficient. Moreover, methods
based on IP IDs, which were frequently researched up to the early 2010’s (cf. Sec. 1.3.2 and Sec. 1.3.3),
can now only detect a small amount of alias pairs/lists within specific target networks. This not only
suggests combining multiple methods is nowadays mandatory for exhaustive alias resolution, but
this also highlights the importance of space search reduction. For instance, as the DNS heuristic (cf.
Sec. 2.3.1.4) has a limited accuracy, it is crucial to break down the initial set of alias candidates as
much as possible to minimize both false positives and false negatives.
3.3.4 Compliance with the ICMP timestamp request
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Figure 3.6: Distribution of alias candidates replying to ICMP timestamp request (April 14th, 2017).
Figure 3.6 shows the distribution of successfully fingerprinted alias candidates replying to the
ICMP timestamp request, with the same format and data as in previous sections. As discussed in
Sec. 2.1.2, the inclusion of this feature in the fingerprints was purely exploratory: the objective was to
see if there were correlations between alias pairs/lists and compliance to the mechanism, or even
correlations with other fingerprint components. The main finding from this exploration was that not
all router interfaces replied to such requests, and that the distribution greatly changed from one AS to
another. The mechanism was not implemented at all in the cases of AS50673 (18; Serverius Holding
B.V.) and AS802 (20; University of York). However, it did not appear to correlate with other fingerprint
components. Moreover, among well established alias pairs/lists (notably found within the ULiège
network), not all aliased interfaces were displaying the same behaviour regarding this mechanism.
Overall, there was no conclusive evidence the ICMP timestamp request could be used to validate
or invalidate potential aliases. Therefore, the investigation of this feature was not continued in the
context of this research work, though it could be further tested in the future to determine whether it
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Figure 3.7: Effects of the space search reduction induced by TreeNET (April 14th, 2017).
could help in the same manner as iffinder, i.e., to build small alias lists to be completed with other
methods (as suggested in Sec. 2.3.1.1).
3.3.5 Effects of space search reduction
Finally, the effects of the space search reduction resulting from the tree-like topology mapping
of TreeNET were examined. Figure 3.7 illustrates the proportion of successfully fingerprinted alias
candidates with respect to the total number of responsive IP interfaces for each target AS as a bar chart.
The black curve illustrates the largest list of alias candidates that were considered simultaneously.
Once again, the data is the same as in previous figures. Regardless of the target AS, there was a drastic
reduction in the interfaces to consider for alias resolution with respect to the responsive (or live) IP
interfaces: at worst, around 30% of the live interfaces were fingerprinted, and at best, significantly
less than 10%. This result does not include the fact that the fingerprinted alias candidates were
themselves split into even smaller sets before being put through a suitable alias resolution method.
However, Figure 3.7 also shows that the method for space search reduction is crucial, as it shows
that, in some ASes, there were very large aggregates of alias candidates to consider together. This was
especially apparent for AS14 (13; Columbia University), where roughly one third of the fingerprinted
candidates was found in the same alias resolution scenario, which seemed large even considering
the total number of live interfaces.
In fact, the large aggregates of alias candidates suggested by Figure 3.7 often coincided with the
multi-label nodes used by TreeNET to account for the parts of the topology that feature multiple
paths (cf. Sec. 3.1.1). Due in particular to load balancing, some large neighborhoods located closer
to the vantage point had to be superposed through the mechanism of multi-label nodes, which
eventually resulted in large lists of alias candidates. In theory, alias resolution can reveal routers
within these scenarios, some of them accounting for convergence points in load balancing architec-
tures [50]. In practice, however, and because multi-label nodes fuse alias resolution scenarios instead
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of clearly distinguishing them, they reduce the benefits of the tree-like mapping regarding space
search reduction. As a result, TreeNET perfectly handles neighborhoods appearing at the ends of
a tree or in networks with little traffic engineering, but barely reduces the space search when load
balancing architectures are involved.
Because of asymmetrical paths, load balancers can also induce inconsistencies in the distances
observed between the vantage point and a remote location. For example, subnet interfaces that are
around the same real-life devices can be found at the end of route paths with slightly different lengths.
This has two consequences: first, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, subnets can be poorly identified
and split into several chunks, and second, subnets from the same location can be found at the end
of different branches of the tree-like map. This results in some neighborhoods being divided into
several individual neighborhoods, resulting in overly reduced alias resolution scenarios. A similar
issue was witnessed on the ULiège network while validating TreeNET (cf. Sec. 3.2.2), though it was
caused by network redirections rather than load balancing. Figure 3.8 shows, using the same data
and format as before, the ratio of aliased candidates versus the ratio of non-aliased candidates for
each measured AS. While a majority of IP interfaces could be aliased in most cases, there were also
large amounts of interfaces that could not be aliased at all. Although it would be perfectly reasonable
to discover that an interface is not an alias of any other identified interface, the large number of
unaliased interfaces in some instances, such as in the case of AS5511 (6; Orange S.A.), was also the
result of overly reduced alias resolution scenarii.
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Figure 3.8: Proportions of alias candidates being successfully aliased (April 14th, 2017).
Two main conclusions can be drawn from Figures 3.7 and 3.8: first, space search reduction is
a powerful tool, and second, its accuracy is critical to achieve thorough alias resolution. Having to
concurrently consider large amounts of alias candidates requires thorough probing scheme and
resolution, such as Internet-scale solutions like MIDAR [73], but creating such techniques for every
possible alias resolution method is ultimately cumbersome. Reciprocally, a space search reduction
scheme that (accidentally) reduces the space search too much can also result in poor alias resolution.
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3.4 Closing comments on the framework and perspectives
This first part of the thesis provides the three following key contributions.
1. It provides a new application of IP fingerprinting [121] by designing a new format of fingerprints
(cf. Sec. 2.1.2) used to detect which alias resolution methods are suited to a set of alias candi-
dates. It also provides a form of space search reduction, i.e., alias candidates with completely
different fingerprints cannot be an alias of each other. This also constitutes a first system-
atic methodology for combining several methods (cf. Sec. 2.3.2), a research direction which
has already been put forward by previous research [117] and further explored by posterior
research [87]. Observations in the wild conducted from the PlanetLab testbed further showed
individual methods are no longer self-sufficient (cf. Sec. 3.3.3).
2. By carefully scheduling the probing work (cf. Sec. 2.2) used by the framework and combining it
with space search reduction (cf. Sec. 3.1.1), it has been demonstrated on a groundtruth network
that the overall methodology features both an accuracy rivaling the state-of-the-art and a very
cheap probing cost, much lower than that of other state-of-the-art tools (cf. Sec. 3.2.2).
3. With the help of fingerprints collected in the wild from the PlanetLab testbed, it was also
proved that specific values of fingerprints tend to correlate (cf. Sec. 3.3.2). This suggests there
are several profiles of routers in the Internet, and some of them might be linked to equipment
vendors, much like the TTL-based router signatures of Vanaubel et al. [121].
As long as it is combined with preliminary space search reduction to get simple alias resolution
scenarios, the framework can be both accurate and cheap when it comes to probing, as noted by
contribution 2. Moreover, as contribution 1 showed, envisioning such a methodology becomes even
more necessary: indeed, state-of-the-art methods are increasingly less self-sufficient, but combining
them together can compensate for the shortcomings of each.
In fact, the combination of space search reduction and fingerprinting should be envisioned as a
general approach to alias resolution and not as an ad hoc solution that focuses on the specificities of
network protocols. These methods can only work for a time, in the same way as the methods based
on the IP protocol timestamp option (cf. Sec. 1.3.4). On the contrary, as long as an implementation
provides accurate individual alias resolution heuristics, the whole methodology could easily be
re-used in future research, especially given how some values of the fingerprints tend to correlate,
therefore suggesting certain brands of equipment have specific properties to take into account when
performing alias resolution (as noted by contribution 3). While developed only for IPv4 in the context
of this thesis, the proposed framework could also be adapted to the IPv6 protocol as well.
However, and as highlighted in Sec. 3.3.5, achieving accurate space search reduction is a challenge
in itself. In particular, the effects of traffic engineering, in particular load balancing, can result in
inaccurate subnet inference and topology mapping. These issues are especially visible with TreeNET,
which relies on strong hypotheses: constant distances between the vantage point and a given location
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and traceroute paths that can be viewed as trees. Because of these problems, alias resolution
scenarios can be either too large, or too small.
As discussed in Sec. 1.4, alias resolution is also a tool for deciphering load balanced paths. In the
following parts of this thesis, the framework presented and assessed in this first part will be applied to
design subnet inference techniques (cf. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6) and topology mapping methodolo-
gies (cf. Chapter 10) that are able to take account of the effects of load balancing. Reciprocally, these
contributions will also provide a better setting for fingerprint-based alias resolution (cf. Sec. 10.4).
Finally, it should be noted that most of the research presented in this first part of this thesis was
conducted during 2016 and 2017, and that implementations of the framework have only received
minor improvements since then (cf. Sec. 3.1.2). Any new research reusing ideas from the fingerprint-
based framework should therefore consider:
• whether it should refresh and/or expand the typical values of the fingerprints (cf. Sec. 2.1.2),
• whether there are other unexplored properties to investigate either for alias resolution itself or
for space search reduction,
• including research that was conducted after this work (e.g., automatically creating regexes for
reverse DNS with machine learning [80]).



















INTRODUCTION TO SUBNET INFERENCE
T
his chapter presents the terminology and the state-of-the-art of subnet inference. First, Sec. 4.1
introduces the definitions and motivations relevant to subnets (short for subnetworks) and
their discovery. Sec. 4.2 then reviews the state-of-the-art of subnet inference. Sec. 4.3 con-
cludes this first chapter by summarizing the typical limits of state-of-the-art solutions.
4.1 Terminology
4.1.1 Main definitions and motivations
In a computer network, a subnet (short for subnetwork) is a set of devices, each identified by a
unique IP address, that are connected together through the same connection medium and that can
communicate directly with each others at the link layer [92]. As a result, subnet inference denotes
the systematic discovery of subnets within a target network. In the Internet, a subnet can be a point-
to-point link between two adjacent routers as well as a LAN (Local Area Network) within the topology
of a network, e.g., a group of end systems, such as servers.
Typically, a subnet is denoted by the CIDR (Classless Inter-Domain Routing) notation [43] tra-
ditionally used to represent contiguous blocks of addresses managed by network operators. As
a reminder, the CIDR notation for IPv4 is a.b.c.d/e where a.b.c.d is the prefix address and e
the length of this prefix. The subnet prefix is therefore the prefix address of a given subnet and
contains a fixed amount of bits, starting from the most significant bit, that are constant for all IP
addresses found within the subnet, with the length e denoting how many bits are constant. For exam-
ple, 139.165.223.0/24 denotes a subnet within the ULiège network (within the 139.165.0.0/16
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prefix) managed by the RUN 1 that hosts end systems like the queen machine 2 and the stations
allocated to RUN members. For this subnet, the prefix length is equal to 24: this means the 3 first
bytes, i.e., 139.165.223., are identical for any IP address on the subnet (e.g.: 139.165.223.1,
139.165.223.30, etc.).
Though the field of topology discovery has historically focused on the interface-level, router-
level and AS-level [37, 61], notably with the development of alias resolution (cf. Chapter 1), the
research community has been exploring alternative approaches since the late 2000’s. This general
effort encompassed the study and discovery of Internet eXchange Points (or IXPs) [13, 95], Points-of-
Presence (or PoPs) [41, 109], and of course, subnets [58, 70, 116, 118]. Initially, the subnet-level was
explored as a complementary view to the router-level: the objective was to characterize links better
at the network layer to annotate or complete existing maps [58]. Subnet inference has also been
investigated to highlight unique topological features of ISP networks [118]. As already mentioned
in Sec. 3.1, studying the subnet-level can also act as a form of space search reduction for alias
resolution [51, 55]. Not only the subnet-level can help discover the router-level, but it also opens new
opportunities for network modeling, as will be explained in detail in Chapter 12.
4.1.2 Practical definitions
To describe the state-of-the-art of subnet inference as well as new subnet inference techniques
introduced in subsequent chapters more easily, a few practical terms are hereby introduced. First of
all, the TTL distance is the minimal TTL value a tool running at a given vantage point can use in a
probe packet to get a reply (e.g., an echo-reply ICMP message) from a given target interface. For
example, a TTL distance of 10 means that there are 10 hops between the target interface and the
vantage point. In this scenario, using a TTL value one unit smaller in a probe packet would result in a
time-exceeded ICMP message emitted by the router located just before the target interface.
A measurement-based definition of a subnet should also be provided. From the perspective of
a single vantage point, and in the (quasi) absence of traffic engineering (e.g., load balancing), the
interfaces of one subnet will appear as a set of IP addresses that are both consecutive with respect
to the IP address space and (ideally) located at the same TTL distance. Moreover, they should be
reached through similar (if not identical) routes: as a result, the last interface(s) appearing in the
routes towards distinct subnet interfaces of the same subnet should be identical.
Ideally, a subnet should also contain at least one interface belonging to the last router crossed
before entering the subnet, therefore observed one hop closer to the measurement vantage point
than other subnet interfaces. The last router crossed before entering the subnet can be referred to
as the ingress router. Any subnet interface that is not located on the ingress router is called a pivot
interface (occasionally shortened to pivot). The immediate consequence of this definition is that all
pivot interfaces of a subnet should be observed at the same TTL distance. The (presumably) single
interface located on the ingress router is called a contra-pivot interface (occasionally shortened to
1Research Unit in Networking, the computer networking research group of the Montefiore Institute
2queen.run.montefiore.ulg.ac.be; hosts notably the RUN’s website
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contra-pivot). In practice, routers can have back-up interfaces for critical subnets, meaning a subnet
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Figure 4.1: Definition of a subnet from the perspective of a measurement.
Figure 4.1 depicts the measurement-based definition of a subnet, completed with the concepts of:
ingress router, pivot interface and contra-pivot interface. In this figure, the squares depict the pivot
interfaces, i.e. any subnet interface not located on the ingress router, while the circles represent router
interfaces. The plain-line circle, in particular, stands for the contra-pivot interface of the depicted toy
subnet. Note that the entire terminology is common to the subnet inference tools TraceNET [116],
ExploreNET [118] and TreeNET [55], and will be re-used as is in subsequent chapters.
4.2 State-of-the-art subnet inference solutions
4.2.1 traceroute-based subnet inference (TraceNET)
In 2007, M. H. Gunes and K. Sarac presented an early subnet inference methodology that processed
traceroute paths to identify subnets [58]. Their methodology relied on IP assignment practices, i.e.,
the fact that subnet interfaces from the same subnet will feature the same first bits, also known as the
same subnet prefix. In particular, they used an iterative method to enumerate all potential subnet
prefixes and subsequently used several heuristics to exclude potential subnets which could not be
considered as accurate. Among others, their approach excluded any subnet that encompassed two IP
addresses that had a predecessor/successor relationship in a traceroute path, and also excluded
hypothetical subnets where the TTL distances were inconsistent. One of their heuristics also excluded
small subnets when larger subnets encompassing them were possible, i.e., not filtered out by the
3Such subnets were observed on the ULiège network and verified with the friendly help of the SeGI.
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previous heuristics. At the time, Gunes’ and Sarac’s methodology provided promising results, as more
than half of their inferred subnets exactly matched a groundtruth.
In 2010, M. Engin Tozal and K. Sarac expanded this early approach with the subnet inference tool
TraceNET [116]. As its name implies, TraceNET is an elaborated variant of traceroute that not only
discovers route paths but also discovers the subnets crossed between each hop. To do so, for each
IP address discovered with the usual traceroute, TraceNET builds a /31 subnet encompassing it
and probes the other IP address encompassed by this early prefix. If the corresponding interface is
responsive, it applies a series of heuristics to guarantee the subnet consistency. These heuristics (nine
in total) are all based on IP assignment practices and typical router behaviour observed at the time. If
the resulting subnet is sound, it is expanded by decreasing its prefix length by 1, i.e., it becomes a /30
subnet. TraceNET further probes the IP addresses newly encompassed by the expanded prefix and
applies its heuristics for the second time to ensure the subnet remains consistent, then expands again,
and so on. Whenever an heuristic fails, the subnet is shrunk by incrementing its prefix length once
and TraceNET moves on to other potential subnets. Figure 4.2 illustrates the typical data discovered
by TraceNET, based on a figure from the paper that introduced it [116]. In this figure, arrows show the
analyzed route path while grey circles correspond to interfaces usually discovered with traceroute.
VantageTarget




Subnet discovered by TraceNET(part of) Path to the target
Figure 4.2: Topological data as discovered by TraceNET.
In addition to providing a more thorough subnet inference scheme, TraceNET is also the first
subnet inference work to rely on the concepts of pivot interface, contra-pivot interface and ingress
router previously defined in Sec. 4.1.2. It should be noted, though, that its definition of pivot interface
specifically denoted the first IP address of a growing subnet while this thesis broadens the definition
as any subnet interface not located on the ingress router. Tozal and Sarac however noted that
TraceNET was not well suited for situations featuring symmetric or asymmetric paths induced by
load balancers [14], in addition to underestimating large subnets (e.g., /24). To mitigate the former
issue, TraceNET only used ICMP probes, as ICMP probes were discovered to be less subject to load
balancing at the time [81]. Another issue with TraceNET is that routing dynamics in the Internet
tend to use the same sub-paths, meaning a lot of paths (such as back-up links) will be missed
while collecting traceroute paths. As a consequence, TraceNET cannot discover the subnet-level
exhaustively. Such an issue has already been noticed with research work involving RocketFuel [113]
and AROMA [74], two topology discovery tools previously mentioned in Chapter 1.
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4.2.2 An active probing method: ExploreNET
To make up for TraceNET’s inability to discover subnets exhaustively, their authors introduced an
alternative in 2011: ExploreNET [118]. The methodology of ExploreNET consists of actively probing
a given target IP address in order to discover the subnet that best accommodates it. In the process,
ExploreNET will, of course, probe the IP addresses that are closest to the initial target with respect
to the IPv4 address space. In fact, its methodology is very similar to that of TraceNET: ExploreNET
starts by building a /31 subnet that includes the target IP address (if responsive), then probes
the second IP interface of this prefix and determines whether or not both IP addresses form a
consistent subnet with the help of a custom set of heuristics. If this first subnet is sound, it will be
expanded by decrementing the prefix length. For each new prefix length, ExploreNET probes the
newly encompassed IP addresses to confirm they satisfy the heuristics to guarantee the new subnet
remains consistent. The heuristics however differ from TraceNET, as they mostly ensure that the
probes reaching the subnet interfaces are passing through the same ingress router, and not through
another router observed at the same distance, which may be the ingress router to another subnet.
When a freshly expanded subnet no longer satisfies all heuristics, it is shrunk by incrementing its
prefix length once and kept as is.
ExploreNET provides a number of benefits with respect to TraceNET: first, it can discover sub-
nets corresponding to links that are difficult to observe with traceroute probing, and second, it
can discover subnets regardless of the existence of symmetric paths induced by load balancing
architectures. Indeed, ExploreNET only requires the probes to continually reach the same ingress
router to consistently discover subnets, meaning there can be some load balancing on the way. The
design of ExploreNET allowed Tozal and Sarac to study more exhaustively the subnet-level of various
ISPs. In particular, they highlighted that the typical distribution of subnet prefix length tends to follow
a power law shape, i.e., small subnets (/30 and /31) are the most common in the Internet, but a few
large subnets (/20, /21, etc.) could also be discovered within specific ISP networks. Interestingly, they
also discovered that the /24 prefix is far more common than comparable prefix lengths (e.g., /23 and
/25), which they explained by the fact that /24 is a popular choice for creating subnets [118].
Unfortunately, ExploreNET also has limitations. For one thing, it has no built-in mechanism
to mitigate the effects of asymmetric paths in load balancing architectures. Typically, these paths
can induce inconsistencies in the observed TTL distances for subnet interfaces found in the same
subnet, therefore preventing consistent inference by either TraceNET either ExploreNET. Moreover,
the open source implementation of ExploreNET 4 puts a condition on growing a subnet: at least
half of the attributable subnet IP addresses must be populated with responsive IP addresses before
expanding it, with the exception of small subnets (i.e., /29, /30, and /31). Having to satisfy such a
threshold is sound, as it is preferable to avoid inferring overgrown subnets. In practice, this threshold
prevents correctly inferring subnets when their responsive IP addresses are either few, or not spread
uniformly in their address space. For example, it is fairly possible a large subnet (e.g., a /24) features
4available at http://nsrg.louisiana.edu/project/ntmaps/output/explorenet.html
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a block of contiguous IP addresses in the third quarter of its address space, but no responsive IP
address elsewhere with the exception of one contra-pivot interface found in the beginning of the
same space 5. In such a scenario, ExploreNET will partition the actual subnet into several chunks,
resulting in inaccurate subnet inference.
4.2.3 Subnet refinement with TreeNET
TreeNET [55] (briefly introduced in Sec. 3.1) implements an heuristic to mitigate ExploreNET’s
partitioning issue. As already explained, TreeNET does not implement its own subnet inference
scheme but instead builds itself upon ExploreNET, as the initial focus of TreeNET is subnet-based
topology mapping. The underlying idea of the correction heuristic is simple: if a subnet only features
pivot interfaces, it is probably incomplete, as any subnet should contain at least one interface found
on the ingress router. The heuristic therefore consists of selecting an inferred subnet without a
contra-pivot interface and expanding it repeatedly until it overlaps other inferred subnets that could
contain such an interface. Contra-pivot interfaces are identified by the fact that they are located
exactly one hop closer to the vantage point than pivot interfaces. If an overlapped subnet contains
a sound contra-pivot interface, all overlapped subnets are merged under a new subnet prefix. Of
course, this correction heuristic puts several conditions before the merger to guarantee sound results:
for instance, if the expanded subnet overlaps too many subnets whose interfaces would become
outliers (i.e., TTL distances become inconsistent), then the heuristic stops. This is also the case if the
resulting merged subnet features too many contra-pivot interfaces – TreeNET allowing more than
one, as multiple contra-pivot interfaces are possible in practice (cf. Sec. 4.1.2).
Actual subnet (/28)Ingress router
Second chunk discovered by 
ExploreNET (/29)
First chunk discovered by 
ExploreNET (/31)
/28 subnet recovered by
TreeNET
Pivot interface Contra-pivot/router interface
Figure 4.3: A toy case of subnet partitioning. Grey squares/bullet are responsive interfaces.
Figure 4.3 depicts a toy case of subnet partitioning. An actual /28 subnet, containing up to 14
attributable addresses (24 −2 because the subnet prefix and broadcast address should not be used),
is first discovered as a /31 and a /29 by ExploreNET, the former containing the contra-pivot interface
5Several confirmed /24 subnets of the ULiège network are like this.
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while the latter only contains pivot interfaces. This is due to the responsive IP addresses not being
uniformly spread, as pivot interfaces are only visible in the second half of the subnet. By expanding
the discovered /29 and correctly identifying the /31 as a contra-pivot interface, TreeNET can recover
the full /28 subnet. As will be discussed in Sec. 7.1, this heuristic considerably improves the inference
of larger subnets and allow TreeNET to be more representative of the subnet-level of a target domain
overall, though it can also produce overgrown subnets (especially when TTL distances vary).
4.2.4 Subnet inference with multiple vantage points (Cheleby)
While previous state-of-the-art solutions are typically run from a single vantage point, it should be
noted that subnet inference involving multiple vantage points has been explored too. In early 2012,
H. Kardes et al. introduced the Cheleby system [70], which runs Paris traceroute [11] towards target
networks from hundreds of vantage points and processes the collected paths in order to reliably
discover subnets. The underlying idea is the same as before: a subnet can be recognized as a set
of IP addresses, consecutive with respect to the IPv4 address space, where all interfaces (except
contra-pivot interfaces) are observed at the same TTL distance. By combining multiple vantage
points, it becomes possible to verify whether a sequence is consistently observed across several
measurements to guarantee a discovered subnet is not a false positive (i.e., a subnet that does not
match the real topology) resulting from occasionnal coincidences in the observed TTL distances.
The Cheleby system is an ambitious but expensive solution to deploy. In their paper, Kardes et
al. mention having used around 500 PlanetLab nodes out of 600 available nodes (from a total of
1,100 advertised nodes), the difference being explained by the fact that around 100 of the 600 usable
nodes did not produce satisfying measurements. Such a large scale deployment is therefore difficult
to achieve in practice, with the main benefit being the mitigation of the consequences of traffic
engineering, thanks to the multiple vantage points. Designing subnet inference methods that can
address these challenges from a single vantage point can result in much simpler deployments.
4.3 Limits of state-of-the-art solutions
Besides the Cheleby system (cf. Sec. 4.2.4), that sets itself apart from other solutions by using many
vantage points, most state-of-the-art tools can achieve reliable subnet inference from a single vantage
point in different contexts. Moreover, measurements in the wild with these tools allowed the research
community to have a first glance at typical properties of the subnet-level, such as the power law
shape of the distribution of the prefix length (with the notable exception of /24 subnets) [118].
However, TraceNET, ExploreNET, and TreeNET all suffer from the same problem: all three rely
on strong hypotheses regarding what a subnet will look like from the perspective of a single vantage
point. Indeed, all three require constant TTL distances and a consistent ingress router for a given
subnet to be inferred accurately. Both properties can be easily thwarted by load balancing (a common
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form of traffic engineering): for instance, asymmetrical paths in load balancers [14] will typically
induce variations in the observed TTL distances, preventing the correct inference of specific subnets.
In addition to the problems induced by load balancing, each tool also comes with its own
issues: for instance, TraceNET cannot exhaustively map the subnet-level due to routing dynamics.
However, they also share another major flaw: all three rely heavily on the IPv4 scope. It was previously
mentioned that IPv4 subnets are very small when compared to IPv6 subnets: in IPv6, it is not
uncommon to use /64 prefixes (that can even be used as point-to-point links), each such a prefix
providing up to 264 possible addresses. Subnet inference as performed by TraceNET and ExploreNET,
on the other hand, exhaustively explores the address space of subnets that can at most contain
212−2 = 4,094 attributable addresses (corresponding to a fully populated /20 subnet 6). While testing
a few thousands IP addresses remains computationally reasonable, doing the same task with billions
of potential IP addresses per subnet would be prohibitively complicated.
4.4 Research questions
The second part of this thesis aims to provide a new subnet inference solution for IPv4 that can
overcome the limits of the previously discussed tools, mainly TraceNET (cf. Sec. 4.2.1), ExploreNET
(cf. Sec. 4.2.2) and TreeNET (cf. Sec. 4.2.3). Not only will this second part address the challenges
induced by load balancing discussed in Sec. 4.3, but it will also describe a methodology that was
designed with efficiency in mind.
To achieve both aforementioned goals, this part will center around the following research ques-
tions, with each subsequent chapter answering specific questions.
1. Is it possible to precisely define the consequences of traffic engineering ? How frequent are
they ? Before designing a subnet inference methodology that will remain accurate despite
load balancing, the induced phenomena first have to be characterized to identify them during
subnet inference and take their effects into account. Moreover, quantifying them also will show
the extent to which state-of-the-art tools are outdated and further justify the need for a novel
approach. These questions will be answered in Chapter 5.
2. Can a systematic subnet inference methodology that can live with traffic engineering be
designed ? Can it be in linear time ? Once the effects of traffic engineering have been properly
identified, it should be possible to design algorithms that can discover subnets even when these
consequences change how subnets appear to probes. Chapter 6 will present a methodology to
achieve this, and will also show such a methodology can be in linear time.
3. How accurate is this methodology ? Can it outperform state-of-the-art tools ? The subnet
inference solution presented in Chapter 6 will also be thoroughly assessed on two groundtruth
6/19 subnets (or larger) have not been observed with previous research nor the research presented in this thesis.
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networks in Chapter 7. Through the process, the new tool will also be compared with the state-
of-the-art in terms of accuracy (i.e., how true the discovered subnets are) and performance
(i.e., how fast the tools can run).
4. Do changes in effects of traffic engineering affect the discovered subnets ? To what extent
? The ability of the new tool to consistently discover the same subnets despite variations in
terms of traffic engineering should also be assessed. Chapter 7 will also cover these questions
by introducing some custom metrics and measuring them with large amounts of data collected
from the PlanetLab testbed.
5. Can the new methodology be adapted to IPv6 ? Finally, this part of the thesis will also briefly
discuss whether the new methodology is only bound to work with IPv4 (like previous solutions,














his chapter discusses in detail the modern challenges of subnet inference, thereby answering
research question 1 from Sec. 4.4. To recap, this research question consists of learning whether
it is possible to precisely define and quantify the typical consequences of traffic engineering
regarding subnet inference. Sec. 5.1 defines the phenomena induced by traffic engineering or spe-
cific network equipment that can impair state-of-the-art subnet inference methodologies. Sec. 5.2
presents a quantification of these phenomena in the wild, using data collected from the PlanetLab
testbed. Sec. 5.3 concludes this chapter by summarizing how a modern subnet inference tool should
handle the discussed challenges.
5.1 Characterization of the challenges
This section defines and characterizes several routing phenomena that can thwart the traditional
hypotheses of subnet inference (as reviewed in Chapter 4). Sec. 5.1.1 first precisely defines the
notion of trail, a concept used to broadly denote the last hop(s) prior to a subnet. Then, Sec. 5.1.2
and Sec. 5.1.3 respectively define warping and flickering trails, both being consequences of traffic
engineering, and Sec. 5.1.4 describes echoing trails, which result from specific equipment.
5.1.1 A broader definition of the last hop: the trail
As previously discussed in Sec. 4.1, one of the key elements that can be used to infer subnets is to
ensure that a set of interfaces (consecutive with respect to the IPv4 scope) are reached through the
same ingress router. In particular, ExploreNET implements various heuristics to guarantee that the
ingress router of a newly discovered interface is the same as it was for previously probed subnet
interfaces, which guarantees that all interfaces are on the same subnet (cf. Sec. 4.2.2). An ingress
router can be notably identified by a router interface discovered through traceroute probing.
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However, the last hop observed prior to a set of subnet interfaces is not always visible: some
routers are indeed configured not to reply to traceroute probes, and therefore appear as anony-
mous hops [59, 68, 125] in the paths, i.e., hops without a well identified IP interface (typically denoted
by the wildcard symbol * in the output of the classical traceroute [119]). Moreover, the last hop
can also be a cycling hop, i.e., the router interface identified at this hop has already been identified
at previous hop counts in the route. Cycling hops can either follow each other in a path or appear
several hops away from each other, and should therefore be handled with caution [85]. Cycling hops
can be the result of a misconfiguration as well as a consequence of temporary network failures.
In order to simplify the terminology used in subsequent sections and chapters, the last non-
cycling and non-anonymous route hop observed prior to the target IP address of a traceroute
measurement will be defined as a trail. When this well identified hop is several hops away from the
target IP address (e.g., as a result of intermediate anonymous hops), an integer value is also associated
with the trail to count the amount of intermediate problematic hops, also called anomalies. A trail is
said to be anomaly-free if there is no intermediate hop between the trail and the target IP address.
An anomaly-free trail is typically denoted by the IP address tied to the trail itself, while a trail with
anomalies is denoted by the concatenation of the trail with the anomaly count. E.g., 10.0.2.1
denotes an anomaly-free trail while 10.0.2.128 | 2 denotes a trail with two problematic hops (e.g.,
anonymous hops) observed before reaching the target IP address.
In addition to simplifying the terminology, the concept of trail also constitutes a best effort
strategy for subnet inference in itself: IP addresses that are consecutive in the IPv4 scope and whose
last hops are not visible to traceroute probes can still be approximated as subnets when they
exhibit the same trail. In this particular scenario, the identical trails amount to a common end route
shared by all subnet interfaces, which may not strictly identify a same ingress router but nevertheless
suggests these interfaces are found at the same place. A subnet built on the basis of such trails can
therefore be overgrown, but eventually interpreted as an IPv4 prefix delimiting actual subnets.
Listing 5.1: Subnet interfaces with problematic trails
1 0 . 0 . 7 . 1 − 4 [ 1 0 . 0 . 2 . 1 2 8 | 1]
1 0 . 0 . 7 . 3 − 5 [ 1 0 . 0 . 2 . 1 2 8 | 2]
1 0 . 0 . 7 . 4 − 5 [ 1 0 . 0 . 2 . 1 2 8 | 2]
1 0 . 0 . 7 . 6 − 5 [ 1 0 . 0 . 2 . 1 2 8 | 2]
1 0 . 0 . 7 . 8 − 5 [ 1 0 . 0 . 2 . 1 2 8 | 2]
A subnet interface with the IP address I P and the estimated TTL distance T T L can be expressed
as IP - TTL [trail]. The trail is put into brackets for clarity. Example 5.1 shows a toy set of subnet
interfaces, consecutive with respect to the IPv4 scope, that feature trails with anomalies. Though the
ingress router of the listed interfaces is not clearly identified, since the trails of the subnet interfaces
found at a TTL distance of 5 are identical, they might very well be on the same subnet. Indeed,
this implies they are at the very least located around the same place in the network topology. This
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conclusion is further supported, in this instance, by the fact that they were all located at the same
TTL distance, i.e., they likely constitute the pivot interfaces of a same subnet. Finally, since 10.0.7.1
is located exactly one hop earlier than all the other interfaces, it could very well be the contra-pivot










(last non-anonymous hop before 10.0.7.0/28)
…
Figure 5.1: Toy topology inducing the trails from Example 5.1. Squares are pivot interfaces.
Figure 5.1 shows a toy topology that could induce the trails from Example 5.1. In this figure, the
grayed/darkened elements corresponds to routers (and their interfaces) that are invisible to probes,
i.e., they induce anonymous hops when they are crossed by traceroute probes. The green circle
depicts the last non-anonymous router hop, 10.0.2.128 in this instance, which appears in the trails
shown in Example 5.1. Because of the consistency of TTL distances and anonymous hops (i.e., they
do not result from rate-limiting in this instance), it may be that the listed interfaces are on the same
subnet. This simple example shows that reconsidering the last hop(s) towards an IP interface as a trail
could offer a satisfying approximation of a subnet when traceroute issues prevent the discovery of
the ingress router interfaces.
5.1.2 Warping trails
Warping trails constitute the first challenge that needs to be tackled to achieve accurate subnet
inference in the current Internet. As the term warping suggests, warping trails denote trails that are
not consistently observed at the same TTL distances, i.e., they are "warping" within the traceroute
records. While any trail can be warping, it is especially important to identify warping anomaly-free
trails as these trails clearly identify interfaces of routers that are observed at different TTL distances
depending on the target IP address of the analyzed traceroute records.
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Having properly identified router interfaces appearing at varying TTL distances strongly suggests
that warping trails are a direct consequence of asymmetrical paths in networks that implement
traffic engineering policies such as load balancing [14]. The consequence for subnet inference is
that the same ingress router can be observed for a set of subnet interfaces that are not located at the
same TTL distance from the vantage point. The former observation would suggest the interfaces
are on the same subnet, but classical subnet inference tools (cf. Sec. 4.2) usually assume that the
(pivot) interfaces of a same subnet should be observed at a constant TTL distance. A modern subnet
inference methodology should therefore be designed so that the trail has priority over the TTL
distances to mitigate the effects of asymmetrical paths in network architectures. Figure 5.2 depicts a
toy topology that can result in the observation of warping trails among interfaces of a same subnet,
with the warping trails being associated to the green interface of R6 in the figure. The dashed circles














Figure 5.2: Toy topology inducing warping trails. Squares are pivot interfaces.
It should be noted that (Paris) traceroute [11], which was designed to stabilize paths in load
balancing architectures, cannot prevent this phenomenon: indeed, (Paris) traceroute was designed
to stabilize paths in per-flow load balancers to avoid false link discovery, and therefore does not
prevent varying TTL distances being possible for one router interface.
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5.1.3 Flickering trails
Flickering trails are another consequence of traffic engineering. Given a set of subnet interfaces that
are close in respect of the address space and located at the same TTL distances, the trails of these
interfaces are said to be flickering if they are anomaly-free but appear one after the other in sequence.
Example 5.2 shows a toy scenario of subnet interfaces exhibiting flickering trails, reusing the same
notation as in Example 5.1. In this example, 10.0.3.1 and 10.0.3.64 are flickering with each other.
The "flickering" term was picked to refer to how the expected result, i.e., seeing a specific interface of
the ingress router, is changing in a quasi random manner.
Listing 5.2: Flickering trails
1 0 . 0 . 5 . 3 5 − 7 [ 1 0 . 0 . 3 . 1 ]
1 0 . 0 . 5 . 3 7 − 7 [ 1 0 . 0 . 3 . 6 4 ]
1 0 . 0 . 5 . 3 8 − 7 [ 1 0 . 0 . 3 . 1 ]
1 0 . 0 . 5 . 4 2 − 7 [ 1 0 . 0 . 3 . 1 ]
1 0 . 0 . 5 . 4 4 − 7 [ 1 0 . 0 . 3 . 6 4 ]
While warping trails are most likely a consequence of asymmetrical paths in load balancers,
flickering trails are more likely to be a consequence of symmetrical paths in similar architectures. A
subnet is reached through different paths of the same length that converge towards the same ingress
router, and as a result, different interfaces from this ingress router are revealed by the traceroute
probes. By definition, flickering trails can only be anomaly-free trails: observing different possible
router interfaces one or more hops prior to a subnet does not mean the paths converge at the ingress
router, as they may converge sooner.
Figure 5.3 depicts another toy topology that could induce the flickering trails observed in Exam-
ple 5.2. The two green circles of R4 depict the router interfaces that can appear as the flickering trails
of the subnet interfaces from 10.0.5.0/25 due to the presence of symmetrical paths in the topology.
Again, the dashed circles highlight the alternative path. It is worth noting that the phenomenon
of flickering was actually first discovered on the ULiège network by reviewing the trails of subnet
interfaces belonging to well-known subnets, and turned out to be induced by parts of the topology
that were very close to the toy topology depicted in Figure 5.3.
In fact, Figure 5.3 is reminiscent of Figure 1.3 from Chapter 1. Indeed, the detection of flickering
trails immediatly raises the question of whether or not the associated router interfaces belong to the
same device or not, therefore motivating the use of alias resolution. If an alias resolution method
demonstrates that they belong to the same device, then subnet interfaces with aliased flickering trails
should be considered as being on the same subnet. Ignoring this hypothetical scenario can result in
subnet partitioning, i.e., the actual subnet is inferred as several smaller subnets due to the flickering
trails. Because there are few flickering trails per subnet in practice, the framework from Chapter 2 is
an ideal solution for resolving them.
It should be noted that, while spotting warping (anomaly-free) trails only requires a census
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Figure 5.3: Toy topology inducing the flickering trails from Example 5.2. Squares are pivot interfaces.
of all TTL distances observed for each router interface associated to an anomaly-free trail to be
done, detecting flickering trails is a bit more complicated. First of all, the largest possible flickering
delta needs to be defined: it expresses the difference between the 32-bit integer equivalent of the
IP addresses of two consecutive subnet interfaces (with respect to the address space). Then, if a
sequence of three consecutive subnet interfaces a, b and c such that
• all three are observed at the same TTL distance,
• the deltas between a and b and b and c are smaller than or equal to the largest allowed delta,
• a and c have identical trails, that differ from the trail of b,
can be identified, then the trails associated to a, b and c can be considered to be flickering with each
other. For example, the tree first subnet interfaces listed in Example 5.2 are enough to discover that
10.0.3.1 and 10.0.3.64 are flickering with each other if using a delta smaller than or equal to 4.
Obviously, the largest possible flickering delta should be tuned so that small gaps in the address
space between consecutive IP addresses are permitted. But these gaps should also be small enough
to avoid false positives, i.e., detecting flickering trails when the associated subnet interfaces are far
enough from each other in the address space to infer they may be on distinct subnets. A practical
algorithm for detecting flickering trails will be presented in Chapter 6, which will also briefly explain
how the alias resolution framework of Chapter 2 should be tuned for resolving them.
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5.1.4 Echoing trails
Finally, a modern subnet inference methodology should also take into account a peculiar phe-
nomenon: echoing trails. An echoing trail features the same IP address as the target interface of
the traceroute probes that led to its discovery, i.e., the trail is "echoing" the target IP address. This
observation might initially be assimilated as a cycle induced by a temporary network failure or some
misconfiguration, but an echoing trail has two defining characteristics:
• the target will never reply to probes with a TTL value equal to the TTL distance of the trail,
• there is no other occurrence of the IP address of the target in the path leading to it.
In fact, echoing trails are a systematic observation for given ranges of IP addresses, rather than
the result of occasional network failures or misconfiguration. This issue was first discovered while
reviewing traceroute data collected on a Belgian ISP. After reviewing the data with the help of a
network operator of the ISP, it transpired that the routers identified at the last hops of the collected
routes were configured to use the target IP address as the source IP of their own time-exceeded
replies as long as the source IP was in a neighboring subnet.
While this may initially suggest that subnet inference is impossible when the ingress router to
some subnet(s) behaves as aforementioned, a best effort strategy is possible as long as the TTL
distances are consistent. Indeed, if a set of subnet interfaces, consecutive with respect to the address
space, are all located at the same TTL distances while exhibiting echoing trails, this suggests at
the very least that the last hop router before each interface has the same approximate location
and behaviour. Therefore, the subnet interfaces likely share the same ingress router, and could be
considered as being on the same subnet. This heuristic will of course only work if the TTL distances
are consistent: if asymmetrical paths are crossed on the way, it becomes difficult to assume that
consecutive subnet interfaces with echoing trails but varying TTL distances are still on the same
subnet. Example 5.3 shows a toy sequence of subnet inferences with echoing trails, reusing the same
format as in Examples 5.1 and 5.2. Due to the constant TTL distances and consistent ingress router
behavior, gathering these interfaces under the same prefix can still result in a sound subnet.
Listing 5.3: Echoing trails
10 .0 .8 .1 28 − 4 [ 1 0 . 0 . 8 . 1 2 8 ]
10 .0 .8 .1 30 − 4 [ 1 0 . 0 . 8 . 1 3 0 ]
10 .0 .8 .1 31 − 4 [ 1 0 . 0 . 8 . 1 3 1 ]
10 .0 .8 .1 33 − 4 [ 1 0 . 0 . 8 . 1 3 3 ]
10 .0 .8 .1 35 − 4 [ 1 0 . 0 . 8 . 1 3 5 ]
Contrary to warping trails (cf. Sec. 5.1.2) and flickering trails (cf. Sec. 5.1.3), echoing trails are not
the result of traffic engineering policies and are actually caused by specific network equipment. As
discussed in the next section (cf. Sec. 5.2), they are an uncommon but noticeable occurrence in the
wild. Due to their nature, echoing trails are always unique.
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5.2 Subnet inference challenges in the wild
This section presents a study of warping trails (cf. Sec. 5.1.2), flickering trails (cf. Sec. 5.1.3) and
echoing trails (cf. Sec. 5.1.4) in the wild, using data collected from the PlanetLab testbed during
the fall of 2018. Sec. 5.2.1 first explains how the data was collected. Sec. 5.2.2 then presents the
observations and discusses their implications for subnet inference.
5.2.1 Measuring problematic trails
To study trails in the wild, a new measurement tool was designed during the second half of 2018. This
measurement tool was actually an early build of WISE [52, 53], a subnet inference tool created in the
context of this thesis that will be presented in detail by Chapter 6. At the time, WISE was only meant
to make a census of responsive IP addresses and conduct (Paris) traceroute measurements towards
each one to be able to identify their respective trail. It was also designed so that it could minimize
overhead probing while performing the traceroute measurements. With a few modifications, this
early build was also able to detect all types of problematic trails introduced in Sec. 5.1 (using a delta
value of 4 to detect flickering trails, cf. Sec. 5.1.3). The only task not performed by this early build,
apart from subnet inference, was the alias resolution of flickering trails.
Because the detection and subsequent analysis of responsive IP addresses did not change to any
great degree between the early build and the final version of WISE (with the obvious exception of
resolving flickering trails), the algorithmic details of these operations will be provided in Chapter 6
rather than in this section. Example 5.4 nevertheless provides a small sample of the typical data
that the early WISE collected, coming from a measurement performed on AS6453 (TATA Communi-
cations) from the PlanetLab testbed in December 2018 1. The format of the data is the same as in
the Examples 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. Note how the IP addresses starting in 116.0.70. have varying TTL
distances but similar trails: this suggests 180.87.12.45 is subject to warping.
Listing 5.4: Sample of data collected by the early build of WISE (December 2018)
116.0.68.150 − 15 [ 1 1 6 . 0 . 8 2 . 6 2 ]
116.0.68.151 − 14 [ 1 1 6 . 0 . 9 3 . 1 4 9 ]
116.0.68.201 − 13 [ 1 1 6 . 0 . 9 3 . 1 4 1 ]
116.0.68.206 − 13 [ 1 2 0 . 2 9 . 2 1 6 . 3 8 ]
11 6.0 .7 0.1 − 12 [ 1 8 0 . 8 7 . 1 2 . 4 5 ]
11 6.0 .7 0.2 − 10 [ 8 0 . 2 3 1 . 2 1 7 . 9 1 ]
11 6.0 .7 0.3 − 12 [ 1 8 0 . 8 7 . 1 2 . 4 5 ]
11 6.0 .7 0.4 − 11 [ 1 8 0 . 8 7 . 1 2 . 4 5 ]
11 6.0 .7 0.5 − 10 [ 1 8 0 . 8 7 . 1 2 . 4 5 ]
1https://github.com/JefGrailet/WISE/blob/master/Dataset/AS6453/2018/12/10/AS6453_10-12.ips
76
5.2. SUBNET INFERENCE CHALLENGES IN THE WILD
The early WISE collected data, not only to design the subnet inference it would later provide, but
also to study problematic trails. Moreover, since warping trails and flickering trails both result from
load balancing, the measurements were scheduled to renew the vantage points at each run. Indeed,
traffic engineering can vary depending from where a target network is being measured.
For convenience, the data collected on a single target network by any measurement tool from a
single vantage point and on a given date is defined as a snapshot. By collecting snapshots from the
same target network but from different vantage points (and on different dates), it becomes possible
to quantify how problematic trails depend on the vantage point.
Due to the limited amount of working PlanetLab nodes at the time 2, measurements with WISE
were scheduled with vantage point rotation, i.e., on each date, each target network would be mea-
sured from a specific vantage point. After collecting the new snapshots for all target networks, a new
measurement was scheduled but only after shifting the vantage points. By shifting all vantage points
between each measurement of all target networks once, it became possible to collect a snapshot of
the same target network from each available vantage point. The whole measurement campaign was
said to be finished when a complete rotation was achieved, i.e., for each target network, there was a
snapshot from each vantage point (or an attempt at collecting one).
ASN Name Origin Category
12956 Telefonica Global Solutions Spain Tier-1
3257 GTT Communications Inc. USA Tier-1
6453 TATA Communications USA Tier-1
6762 Sparkle Italy Tier-1
10010 TOKAI Communications Japan Transit
13789 Internap Corporation USA Transit
22652 Fibrenoire Inc. Canada Transit
286 KPN B.V. Netherlands Transit
30781 Jaguar Network France Transit
50673 Serverius Holding B.V. Netherlands Transit
5400 British Telecom UK Transit
6939 Hurricane Electric LLC USA Transit
703 Verizon Business/UUnet ASPAC USA Transit
8220 COLT Technology UK Transit
8928 Interoute Communications UK Transit
109 Cisco Systems USA Stub
14 Columbia University USA Stub
224 UNINETT Norway Stub
37 Navy Network Information Center (NNIC) USA Stub
4711 INTEC Inc. Japan Stub
52 University of California USA Stub
802 York University Canada Stub
Table 5.1: Summary of the 22 Autonomous Systems probed with WISE (early build) in late 2018.
2Only a few dozens of nodes could be used in late 2018.
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The data discussed in Sec. 5.2.2 was collected between November 29th and December 21st, 2018.
During this campaign, 22 different Autonomous Systems (or ASes) were measured by the early build
of WISE from 22 distinct PlanetLab nodes. By the end of the campaign, and since each AS had been
measured once from each PlanetLab node, almost 484 snapshots had been collected (i.e., minus a few
cases where the corresponding PlanetLab nodes had poor reachability). Table 5.1 shows a summary
of the ASes that were measured during this campaign. Most of the ASes found in this selection are
the same as those measured with TreeNET in 2017 (cf. Sec. 3.3 from Chapter 3), but with updated
prefixes and some additions, such as AS3257 (GTT Communications, Inc.) and AS6762 (Sparkle), two
Tier-1 ASes selected for their sizes (slightly more than two millions of attributable IP addresses for
AS3257, and less than 200,000 for AS6762) and high ranking in CAIDA’s AS ranking [2] at the time.
5.2.2 Observations from the PlanetLab testbed
One way to visualize the frequency of problematic trails within a given target network is to look
at the occurrences of trails affected by each issue. For instance, if a trail is found to be warping,
all occurrences of this trail in a snapshot can be counted and compared to the total number of
discovered trails in the same snapshot to evaluate the extent of the issue. Evaluating problematic
trails by occurrences rather than uniqueness is motivated by the fact that the latter would distort
interpretations in at least two ways. On the one hand, warping/flickering trails can be observed with
a few specific interfaces while these interfaces continue to appear as the trails for many (sometimes
most of) responsive IP addresses, so quantifying them with respect to unique trails could make
them look less important than they actually are. On the other hand, echoing trails would be over-
represented: echoing trails are unique by definition, therefore making up a large share of the unique
trails found in a snapshot, while few subnet interfaces are actually concerned by this issue.
Given a snapshot, the total trails affected by each kind of problem can be divided by the total
number of collected trails to compute a ratio. Then, for each target network, the ratios obtained
for each snapshot can be plotted depending on the snapshot. With this approach, it then becomes
possible to visualize, in a single figure, the extent of each issue for each target network, depending
on the vantage point. Due to the considerable amount of ASes probed between November 29th and
December 21st, 2018, only a few representative figures will be discussed in this section, but figures
for any campaign and any target AS can be browsed online in the public GitHub repository of WISE 3.
The first conclusion that can be drawn from Figure 5.4, which illustrates AS6453 (TATA Commu-
nications), a Tier-1 AS, is that all issues appeared in every snapshot, with the obvious exception of
December 17th, 2018, which was the result of the corresponding vantage point having poor reach-
ability, as very few trails could be obtained in practice. There is also no mention of a snapshot for
December 18th, 2018 (contrary to subsequent figures) as the corresponding PlanetLab node did not
find any responsive IP.
3https://github.com/JefGrailet/WISE/tree/master/Evaluation/Obstacles
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The second conclusion is important regarding subnet inference: the extent of each issue varies
considerably from one snapshot to another. Among the very first snapshots of the collection, prob-
lematic trails were in the minority, but almost 80% of the trails were affected by consequences of load
balancing (i.e., warping and flickering) in other snapshots. In particular, three hills can be seen in the
figure: December 6th and 7th, December 10th and 11th, and finally December 15th and 16th. In all
three cases, warping was the most common issue, but flickering was also well represented. Another
very interesting result is how flickering and warping seemed decorrelated: for instance, on December
6th and 7th, flickering affected less than 20% of trails while almost 80% of them were affected by
warping. There are however similarities between December 15th and 16th, but only one snapshot
showed any degree of correlation for December 10th and 11th. Finally, it is also worth noting that
flickering is sometimes the most common issue, as seen with the snapshots collected during the
early days of December 2018. All in all, these observations clearly suggest warping and flickering




































































Figure 5.4: Problematic trails in AS6453 (snapshots from November 29th and December 21st, 2018).
While the early build of WISE did not perform alias resolution on flickering trails (cf. Sec. 5.2.1), it
should be noted that a considerable amount of IP interfaces subject to flickering could be aliased
in multiple snapshots collected with the final WISE (presented in Chapter 6). In particular, when it
comes to snapshots of AS6453, many alias pairs or (small) alias lists could be detected thanks to the
iffinder-like (cf. Sec. 2.3.1.1) and Ally-like (cf. Sec. 2.3.1.2) methods used in the framework outlined
in Chapter 2. For instance, on February 19th, 2019, 37 out of the 62 IP interfaces associated with
flickering trails ended up in alias pairs or lists, and there were as many as 84 out of 119 IP addresses
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that appeared on alias pairs/lists the next day (from another vantage point) 4. In both snapshots,
flickering trails were first detected using a delta equal to 4 (cf. Sec. 5.1.3). Because the aforementioned
alias resolution methods are reliable when working with small sets of alias candidates, these results
further support the initial hypothesis that flickering results from reaching an ingress router through






































































Figure 5.5: Problematic trails in AS3257 (snapshots from November 29th and December 21st, 2018).
Figure 5.5 shows results for another Tier-1 AS, AS3257 (GTT Communications). Similar conclu-
sions can be drawn when it is compared to Figure 5.4: the presence of all three issues, the varying
amount of trails affected by each, and the decorrelation between warping and flickering. Figure 5.5
however differs from Figure 5.4 in two ways. First, more than 60% of trails are subject to warping in all
snapshots with the exception of the first and last snapshots, captured from PlanetLab nodes with poor
reachability. The ratios vary much more with flickering, as affected trails range from less than 10% to
almost 70% of all trails depending on the snapshot. Second, the echoing trails are quasi constant.
Such an observation should not be too surprising, since echoing trails are consequences of specific
equipment (cf. Sec. 5.1.4). It is, in fact, more surprising that the ratios of echoing trails vary slightly
with AS6453. Several hypotheses can be formulated: the IP addresses with echoing trails might be
reached through different equipment depending on the vantage point, small variations in the amount
of responsive IP addresses might change the ratios, and finally, some network misconfiguration or
failure might induce an actual cycle misinterpreted as echoing.
For completeness’ sake, previous figures will be now compared with the observations made on
4https://github.com/JefGrailet/WISE/tree/master/Dataset/AS6453/2019/02
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ASes featuring different classifications. First, Figure 5.6 shows the observations made on AS14, a
small AS managed by the Columbia University (located in New York City) usually characterized as
a Stub AS. The ratios of echoing and warping trails appear to be quasi constant and fairly low (i.e.,
below 10% of the total of trails), with the exception of two large hills of warping trails resulting from






































































Figure 5.6: Problematic trails in AS14 (snapshots from November 29th and December 21st, 2018).
Interestingly, the vantage points used for December 4th and December 5th were the same as
those used to capture the snapshots of December 15th and December 16th for AS6453, resulting in
a comparable hill. Moreover, those vantage points were PlanetLab nodes located in Sweden, while
both AS14 and AS6453 were located in the US, suggesting that the traffic engineering issues could be
correlated with the large geographical distances. However, similar phenomenons were observed with
the same ASes despite using PlanetLab nodes located in the US, on December 17th and December
18th for AS14 and December 6th and December 7th for AS6453. If it is also considered that flickering
trails occurred more frequently than warping trails with AS14, it can be concluded that the subnet
inference challenges discussed in this chapter are not exclusive to networks as important as Tier-1
ASes. This also further reinforces the conclusion that no issue cannot be completely avoided unless a
very close vantage point is used, i.e., from which traffic engineering will be minimized.
Finally, Figure 5.7 shows the observations for AS286, a Transit AS managed by KPN B.V., a Dutch
ISP. This time, the observations are somewhat similar to those illustrated on Figure 5.4, with one
exception: two of the three hills span over the equivalent of four snapshots instead of two, unlike in
previous figures. This suggests that, regardless of whether the vantage points were similar to those
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Figure 5.7: Problematic trails in AS286 (snapshots from November 29th and December 21st, 2018).
used to probe previous ASes and induced comparable results, the traffic engineering issues cannot
be completely linked to the use of specific vantage points. In this instance, at least four PlanetLab
nodes did not lead to similar observations for AS286 (or AS6453) and AS14.
5.3 Closing comments
As highlighted by the figures shown in Sec. 5.2.2, traffic engineering and its consequences should be
considered as unavoidable in the Internet today, and the traditional hypotheses of subnet inference
(cf. Sec. 4.1) should be re-evaluated. In particular, the TTL distance of subnet interfaces should no
longer be considered as a requirement, but rather an indication: the trail (as defined in Sec. 5.1.1)
should be the main criteria for verifying whether or not two subnet interfaces are reached through
the same ingress router. Trails themselves are subject to the consequences of load balancing, and
because of flickering trails (cf. Sec. 5.1.3), the trails of IP interfaces from the same subnet can vary.
Such an issue can only be solved with the help of alias resolution, e.g., with the fingerprint-based
framework of Chapter 2. Moreover, with echoing trails (cf. Sec. 5.1.4), the trails cannot be used to
identify one or several interface(s) of the ingress router, which means only a best effort approach
can be attempted. WISE [52, 53], a new subnet inference tool introduced in Chapter 6, implements a










WISE: WIDE AND LINEAR SUBNET INFERENCE
T
his chapter introduces a new tool that provides a linear time subnet inference scheme able
to deal with traffic engineering: WISE [52, 53] (for Wide and lInear Subnet inferencE). It
therefore answers research question 2 from Sec. 4.4. Section 6.1 begins with an overview of
the tool, notably detailing its purpose, its features and its workflow. The subsequent sections provide
the implementation and algorithmic details of WISE: Sec. 6.2 introduces some recommended data
structures, Sec. 6.3 presents the probing work and Sec. 6.4 explains the subnet inference itself.
6.1 WISE overview
WISE is a subnet inference tool capable of discovering the subnets of a target network, given a set
of input (IPv4) prefixes managed by the network. Its initial purpose is to refresh state-of-the-art
subnet inference practices by addressing the challenges previously discussed in Chapter 5, i.e., it
independently detects warping trails (cf. Sec. 5.1.2), flickering trails (cf. Sec. 5.1.3) and echoing
trails (cf. Sec. 5.1.4) to take them into account while inferring subnets. In particular, it includes the
alias resolution framework introduced in Chapter 2 in order to resolve flickering trails (cf. Sec. 6.3),
therefore allowing the discovery of subnets whose ingress router is a convergence point (cf. Sec. 6.3.3).
Not only is WISE better armed against traffic engineering (and specifically load balancing) than
its state-of-the-art predecessors, but it is also designed so that all its main algorithms feature a
linear time complexity. These two features result from its overall methodology, as WISE proceeds
in three major steps: discovery of the responsive IP interfaces, also known as target pre-scanning ,
estimation of the TTL distance and trail of each discovered interface, also known as target scanning ,
and offline subnet inference. This workflow is summarized in Figure 6.1 as a flow-chart. The chart
demonostrates how the two first steps, i.e. target pre-scanning and target scanning, are the steps that
were already implemented in the early build of WISE mentioned in Sec. 5.2.1.
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Target pre-scanning
Target scanning
Finds responsive IP interfaces within 
the target IP prefixes.
Probes responsive IP interfaces to evaluate 
TTL distances and to discover trails.
Subnet inference
Infers subnets with the collected data.
Inference algorithm in O(N)
Subnet post-processing in O(N)





Figure 6.1: WISE workflow.
Rather than probing subnet interfaces while discovering subnets (like ExploreNET, cf. Sec. 4.2.2),
WISE first collects the data it needs for subnet inference such that the inference can be carried out
without additional probing. This data collection first starts with the target pre-scanning, which simply
consists of probing every attributable IP address within the prefixes of a target network once to make
a census of responsive IP interfaces. In practice, WISE performs this operation two or more times (as
the user determines necessary) to avoid missing IP interfaces because of delays (cf. Sec. 6.3.1).
The main goal of target pre-scanning is to reduce the total of IP interfaces the target scanning
should consider, as a way to simplify the probe scheduling. Indeed, this second step sends several
probes towards each responsive IP interface to estimate its TTL distance and discovers its trail,
both being required for subnet inference. Because the target scanning analyzes each responsive IP
interface regardless of what subnet it is on, the time complexity of the operation can be easily made
proportional to the total number of responsive IP interfaces. This step is made even more efficient in
practice thanks to probing heuristics and multithreading, as will be explained in Sec. 6.3.
Once WISE is familiar with all responsive IP interfaces as well as their respective TTL distances
and trails, it infers subnets by finding the IP prefixes that best accommodates sets of consecutive (and
responsive) IP interfaces. This can be achieved by reviewing the list of discovered IP interfaces after
sorting it with respect to the address space, i.e., interfaces which the IP addresses have the lowest
32-bit integer values come first (e.g., 10.0.1.255 comes before 10.0.2.4). WISE can then pick the
first IP interface on the list, grow a subnet prefix from it and extract the subsequent IP interfaces
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encompassed by the expanding subnet from the list. As the subnet grows, it checks a set of rules to
guarantee the encompassed IP interfaces are part of the same subnet, and halts the growth if the
subnet no longer fits the criteria. Once a subnet reaches its final size, WISE can proceed by finding
the next subnets encompassing the remaining IP interfaces. As will be discussed in Sec. 6.4.1.2, each
discovered IP interface is evaluated a bounded number of times, resulting in an O (N ) inference
where N denotes the number of discovered IP interfaces. The subnet inference is completed with
a short post-processing, also in linear time, that aims at maximizing the accuracy of the results (cf.
Sec. 6.4.2).
Thanks to its design, WISE is a convenient tool able to scan the subnets within a set of target IPv4
prefixes in a short amount of time. As a result, it can be easily deployed from a single vantage point to
discover the subnet-level of a target network encompassing hundreds of thousands of responsive IP
interfaces. Finally, it is worth noting that WISE is an open source tool with a source code and dataset
that can be browsed online via a GitHub repository 1.
The rest of this chapter presents WISE in detail: the recommended data structures for any imple-
mentation (Sec. 6.2), the probing stage (Sec. 6.3) and the offline subnet inference (Sec. 6.4). Each
major algorithm will be described with pseudo-code and time complexity analysis. A validation of
WISE will be provided in Chapter 7, along with an analysis of snapshots (as defined in Sec. 5.2.1) of
the subnet-level of various ASes collected from the PlanetLab testbed throughout 2019.
6.2 Recommended data structures
The algorithms detailed in later sections can be implemented in any programming language as long as
probing utilities are available (usually as one or several side libraries). However, in order to make any
implementation convenient and efficient, at least three ad hoc data structures are recommended: an
IP dictionary (Sec. 6.2.1), an alias set (Sec. 6.2.2) and an IP aggregator (Sec. 6.2.3). These structures
are not mandatory but can help to achieve linear complexity with some algorithms detailed in
subsequent sections. Note that these data structures are not exclusive to WISE and will also be
involved in some algorithms of SAGE [54] (Subnet AGgrEgation), another topology discovery tool
developed during this thesis that will be presented in detail in Chapter 10.
6.2.1 IP dictionary
In order to store and manage the IP interfaces WISE discovers during the course of its execution
efficiently, an IP dictionary could be implemented. The purpose of this data structure is to map any
IP address with a small data structure providing all the details recorded for the interface associated
with this address, typically consisting of: the estimated TTL distance, the trail, a path obtained by
probing this IP address with (Paris) traceroute (if any) and the alias resolution data collected for it
1https://github.com/JefGrailet/WISE
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(if any). This data can be complemented with various flags advertising any special behaviour, such as
being part of a trail, or being affected by warping, flickering or echoing (as defined in Sec. 5.1).
It is crucial that the access to the data tied to any IP address, also called (dictionnary) entry,
is O (1). This can be achieved by using a hash table or by implementing a time/memory trade-off
with more simple structures. One option consists of using the X first bits of an IP address as the
index of a large array of lists, so that the size of the lists keeps a fairly low upper bound, achieving
O (1). For instance, with the IPv4 address space, the 20 first bits of any IP address can be used as
an index for the array of lists (therefore featuring 220 = 1,048,576 cells), resulting in lists having
at most 4,096 entries (i.e., the capacity of a /20 prefix). This solution is actually used by the public
implementation of WISE [49] (as well as SAGE [48]). In addition to storing data, an IP dictionary should
also provide various operations such as listing the recorded IP addresses (with or without special
behaviour), flagging special IP addresses, or writing all the entries to an output file. In later sections,
such operations will be used to get the input(s) of various algorithms, sometimes implicitly.
6.2.2 Alias set
During the course of its execution, WISE will use alias resolution to resolve IP addresses previously
identified as flickering trails (as defined in Sec. 5.1.3). After discovering alias pairs/lists, it should be
possible to retrieve a pair or list easily on the basis of an IP address that is part of it. Such an operation
is notably performed during the subnet inference step (cf. Sec. 6.4) to check whether two subnet
interfaces with flickering trails are accessed through the same ingress router.
In order to manage alias pairs/lists in a convenient manner, an alias set can be created to look
up one alias pair or list encompassing a provided IP address easily. One way to do this is to manage a
list of the alias pairs/lists (as data structures/objects) and a structure mapping any previously aliased
IP address to the associated alias pair/list (still as an object or data structure) at the same time. In
doing so, the pairs/lists can both be easily enumerated, notably to write them in an output file, while
making it easy to quickly look up a previously discovered alias pair or list. Depending on the nature of
the map structure, i.e. hash table or (balanced) tree 2, the looking up can be done in O (1) or O (log N )
with N denoting the total number of IP addresses being part of alias pairs/lists.
6.2.3 IP aggregator
To minimize probing while resolving flickering trails, WISE can take advantage of the alias transitivity
property first mentioned in Sec. 1.2. As a reminder, this property goes as follows: given three IP
addresses A, B , and C , if A and B are aliases of each other while B and C are aliases of each other too,
then A is also an alias of C . One way to take advantage of alias transitivity consists of building the
largest hypothetical alias lists before running the framework of Chapter 2. By doing so, each alias
candidate will be probed only once in the context of WISE, while testing separate alias pairs could
result in some alias candidates being probed multiple times.
2The map from C++ is typically a red-black tree, cf. https://en.cppreference.com/w/cpp/container/map.
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To achieve this, an IP aggregator, i.e., a data structure that eases the construction of hypothetical
alias lists, can be created. Such a structure can receive a possible alias pair and check whether or
not it has already recorded an alias pair/list already encompassing one of the IP addresses found in
the pair. If an overlap exists between the new pair and one of the previously recorded pairs/lists, the
aggregator builds a merged alias list on the basis of alias transitivity (unless both IP addresses in the
new pair are already known). In practice, an IP aggregator can be implemented in almost the same
manner as an alias set (cf. Sec. 6.2.2), i.e., by mapping any alias candidate to the current alias pair/list
it is found in. This can be implemented, again, with the help of a hash table or a balanced tree (e.g.,
like std::map in C++). As a consequence, a pre-recorded alias pair/list look-up can be achieved in
constant or logarithmic time (with respect to the total of alias candidates).
6.3 WISE probing
This section describes step by step the probing work of WISE. Sec. 6.3.1 presents the target pre-
scanning step while Sec. 6.3.2 explains the target scanning. Then, Sec. 6.3.3 details the final step of
target scanning, i.e., post-processing the collected data to detect the issues described in Chapter 5,
and in particular, flickering trails.
6.3.1 Target pre-scanning
6.3.1.1 Algorithms
The target pre-scanning begins with the list of IP addresses to probe. This list is typically obtained by
enumerating all attributable IP addresses contained in the IPv4 prefixes provided as input to WISE.
As already mentioned in Sec. 6.1, the pre-scanning consists of sending a single probe towards each
target IP address to make a census of all responsive IP addresses within the target network. For this to
be made possible, a high TTL value (e.g., 64) should be used in the probes to increase the chances of
getting a reply. Though, in theory, probes could use any protocol, the public implementation of WISE
uses an ICMP echo-request since network interfaces reply more often to direct ICMP probes [81].
Responsive target IP addresses are recorded in the IP dictionary (cf. Sec. 6.2.1).
In order to make pre-scanning efficient, the target IP addresses can be shared between multiple
threads. The way to schedule the threads is up to the implementation, as well as the total number
of threads, though it is recommended that each thread probes a comparable amount of target IP
addresses. However, it is highly recommended that the target IP addresses are ordered randomly to
avoid probing them sequentially. Indeed, such a probing schedule could typically be identified as an
attack on the target network and trigger rate-limiting policies.
Algorithm 6 summarizes target pre-scanning. This algorithm should not be changed when using
multiple threads: each thread will simply have its own list L. A probe with a large TTL value (e.g., 64,
as shown at line 4) is sent to the target for each target IP address provided to the thread (via the list L
in the algorithm). The probe can consist of a simple ICMP echo-request, as suggested by line 2, but
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Algorithm 6 Target pre-scanning
Require: T , the timeout delay for a single probe
Require: L, list of target IPs (for this thread)
Require: D , the IP dictionary
1: procedure TARGETPRESCANNING(Time T , List<IP> L, Dictionary D)
2: prober ← new ICMPProber(T )
3: for target ∈ L do
4: reply ← prober.probe(target, 64)
5: if reply.isValid() then
6: D .record(target)
other approaches can be considered if thought more appropriate. The thread then waits for the reply
and makes sure the reply is valid, i.e., if using an ICMP echo-request, a valid reply will be a correctly
formed ICMP echo-reply whose source IP address matches the target IP address. If the reply is
valid, the target IP address will be recorded in the IP dictionary (denoted D in the algorithm). When
using multithreading, such an operation must be made thread-safe. This is done by implementing
mutual exclusion between threads upon recording a new IP address in the dictionary, unless the
implementation of the dictionary guarantees there cannot be data corruption on recording different
IP addresses concurrently. It is worth noting that, in the case of the public implementation of WISE, a
timeout to a probe is modeled by a placeholder object returned by the prober object. Implicitly, the
isValid() method at line 5 returns false if reply is a placeholder. Finally, when a large number of IP
addresses turn out to be responsive, a thread should ideally wait for a short time (a few milliseconds)
before probing the next target, again to avoid triggering rate-limiting policies.
As briefly mentioned in Sec. 6.1, pre-scanning should be conducted more than once: a target IP
address can be unresponsive as a result of a temporary network failure. Therefore, it is recommended
to re-do pre-scanning at least once to maximize the number of discovered responsive IP addresses.
The public implementation of WISE typically runs the pre-scanning twice, with the second pre-
scanning round using twice the timeout value of the first round. This is why line 2 of Algorithm 6
uses a parameter T giving the timeout delay for a probe. The public implementation of WISE offers
an optional third pre-scanning round triggered by the user when deemed appropriate.
Finally, it is worth noting that TreeNET [55] already implemented a step equivalent to target pre-
scanning, as can be seen in its source code 3 and as briefly mentioned in Sec. 3.2.1. The differences
between WISE and TreeNET in that regard are inconsequential.
6.3.1.2 Time complexity
Assuming the target IPv4 prefixes provided for WISE at the start encompass up to N attributable IP
addresses and that the target pre-scanning sends a bounded number of probes towards each target
IP address (two to three probes with the public implementation of WISE), the time complexity is O (N )




crucial to reduce the total execution time. Reducing the initial timeout delay can also speed up the
pre-scanning, but this comes at a the cost of potentially discovering less responsive IP addresses.
6.3.2 Target scanning
6.3.2.1 Algorithms
The target scanning starts by listing all the responsive IP addresses that were previously recorded in
the IP dictionary. In order to conduct subnet inference, each recorded IP address needs to be probed
individually in order to estimate its TTL distance and discover its trail (as defined in Sec. 5.1.1). This
can be achieved by running Paris traceroute [11] towards each target IP address. The TTL distance
will be equal to the TTL value used by the last probe sent by Paris traceroute, i.e., the first probe
whose reply features the target IP address as the source. The trail can be easily derived from the
last hop(s) of the discovered route. The traceroute itself can be performed with differing network
protocols, though the public implementation of WISE relies on ICMP echo-request packets. As a
consequence, the first reply coming from the target should be an ICMP echo-reply packet.
However, because WISE only requires the final hop(s) towards each responsive IP address (and the
resulting TTL distance), the target scanning uses a probing reduction heuristic to avoid performing
a full traceroute measurement for each responsive IP address. Because interfaces from the same
subnet should ideally appear at the same TTL distance, IP interfaces that are consecutive (and close)
in the IPv4 address space are likely to appear at similar TTL distances. Moreover, subnets that are
close to each other in the address space can also appear at similar distances. Therefore, on probing a
succession of known IP interfaces, the target scanning can rely on the TTL distance discovered for
one interface to reduce the number of probes used to scan the next interfaces.
Before using the heuristic, the target scanning picks the very first target on the list of responsive
IP addresses to scan. This first target is probed with the classical (Paris) traceroute, the TTL value
of the probes starting at 1 4, and increasing with each probe until a reply (i.e., an ICMP echo-reply
packet in the case of WISE) from the target IP address has been received. This operation can be
referred to as forward probing [39]. The TTL value of the last probe is recorded as the TTL distance
between the vantage point and the target IP address, while the last hops before the target are used to
infer the trail. If these last hops are anonymous, additional probes are sent to make sure this is not the
result of a temporary failure. These additional probes first use the TTL distance of the target, minus
one, and decrease the distance with each new probe, until a non-anonymous IP interface replies.
This process of sending probes with a decreasing TTL can be referred to as backward probing [39].
The probing reduction heuristic can be used right from this point. The TTL distance discovered for
the first target is used as the starting TTL value for the forward probing towards the second target. If
the reply to the first probe does not come from this second target, then the forward probing continues
as normal. In this scenario, backward probing is eventually required if and only if the last hops prior
4In practice, with WISE, another initial TTL value can be used by tuning the probing parameters.
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to the target prove problematic for trail discovery. If the reply to the first probe comes directly from
the new target, however, the forward probing ceases already to be replaced with backward probing.
This probing heuristic is not entirely new: it is very close to ordinary backward probing [38].
In this scenario, backward probing is mandatory and has two goals. First, it minimizes the
TTL distance of the new target by decreasing the TTL value of the probes until direct replies from
this target are no longer received. Second, after adjusting the TTL distance, it collects just enough
traceroute data to reliably discover the trail. If the new target happens to be on the same subnet as
the previous target, then only two additional probes are necessary to confirm its TTL distance and
find its trail, as long as this trail is anomaly-free and if there is no warping (cf. Sec. 5.1.2). When the
trail is anomaly-free, the first additional probe both confirms the TTL distance and discovers the
trail itself, while the second additional probe guarantees the IP address associated to the trail is not
cycling 5. More broadly speaking, having discovered the last non-anonymous router interface in a
path, at least one additional probe is sent to make sure it is not cycling.
Regardless of the heuristic outcome, unless the second target IP address is located exactly next
to the vantage point (i.e., the TTL distance is equal to 1), there will be less probes in total than if a
full traceroute measurement has been conducted, especially if the second target happens to be on
the same subnet as the first (Sec. 6.3.2.2 will assess this). The heuristic can be repeated with each
subsequent target by re-using the TTL distance of the previous target, and target scanning as a whole
can be further sped up with multithreading, but with one major difference in respect of the target
pre-scanning (cf. Sec. 6.3.1): the probing reduction heuristic will only fully make sense if the targets
scanned by a single thread are consecutive in the address space. This detail aside, multithreading
and other probing details (such as conditions for interrupting forward/backward probing to avoid
problematic scenarii) depend on the implementation used.
Algorithm 7 Target scanning for a set of responsive (and consecutive) IP addresses
Require: T , list of reponsive (and consecutive) IP addresses (as objects)
1: procedure TARGETSCANNING(List<IPEntry> T )
2: prevTTL ← 1
3: for target ∈ T do
4: startTTL ← prevTTL
5: FORWARDPROBING(target, startTTL)
6: foundTTL = target.getTTL()
7: if foundTTL == startTTL or target.badRoute() then
8: BACKWARDPROBING(target)
9: target.setTrail()
10: prevTTL ← target.getTTL()
Algorithm 7 summarizes target scanning, including the probing reduction heuristic. In the same
way as Algorithm 6, this pseudo-code should not change when using multiple threads, as each thread
can simply have its own list of targets T . However, this pseudo-code assumes the targets are directly
provided as objects rather than as IP addresses, i.e., as their respective counterpart in the IP dictionary
5Here, the definition of cycle is restricted to consecutive occurrences of the same IP address.
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(cf. Sec. 6.2.1). This is mostly for convenience: indeed, handling the objects directly avoids going back
and forth to the IP dictionary (with mutual exclusion in case of multithreading). Before scanning the
targets, a prevTTL variable is created (line 2) in order to maintain the TTL distance of the previous
target, used to perform the probing reduction heuristic. There is, of course, no such TTL at the start, so
it is initially set to 1, which means that the startTTL variable used for the forward probing can, in all
cases, be set with prevTTL (cf. line 4). Forward probing is then performed (line 5), storing the (partial)
traceroute measurement within the provided object in mean time and setting the TTL distance
at the end. A need for backward probing is then evaluated: if the distance discovered by forward
probing equals the TTL value used by the first probe (as shown at line 7), then backward probing is
performed to both minimize the TTL distance (and adjust it if needed) and collect enough data for
trail discovery. Backward probing is also performed when the end of the (partial) route towards the
target leads to a trail with anomalies. Note that backwardProbing() only receives the target object
because this object is assumed to already contain the (current) TTL distance this procedure requires.
Once the probing has been completed, the object for the target has all the data it needs to set the
associated trail (line 9) and the prevTTL value can be updated for the next target.
Finally, it should be noted it is still possible that temporary failures or rate-limiting mechanisms
can impair target scanning, especially when it comes to trail discovery. This can happen, for instance,
on probing interfaces found in large and well populated subnets (i.e., most attributable IP addresses
on the subnet are responsive). Therefore, to maximize the amount of anomaly-free trails, a short
period of time can be allowed after having scanned all IP addresses, before repeating backward
probing on the target IP addresses whose trails still contain anomalies. The public implementation of
WISE implements such a mechanism. While scheduling backward probing tasks (i.e., threads), WISE
ensures targets are attributed to each thread by TTL distance: this increases the chances that the same
part of the target network gets re-probed by only one thread, again to minimize the risks of triggering
rate-limiting mechanisms. The inclusion of this mechanism depends on the implementation.
6.3.2.2 Time complexity and heuristic assessment
The time complexity of the target scanning obviously depends on the number of responsive IP
addresses discovered during pre-scanning (cf. Sec. 6.3.1). This value can be expressed as N . For an
individual target IP address, the very worst case would be to perform the traceroute-like forward
probing starting with an initial TTL value of 1 and increasing to the maximum TTL value defined
by the IP protocol [102], i.e. 255, or a maximum TTL value allowed by the program (e.g., 64; this
value is used in WISE). This worst case corresponds to an IP address that was responsive during
pre-scanning, but no longer replies during target scanning (or is located unusually far if using a lower
maximum TTL value than 255), and for which no previous TTL distance was available to benefit
from the probing reduction heuristic. But even in this (rare) worst case scenario, the total number of
operations (probes) is bounded by a constant. As the operations for a given target IP address do not
depend on N , it is safe to assume that scanning a single IP address is in constant time (O (1)) and that
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the time complexity of target scanning is therefore O (N ), in linear time.
In practice, target scanning can be a cumbersome process if performed without the probing
reduction heuristic and without multithreading. While the benefits of multithreading are immediate
and obvious (given M threads, each thread can scan N /M targets), the benefits of the probing
reduction heuristic should be assessed. To do so, another look at the test measurements conducted
with SAGE [54] in April 2021 will be taken (they were already discussed in Sec. 2.2.4). Indeed, SAGE (cf.
Chapter 10) is built on top of WISE, and therefore starts with the same sequence of algorithm steps
as WISE itself, therefore including a target scanning step. Moreover, with its slightly verbose mode
(also mentioned in Sec. 2.2.4), SAGE prints the out the (partial or full) traceroute paths collected for
each scanned target IP address. By comparing the length of the collected (partial or full) paths with
the TTL distance of each target IP address, it becomes possible to quantify how many probes have
been spared. Indeed, the TTL distance can be used to infer the total number of probes that would
have been sent if full traceroute measurements had been performed instead, while the length of
the collected paths gives an estimation of how many probes were actually used.
Metrics ULiège AS12956 AS13789 AS224 AS6453
Scanned IP addresses 3,175 94,249 7,772 46,130 89,418
Partial routes 2,146 93,973 7,528 45,873 85,242
Ratio of partial routes 67.59% 99.71% 96.86% 99.44% 95.33%
Average TTL distance 4.61 15.73 15.88 18.77 17.28
Theoretical #probes 14,646 1,482,962 123,385 865,980 1,545,412
Actual #probes 10,913 306,470 27,615 145,044 519,228
Ratio of spared probes 25.49% 79.33% 77.62% 83.25% 66.40%
Table 6.1: Quantifying the probing reduction heuristic with SAGE (April 2021).
Table 6.1 shows the results of the probing reduction heuristic assessment for the five measure-
ments conducted in early April 2021 from the Montefiore Institute, i.e., the same as discussed in
Sec. 2.2.4. The first part of the table provides the total number of responsive IP addresses that could
be successfully scanned, along with the number and ratio of partial traceroute records. These first
metrics are completed with the average TTL distance, as an indication of how many probes would
have been necessary, on average, to complete a traceroute measurement towards an IP address of
the given target network. The second part of the table presents how many probes would have been
needed to collect complete traceroute paths towards all responsive IP addresses, based on their
respective TTL distances, and how many probes were actually sent during target scanning. Finally,
the last line gives the ratio of theoretical probes that were not actually sent.
Table 6.1 clearly demonstrates that the probing reduction heuristic spares a considerable amount
of probes, even when the vantage point is close to or within the target network: indeed, the ULiège
column suggests that 25% of theoretical traceroute probes were avoided. All other columns show
that much more than half of the probes that would have, in theory, been required have been spared,
with more than 75% of them being spared with three of the five measurements. In conclusion, the
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target scanning as implemented by both WISE [49] and SAGE [48] can be said to be efficient thanks to
the combination of a linear complexity, multithreading and a powerful heuristic.
6.3.3 Detection of problematic trails
6.3.3.1 Algorithms
After the target scanning step has been completed, one quick post-processing must take place in
order to detect warping trails (cf. Sec. 5.1.2), flickering trails (cf. Sec. 5.1.3), and echoing trails (cf.
Sec. 5.1.4). In particular, flickering trails must go through alias resolution so that the subsequent
subnet inference (cf. Sec. 6.4) can tell whether or not two subnet interfaces with flickering trails have
indeed been reached through the same ingress router.
The warping trail detection is hopefully trivial: it just requires going through the list of scanned
IP addresses to make a census of all TTL distances observed for a given IP address appearing in
trails. In practice, to keep track of the IP addresses found in trails while browsing the scanned IP
addresses means simply taking advantage of the IP dictionary (cf. Sec. 6.2.1) and its (recommended)
access in O (1), and making sure the N scanned IP addresses can be processed in proportional time.
Finding echoing trails is even more simple: due to their nature, the scanned IP addresses where the
IP address of the trail is strictly equal to the scanned IP address simply needs to be flagged. Therefore,
identifying echoing trails does not require looking up other entries in the IP dictionary.
Flickering trails, as already discussed in Sec. 5.1.3, require more care, as shown by Algorithm 8. All
objects corresponding to scanned IP addresses are first extracted from the IP dictionary D (cf. line 2).
The listScannedIPs() method should provide them in an ordered manner with respect to the IP
address space. Next, each object is compared with the previous and following objects on the list
(line 10 and 11). To consider the presence of possible flickering, all three IP addresses should be close
in respect of the address space (line 12), using δ as the maximum difference, and must appear at the
same TTL distance (line 14). If the previous and subsequent objects have the same (anomaly-free)
trail (line 18) while differing from the (anomaly-free) trail of the current object (line 20), then the IP
addresses associated with both trails can be considered as flickering with each other.
Once all flickering trails have been identified, an IP aggregator (cf. Sec. 6.2.3) can be combined
with the alias resolution framework of Chapter 2 to check which IP addresses associated with flick-
ering trails are actually alias of each others. Each IP address associated with a flickering trail can
be added to the IP aggregator, along with the IP addresses it is flickering with in the collected data.
As the aggregator enforces alias transitivity (cf. 1.2), a list of the largest hypothetical alias lists can
be obtained. Since none of these lists overlap (i.e., they share no common alias candidate), each
one can be fed to the fingerprint-based framework to quickly test it. Due to flickering trails already
suggesting the associated IP addresses could be alias of each others, the fingerprint-based framework
can alias them by default when no practical method can be applied (cf. Sec. 2.3.2), though the public
implementation of WISE permits the program to be configured in such a way that it only allows
alias resolution based on the iffinder-like method (cf. Sec. 2.3.1.1) and methods based on the IP
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Algorithm 8 Detection of flickering trails
Require: D , IP dictionary
Require: δ, the largest allowed flickering delta
1: procedure DETECTFLICKERING(Dictionary D , Integer δ)
2: lsIPs ← D .listScannedIPs()
3: it ← lsIPs.begin()
4: for it 6= lsIPs.end() do
5: IP ← it.getContent()
6: if IP.getTrail().hasAnomalies() then
7: continue
8: if it.getPrev() == ; or it.getNext() == ; then
9: continue
10: prevIP ← it.getPrev().getContent()
11: nextIP ← it.getNext().getContent()
12: if IPDIFF(prevIP, IP) > δ or IPDIFF(nextIP, IP) > δ then
13: continue
14: if prevIP.getTTL() 6= IP.getTTL() or nextIP.getTTL() 6= IP.getTTL() then
15: continue
16: prevT ← prevIP.getTrail()
17: nextT ← nextIP.getTrail()
18: if prevT.hasAnomalies() or !prevT.equals(nextT) then
19: continue
20: if IP.getTrail().equals(prevT) then
21: continue
22: flickering1 ← D .get(IP.getTrail().getIP())
23: flickering2 ← D .get(prevT.getIP())
24: flickering1.setAsFlickeringWith(flickering2)
25: flickering2.setAsFlickeringWith(flickering1)
26: it ← it.getNext()
protocol identification field (cf. Sec. 2.3.1.2 and Sec. 2.3.1.3). Regardless of how the framework is
tuned, the resulting alias pairs or lists can be stored in an alias set (cf. Sec. 6.2.2) for subsequent use
during subnet inference (cf. Sec. 6.4). Unaliased IP addresses are subsequently no longer considered
as being subject to flickering.
6.3.3.2 Time complexity
Each kind of problematic trail can be quantified in O (N ) where N denotes the total number of
scanned IP addresses, as long as the access to one entry in the IP dictionnary is in constant time (cf.
Sec. 6.2.1). The case of the echoing trails is trivial, since each IP address with an echoing trail can be
immediately flagged as such without consulting other entries. Warping trails are a different matter:
for each scanned IP address, if its trail is anomaly-free, the entry in the IP dictionary matching the IP
address found in the trail must be retrieved. Then, the TTL distance of the trail (i.e., TTL distance of
the scanned IP address minus one) must be compared to the known TTL distance of the second entry.
If the TTL distances do not match, the second entry can be flagged as warping, and the distance
can be recorded. If the second entry has already been flagged as warping, then the only remaining
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operation consists of recording the new TTL distance (if new). This sequence of operations can
hopefully be O (1) for a given scanned IP address as long as checking the IP dictionary is achieved in
constant time, resulting in O (N ) (linear time) for the warping trail detection.
In the same way, identifying flickering IP addresses can be done in linear time too. Indeed, all
operations shown in Algorithm 8 are O (1) with the exception of the four instructions before the it
← it.getNext() instruction (lines 22– 25) in the body of the loop. The two first instructions are
O (1) if accessing an entry of the IP dictionary is in constant time, while the two last can be O (1) too
assuming the entries are added at the end of the lists (of flickering peers) without further processing,
e.g. via a simple push operation (i.e., like the push_back() method in the pseudo-code). Once all
flickering trails have been identified, the lists of flickering peers can easily be cleaned (i.e., they are
sorted and duplicate occurrences of an entry are removed) so that each peer only occurs once.
6.4 WISE inference
This section describes in detail how WISE can discover subnets, given the data collected and post-
processed at target scanning (cf. Sec. 6.3.2 and Sec. 6.3.3). Sec. 6.4.1 presents the main algorithms of
subnet inference, i.e., how WISE accommodates subnet prefixes on contiguous blocks of previously
scanned IP addresses while ensuring subnet soundness. Sec. 6.4.2 then introduces and discusses a
potential remaining issue after the inference, and how it can be mitigated with the help of a heuristic




The subnet inference performed by WISE is entirely offline: all the data it requires has already been
collected during the previous steps (cf. Sec. 6.3). The process of aggregating the previously scanned
IP addresses into subnets can be presented in a convenient manner by breaking it down in several
operations. The main algorithm, which creates and grows individual subnets, will be reviewed first.
The main algorithm starts with the list of the successfully scanned IP addresses, sorted on the
basis of their respective value as a 32-bit integer (by ascending order). An initial interface is picked at
the top of the list and a /32 subnet is built for it. This first IP interface will subsequently be known
as the reference pivot, i.e., the interface used to test whether subsequent interfaces are on the same
subnet. After creating this initial basic subnet, the algorithm decreases the prefix length of the subnet
and removes all IP addresses that are encompassed by the expanded subnet from the list. These IP
addresses will be denoted subsequently as candidate interfaces (or more simply candidates). Using
the reference pivot, these candidates are reviewed to see if they could correspond to pivot interfaces
(as defined in Sec. 4.1.2), i.e., IP addresses that are on the same subnet as the reference pivot. When a
candidate is not a potential pivot, it can either be considered as a potential contra-pivot interface (as
95
CHAPTER 6. WISE: WIDE AND LINEAR SUBNET INFERENCE
defined, again, in Sec. 4.1.2) or as an outlier, i.e., an interface which cannot be considered neither as
a pivot interface nor as a contra-pivot interface. Whether a candidate that is not a potential pivot will
be ruled as a contra-pivot interface or as an outlier will depend mostly on its TTL distance.
Depending on the number of pivot interfaces, contra-pivot interfaces and outliers discovered
among the candidates, the subnet inference decides whether the current subnet can be further
expanded or if it should be kept either as is or with an increased prefix length. In the two first
scenarios, the reviewed candidates are inserted into the subnet. The last scenario, i.e. increasing the
prefix length, is equivalent to shrinking the subnet because too many candidate interfaces (if not all)
are not on the same subnet as the reference pivot, leading to an inconsistent subnet. When shrinking
occurs, the candidate interfaces must be restored to the list of the scanned IP addresses so they can
be involved in the inference of the next subnet(s). As will be seen later, the main algorithm needs to
take account of the possibility that the reference pivot may have been updated during the review
of the candidates, i.e., it must be able to remember the reference pivot used at the last successful
expansion so it can restore it if the current expansion changed it and if shrinking occurs. On a side
note, a subnet is never grown beyond a given prefix length. In WISE, /20 is the smallest possible prefix
length (as mentioned in Sec. 4.3, /20 is the smallest subnet prefix length observed in the wild [118]).
Algorithm 9 shows the main algorithm of subnet inference in WISE, starting with a list of scanned
IP addresses I and an alias set A (as described in Sec. 6.2.2). This alias set provides the alias pairs/lists
resulting from flickering trails discovered at the end of target scanning. This set is used to decide
whether or not two flickering trails can be considered as belonging to the same ingress router.
Lines 4–6 create a new /32 subnet and inserts inside the first IP from the list I . This first IP is
automatically considered as the reference pivot. The subnet growth loop can start following this
(line 7). The prefix length of the current subnet is first decremented (line 8), and the code determines
whether the expanded subnet overlaps the last inferred subnet (if any), stopping the growth if such
overlap exists (line 9). This is essentially to prevent the production of inconsistent results: indeed,
depending on how a subnet expands, it can, in some instances, cover one or more previously inferred
subnets whose interfaces are already out of I . After this check, a second loop removes all potential
candidate interfaces from I that are now encompassed by the new subnet, shown at lines 12–14.
These candidates are then compared to the reference pivot, using the alias set A if flickering trails are
involved. The reference pivot does not appear directly in the call to the review() function as it is
considered to be stored within the subnet object (line 16). Immediately prior to that, the reference
pivot used by the last successful expansion is copied into a side variable in case the subnet needs to
be shrunk (line 15), so that this previous reference pivot can be restored if necessary (line 21). The
reviewed candidate interfaces are subsequently fed to a diagnostic function along with the subnet
itself. This function, which will be detailed later (see Algorithm 11) returns: 0 if the subnet can be
grown further, 1 if the growth needs to stop without changing the prefix length and 2 (or more) if the
subnet has to be shrunk (line 17). If shrinking is required, the reviewed interfaces are put back in
I (lines 19–23). When the growth just needs to stop, the reviewed candidates are inserted into the
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Algorithm 9 Main algorithm of subnet inference
Require: I , sorted list of scanned IP addresses
Require: A, the alias set resulting from flickering trails
1: function SUBNETINFERENCE(List<IPEntry> I , AliasSet A)
2: subnets ← new List<Subnet>()
3: for I .size() > 0 do
4: reference ← I .pop()
5: subnet ← new Subnet()
6: subnet.addInterface(reference)
7: for subnet.getPrefixLength() ≥ M I N _PREF I X do
8: subnet.expand()
9: if subnet.overlap(subnets.back()) then
10: subnet.shrink()
11: break
12: candidates ← new List<IP>()
13: for subnet.encompass(I .front()) do
14: candidates.add(I .pop_front())
15: oldReference ← subnet.getReferencePivot()
16: reviewed ← REVIEW(subnet, candidates, A)
17: stop ← DIAGNOSE(subnet, reviewed)
18: if stop > 0 then
19: if stop > 1 then
20: subnet.shrink()
21: subnet.updateReferencePivot(oldReference)









subnet before quitting the current loop (line 25). If the growth can continue, the reviewed candidates
are also inserted before the next iteration of the loop (line 28).
The r evi ew() function shown in Algorithm 9 at line 16 will next be elaborated. This function
replaces the process of determining whether each of the candidate interfaces can be considered as
a potential pivot interface, as a contra-pivot interface or as an outlier. Remember that a candidate
interface is considered as a potential pivot interface if it is said to be on the same subnet as the
reference pivot. To check this, the properties of each candidate (trail and TTL distance) are compared
to those of the reference pivot by testing up to five inference rules. All rules have the same underlying
idea: two IP interfaces, close with respect to the IP address space, can only be on the same subnet if
the IP addresses associated to their trails belong to the same ingress router, and, if such a relationship
cannot be elucidated, they should at the very least be observed at the same TTL distance while
their trails should exhibit a similar behaviour. In other words, if two candidates are at the same TTL
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distance but have distinct trails, they can be considered as being reached through the same ingress
router if they exhibit echoing trails or if the anomalies (cf. Sec. 5.1.1) differ between both trails (e.g.,
as a result of occasionnal rate-limiting policies). The rules are tested in sequence: if rule 1 cannot be
met, rule 2 is tested, then rule 3 if rule 2 cannot be met either, etc. A candidate is ruled as a potential
pivot interface of the current subnet as soon as one rule has been satisfied.
The five inference rules are:
• Rule 1: both interfaces have the exact same trail.
• Rule 2: both interfaces do not share the same trail, but are located at the same TTL distance
and their trails differ in terms of anomalies (as defined in Sec. 5.1.1).
• Rule 3: both interfaces are located at the same TTL distance and exhibit echoing trails.
• Rule 4: both interfaces are located at the same TTL distance and their trails are both flickering
with each other and previously aliased.
• Rule 5: both interfaces are not located at the same TTL distance and do not share the same
trail; however, the IP addresses found in the trails were aliased as a result of resolving flickering
trails, meaning they belong to the same device and are reached through asymmetrical paths.
Rule 2 is a way to ensure that an interface located at the same TTL distance as all other interfaces
in a subnet is not mistaken for an outlier because its trail could not be discovered accurately (i.e.,
the trail contains anomalies due to a temporary failure or a rate-limiting policy at the time of target
scanning). While testing this rule, an implementation should consider replacing the reference pivot
with the candidate interface if this candidate has a better trail (i.e., less or no anomalies), so that
subsequent candidates with less or no anomalies can be compared more accurately.
When a candidate interface does not meet any rule, two options remain: it is either a potential
contra-pivot interface or an outlier. A candidate is considered as the former if and only if its TTL
distance is lower than the TTL distance of the reference pivot. Otherwise, the interface is considered
to be an outlier, except in a unique scenario. If the current subnet only features a single interface
(the reference pivot) and if the difference in distance between the potential outlier and this interface
is equal to 1 (i.e., the outlier is located farther), the algorithm swaps the roles and re-considers the
reference pivot as a contra-pivot while the outlier becomes the new reference pivot. This special
case ensures a contra-pivot interface, initially mistaken for a pivot interface, is eventually correctly
identified as a contra-pivot.
Algorithm 10 provides a pseudo-code detailing how the review() function from Algorithm 9
works. This algorithm is straightforward, as it consists of selecting one of the candidates then testing
each rule of inference until one is met (starting from line 5). Whenever a rule has been met or any
other scenario confirmed, a SubnetInterface object is created and inserted onto the list of the
reviewed candidates, combining the candidate itself with a constant value denoting the type of
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Algorithm 10 Review of the candidates for a subnet S
Require: S, the subnet under expansion
Require: C , list of candidate interfaces (current expansion)
Require: A, the alias set resulting from flickering trails
1: function REVIEW(Subnet S, List<IPEntry> C , AliasSet A)
2: reference ← S.getReferencePivot()
3: reviewed ← new List<SubnetInterface>()
4: for candidate ∈ C do
5: if RULE1(reference, candidate) then
6: reviewed.push_back(new SubnetInterface(candidate, RU LE_1))
7: else if RULE2(reference, candidate) then
8: reviewed.push_back(new SubnetInterface(candidate, RU LE_2))
9: betterReference ← COMPARETRAILS(reference, candidate)
10: if betterReference 6= reference then
11: reference ← betterReference
12: S.updateReferencePivot(betterReference)
13: else if RULE3(reference, candidate) then
14: reviewed.push_back(new SubnetInterface(candidate, RU LE_3))
15: else if RULE4(reference, candidate, A) then
16: reviewed.push_back(new SubnetInterface(candidate, RU LE_4))
17: else if ref.getTTL() > candidate.getTTL() then
18: if RULE5(reference, candidate, A) then
19: reviewed.push_back(new SubnetInterface(candidate, RU LE_5))
20: else
21: reviewed.push_back(new SubnetInterface(candidate, CON T R APIV OT ))
22: else if ref.getTTL() < candidate.getTTL() then
23: if RULE5(reference, candidate, A) then
24: reviewed.push_back(new SubnetInterface(candidate, RU LE_5))
25: else
26: diff ← candidate.getTTL() - ref.getTTL()
27: if S.getNbInterfaces() == 1 and diff == 1 then
28: S.clear()
29: S.add(candidate)
30: reviewed.push_back(new SubnetInterface(reference, CON T R APIV OT ))
31: reference ← candidate
32: else
33: reviewed.push_back(new SubnetInterface(candidate, OU T LI ER))
34: else
35: reviewed.push_back(new SubnetInterface(candidate, OU T LI ER))
36: return reviewed
interface it would constitute within the subnet (each RU LE_X constant denotes the rule of inference
with which the associated pivot was successfully tested). However, there are several particular cases
to consider. Testing rules 4 or 5 notably requires the alias set A, and if rule 2 is verified, the algorithm
must check whether the candidate features a better trail than the reference pivot and replace it when
necessary (lines 9–12). As can be seen at lines 17–18 and at lines 22–23, rule 5 is only tested when the
candidate interface and the reference pivot have distinct TTL distances. When the TTL distance of the
candidate is lower, either the candidate turns out to be a potential pivot via rule 5, or it is ruled to be
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a potential contra-pivot (lines 17–21). When the TTL distance of the candidate is higher and rule 5 is
not satisfied, then either there is an outlier (line 33), or a scenario where the reference pivot might be a
contra-pivot after all. This scenario is plausible if and only if the subnet S contains only one interface
(the reference pivot) while the difference in TTL between the reference pivot and the candidate is
strictly equal to 1. If verified, the roles between these interfaces are exchanged (lines 26–31) and kept
for the rest of the review. Finally, when no rule has been met while the candidate and the reference
pivot feature equal TTL distances, the candidate is ruled as an outlier (line 35).
The di ag nose() function shown in Algorithm 9 at line 17 is the last main operation to review.
This part of the algorithm consists of deciding whether or not to include the reviewed candidates in
S results in a sound subnet or not, returning an integer value demonstrating if S can be expanded
further (0), if its growth should stop (1) or if it needs to be shrunk (2). The diagnosis mostly depends
on the presence of potential contra-pivot interfaces among the reviewed candidates. If there is no
potential contra-pivot interface at all, the subnet either keeps growing or is shrunk, the decision
being based on the ratio of outliers found within the candidate interfaces. If pivot interfaces are in
the majority, then the growth can continue. In the public implementation of WISE, pivot interfaces
are considered to be in the majority if outliers make up less than 1/3 of the number of candidates 6.
If the candidate interfaces contain one or several potential contra-pivot interfaces, the diagnosis
must be more thorough. First of all, if there are more interfaces other than contra-pivot interfaces
among the candidates, the outliers should not account for more than 1/3 of the candidates, otherwise
the scenario is too risky to be kept as is. The current prefix length is also rejected if the number
of contra-pivot interfaces is above a constant 7 or if there are more contra-pivots than pivots in
total (i.e., including the pivots already stored in S). There is, however, a practical exception to the
latter: WISE tolerates subnets featuring two contra-pivot interfaces and one pivot interface, as it has
been observed on groundtruth networks (which will be discussed in Sec. 7.1) that such a scenario is
possible with small subnets. Such subnets usually play a key role in the network topology and are
therefore reached through several interfaces of the ingress router (i.e., there is at least one back-up
interface), but do not not necessarily have more than one pivot interface.
If there is only one contra-pivot candidate at this point, then the subnet growth stops, because a
subnet featuring mostly (if not only) pivot interfaces with the exception of one contra-pivot interface
already corresponds to the ideal measurement-based definition of a subnet (cf. Sec. 4.1.2). Doing this
also prevents the subnet inference from badly inferring groups of small subnets (i.e., /30 or /31) that
are consecutive in the IP address space and which often consist of one pivot and one contra-pivot
interface: as WISE is supposed to tolerate multiple contra-pivot interfaces, growing past that point can
produce overgrown subnets. However, if the candidates include more than one possible contra-pivot
interface, the diagnosis should perform additional tests to guarantee that the contra-pivot interfaces
are consistent. Because there are several possible and arbitrary tests, this part of the subnet inference
can be freely tuned depending on which guarantees the implementation should put on contra-pivot
6As with other arbitrary values, this can be tuned upon starting WISE.
7In WISE, the maximum number of contra-pivots is set to 5.
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interfaces. A simple test consists of checking whether contra-pivots are located at the same TTL
distance and share the same trail. In practice, while the public implementation of WISE does the
first, it does not perform the second as traffic engineering can cause a subnet to be reached through
multiple paths, which can result in having multiple contra-pivot interfaces with differing trails.
Algorithm 11 Diagnosis for a group of reviewed candidates
Require: S, the subnet under expansion
Require: R, list of reviewed candidate IPs
1: function DIAGNOSE(Subnet S, List<SubnetInterface> R)
2: nbPivots ← COUNTPIVOTS(R)
3: nbContrapivots ← COUNTCONTRAPIVOTS(R)
4: nbOutliers ← COUNTOUTLIERS(R)
5: maxOutliersRatio ← R.size() / 3
6: if nbContrapivots > 0 then
7: nonContrapivots ← nbPivots + nbOutliers
8: if nonContrapivots > nbContrapivots and nbOutliers ≥ maxOutliersRatio then
9: return 2
10: else if nbContrapivots > M AX _CON T R APIV OT S then
11: return 2
12: else if nbContrapivots > nbPivots + S.getNbPivots() then
13: return 2
14: if nbContrapivots > 1 then











However, WISE implements a custom heuristic named overgrowth test. This test consists of
trying to accommodate sub-prefixes on the reviewed candidates in order to check if it is possible
to obtain sub-prefixes covering together all the candidates while each sub-prefix features only
one contra-pivot interface. This test can be easily implemented by re-using the main principles of
Algorithm 9 on a copy of the list of candidates, but using the contra-pivot interfaces as the initial pivot
of each sub-prefix. Each sub-prefix is then expanded until it starts overlapping the other contra-pivot
interface(s), at which time it is shrunk once. Other candidate interfaces overlapped by this sub-prefix
are then removed from the copy of the list of candidates (along with the contra-pivot itself), and
if no candidates remain after creating each sub-prefix, then this means ideal sub-prefixes can be
discovered within the list of candidate interfaces. In such a scenario, WISE rejects the current subnet
prefix because these sub-prefixes are closer to the ideal definition of a subnet, and assumes the
current subnet may simply not have a visible contra-pivot interface. This test, which is performed, at
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worst, once per subnet, is designed to prevent subnet overgrowth and can be performed in linear
time with respect to the number of candidates. Depending on how an implementation processes the
subnets after their inference, this heuristic may or may not be implemented.
Algorithm 11 summarizes, in pseudo-code, the operations carried out by the diagnose() func-
tion mentioned in Algorithm 9. It starts by quantifying the different types of interfaces and establish-
ing the maximum tolerated number of outliers, denoted maxOutliersRatio in the pseudo-code, as
shown at lines 2–5. The subsequent operations depends on whether or not there are potential contra-
pivot interfaces (line 6), and in particular, the diagnosis entirely depends on the ratio of outliers
among candidates if there is no contra-pivot interface at all (lines 22–25). Otherwise, the diagnosis
confirms that the quantities for each type of interface are still sound (lines 7–13). If there is more
than one contra-pivot interface, diagnose() has to check the candidate interfaces further to verify
whether the contra-pivot interfaces are consistent, notably by checking if all contra-pivot interfaces
appear at the same TTL distance or by performing the overgrowth heuristic used by the public imple-
mentation of WISE (line 15). These additional tests, which can be customized, are symbolized here
by the consistentContrapivots() function, which returns true when the contra-pivot interfaces
satisfy all tests. In that case, the diagnose() function as a whole can return 1 (no shrinking), other-
wise it will return 2. Finally, as none of these tests are performed when there is a single contra-pivot
interface, the function will immediately return 1 in this scenario.
6.4.1.2 Time complexity
The subnet inference has a linear complexity in respect of the number of scanned IP addresses it
has to aggregate into subnets, which will be denoted by N . While evaluating the current prefix of a
growing subnet, the algorithm has to consider and process a certain number of candidates interfaces.
This number will be represented by M , which is strictly inferior to N (because the inference can never
consider all N interfaces at the same time by design) and bounded by the size of the current prefix
divided by 2 (since the other half has already been evaluated at the previous expansion).
The evaluation of a subnet prefix is split into two main operations: review and diagnosis. During
the review, each of the M candidate interfaces is compared with the reference pivot only once, regard-
less of whether the reference pivot has been updated. All operations within the loop in Algorithm 10
are in O (1) as long as the looking up of an alias pair/list for a given IP address in an alias set is O (1) too
(as suggested by Sec. 6.2.2), since rules 4 and 5 require an alias set built after discovering flickering
trails. In practice, because there are usually a small number of flickering trails, finding an alias in
logarithmic time should barely change the overall execution time. Indeed, if the measurements con-
ducted from the Montefiore Institute in early April 2021 with SAGE [54] (already discussed in Sec. 2.2.4
and Sec. 6.3.2.2) are re-examined, the total of IP addresses found in alias pairs/lists, recorded in the
alias set, are negligible for every target network (especially compared to the total of IP addresses to
handle). Table 6.2 provides the total of successfully aliased flickering trails and the size of the largest
alias list for each measurement. The total of scanned IP addresses is provided as well to give an order
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of magnitude for the number of IP addresses dealt with during each measurement 8. Therefore, the
time complexity of the review should ideally be O (M), and as close as possible to it in practice if
finding an alias pair/list in the alias set is done in logarithmic time.
Metrics ULiège AS12956 AS13789 AS224 AS6453
Scanned IP addresses 3,175 94,249 7,772 46,130 89,418
Aliased flickering trails 4 70 8 48 22
Largest alias list (#IPs) 2 8 2 4 3
Table 6.2: Quantifying aliased flickering trails with SAGE (April 2021).
The case of the diagnosis formalized in Algorithm 11 is not much more complex: for instance,
counting the number of interfaces for each type (i.e., pivot, contra-pivot and outlier) can be done in
linear time (i.e., O (M)). The additional tests performed when several potential contra-pivot interfaces
are discovered can be O (1), since they are constant operations involving at worst one or two loops
over a bounded number of contra-pivot interfaces (cf. the constant MAX_CONTRAPIVOTS used in
Algorithm 11). At the very least, these additional verifications can be O (M), notably if the overgrowth
heuristic used by the public implementation of WISE is implemented: indeed, this heuristic has a
time complexity proportional to M , since each candidate is handled at worst once. Therefore, the
worst case for the diagnostic is O (2M) =O (M), and the evaluation of a single subnet prefix as a whole
is O (M). In an ideal scenario where no subnet shrinking takes place, each of the M interfaces of the
evaluation of a given prefix is evaluated by the whole algorithm only once, as these interfaces are
removed from the initial list (i.e., M is substracted to N ). As a consequence, in this ideal scenario, the
entire execution is proportional to N .
However, growing and shrinking several subnets consecutively can lead to comparing one IP
interface with others twice or more. To check whether or not the complexity of subnet inference is
still linear, the two possible worst cases that could induce multiple comparisons of a given scanned IP
interface with others will be examined. In the first scenario, the network exclusively consists of small
subnets featuring only one interface (e.g., a /32 or a /31 prefix). On expanding the subnet, one or two
other IP addresses are encompassed, but since they are not compatible with the current interface,
they are quickly put back in the initial list of scanned IP addresses and therefore considered a second
or a third time during the inference of the next subnets. Therefore, all IP addresses are compared to
other (close) interfaces up to a bounded number of three times, i.e., O (3N ) =O (N ).
In the second worst case scenario, the network consists of consecutive subnets whose prefix
length progressively increases (e.g., a /25, then a /26, then a /27, etc. all contained in a /24 prefix).
Indeed, the last expansion (assuming it occurs) of the first will encompass all other interfaces, but as
they are on different subnets, they will be put back onto the list, after which the same scenario will
occur again but on a smaller scale. In the end, the interface(s) of the smallest subnet will be compared
as many times as there are subnets. Therefore, the total number of comparisons is bounded by
N +N /2+N /4+ ... = 2N . Given that the subnet inference as implemented by WISE does not go lower
8In practice, IP addresses found in flickering trails are not necessarily part of the scanned IP addresses.
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than the /20 prefix, this specific worst case even has an upper bound for the number of processed
interfaces. Therefore, the complexity of the subnet inference of WISE is in linear time, i.e., O (N ).
6.4.2 Subnet post-processing
6.4.2.1 Algorithms
Despite being cautious, the subnet inference detailed in Sec. 6.4.1 can occasionally produce under-
grown subnets. Indeed, a subnet stops growing as soon as it includes one or several contra-pivot
interfaces (i.e., several during the same expansion), and subsequent subnets cannot overlap previ-
ously discovered subnets by design. Both design decisions aim at preventing subnet overgrowth, but
can end up partitioning large subnets, much like with ExploreNET (cf. Sec. 4.2.2). This notably occurs
when the contra-pivot interface(s) are found among the first IP addresses of a growing prefix. As a
result, a large subnet can appear as one long prefix, matching the measurement-based definition of a
subnet (cf. Sec. 4.1.2), followed by a succession of similar or smaller prefixes exclusively containing
pivot interfaces. Figure 6.2 illustrates this partitioning issue for a /28 subnet where the four first IP
addresses allowed to find a sound /30 prefix, resulting in the remaining pivot interfaces ending up in
a /30 prefix and another /29 prefix, both being undergrown in respect of the actual subnet.
IPv4 address space (ascending order)
/30 subnet /30 subnet /29 subnet
Sound Undergrown Undergrown
/29 subnet prefix
/28 subnet prefix (actual subnet prefix)
Figure 6.2: A residual case of subnet partitioning after conducting the subnet inference of Sec. 6.4.1.
This partitioning issue is addressed in one of two ways. First, the subnet inference in WISE actually
reviews the scanned IP addresses in reverse, i.e., it starts with the interfaces whose IP addresses are
the highest in the IP address space when considering their equivalent 32-bit value. This heuristic
is motivated by the fact that, in the vast majority of snapshots (as defined at Sec. 5.2.1) collected
with either WISE or previous state-of-the-art tools (cf. Sec. 4.2), the contra-pivot interfaces tend to
appear among the first IP addresses of large subnets rather than the opposite. As a result, processing
the scanned IP addresses in reverse ensures the subnet inference will review a large number of
104
6.4. WISE INFERENCE
pivot interfaces before discovering contra-pivot interfaces, therefore maximizing the size of larger
subnets. Unfortunately, this heuristic cannot completely prevent subnet partitioning, as contra-pivot
interfaces can be found anywhere in the address space of a subnet in theory. This is why WISE also
implements a post-processing step that detects undergrown subnets and attempts to merge them
with subnets that are adjacent in the address space to recover larger subnet prefixes.
The post-processing as implemented by WISE works as follows. During the subnet inference
(cf. Sec. 6.4.1), any subnet where the growth has had to be stopped because it started overlapping
previously inferred subnet(s) (see line 9 of Algorithm 9) can be flagged so that it will be quickly
identified by the post-processing. After the inference, the post-processing starts to review the list of
inferred subnets until it comes across an undergrown subnet. Then, it decrements the prefix length of
this undergrown subnet and examines the list to enumerate subnets overlapped by the new prefix. In
practice, because decreasing once the prefix length only expands the subnet on one side (i.e., either
the lower bound, either the upper bound of the prefix has changed, but not both at the same time),
picking subnets from one side of the list is enough. If there is at least one overlapped subnet, the
post-processing verifies if merging the overlapped subnet(s) with the current undergrown subnet
produces a more interesting result. If so, the overlapped subnets are moved to a side list storing the
subnets which can be merged for sure and the expansion of the initial undergrown subnet resumes
in order to see if there are subnets to be merged. Otherwise, if the merging scenario produces an
incoherent result, the newly overlapped subnets are put back onto the list where they came from
and the expansion stops, with the undergrown subnet being shrunk once. If the list of subnets that
can be merged for sure is not empty, then they are actually merged with the undergrown subnet and
the result is added to the final list of subnets. Post-processing will proceed by searching for another
undergrown subnet, until it has completely reviewed the inferred subnets.
Algorithm 12 presents the main algorithm for post-processing a list of inferred subnets S. As
explained before, it begins by picking a subnet from the list of inferred subnets and checks whether or
not this subnet is undergrown. If this is not the case, the traversal of the list simply resumes (lines 4–
7). Otherwise, a list to store the subnets which can be merged is created and the post-processing
starts expanding the undergrown subnet (line 8). At each new prefix length, the algorithm checks
the direction in which the subnet is expanding and picks the subnets which are now overlapped in
either direction (lines 10–18). If the list of overlapped subnets (named candidates in this example)
is empty, then the expansion continues (line 19). Otherwise, the post-processing tests the merging
scenario (line 21), providing all subnets that needs to be merged (including those that can be merged
for sure, found at a previous iteration and stored in mergeable). Depending on the outcome, the
algorithm either stops the expansion, restoring the newly overlapped subnets to their respective list
and shrinking once in the process (lines 22–28), or stores the mergeable subnets in the mergeable
list (created at line 8) before resuming the expansion (lines 30–31). Once the expansion loop ends, the
subnets stored for merging are actually merged with the initial undergrown subnet and the resulting
subnet is added to the final list of subnets (lines 32–34). If no optimal merging scenario is to be found,
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Algorithm 12 Subnet post-processing (main algorithm)
Require: S, the list of inferred subnets
1: function POSTPROCESS(List<Subnet> S)
2: postProcessed = new List<Subnet>()
3: for S.size() > 0 do
4: currentSubnet ← S.pop_front()
5: if !currentSubnet.isUndergrown() then
6: postProcessed.push_back(currentSubnet)
7: continue
8: mergeable ← new List<Subnet>()
9: for currentSubnet.getPrefixLength() ≥ M I N _PREF I X do
10: candidates ← new List<Subnet>()
11: leftExpansion ← currentSubnet.expandsToTheLeft()
12: currentSubnet.expand()
13: if leftExpansion then
14: for currentSubnet.overlaps(postProcessed.back()) do
15: candidates.push_front(postProcessed.pop_back())
16: else
17: for currentSubnet.overlaps(S.front() do
18: candidates.push_back(S.pop_front()))
19: if candidates.size() == 0 then
20: continue
21: if !CANMERGE(currentSubnet, mergeable, candidates) then
22: currentSubnet.shrink()
23: for candidates.size() > 0 do






30: for candidates.size() > 0 do
31: mergeable.push_back(candidates.pop_front())








then the initial undergrown subnet is simply moved to the final list without any change (line 36) and
the main loop resumes until it has processed all inferred subnets.
The canMerge() function shown in Algorithm 12 at line 21 and what it can do to decide whether
a merging scenario is sound or not is next examined. The most straightforward approach consists of
testing whether or not the following rules are satisfied or not.
• Merging rule 1: no more than one subnet among the overlapped subnets can contain one or
several contra-pivot interface(s).
• Merging rule 2: no subnet in the merging scenario can be the result of a previous post-
processing.
• Merging rule 3: each subnet other than the initial undergrown subnet has a reference pivot
that can satisfy a subnet inference rule (cf. Sec. 6.4.1.1) when compared to the reference pivot
of the initial undergrown subnet.
• Merging rule 4: when all subnet interfaces are mixed together, pivots are still in the majority.
The last rule more or less replicates the behaviour of the diagnose() function previously described
in Algorithm 11 to ensure the final subnet is not filled with outliers 9. The aforementioned rules are
usually enough to recover a large subnet that was chunked during the inference due to the positioning
of its contra-pivot interface(s), as shown by Fig. 6.2, and are easy to implement in practice.
It is worth mentioning that the rules for merging subnets can be freely tuned by the implementa-
tion depending on how strict the subnet post-processing should be. In fact, the public implemen-
tation of WISE [49] adds some flexibility to the aforementioned rules in practice. Indeed, when the
reference pivot of a subnet does not match an inference rule when compared to the reference pivot
of the initial undergrown subnet, WISE also compares a contra-pivot interface (if any) or an outlier (if
any) of the former to the reference pivot of the latter. For instance, it is possible that a badly placed
outlier fools the subnet inference into concluding the outlier is a pivot interface for a small subnet
while a pivot interface of the encompassing actual subnet is mistaken for a contra-pivot interface for
this smaller subnet. WISE also considers this kind of scenario and records which type of interface
could be on the same subnet as the reference pivot of the initial undergrown subnet. This is necessary
to correctly quantify the pivot interfaces, contra-pivot interfaces and outliers of the hypothetical
final subnet while checking the last merging rule suggested above. It is imperative that care is taken
when testing the first merging rule, as a subnet with a contra-pivot interface which turns out to
be a pivot interface (at least in the merging scenario) should no longer be considered as a subnet
with contra-pivot interface(s) upon adding more subnets into the merging scenario. It is up to the
implementation to decide whether the final algorithm should be tolerant, at the risk of having more
subnets with unusual configurations (but less undergrown subnets).
9By default, WISE considers that a majority amounts to 2/3 of the total of interfaces.
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Finally, at the end of post-processing, the public implementation of WISE also performs additional
tasks to complement the data. In particular, for each subnet, alternative prefix length is computed
that equates to the longest prefix length (i.e., the smallest subnet size) that would contain all the
listed interfaces. Indeed, a sparse subnet can occasionally feature a prefix larger than what is needed
to encompass all its interfaces. WISE also uses an alternative definition of a contra-pivot interface
for subnets where the TTL distances of pivot interfaces vary considerably due to the problem of
warping (as defined in Sec. 5.1.2). In such a scenario, the sole or few IP address(es) that do not fulfill
an inference rule when compared to the reference pivot can be identified as contra-pivot interface(s).
In other words, this is a best effort strategy for finding such interfaces when TTL distances are not
consistent enough to identify them on that basis, as WISE still assumes contra-pivot interfaces should
appear closer to the vantage point (cf. Sec. 6.4.1.1).
6.4.2.2 Time complexity
The complexity of post-processing is linear in respect of the total number of subnets to post-process,
which we be expressed as N . To demonstrate this, the number of subnets involved in a merging
scenario will be represented by M . When a scenario is tested, each subnet involved is evaluated at
most once, regardless of M , as each subnet is only compared to the initial undergrown subnet when
it comes to the third (suggested) merging rule. The merging rules themselves, regardless of what they
do, can be tested in constant time (O (1)). Moreover, the last suggested rule can be easily optimized
by ensuring each subnet maintains its numbers of pivot/contra-pivot interfaces and outliers to avoid
repeatedly counting them, so that the number of interfaces encompassed by each subnet becomes
irrelevant to the current problem. As a consequence, evaluating a single scenario is O (M).
When a merging scenario turns out to be valid, the subnet expansion goes on and another
scenario will be evaluated for a larger M . Two worst case scenarios should be taken into consideration
where several successful scenarios are evaluated, with M eventually growing to be equal to N . There
are two possibilities: either M doubles each time (because the total of IP addresses encompassed
by a prefix doubles when its length is decremented), or M increases by one at each expansion. The
first worst case would amount to having N undergrown subnets with the same prefix length and
successive in the IP address space (e.g., a /20 partitioned in 2,048 /31 subnets). In the second worst
case, each newly overlapped subnet could have a prefix length smaller by one unit than the previously
considered subnet, i.e., if we have an undergrown /30, then the first expansion overlaps another /30,
then the second expansion encompasses a /29, and the third expansion would absorb a /28, etc.
With the first worst case, if M becomes equal to N , there will be N +N /2+N /4+ ... = 2N subnet
evaluations, which is linear. In the case of the second hypothetical worst case, since the total of
subnets in the final merging scenario is equal to N , there is a total of N + (N −1)+ (N −2)+ ...+1 =
N × (N −1)/2 subnet evaluations, which is quadratic. However, both cases have an upper bound in
practice: indeed, as already stated in Sec. 4.3, /19 subnets have not been documented at the time of
this research and WISE therefore does not produce subnets beyond the /20 prefix (this also means
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the largest possible undergrown subnet is a /21). As a result, growing and testing merging scenarios
starting from a given undergrown subnet can be considered as being upper bounded, since there can
be at most 12 consecutive decrementations of a prefix length. With the first worst case, there can be
at most N = 4,096 subnets, while there can be at most N = 12 subnets with the second one.
Another possible worst case for post-processing could result from overlapping (and therefore
evaluating) the same subnets several times by evaluating distinct merging scenarios (i.e., each starting
from a different undergrow subnet) that all fail. The worst possible situation would be to consider a
large undergrown subnet followed by a set of consecutive undergrown subnets with a progressively
increasing prefix length (e.g., a /24, then a /25, etc. all encompassed in the same /23 prefix). An
expansion of the first undergrown subnet would encompass all subsequent subnets. If merging all
subnets does not produce a sound subnet, all subnets are put back, and the same scenario repeats
itself with the second subnet and all subsequent subnets. Under the condition that all the merging
scenarios fail, the post-processing evaluates a total of N + (N −1)+ (N −2)+ ...+1 = N × (N −1)/2
subnets (where N is the total number of subnets), which is quadratic. However, the total number
of failed merging scenarios is bounded by the maximum number of expansions too: there cannot
be more than 12 expansions, and therefore, such a scenario can involve at most N = 12 subnets. In
other words, all worst cases of post-processing are upper bounded. Since expanding an undergrown
subnet and considering its merging with other subnets is upper bounded, it can be considered as
O (1), and as a result, subnet post-processing can be assumed to be O (N ) as a whole, with N being
the total number of subnets to post-process.
6.4.2.3 Practical effects of post-processing
Since WISE only starts considering a merging scenario once it has detected an undergrown subnet
within the list of inferred subnets, post-processing can be an easy step as long as subnet inference
worked well and only produced a few undergrown subnets. In practice, because the public imple-
mentation of WISE adds some flexibility to subnet post-processing (i.e., it can reconsider a type
of interface as another one), the process can also aggregate together undergrown subnets that do
not fall into the partitioning scenario depicted by Fig. 6.2. This is also because, contrary to subnet
inference which processes the IP addresses in decreasing order (with respect to their 32-bit integer
equivalents), the post-processing reviews the subnets in ascending order in respect of their prefix.
As a result, the post-processing in WISE not only recovers large partitioned subnets (as depicted
in Fig. 6.2), but also aggregates together sets of consecutive undergrown subnets into larger subnets.
Because the resulting subnets rarely fulfill all soundness rules, they can be considered as delimiting
actual subnets for which the collected data is inconclusive. Whether a subnet inference tool reusing
the WISE methodology should do this can be debated. The public implementation of WISE [49] im-
plements this behaviour for practical reasons: most undergrown subnets that eventually get merged
together feature very long prefixes and usually encompass one or two observed subnet interfaces,
while the resulting merged subnets are usually small subnets. The former can be considered to
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be measurement artefacts, while the latter can be interpreted as a form of coarse-grained subnet
inference. In fact, a majority of subnets resulting from post-processing have a prefix length of 29 or
more (i.e., eight attributable IP addresses or less).
Metrics ULiège AS12956 AS13789 AS224 AS6453
Subnets before post-processing 353 14,943 2,608 4,526 40,990
Subnets after post-processing 321 10,098 1,987 4,007 24,801
Total of merged subnets 25 1,165 293 286 3,808
Average number of merged subnets 2.28 5.159 3.119 2.815 5.251
Median prefix length (merged) 30 29 29 29 29
Table 6.3: Quantifying effects of subnet post-processing with SAGE (April 2021).
Table 6.3 quantifies the effects of subnet post-processing in WISE with the five measurements
conducted from the Montefiore Institute with SAGE [54] in April 2021 (already discussed in Sec. 6.3.2.2
and Sec. 6.4.1.2). Table 6.3 shows the number of subnets before and after subnet post-processing, how
many subnets resulted from it, and what were the average number of merged subnets and the median
prefix length. In all measurements, the post-processing merged small amounts of subnets resulting
in quite long prefixes, as the median prefix length of merged subnets is 29 for all target networks
except for the ULiège network (30), showing that most merged subnets actually aggregate very long
prefixes that could be considered as artefacts. As such, the subnet post-processing implemented
by WISE both fixed large subnets and reduced the number of measurement artifacts. Making the
post-processing stricter could result in more inferred subnets after post-processing, but with a large
number of very long prefixes that would be hard to interpret, especially with difficult targets such as
AS12956 and AS6453, two Tier-1 ASes for which a lot of traffic engineering is usually observed.
6.5 Closing comments on WISE
In this chapter, the workflow of WISE [52, 53] has been extensively explained and commented on to
show how it handles the challenges described in Chapter 5 and to demonstrate how all its algorithmic
steps are in linear time. The possibility of efficiently implementing these steps, notably by minimizing
and parallelizing the probing work, was also discussed in detail.
While the accuracy of WISE will be thoroughly assessed in Chapter 7, it should already be noted
that the WISE methodology could benefit from being made a bit more complete. In particular, WISE
can currently only handle IP addresses that reply to ICMP echo-request packets, as such packets
are an easy and cheap way to quickly carry out a census of IP addresses that will be aggregated
into subnets later (via the target pre-scanning, cf. Sec. 6.3.1). However, it is possible that other IP
interfaces found in the initial target prefixes are configured not to reply to echo-request packets
and can therefore only be detected through traceroute probing. By combining multiple ways of
discovering live IP interfaces (i.e., interfaces that reply to at least one type of probe) and adapt target
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scanning (cf. Sec. 6.3.2) to each type of probing, a subnet inference tool could possibly discover more
subnets than WISE, or at least refine some subnets it currently discovers.
Moreover, the current subnet post-processing (cf. Sec. 6.4.2) could be refined even further to
more effectively handle difficult subnet inference scenarios, and several approaches to do so need
to be explored. For instance, heuristics based on the typical IP assignment practices observed in
the Internet could be added. This could be useful, for example, to avoid inferring a /28 within a /24
prefix if all other subnets found in this prefix are /30, because this implies the /24 prefix is used by
the network operator only to manage point-to-point links (typically with /30 or /31 subnets).
Finally, while the public implementation of WISE [49] has been designed uniquely for IPv4, its
methodology is arguably more suitable for IPv6. Because most of its probing work is performed on
responsive IP addresses and since the subnet inference itself is done offline (cf. Sec. 6.4), an IPv6 WISE
could be created as long as it could perform an equivalent of target pre-scanning for IPv6. Earlier
tools, in particular ExploreNET [118] (cf. Sec. 4.2.2), could not be so easily adapted to IPv6 since they
probe the network as they infer subnets, which is feasible with IPv4 and its small subnets but too
costly with IPv6. Hopefully, discovering responsive IP addresses in IPv6 and more generally topology
discovery in IPv6 is an active research topic [19, 106], opening doors for IPv6 subnet inference. It
should be noted, though, that the efficiency of WISE still partly relies on the limits of the IPv4 scope
(cf. Sec. 6.4.1.2 and Sec. 6.4.2.2), which means the subnet inference itself should be specifically tuned











WISE VALIDATION AND DEPLOYMENT
T
his chapter thoroughly assesses WISE (described in Chapter 6) and discusses its deployment
in the wild to answer research questions 3 and 4 from Sec. 4.4, i.e., whether WISE is accurate
and whether it is able to discover the same subnets despite vantage point change. Sec. 7.1
first validates WISE on two groundtruth networks while comparing it with the state-of-the-art of
subnet inference in terms of accuracy (i.e., how close to the groundtruth the inferred subnets are) and
network use. Sec. 7.2 then presents the first observations conducted in the wild with WISE, using data
snapshots collected from the PlanetLab testbed during 2019. Finally, Sec. 7.3 concludes this second
part of the thesis by summarizing its main contributions and discussing possible improvements.
7.1 WISE validation
This section assesses WISE [52, 53] with the help of two groundtruth networks whose subnets were
known in advance. Sec. 7.1.1 first describes in detail the networks that were measured, which state-
of-the-art subnet inference tools (cf. Sec. 4.2) WISE was compared to and how all tools were deployed.
Sec. 7.1.2 then presents the results of the validation, using custom metrics to assess the accuracy in
terms of subnet inference of each tool.
7.1.1 Validation methodology
In order to validate WISE, two groundtruth networks were measured in 2019: the entire network
of the University of Liège and the backbone of a Belgian ISP. The former had already been used
to validate the alias resolution framework of Chapter 2 (cf. Sec. 3.2), while the latter provided a
bigger network topology. Indeed, while the ULiège network predominantly consists of a /16 prefix
(completed with two small /24 prefixes), the Belgian ISP manages IPv4 prefixes covering several
hundreds of thousands of attributable IP addresses. With the friendly help of the SeGI (for reminders:
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Service Général d’Informatique) and a network administrator working for the Belgian ISP, the real
subnet prefixes of the whole ULiège network and the backbone of the ISP could be known in advance
to evaluate how accurate the subnet prefixes discovered by WISE were 1.
Not only was WISE validated with these networks, but it was also compared with two other state-
of-the-art subnet inference tools: ExploreNET [118] (cf. Sec. 4.2.2) and TreeNET [55] (cf. Sec. 4.2.3).
As a reminder, TreeNET improves the subnets discovered by ExploreNET with a heuristic aimed
at improving the identification of larger subnets. Rather than deploying both tools separately, an
early version of SAGE [47] was used. While the final SAGE (cf. Chapter 10) is built on top of WISE, the
early version reuses the subnet inference step of TreeNET and records the subnets as discovered by
ExploreNET before refining them with TreeNET’s heuristic (if needed). As a result, this specific tool
allows subnets to be retrieved as inferred by ExploreNET and as improved by TreeNET.
The subnet inference step of TreeNET consisted of discovering responsive IP addresses, much like
the target pre-scanning step of WISE (cf. Sec. 6.3.1), then running ExploreNET on each discovered
responsive IP address. For each inferred subnet, TreeNET applied its heuristic if needed, and subse-
quently avoided running ExploreNET on responsive IP addresses that belonged to the discovered
subnet. As such, the subnet inference step of TreeNET reused in the early SAGE [47] relies on active
probing to discover subnets, unlike the subnet inference of WISE which works offline (cf. Sec. 6.4).
The ULiège network was measured from a vantage point within it 2 with each tool (i.e., WISE
and the early SAGE), for the same reason as in Sec. 3.2: to avoid most probes from being blocked by
firewalls. The tools were also run one after the other, rather than concurrently, to avoid sending too
many probes at once. The Belgian ISP, on the other hand, was probed in a similar manner but from a
European PlanetLab node, therefore a vantage point that was unrelated to the target network.
It should be noted that the validation of WISE (along its comparison with other tools) was actually
been done twice. The first time was in February 2019 [52], with the first final build of WISE, which had
not implemented the overgrowth heuristic at the time (cf. Sec. 6.4.1) and whose post-processing step
(cf. Sec. 6.4.2) was still very fundamental. The second time was in September 2019 [53], with a build
of WISE true to Chapter 6. The subsequent results will therefore be based on this second validation.
7.1.2 Validation results
First, to quantify accurately how close an inferred subnet is to a groundtruth, the subnet distance
metric will be defined. This metric is computed as follows: for a given subnet in the groundtruth,
an inferred subnet whose prefix is – partially or entirely – overlapping the groundtruth prefix has to
be found, and the difference in bits between the inferred prefix length and the groundtruth prefix
length is computed. E.g., if there is a groundtruth subnet 10.0.1.0/24 and an inferred subnet
10.0.1.128/25 that overlaps it, the subnet distance will be equal to 25−24 = 1. As a consequence, a
subnet distance of zero corresponds to a perfect inference, i.e., the discovered prefix perfectly fits
1Again, the details of each groundtruth network will not be made public for confidentiality and security concerns.
2From the former WiFi network ULg-Secure.
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the groundtruth. Overgrown subnets (i.e., that are larger in size than groundtruth subnets) typically
produce negative subnet distances, while undergrown subnets (i.e., which cover less attributable
IPs than the corresponding groundtruth subnet) result in positive distances. When a groundtruth
subnet is overlapped by several (smaller) inferred subnets, the subnet distance can be computed on
the basis of the largest inferred subnet. E.g., if a groundtruth prefix /23 is overlapped by one inferred
/24 subnet and two inferred /25 subnets, the subnet distance is equal to 24−23 = 1, as the /24 subnet
is the largest inferred subnet.
-11 -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

























(a) ULiège network (coverage: 98% / 86% / 81%)
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(b) Belgian ISP (coverage: 91% / 89% / 75%)
Figure 7.1: Subnet distances for WISE, TreeNET and ExploreNET (September 2019).
It is worth noting that positive subnet distances (i.e., undergrown subnets) are to be preferred for
two reasons. First, the lack of responsive IP interfaces within the address space of a given subnet can
prevent the inference of its true prefix length, and therefore, an undergrown subnet can still be true
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to the actual topology. For instance, a /24 subnet where only IP addresses in the first half are being
used in practice will be typically detected as a /25 subnet by WISE. On the other hand, overgrown
subnets typically cover multiple actual subnets and therefore can be hardly considered as sound: at
best, they can be interpreted as a coarse-grained inference delimiting subnets close to each others in
the address space. Second, undergrown subnets that are consecutive in respect of the address space
can be compared and post-processed to recover the actual prefix(es), as already performed to some
extent by the subnet post-processing implemented in WISE (cf. Sec. 6.4.2).
The subnet distance metric can be complemented with a second metric called coverage ratio.
This ratio simply expresses the number of groundtruth prefixes that are overlapped by inferred
subnets divided by the total number of groundtruth prefixes. While the coverage ratio does not
indicate whether or not the inferred subnets are accurate, a high ratio means that the subnet inference
has managed to discover exhaustively the subnet-level of the target network, while a low ratio is
synonymous of a pessimistic inference or a responsivity issue (e.g., due to rate-limiting policies).
If the ratios of groundtruth subnets overlapped by inferred subnets (Y axis) are plotted for each
subnet distance (X axis), the distribution should ideally be centered around 0 (i.e., perfectly inferred
subnets), suggesting the inferred subnets are true to the groundtruth. Figure 7.1 gives the subnet
distance distributions of the data collected with WISE, TreeNET and ExploreNET, respectively, on
both the groundtruth networks mentioned in Sec. 7.1.1. Both Fig. 7.1a and Fig. 7.1b are annotated
with the coverage ratios for subnets discovered respectively by WISE (plain line), TreeNET (dashed
line) and ExploreNET (dotted line). The green vertical line at subnet distance 0 is a marker for the
perfect situation. Additional green dotted lines at subnet distances -1 and 1 highlight the inferred
prefixes differing from the groundtruth by at most one bit.
Generally speaking, both Fig. 7.1a and Fig. 7.1b show that WISE is able to reveal more (nearly)
exact prefixes than both TreeNET and ExploreNET, going up to 60% of exact prefixes on the ULiège
network. WISE also tends to infer more undergrown subnets (positive subnet distance) than TreeNET
as well as smaller prefix lengths for overgrown subnets. Moreover, the coverage ratio achieved by
WISE was better in both situations, especially with the ULiège network. Such a result can be partially
explained by the fact that ExploreNET sometimes discards small subnets due to a lack of responsive
IP addresses within small prefixes. Since TreeNET refines subnets initially inferred by ExploreNET
to more easily identify large subnets, its coverage can improve but sometimes at the cost of more
overgrown subnets, especially in the case of the Belgian ISP. It should also be noted that, despite
being less accurate than WISE, TreeNET clearly improves the inference performed by ExploreNET as
mentioned in Sec. 4.2.3: both subnet distance distributions for ExploreNET imply a large number of
undergrown subnets due to poorly identifying larger subnets.
WISE not only achieves greater accuracy than both ExploreNET and TreeNET, but its methodol-
ogy also renders it more efficient. Table 7.1 compares the runtime and number of probes used by
both WISE and the TreeNET subnet inference included in the early build of SAGE [47] (cf. Sec. 7.1.1).
The provided metrics only cover the subnet inference steps in both cases, i.e., including the target
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scanning step of WISE (cf. Sec. 6.3.2) but excluding the pre-scanning (cf. Sec. 6.3.1). In both cases,
WISE outperforms the methodology of TreeNET in terms of runtime, as this runtime as reduced by
half to discover subnets within the ULiège network and by twenty to perform the same task on the
Belgian ISP. Its number of probes was however in the same order of magnitude as TreeNET: this can
be explained by the fact that the target scanning probed the responsive IP addresses at a steady rate,
while TreeNET (ExploreNET) probed interfaces as it inferred subnets, eliminating target addresses
when it discovered large subnets. Interestingly, TreeNET used fewer probes in total than WISE for
the ULiège network: this was due to the presence of many large subnets (i.e., /23, /24, /25, etc.)
with which TreeNET could eliminate many subsequent target IP addresses. However, there were not
as many large subnets in the Belgian ISP, which explains why the total runtime of TreeNET on this
network was so much longer when compared to the WISE runtime. This clearly demonstrates that
decoupling the subnet inference from the probing is highly benefitial to shorten the runtime.
TreeNET (via early SAGE) WISE
ULiège network
Execution time 52’30 28’34
Number of probes 18,065 26,175
Belgian ISP
Execution time 9:51’10 24’14
Number of probes 277,819 213,840
Table 7.1: Execution time and network use of TreeNET and WISE (September 2019).
It should be noted, though, that the steady probing of WISE triggered rate-limiting policies at
several routers in the ULiège network. As a consequence, a considerable number of IP interfaces
(around 44.5% of the responsive IP addresses) had to be re-probed to maximize the number of
anomaly-free trails (cf. end of Sec. 6.3.2.1). This is why the WISE runtime on the ULiège network was
slightly worse than on the Belgian ISP: in comparison, very few timeouts occurred while scanning the
responsive IP addresses of the ISP. Despite this issue, WISE still outperformed TreeNET, demonstrating
further its methodology is interesting regarding execution time and network use.
To have an even more complete analysis, the results when considering the subnet prefixes ad-
justed by WISE at the end of post-processing (cf. end of Sec. 6.4.2.1) will be presented. This meant
computing, for each inferred subnet, the longuest prefix length that included all discovered subnet
interfaces. Indeed, in some situations, the lack of responsive subnet interfaces meant WISE contin-
ued expanding a subnet until just before overlapping previous results. Such a growth can produce
an overgrown subnet as well as an accurate prefix. Figure 7.1 used these unadjusted, raw prefixes,
while Figure 7.2 shows the validation results upon considering the adjusted prefixes. Interestingly,
this cause the ratio of exact prefixes discovered by WISE to fall slightly below the same ratio for
TreeNET. However, when considering prefixes differing by at most one bit, WISE still outperformed
both TreeNET and ExploreNET, and the curve for WISE also slightly moves to the right, which is syn-
onymous of having more undergrown and less overgrown subnets. This shift could be an advantage,
if the final subnets were to be post-processed further by a third party (e.g., by identifying the prefix
assignment practices of the target network). Nevertheless, the raw prefixes can be kept as is since
they can still match actual subnets accurately thanks to the boundaries of other subnets.
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(a) ULiège network (coverage: 98% / 86% / 81%)
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(b) Belgian ISP (coverage: 91% / 89% / 75%)
Figure 7.2: Same validation as in Fig. 7.1, using WISE adjusted prefixes.
Finally, though the subnets as inferred by WISE, TreeNET and ExploreNET on both groundtruth
networks clearly suggest WISE is the better option, it should be noted that there was little traffic
engineering in both cases. In particular, some flickering trails were witnessed in both networks but
concerned only a small number of subnets: a /26 subnet in the Belgian ISP that featured two flickering
trails could be properly discovered by WISE but was first discovered as a /31 and a /29 subnets by
ExploreNET and later (over)grown into a /23 subnet by TreeNET. Outside this example, only one
other subnet in the Belgian ISP exhibited flickering trails. In other words, both groundtruth networks
were suitable for the methodologies of TreeNET and ExploreNET, which is why the former closely
follows WISE in terms of perfectly inferred subnets. WISE is nevertheless expected to more frequently
discover the same subnets when traffic engineering induces more consequences. This point will be
discussed in Sec. 7.2.3 with the help of snapshots collected in the wild.
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7.2 WISE in the wild
This section discusses observations made in the wild from the PlanetLab testbed with WISE during
the course of 2019. Sec. 7.2.1 first briefly discusses how and when WISE was deployed. Then, Sec. 7.2.2
evaluates the soundness of the discovered subnets in respect of the measurement-based definition
(cf. Sec. 4.1.2), Sec. 7.2.3 discusses the subnet persistence, i.e., whether the same prefixes can be
inferred despite a change of vantage point, and finally, Sec. 7.2.4 discusses the distribution of the
prefix length among inferred subnets.
7.2.1 WISE deployment
The first final version of WISE was deployed on the PlanetLab testbed on December 28th, 2018 in
order to collect subnet-level data on the same target ASes as those mentioned in Sec. 5.2.1. This
first campaign ended on January 24th, 2019 and also involved vantage point rotation (as defined in
Sec. 5.2.1): for each of the 22 target ASes, there were 22 snapshots (minus one or two, due to a lack of
responses to probes) collected from each of the 22 PlanetLab nodes used during the campaign. Not
only was this strategy aimed at making the most of the available PlanetLab nodes, but it also allowed
thoroughly studying the effects of changing the vantage point while running WISE [52].
This first campaign was however not the last, and a total of ten campaigns, all involving vantage
point rotation, were carried out in 2019 [53]. In particular, the last four campaigns involved the
lattest version of WISE subnet inference, i.e., featuring all the mechanisms and heuristics described or
mentioned in Chapter 6. Subsequent sections will therefore provide observations about the snapshots
collected during the seventh campaign (September 2019), but the details about all the campaigns
and their snapshots can be browsed online via the WISE public GitHub repository 3.
ASN Name Origin Category
12956 Telefonica Global Solutions Spain Tier-1
3257 GTT Communications Inc. USA Tier-1
6453 TATA Communications USA Tier-1
6762 Sparkle Italy Tier-1
10010 TOKAI Communications Japan Transit
13789 Internap Corporation USA Transit
286 KPN B.V. Netherlands Transit
50673 Serverius Holding B.V. Netherlands Transit
6939 Hurricane Electric LLC USA Transit
8220 COLT Technology UK Transit
8928 Interoute Communications UK Transit
1241 Forthnet Greece Stub
224 UNINETT Norway Stub
Table 7.2: Summary of the 13 Autonomous Systems probed with WISE in September 2019.
3https://github.com/JefGrailet/WISE/tree/master/Dataset
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During the seventh campaign of WISE, a total of 13 ASes were measured exclusively from European
PlanetLab nodes 4. Much like with measurement campaigns previously discussed in this thesis (cf.
Sec. 3.3.1 and Sec. 5.2.1), the target ASes were selected as a representative sample of the Internet,
notably using CAIDA’s AS ranking [2] to select ASes that played a major role in the Internet and the
Hurricane Electric BGP Toolkit [4] to retrieve their IPv4 prefixes. They also featured at most a few
millions of attributable IP addresses so that WISE could discover their subnet-level in the span of a
few hours. Table 7.2 lists the 13 ASes measured from September 4th to September 17th, 2019.
7.2.2 Subnet soundness in the wild
In the absence of a groundtruth to assess the soundness of inferred subnets, criteria needs to be
defined to determine whether a given subnet looks sound or atypical. Ideally, a subnet should be
as close as possible to the ideal measurement-based definition used by state-of-the-art tools (cf.
Sec. 4.1.2), although some room should be made for situations where TTL distances towards pivot
interfaces are not all equal. To satisfy these requirements, three rules have been defined to quantify
subnet soundness: the contra-pivot rule, the spread rule, and the outlier rule.
The contra-pivot rule states that an ideal subnet should feature at least one contra-pivot interface,
as a subnet with none could very well be a part of a larger subnet. The spread rule states that, in
the presence of contra-pivot interfaces, these interfaces are either in the minority for large subnets,
or no more common than pivot interfaces for small subnets (i.e., the prefix length 29 or greater).
Finally, a subnet fulfilling the outlier rule is a subnet containing no interfaces other than pivots and
contra-pivots. A subnet satisfying the three rules is considered as sound, and if the TTL distances of
the pivot interface(s) are identical while the contra-pivot interface(s) is (are) found exactly one hop
sooner, then the subnet strictly satisfies the ideal measurement-based definition used by previous
state-of-the-art subnet inference tools.
It is worth noting that revealing a given subnet prefix from different vantage points does not mean
that the prefixes will exactly meet the same soundness rules. For instance, it is always possible that the
subnet revealed from vantage point X could feature an outlier, while the same subnet revealed from
vantage point Y will exhibit highly varying distances, making the contra-pivot interface detection
difficult (which a final heuristic of post-processing, mentioned in Sec. 6.4.2, attempts to achieve). The
three aforementioned rules are therefore also a good indicator of how changing the vantage point
(and, consequently, the different paths towards the targeted domain) can impact the inference of a
given subnet, notably due to traffic engineering (cf. Chapter 5). Due to the large number of snapshots
collected during 2019, this section will only provide figures with representative results, but all figures
regarding subnet soundness can be browsed online via the WISE public GitHub repository 5.
Figure 7.3 pictures the subnet soundness for AS6453 (TATA Communications, Inc.; Tier-1), using
13 snapshots collected with WISE from the PlanetLab testbed between September 4th and September
4Or PLE nodes, for PlanetLab Europe; International nodes (PLC, for PlanetLab Central) were barely usable at the time.
5https://github.com/JefGrailet/WISE/tree/master/Evaluation/Accuracy/Figures
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(b) Subnet soundness rules (top) and numbers of subnets (bottom)
Figure 7.3: Subnet soundness for AS6453 (September 4th to September 17th, 2019).
17th, 2019 (included). The figure is split into two: Fig. 7.3a plots the ratios of problematic trails
observed during the campaign, in the exact same manner as in Sec. 5.2.2, while Fig. 7.3b provides
both the total number of subnets found in each snapshot (bottom) and the ratios of subnets that
satisfied zero, one, two or three soundness rules. By putting both figures side by side, it is possible to
verify whether or not the variations in problematic trails impacted subnet inference. In the case of
AS6453, the ratios of subnets fulfilling three or two rules were steady, as they represented more than
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50% and often more than 60% of all inferred subnets, with the exception of one snapshot captured
on September 15th, 2019. Interestingly, this date also coincided with the second snapshot to have
the largest number of inferred subnets as well as the third spike in warping/flickering trails depicted
in Fig. 7.3a. The two other spikes in Fig. 7.3a (September 6th and September 11th) coincided with
small drops in the ratio of sound subnets, though the corresponding ratios still featured clearly more
than 50% of sound-looking subnets. The snapshot with the largest number of subnets (September
10th) was also satisfying in terms of soundness, which can be explained by the fact that there were
comparatively less warping trails and much less flickering trails than for September 15th. Finally, in
all cases, the ratio of subnets satisfying no rule at all (i.e., subnets with no contra-pivot interface and
one or more outliers) was low, as shown by the thin black bars at the top of Fig. 7.3b. Overall, this first
figure shows that WISE adapted well to vantage point changes and produced few atypical subnets.
Similar conclusions can be drawn from Figure 7.4, which provides the same visual tools as
Figure 7.3 but using the 13 snapshots collected with WISE on AS3257 (GTT Communications, Inc.;
Tier-1) during September 2019. AS3257 is an interesting case to compare with AS6453 because it
is also a Tier-1 AS, but covering much more attributable IP addresses (more than 2 millions) and
with more systematic traffic engineering, as demonstrated by the steadily high ratio of warping trails
pictured in Fig. 7.4a. Despite these challenges, the ratios of sound subnets were always in the region
of 50% in the collected snapshots, as shown by Fig. 7.4b, with an exception on September 16th. This
exception also coincided with a spike in flickering trails in Fig. 7.4a. Moreover, in the same way as
in Figure 7.3, the ratios of subnets satisfying no soundness rule were also low, demonstrating again
that WISE could cope well with vantage point changes (and their effects regarding traffic engineering)
while producing a vast majority of non-atypical subnets and a majority of sound subnets.
To complement the discussion surrounding Figure 7.3 and Figure 7.4, since they both involve
Tier-1 ASes, the observations made on a Transit AS and a Stub AS, respectively, will be discussed.
Figure 7.5 provides the same visual tools as before to evaluate the soundness of subnets discovered
in AS286 (KPN B.V.), a Transit AS from the Netherlands, again using 13 snapshots collected with WISE
from PlanetLab during September 2019. Once more, WISE was able to achieve a majority of sound
subnets with a low ratio of atypical results (i.e., the top black bar in Fig. 7.5b) in all cases, but with more
contrasts than in previous figures. The first and last snapshots (i.e., September 4th and September
17th) notably featured the lowest ratios of sound subnets as well as the largest numbers of discovered
subnets, and coincided with spikes in all types of problematic trails. Interestingly, the number of
responsive IP addresses in each snapshot was quasi constant, which means the consequences of the
vantage point change was that subnet interfaces appeared differently to probes. In particular, the
unusually varying ratios of echoing trails shown by Fig. 7.5a suggested many interfaces could not be
reached via the same ingress router depending on the vantage point. This was the major difference in
respect of Figure 7.3 and Figure 7.4, since they both displayed consistently low ratios of echoing trails.
Interestingly, the highest ratios of sound subnets for AS286 (i.e., almost 70%) coincided with the
snapshots whose ratios of echoing and warping trails were the lowest (in particular, from September
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(b) Subnet soundness rules (top) and numbers of subnets (bottom)
Figure 7.4: Subnet soundness for AS3257 (September 4th to September 17th, 2019).
8th to September 11th). On closer inspection, the data showed that contiguous blocks of IP addresses
with echoing trails did not have the same properties in terms of TTL distances depending on the
vantage point, i.e., in some snapshots the TTL distance was always the same for each IP address
of a given block, but in other snapshots the distances for the same block varied. The first situation
allowed WISE to infer subnets with the help of the third rule of inference (cf. Sec. 6.4.1), while the
latter prevented the application of the same rule. Unfortunately, by definition, echoing trails are
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(b) Subnet soundness rules (top) and numbers of subnets (bottom)
Figure 7.5: Subnet soundness for AS286 (September 4th to September 17th, 2019).
always unique (cf. Sec. 5.1.4), so they cannot be identified as warping at the same time since there is
no other trail to compare them to. Therefore, WISE was unable to identify "warping echoing" trails,
and currently offers no practical solution to perform subnet inference with IP addresses featuring
such trails. A practical workaround could consist of combining snapshots from multiple vantage
points in order to keep those where echoing and warping do not happen at the same time, in a way
similar to the Cheleby system [70] (cf. Sec. 4.2.4).
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(b) Subnet soundness rules (top) and numbers of subnets (bottom)
Figure 7.6: Subnet soundness for AS224 (September 4th to September 17th, 2019).
Finally, Figure 7.6 provides the usual visual tools to assess the soundness of subnets discovered in
AS224 (UNINETT), a Norwegian Stub AS, based on 13 snapshots captured in the same conditions
as before. This time, the results were both satisfying and consistent across all snapshots with the
exception of two snapshots, respectively captured on September 6th and September 15th, which
coincided with spikes in the ratio of warping trails. Interestingly, the variation in the flickering trails
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did not appear to have a major effect on subnet soundness. The final snapshot (September 17th) also
coincided with a spike in warping trails despite providing a high ratio of sound subnets. What was
also interesting was that the ratio of warping trails was higher in the snapshot captured on September
15th than in that collected on September 6th, although the former provided more sound subnets than
the latter. Closer inspection of the warping trails of both snapshots revealed that the observed TTL
distances and their differences varied more in the snapshot captured on September 6th. Likewise, TTL
distances for warping trails in the snapshot captured on September 17th were surprisingly regular,
with many warping trails featuring two TTL distances with a difference of two hops between them.
This regularity likely eased the subnet inference, while more variety in TTL distances could have
further worsened contra-pivot discovery and induced WISE to mistaking contra-pivots for outliers
more often than it would otherwise have done. In other words, WISE is able to effectively handle a
vantage point change and more generally traffic engineering, but can still struggle if asymmetrical
paths are more diverse and exhibit greater differences in length.
7.2.3 Subnet persistence
To further assess the extent to which WISE discovers the same subnets on a given target AS regardless
of the vantage point, the notion of subnet persistence needs to be defined: given two snapshots of a
given target network, a subnet is said to be persistent if its prefix is present in both snapshots. This
notion is sub-divided into weak persistence and strict persistence. Given two snapshots of a given
target network, a subnet is said to be strictly persistent if its prefix is found in both snapshots and if
the corresponding subnet perfectly satisfies the same soundness rules (as defined in Sec. 7.2.2. As
a consequence, a subnet will be weakly persistent if its properties in two given snapshots are such
that it does not satisfy the same rules in both cases. The detection of a weakly persistent subnet
leads to two conclusions. First, changing the vantage point from one run of WISE to another can lead
to additional difficulties, such as those described by Chapter 5. Second, despite these additional
challenges induced by a vantage point change, WISE can re-discover the same subnet prefixes.
The subnet persistence in the same ASes as discussed in Sec. 7.2.2 will be examined. In the same
way as before, additional figures for other ASes and other campaigns can be browsed online via the
WISE public GitHub repository 6, with one minor difference: figures in this section will also depict the
intersection of strictly persistent subnets, i.e., the number of subnets that reappear strictly in the
same manner in all snapshots of a given campaign.
Figure 7.7 depicts the strict and weak persistence of subnets discovered for AS6453 (TATA Commu-
nications, Inc.), based on its snapshots captured in September 2019. In this figure, all the snapshots
except for the first one (X axis) were compared to the very first snapshot, captured on September 4th,
that will be subsequently denoted as the reference snapshot. The light grey bars quantify the strictly
persistent subnets while the dark grey bars account for weakly persistent subnets. The dotted bars
6Cf. https://github.com/JefGrailet/WISE/tree/master/Evaluation/Persistence/Figures
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Strictly persistent Persistent No equivalent Intersection
Figure 7.8: Subnet persistence for AS3257 (September 4th to September 17th, 2019).
quantify the remaining subnets (i.e., no persistence), and finally, the dotted black horizontal line
measures the intersection of strictly persistent subnets.
This first figure shows the subnet persistence was quite high for each pair of snapshots: with the
exception of September 10th and September 15th, the parts of each stacked bar that accounted for
persistent subnets were clearly the dominant parts. Curiously, the intersection across all snapshots
only accounted for slightly more than a thousand subnets. This could be, however, explained by the
fact that the intersection also included the snapshots of September 10th and September 15th, as will
be detailed shortly. Interestingly, each snapshot provided a noticeable number of weakly persistent
subnets in addition to a small number of unique subnets with respect to the reference snapshot.
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Figure 7.8 depicts the subnet persistence observed among snapshots of AS3257 (GTT Commu-
nications, Inc.) captured in September 2019 in the same manner as Figure 7.7. Again, the parts of
the stacked bars depicting persistent subnets were clearly dominant with a few exceptions, dated
on September 12th and September 16th in this case. The intersection made up for more than one
quarter of all subnets in most snapshots, though it can be inferred that the two previously mentioned















































Strictly persistent Persistent No equivalent Intersection

















































Strictly persistent Persistent No equivalent Intersection
(b) AS224 (UNINETT)
Figure 7.9: Subnet persistence for a Transit and a Stub ASes (September 2019).
Finally, Figure 7.9 depicts the subnet persistence observed in one Transit AS (AS286, Fig. 7.9a)
and one Stub AS (AS224, Fig. 7.9b), respectively. The same observations as before can be made:
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a high subnet persistence in most snapshots, a few snapshots with less persistence, and finally
an intersection that is clearly visible but that appears to be low at first sight, given the number
of snapshots with high persistence in respect of the reference snapshot. Note, however, how the
reference snapshot for AS286 was not the first to be captured chronologically speaking: this choice
was made due to the September 4th snapshot not featuring as many sound subnets as others, as a
result of traffic engineering and a combination of warping and echoing (cf. Fig. 7.5).
All previous figures tend to demonstrate that WISE could recover the same subnets in most cases,
despite changing the vantage point and despite the variations in problematic trails shown in figures
from Sec. 7.2.2. Surprisingly, though, the intersection in all figures appeared to be underwhelming:
roughly one quarter of the inferred subnets in most cases. However, as previously stated, the few
snapshots for each AS that included more unique subnets (because there was not as much persis-
tence) were behind these underwhelming intersections. To demonstrate this, Table 7.3 provides the
total number of strictly persistent subnets across all snapshots for each of the ASes discussed in this
section leaving out the two least sound snapshots (i.e., least sound subnets).
Target AS Omitted snapshots New intersection (# subnets)
AS6453 September 6th, September 15th 2,919
AS3257 September 12th, September 16th 11,893
AS286 September 4th, September 17th 491
AS224 September 6th, September 15th 2,965
Table 7.3: Better intersections of strictly persistent subnets (September 2019).
In the case of AS3257 and AS224, the number of strictly persistent subnets found across all
snapshots became close to the individual numbers of strictly persistent subnets found for each
pair of snapshots (i.e., reference snapshot with each of the remaining snapshots). To visualize this,
Figure 7.10 provides the same content as Fig. 7.8 without the least sound snapshots and the updated
intersection. As for AS6453 and AS286, the intersection was close to half the inferred subnets in most
cases. In fact, omitting a third snapshot for AS6453 (September 11th) even increases the intersection
to 3,804 subnets, i.e., more than half the number of inferred subnets in the remaining snapshots.
These improved intersections show that WISE usually discovered the same subnets, though the initial
intersections already showed it had such capability, even including the least sound snapshots.
By looking in details at the data, it can be seen, in practice, how WISE discovered the same
subnets despite how traffic engineering changed how they appeared to probes. This can notably
be seen with the subnet 129.242.88.0/21 that WISE regularly discovered within AS224. In most
snapshots collected in September 2019 for AS224, this subnet appeared with regular TTL distances
for pivot interfaces. Example 7.1 shows the first interfaces listed for this subnet, using the snapshot
collected on September 4th. However, on September 15th, the TTL distances for the same interfaces
varied, i.e., the pivot TTL distance was either 20 or 21 hops. Despite this, WISE was still able to infer
129.242.88.0/21, notably thanks to the trail consistency, as shown by Example 7.2.
More persistent subnets and how they appear depending on the snapshot can be investigated
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Figure 7.10: Subnet persistence for AS3257 (omitting September 12th and September 16th).
with the help of Python scripts provided by the WISE public GitHub repository 7.
Listing 7.1: 129.242.88.0/21 (AS224) on September 4th (first lines)
129.242.88.0/21
17 − 129.242.88.1 − [ 1 5 8 . 3 9 . 1 . 7 4 ] − Rule 1
16 − 129.242.88.2 − [ 1 2 8 . 3 9 . 2 3 0 . 4 4 ] − Contra−pivot
17 − 129.242.88.3 − [ 1 5 8 . 3 9 . 1 . 7 4 ] − Rule 1
17 − 129.242.88.5 − [ 1 5 8 . 3 9 . 1 . 7 4 ] − Rule 1
17 − 129.242.88.23 − [ 1 5 8 . 3 9 . 1 . 7 4 ] − Rule 1
17 − 129.242.88.40 − [ 1 5 8 . 3 9 . 1 . 7 4 ] − Rule 1
17 − 129.242.88.56 − [ 1 5 8 . 3 9 . 1 . 7 4 ] − Rule 1
Listing 7.2: 129.242.88.0/21 (AS224) on September 15th (first lines)
129.242.88.0/21
20 − 129.242.88.1 − [ 1 5 8 . 3 9 . 1 . 7 4 ] − Rule 1
19 − 129.242.88.2 − [ 1 2 8 . 3 9 . 2 3 0 . 4 4 ] − Contra−pivot
20 − 129.242.88.3 − [ 1 5 8 . 3 9 . 1 . 7 4 ] − Rule 1
21 − 129.242.88.5 − [ 1 5 8 . 3 9 . 1 . 7 4 ] − Rule 1
20 − 129.242.88.26 − [ 1 5 8 . 3 9 . 1 . 7 4 ] − Rule 1
20 − 129.242.88.27 − [ 1 5 8 . 3 9 . 1 . 7 4 ] − Rule 1
20 − 129.242.88.40 − [ 1 5 8 . 3 9 . 1 . 7 4 ] − Rule 1
21 − 129.242.88.54 − [ 1 5 8 . 3 9 . 1 . 7 4 ] − Rule 1
7https://github.com/JefGrailet/WISE/tree/master/Evaluation/Persistence
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7.2.4 Subnet prefix length distribution
Finally, the prefix length distribution of the subnets discovered by WISEwill be reviewed, (again) using
snapshots collected in September 2019 for the ASes discussed in Sec. 7.2.2 and Sec. 7.2.3. Previous
work in subnet inference highlighted the fact that the distribution of prefix lengths tended to follow
a power law shape, with the exception of /24 subnets [118] (see also Chapter 4). To study such a
distribution for each selected AS, only the last snapshot was used to compute a distribution, with the
exception of AS286 where the penultimate snapshot (September 16th) was be used instead, as it was
more representative of all the snapshots collected for this target AS. Figure 7.11 depicts the typical
subnet prefix length distribution obtained on all four previously discussed ASes.























(a) AS6453 (TATA Com.), September 17th, 2019























(b) AS3257 (GTT Com.), September 17th, 2019
























(c) AS286 (KPN B.V.), September 16th, 2019





















(d) AS224 (UNINETT), September 17th, 2019
Figure 7.11: Subnet prefix length distribution for various Autonomous Systems.
Fig. 7.11a shows the typical distribution obtained on AS6453, using the snapshot captured on
September 17th, 2019. This distribution does follow a power law shape, but only up to the /30 prefix:
there is indeed slightly less /31 subnets. The few /32 subnets are either loopback interfaces 8, or
artefacts. Why there are comparable numbers of /30 and /31 subnets is an interesting question:
indeed, conventions in subnetting [92] would tend to make /30 subnets more common, since they
would include only two usable interfaces (the subnet prefix and the broadcast address must be
8Such subnets exist within both the ULiège network and the backbone of the Belgian ISP mentioned at Sec. 7.1.
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omitted), which is the minimum requirement for a point-to-point link. As such, /31 subnets might
come off as incomplete measurements. In practice, /31 subnets do exist 9, and might be a way for
network operators to economize IP addresses in their IPv4 prefixes. An investigation of this specific
practice can be left for future work. Interestingly, /24 subnets are not more common than /23 or /25
subnets (among others) in snapshots of AS6453, contrary to what previous work suggested [118].
For other ASes, however, there is a tendency for /24 subnets to be slightly more frequent than
if the distribution was exactly following a power law shape. This was the case for AS3257, as shown
by Fig. 7.11b. In this second distribution, the ratio of /24 subnets was comparable to the ratio of
/25 subnets (in fact, it was slightly higher), and might be even higher in reality since /24 subnets
may have been inferred as longer prefixes by WISE in practice (cf. Sec. 6.4). Interestingly, /30 subnets
were this time clearly more frequent than /31 subnets, and /32 subnets were a bit more common.
Whether this was the result of measurement issues or of specific practices implemented by this AS is
something that could be investigated in the future.
Finally, Fig. 7.11c and Fig. 7.11d shows the typical prefix length distribution obtained for AS286
(KPN B.V., Transit) and AS224 (UNINETT, Stub), respectively. These results are even more interesting
than the previous ones: Fig. 7.11c shows that the prefix length distribution in AS286 clearly follows
a power law shape, even when it comes to /30 and /31 subnets, especially since there are very few
/32 subnets. Again, the /24 prefix length is not more common than other lengths. Fig. 7.11d shows
a surprising distribution: not only /24 subnets are slightly more common than /25 subnets in the
snapshot, but all prefix lengths from /24 to /29 each account for a bit less than 10% of inferred
subnets. All observations considered, it becomes difficult to assert whether or not the prefix length
distribution within any target network follows a power law shape, with or without a tendency to have
more /24 subnets (as suggested by previous research [118]). Moreover, the ratios of /30, /31 and /32
subnets suggest there are very different practices for such prefix lengths depending on the network.
Future work regarding the subnet-level could shine light on the specificities of each distribution,
and perhaps link them with the type of network where they are found. Again, more figures depicting
distributions for other target ASes or other campaigns can be browsed online via the WISE public
GitHub repository 10.
7.3 Closing comments on subnet inference
This second part of the thesis made three major contributions while answering several research
questions that were first formulated in Sec. 4.4.
9Some were found in the Belgian ISP discussed at Sec. 7.1.
10https://github.com/JefGrailet/WISE/tree/master/Evaluation/Prefixes
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1. The typical consequences of traffic engineering have been characterized and quantified in the
wild in Chapter 5 as an anwser to research question 1. It has been demonstrated that these
phenomena can vary greatly depending on the vantage point, but are always present, therefore
impairing state-of-the-art subnet inference methods.
2. To address research question 2, a new subnet inference tool called WISE [52, 53] has been
introduced and described in detail in Chapter 6. The detailed algorithms have been used to
demonstrate how WISE can handle the challenges induced by traffic engineering (especially
load balancing) in practice and why its major algorithmic steps are all in linear time. WISE
has also been used to answer research question 3 as it has been validated on two groundtruth
networks and compared favourably with TreeNET [55] and ExploreNET [118] in Sec. 7.1.
3. Using measurements of various Autonomous Systems collected from the PlanetLab testbed
over extended periods of time, research question 4 has been thoroughly addressed too. Sec. 7.2
notably demonstrated that the WISE methodology can discover a large number of identical sub-
nets for a given target network upon changing the vantage point while providing a considerable
number of sound-looking subnets.
These major contributions are completed by two minor contributions.
1. The potential for adapting the WISE methodology to IPv6 has been discussed in Sec. 6.5, and it
has been notably pointed out that the main obstacle to this is the discovery of responsive IP
addresses within IPv6 prefixes – something the research community is actively researching [19,
106]. This therefore provides a partial answer to research question 5.
2. It was shown that the distribution of the prefix length of subnets within Autonomous Systems of
different types does not necessarily follow a power law shape, therefore nuancing conclusions
advanced by previous research [118].
Though the research work presented in this part of the thesis thoroughly expanded the topic of
subnet inference, several improvements are possible. As already mentioned in Sec. 6.5, other ways
of discovering potential subnet interfaces could be explored and would complement the current
WISE methodology, at the very least to refine the subnets WISE can currently discover, and at best
to discover more subnets. The post-processing step (cf. Sec. 6.4.2) could also be completed with
additional heuristics to better identify subnets under certain scenarios, notably by relying on IPv4
assignment practices. Finally, as briefly mentioned in Sec. 7.2, some phenomena induced by traffic
engineering and/or specific equipment (cf. "warping echoing" trails, cf. Sec. 7.2.2) could still impair
WISE inference to the point where properly identifying the issues from a single vantage point could
prove to be too difficult. One way to circumvent these issues could consists of developing strategies
for combining multiple snapshots (as defined in Sec. 5.2.1) captured from distinct vantage points to



















INTRODUCTION TO NETWORK GRAPH INFERENCE AND MODELING
T
his chapter provides an introduction to both network graph inference and network modeling.
Sec. 8.1 begins by summarizing the state-of-the-art regarding the classical tool traceroute,
reviewing notably how it has been used up to this day to study network graphs and what
its well-known issues are. Sec. 8.2 proceeds with the review of network mapping tools based on
IGMP [33] probing, a unique probing approach explored by the research community late in the
2000’s. Then, Sec. 8.3 presents the state-of-the-art of network modeling as well as bipartite graphs,
a modeling formalism which showed potential for accurately accounting for the structure of the
Internet. Finally, Sec. 8.4 summarizes the limits of the research discussed in this chapter and lists the
research questions that will be tackled in this third and final part of this thesis.
8.1 traceroute-based topology mapping
Since the 1990’s, traceroute [119] has been one of the main tools of both network operators and
academics. This section provides a representative sample of research work on topology discovery
involving traceroute. Sec. 8.1.1 first provides a short history of traceroute itself, covering the
characterization of traceroute paths over the years and their known issues. Sec. 8.1.2 then covers
traceroute extensions, i.e., topology discovery tools that complement the traditional traceroute
probing with additional probing work and/or heuristics to discover additional network elements or
improve traceroute paths. Sec. 8.1.3 subsequently reviews a representative set of topology discovery
tools involving traceroute that aims at discovering the router-level of a target network. Finally,
Sec. 8.1.4 briefly reviews state-of-the-art methods used to perform efficient traceroute probing,
and in particular, fast topology mapping tools, i.e., tools that perform intensive traceroute probing
to quickly discover large networks and/or the entire IPv4 Internet.
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8.1.1 traceroute: history, characterization and issues
The original traceroute [119], designed by Jacobson in 1989, is a simple tool that sends a sequence
of UDP probes towards a provided target IP address to discover the path between the vantage point
and the target address. The first probe packet uses, by default, a TTL value of 1, each consecutive
probe using an incremented TTL value, and this until the target replies to a probe or until a given
number of consecutive probes turn out unsuccessful (e.g., several timeouts). Each probe packet
whose TTL value expires causes the receiving device to send a time-exceeded ICMP message back
to the vantage point, with the reply packet providing the IP address of the receiving interface as its
source IP address. Therefore, traceroute can discover the interfaces of each router crossed on the
way to some destination IP address and uses this as a way of revealing the network path. It can also
be used to estimate the TTL distance (cf. Sec. 4.1.2) between the vantage point and the target.
However, as discussed in Sec. 1.4 and Chapter 5, traceroute paths have to be handled carefully.
In particular, they are rarely stable, i.e., the discovered interfaces tend to vary from one measurement
to another [12, 81, 82]. Moreover, since the 2000’s, it has been common knowledge that a set of
traceroute paths constitute a directed acyclic graph (or DAG) of the IP-level [98].
While changes in traceroute paths between a given source and a given destination can be
explained by different factors, such as changes in peering between Autonomous Systems (or ASes, cf.
Sec. 8.3.1) [82], the research community has thoroughly investigated the effects of load balancing
architectures (already mentioned in Sec. 1.4), i.e., a subset of devices that aim at balancing the
amount of traffic between them to make the most of the available links. Such a strategy notably
avoids a need to constantly increase the link capacity, which is usually a costly operation. Load
balancing architectures can induce false link detection with traceroute: because the paths taken by
each probe can vary, the final traceroute paths can suggest links that do not actually exist.
(a) Toy load balancer
(b) A traceroute path with false links (grey circles are the discovered interfaces)
Figure 8.1: False link discovery with the regular traceroute.
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Figure 8.1 illustrates the false link discovery issue, with Fig. 8.1a depicting a toy load balancer and
Fig. 8.1b providing a potential (incorrect) path traceroute that could detect. In the event of the latter,
the red edge depicts a truly false link, while the orange edge corresponds to a link that does not exist
in the strict sense but which connect routers that do share a common link. The Paris traceroute
tool was designed by Augustin et al. in 2006 to reduce false link discovery and to straighten the
discovered paths in per-flow load balancers by manipulating header fields of ICMP [101], UDP [100],
and TCP [103] probes [11]. Figure 8.2 illustrates the effects of Paris traceroute, reusing the toy load
balancer from Fig. 8.1a. The same research group later extended Paris traceroute by incorporating a
Multipath Detection Algorithm (MDA) to enumerate load balanced paths in the wild and characterize
them [14]. Ulterior research by the same group in 2011, still using Paris traceroute, demonstrated
that the large majority of traceroute paths collected in the wild cross at least one load balancer [12],
further supporting the hypothesis that a collection of paths naturally forms an IP-level DAG.
Figure 8.2: Accurate path discovered by Paris traceroute [11] (same network as Fig. 8.1a).
In addition to characterizing the effects of load balancing structures on traceroute paths, the
research community also investigated the problem of anonymous hops more than once [59, 68,
125] (already mentioned in Sec. 5.1.1), i.e., routers that do not reply to traceroute probes (by
default, because of a temporary failure, etc.), resulting in a missing interface in a traceroute path.
Anonymous hops can be a problem for path interpretation, much like another well known issue: path
cycles (also mentioned in Sec. 5.1.1), i.e., in a same path, a same router interface can appear more
than once, suggesting that the packets have passed through the same device several times and have
not taken an optimal path through the network. As highlighted in a 2016 study by Marchetta et al.,
path cycles can be explained by numerous causes, such as MPLS tunnels [85].
8.1.2 traceroute extensions and alternatives
While traceroute itself has been the topic of many studies, many other tools aim at complementing
it, usually by combining additional probes and/or heuristics to refine the discovered paths and/or
discover additional topological data. For example, this thesis has already mentioned TraceNET [116]
(cf. Sec. 4.2.1), a traceroute-based subnet inference tool which infers the subnets that correspond
to the links crossed between each router discovered via (Paris) traceroute. In the same spirit,
traIXroute, introduced in 2016 by Nomikos and Dimitropoulos, analyzes traceroute data to
locate IXPs (Internet eXchange Points) within traceroute paths by exploiting existing data on IXP
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prefixes, IXP members, and IXP interfaces of BGP routers [95].
A completementary method, if not an alternative to traceroute probing lies in the Record Route
option provided among the options of the IP protocol [102]. If used, this option allows one IP packet
to record an interface of each router it crosses. Sidecar, introduced by Sherwood and Spring in early
2006, creates TCP connections to embed IP packets featuring the Record Route option to silently
discover router interfaces [112]. Such an approach features has several advantages, such as preventing
false link discovery or uncovering interfaces beyond NATs (Network Address Translators, devices
that remap IP addresses and port numbers to other IP addresses in another network). Another tool
introduced in 2008 by Sherwood et al., DisCarte, used disjunctive logic programming to merge regular
traceroute paths with Record Route data in order to produce accurate paths [111]. Nowadays, using
the Record Route has unfortunately become practically impossible due to current filtering practices,
which usually consist of dropping any IP packet using an option [44].
8.1.3 traceroute-based router-level mapping tools
Because traceroute probing naturally discovers router interfaces, a number of tools have exploited
it to build router-level maps of the Internet (cf. Sec. 8.3.1), usually in combination with various
heuristics and alias resolution (cf. Chapter 1). The Mercator tool, introduced in 2000 by Govindan
and Tangmunarunkit, performs traceroute probing in combination with custom heuristics and
the same alias resolution method as iffinder [71] (cf. Sec. 1.3.1) to build router-level maps [45].
Rocketfuel, designed by Spring et al. around 2002, combines traceroute probing from hundreds of
different sources with its Ally alias resolution component (cf. Sec. 1.3.2), BGP routing tables, DNS
(to distinguish backbone from Points-of-Presences) and custom heuristics to build comprehensive
router-level topologies of ISPs [113]. The AROMA (Accurate ROuter-level MAp) tool, elaborated by Kim
and Harfoush in 2007, provides several improvements over the methodology of Rocketfuel [74]. It
notably adds alias resolution based on reverse DNS (cf. Sec. 1.3.5) and an improved selection of
the targets of the traceroute probing to discover more exhaustive paths while using less probes,
resulting in both better maps and significantly smaller overhead probing. However, none of these
tools were designed with the effects of load balancing in mind, which became increasingly common
by the end of the 2000’s [12] (cf. Sec. 8.1.1), in addition to relying on alias resolution methods that can
now only cover a limited set of router interfaces, as discussed in Sec. 3.3.3.
Designed early in the 2010’s, the MERLIN hybrid tool [83] combines (Paris) traceroute probing
with IGMP probing performed from several vantage points to discover accurate intra-domain router-
level maps; IGMP probing itself, which is now unfortunately outdated, is covered in more detail
in Sec. 8.2. Finally, TreeNET [55], introduced to the community in 2016, performs traceroute
probing towards subnets previously discovered via ExploreNET [118] to build tree-like maps of target
networks. TreeNET has been already briefly discussed in Chapter 3, as it provided a space search
reduction scheme for alias resolution. However, as highlighted in Sec. 3.3.5, tree-like maps can be
difficult to interpret when load balancing influences most of the discovered traceroute paths.
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8.1.4 Efficient traceroute and fast topology mapping
In addition to the numerous works studying the various issues affecting traceroute paths and how
to mitigate them, several publications have also put an emphasis on performing efficient, large-scale
traceroute probing. For instance, the Doubletree algorithm was designed by Donnet et al. in 2005
to reduce the overhead probing when running traceroute from both a single or multiple vantage
points [39]. Heuristics of Doubletree have been notably reused by WISE [52, 53] (cf. Sec. 6.3.2).
During the 2010’s, the research community explored another application of traceroute probing:
fast topology mapping . Instead of targetting a specific network, fast topology mapping tools aim at
probing large network chunks or even the entire IPv4 Internet to capture comprehensive pictures of
the Internet in a short timespan. Introduced by Beverly in 2016, Yarrp (Yelling at Random Routers
Progressively) sends traceroute probes towards all IPv4 /24 prefixes to capture a IP-level topology
of the entire Internet in around one hour from a single vantage point [18]. Yarrp achieves this by
encoding information in the ICMP and TCP headers [101, 103] to avoid maintaining a state for each
probe and by using a pseudo-random probing scheme to avoid triggering security policies that could
prevent replies being received.
Yarrp would later act as a basis for Diamond-Miner. Introduced in early 2020 by Vermeulen et
al., Diamond-Miner (sometimes called D-Miner) expands upon Yarrp by adding the detection of
load balanced paths [122], reusing heuristics from the Multipath Detection Algorithm (MDA) that
was included in the classical Paris traceroute in 2007 by Augustin et al. [14]. Yarrp also inspired
FlashRoute, introduced by Huang et al. in 2020 [65], which combines algorithmical elements from
Paris traceroute [11], Yarrp and Doubletree to accurately discover traceroute paths throughout
the entire IPv4 Internet while reducing the overall probing time by a factor of three.
8.2 IGMP-based topology mapping
Besides traceroute and all associated topology discovery tools, the research community has also
explored an alternative probing technique based on the IGMP protocol [33]. The IGMP (Internet
Group Management Protocol) protocol is used to manage multicast groups in IPv4, and was initially
designed so that multicast routers could dynamically learn which interfaces within neighboring
subnets were part of a multicast group. However, two additional types of IGMP messages were later
added by the DVMRP protocol [105] (Distance Vector Multicast Routing Protocol) to monitor routers.
The mrinfo tool [67] was designed in 1995 by Jacobson to take advantage of these two additional
messages, respectively ASK_NEIGHBORS and NEIGHBORS_REPLY, to list all multicast enabled inter-
faces of remote routers along with those adjacent to them. Though the DVMRP protocol is outdated,
IPv4 multicast routers still replied to the aforementioned IGMP messages during the 2000’s [96].
IGMP probing has the major advantage of silently discovering router interfaces and their ad-
jacencies without involving alias resolution (cf. Chapter 1). It does, however, have two drawbacks:
first, IGMP probing only works with routers that enable multicasting, and second, it can only work if
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the target domain (or any intermediate domain on the way) does not filter ASK_NEIGHBORS IGMP
messages. The research community nevertheless used this probing technique to discover redundant
links between ASes [91] and to map intra-domain topologies [97]. The latter could be achieved with
the mrinfo-rec (rec for recursive) probing scheme, which sends new IGMP ASK_NEIGHBORS queries
on each adjacent interface found in a NEIGHBORS_REPLY IGMP message, unless this interface has
already been probed previously. Figure 8.3 depicts a toy topology that can be discovered thanks
to mrinfo (mrinfo-rec), where the interfaces of R3 have been highlighted in bold. Example 8.1
provides the NEIGHBORS_REPLY IGMP message that can be received by probing 10.0.0.2 (from R3)
with mrinfo. In this example, the listed interfaces (left side) correspond to interfaces of the target











Figure 8.3: Toy topology (based on [90]) that can be discovered via mrinfo (-rec).
Listing 8.1: NEIGHBORS_REPLY IGMP message obtained by probing R3 (via 10.0.0.2) with mrinfo
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 [ version 1 2 . 4 ]
1 0 . 0 . 0 . 2 −> 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 1 [1/0/pim/ querier ]
1 0 . 0 . 1 . 3 −> 1 0 . 0 . 1 . 1 [1/0/pim/ querier ]
1 0 . 0 . 1 . 3 −> 1 0 . 0 . 1 . 2 [1/0/pim/ querier ]
1 0 . 0 . 2 . 1 −> 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 [1/0/pim/ l e a f ]
Starting from 2004, the mrinfo-rec scheme has been deployed to build a large dataset [96]. Such a
dataset has notably been used by Mérindol et al. in 2010 to infer the presence of Layer-2 equipment in
the Internet and evaluate its effects on the observed behaviour of routers [90]. Finally, the hybrid tool
MERLIN (MEasure the Router Level of the INternet), introduced in 2011 by Marchetta et al., combined
Paris traceroute [11], mrinfo and the Ally component of Rocketfuel [113], to comprehensively
discover the router-level of a target domain using multiple vantage points [83]. Unfortunately, IGMP
probing eventually became obsolete due to IGMP filtering becoming increasingly common early in




While network graph inference has been an important part in the research work keeping the commu-
nity busy since the late 1990’s, network modeling has also been explored from multiple angles [98].
Indeed, data collected from the Internet can be used to model realistic topologies and later used to
assess new technologies in simulated environments, such as new network protocols. In particular,
realistic data can be fed to network models to randomly generate realistic topologies for simulation
purposes. Sec. 8.3.1 first covers the topic of modeling the Internet, notably from the perspective of
the router-level and the AS-level, while Sec. 8.3.2 presents an alternative approach: bipartite graphs.
8.3.1 Router-level and AS-level models
A classical model of the Internet consists of a graph where vertices account for a specific type of
network element (e.g., routers) while the edges account for their adjacencies. For instance, in a
router-level graph (i.e., where each vertex models a router), an edge between two vertices models
the fact that the corresponding routers are directly connected together (e.g., via a point-to-point
link). This simple model allows the Internet to be studied with classical graph metrics [35], and
in particular, router-level graphs allow for the study of the router degree, i.e., how many routers a
given router is directly connected to (e.g., via point-to-point links or LANs). Figure 8.4 pictures a toy
example of a router-level graph, where the router at the center of the figure has a degree equal to
seven due to being directly linked to seven other routers. The distribution of the router degree in the
Internet has been studied and debated many times by the community: in particular, Faloutsos et al.
claimed in 1999 that the router degree distribution was typically shaped like a power law [40].
Figure 8.4: An example of a router-level graph. The router in the center has a degree equal to 7.
Studying the router-level of the Internet is notably what drove the research community into
investigate alias resolution in the first place (cf. Chapter 1). In particular, a 2007 study by Gunes
and Sarac highlighted that bad or incomplete alias resolution can drastically change the observed
properties of the router-level of a target network [57]. However, the study of the router-level is not
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restricted to interpreting data collected through alias resolution, and several models try to account for
physical, statistical, or economical properties of computer networks [98]. For instance, an analytical
approach for modeling the Internet topology, proposed by Alderson et al. in 2005, relied on statistics
and graph theory to build annotated router-level graphs accounting for technological constraints and
economic considerations [10]. Another model, introduced by Wang and Loguinov in 2010, estimated
the wealth of each ISP and used that knowledge to infer the evolution of a network topology over
time with the help of a multiplicative stochastic process [123]. In particular, for a given point of time,
this model ensured that the degree of each router stayed proportional to the associated ISP’s wealth.
Figure 8.5: A toy example of an AS-level graph. The clouds depict individual ASes.
Over time, the research community has also studied the AS-level, i.e., the dynamics occurring
between Autonomous Systems [37, 61]. More precisely, each AS has a given number of neighbors,
i.e., other ASes it is directly connected with, to which it will route packets depending on the routes
advertised by each neighbor through the BGP protocol [79]. Figure 8.5 depicts a toy example of the
AS-level, where clouds model individual ASes and where routers on the edge of clouds (in gray)
correspond to the AS Border Routers (or ASBRs), i.e., the routers that handle inter-AS links. The
discovery of AS relationships was notably investigated in a study by Dimitropoulos et al. in 2006 [36].
The same study also showed that the distribution of the number of peers for each AS also tends to
follow a power law, just like the routers themselves at the intra-AS level. The AS-level plays a critical
role in the routing, as it can completely change the routes taken by packets over time. In particular,
traceroute paths collected from a same vantage point towards fixed destinations over small or long
periods of time may never be stable, as evidenced by a study conducted in 2009 by Magnien et al. [82].
The research community has often relied on power law assumptions for network modeling, and
these assumptions have been commented on and challenged several times [26, 28, 76, 78, 89]. In
particular, data collected with the help of mrinfo [67, 96] (cf. Sec. 8.2) was used to show how the
observed degree of some routers may be overestimated due to the influence of Layer-2 devices [90],
meaning the power law distribution might be an artefact. Figure 8.6 pictures the same topology as in
Fig. 8.4, but considering the central router actually consists of two routers connected via an Ethernet
switch (highlighted by the red dashed oval). As a result, the largest router degree drops from seven to
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Figure 8.6: The large degree router from Fig. 8.4 may consist of a mesh involving Layer-2 equipment.
five. A short review conducted in 2008 by Haddadi et al. also criticized the over-reliance of network
models on power law assumptions, both at the (intra-AS) router-level and the AS-level [62].
8.3.2 Bipartite graphs
Bipartite graphs are a type of graph where the vertices are divided into two disjointed sets, > and ⊥,
so that every edge exclusively connects a > vertex with a ⊥ vertex. Figure 8.7 is a toy example of a
bipartite graph, where the > set consists of vertices α, β, γ while vertices A, B, C, D, E correspond to
the ⊥ set. Bipartite graphs are naturally suitable for model networks where vertices can be categorized
into two families of elements, and have been frequently used by the scientific community to study
social networks, such as file-sharing communities [66, 93, 124]. Using a bipartite formalism to model
the Internet graph has been discussed several times, notably in a study conducted by Guillaume
and Latapy in 2006 [56]. Indeed, since routers are usually connected together through other network
elements, such as subnets or Layer-2 equipment (e.g., Ethernet switches), conceptualizing the
Internet as a bipartite graph where one set accounts for routers while the other set includes network
elements that connect routers together is an intuitive modeling approach.
A B C D E
α β γ
Figure 8.7: A simple example of bipartite graph. The > vertices are α, β and γ.
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Bipartite graphs are useful not only because they can model some types of networks more
easily than other formalisms, but also because they can be used to infer simpler graphs through
the mechanism of bipartite projection. Given a bipartite graph, a regular graph can be created with
either > or ⊥ vertices by creating an edge between a pair of vertices of one party each time they share
a common neighbor vertex from the second party. Therefore, if a bipartite formalism is chosen to
model a computer network where one party consists of routers, it is possible to recover a router-level
graph through projection (e.g., >-projection if routers are > vertices) and to explore other levels
of the network topology by projecting on the other party as well. Figure 8.8 depicts projections on
the bipartite graph from Figure 8.7, with Fig. 8.8a giving the >-projection and Fig. 8.8b illustrating
the ⊥-projection. Finally, many interesting metrics have been designed for bipartite graphs by the
scientific community [77] and are available by default in popular programming libraries to study










Figure 8.8: Projections of the bipartite graph depicted in Fig. 8.7.
While bipartite graphs have been studied for decades, the first actual bipartite formalism for the
Internet was introduced to the research community in 2013 by Tarissan et al. [114]. This bipartite
formalism includes Layer-2 equipment (such as Ethernet switches) as > vertices while routers
constitute the ⊥ vertices. Such a formalism is in fact a consequence of contemporary advances in
topology mapping: a few years earlier, IGMP [33] probing was explored by the research community
with the help of mrinfo [67] to discover routers and Layer-2 devices [83, 90, 97] (cf. Sec. 8.2) and to
challenge the idea that the distribution of the router degree in the Internet follows a power law [40].
The mrinfo dataset [96] was used by Tarissan et al. as a basis to create realistic bipartite graphs to
model the Internet, which were subsequently used to highlight its topological properties and to create
a bipartite graph generator able to randomly create new topologies for simulation purposes [114]. To
account for point-to-point links between routers, i.e., routers being connected together without an
intermediate Layer-2 device, Tarissan et al. used virtual Layer-2 devices that only connect two routers
linked in practice by a point-to-point link. This workaround allows the projection of a bipartite graph
on the routers to accurately depict the router-level. Figure 8.9 pictures a toy network (Fig. 8.9a) and
its equivalent bipartite graph as defined by Tarissan et al. (Fig. 8.9b), where the orange dashed lines
account for the single point-to-point link.
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𝑅1 𝑅2 𝑅3 𝑅4
𝑆1 𝑆2
(b) As a bipartite graph
Figure 8.9: The Layer-2/Layer-3 bipartite formalism proposed by Tarissan et al. [114].
While realistic and thoroughly assessed, this bipartite formalism has two drawbacks. On the one
hand, it relies heavily on data collected via IGMP probing, although such a method has become
difficult to use due to filtering practices applied by network operators [84] (cf. Sec. 8.2). On the
other hand, the formalism itself relies on a workaround to model point-to-point links. Though
the aforementioned virtual Layer-2 devices make it possible to create an accurate picture of the
router-level while projecting a bipartite graph on the routers, Tarissan et al. mentioned that such
a workaround can also impact the structure of randomly generated bipartite graphs. As will be
discussed in Chapter 12, a solution to this issue could consist of including subnets in the formalism,
since (small) subnets usually correspond to point-to-point links in the Internet (cf. Chapter 4).
8.4 Closing comments and research questions
Many approaches for both network graph inference and network modeling have been explored by the
research community over the past two decades. In particular, the research involving IGMP probing
has proven to be one of the most insightful, as it has even led to Layer-2 equipment discovery [90] (cf.
Sec. 8.2), which in turn motivated a bipartite model of the Internet [114] (cf. Sec. 8.3.2). Unfortunately,
IGMP probing has been rendered practically impossible to use due to new filtering practices [84].
Other approaches to discover topological data have also lost relevance over time, such as the path
discovery via the Record Route option of the IP protocol [102], rendered obsolete by modern filtering
practices [44]. Furthermore, network mapping approaches that could still be deployed today do
not account well for modern topological properties of the Internet, such as the prevalence of load
balanced paths [12] (cf. Sec. 8.1.1), as discussed in Sec. 8.1.3. Finally, modern efforts tend to focus on
discovering other network elements, such as IXPs [95], or on fast topology mapping (cf. Sec. 8.1.4).
Due to state-of-the-art approaches either becoming deprecated or losing accuracy over the years,
new network graph inference schemes are much needed to capture accurate snapshots of intra-
domain topologies. Moreover, though numerous network modeling works focus of one particular level
of the network stack, research resulting from data collected through IGMP probing has demonstrated
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the potential of bipartite formalism for the Internet [114]. Indeed, bipartite graphs are naturally
suited to computer networks, especially when considering the intra-domain level (i.e., within a single
AS), due to network components usually being linked together through other components (e.g., a
point-to-point link between routers is typically a /30 or /31 subnet). This third and final part of the
thesis will address the challenges of accurately discovering intra-domain topologies and modeling
these topologies as bipartite graphs by answering the following research questions.
1. How can traceroute paths be best handled to map the topology of a target network in
today’s Internet ? As mentioned in particular in Sec. 8.1.1, the effects of load balancing in
today’s Internet are a fact merely an hypothesis, and the structure arising from a collection of
traceroute paths will be much closer to a directed acyclic graph (or DAG) than a tree [98].
It is therefore crucial to find a way to account for this inherent property of traceroute data,
rather than finding a workaround. This question will be thoroughly discussed in Chapter 9.
2. Is it possible to design a topology inference tool that can systematically build the DAG of a
target network ? Accounting for the DAG structure of traceroute data is one thing, but to
accurately map a target network, it must be possible to go from an IP-level perspective to
at least a hop-level, if not a router-level perspective. Chapter 10 will present and describe a
topology discovery tool able to perform this task, whose algorithms can be implemented in
(quasi-)linear time.
3. Is this new tool capable of building DAGs that are true to the target domain, regardless
of the vantage point ? The tool described in Chapter 10 will be thoroughly validated, then
deployed in the wild to evaluate the effects of changing the vantage point to measure a same
given target network. This evaluation will be provided in Chapter 11.
4. Can the data collected by the new tool be interpreted with bipartite formalisms to study the
topological properties of a target network ? Using many snapshots (as defined in Sec. 5.2.1)
of various Autonomous Systems (or ASes), new bipartite formalisms will be discussed and used












his chapter explores in detail how traceroute records can be interpreted to build the map
of a target network. As such, it addresses research question 1 from Sec. 8.4, which is about
finding out how the directed acyclic graph shape of a collection of traceroute paths can be
best accounted for in order to build accurate maps of the modern Internet.
As already mentioned in Sec. 8.1, traceroute is one of the most widely used tools in topology dis-
covery, notably thanks to its ability to reveal the router interfaces crossed by the probes sent towards
a specific destination. Because the paths towards a specific network will share many similarities,
notably exhibiting the same first interfaces, it is tempting to view a collection of traceroute paths
towards a specific target domain as a kind of tree where a node models a single interface and features
one or several successors and – ideally – one predecessor. However, network topologies can notably
include convergence points, i.e., devices where multiple network paths converge as a result of load
balancing architectures and other traffic engineering policies [14] (cf. Sec. 1.4 and Sec. 5.1.3). Because
of convergence points and their multiple predecessors, a collection of traceroute paths should
actually be closer, in practice, to a directed acyclic graph (or DAG) [12, 98] (cf. Sec. 8.1.1).
With the help of heuristics, the topology discovery tool TreeNET [55] is nevertheless able to build
a tree from a set of paths (towards a set of subnets) collected with Paris traceroute [11]. How it
manges to do this in practice and the limits of such a methodology are explained in detail in Sec. 9.1.
traceroute is also well known to suffer from several issues induced by traffic engineering or
specific router configurations, some of which have already been discussed in previous chapters
(cf. Chapter 5). Another approach to exploit traceroute paths would consist of processing the
collected paths to identify the various problems affecting them. In doing so, it becomes possible
to post-process the discovered paths in order to more easily build the map of a target network, a
strategy that can notably benefit TreeNET. The traceroute extension RTrack [46] implements such
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a strategy to improve the discovered paths. The precise issues it deals with are detailed in Sec. 9.2.
However, post-processing the data collected with (Paris) traceroute in order to ease topology
mapping is open to debate. In fact, it might not even be necessary, i.e., it is possible to work with the
initial data, or even with partial traceroute records. Re-using the concept of neighborhood used by
TreeNET (cf. Sec. 3.1.1) and the concept of trail introduced with WISE (cf. Sec. 5.1.1), a target domain
can be mapped out step by step without trying to mitigate traceroute issues and while embracing
the possibility for a router interface discovered by traceroute to have several predecessors in the
paths where it appears. Such a strategy is extensively presented and assessed in Sec. 9.3.
Finally, Sec. 9.4 concludes this chapter by summarizing the merits of each approach and arguing
which one would be preferable to build accurate maps of the modern Internet.
9.1 Network mapping with complete traceroute paths (TreeNET)
This section reviews the topology mapping methodology of TreeNET [55]. As its name implies,
TreeNET builds a tree-like mapping of a target network by collecting Paris traceroute [11] paths
towards a set of subnets found within the same target network. The subnets are initially inferred with
the help of ExploreNET [118] (cf. Sec. 4.2.2) then refined with a correction heuristic implemented
by TreeNET to recover large subnets first detected as several small subnets by ExploreNET [55] (cf.
Sec. 4.2.3). Sec. 9.1.1 first explains in detail how TreeNET uses the (complete) traceroute paths
towards the inferred subnets to build its tree-like structure, then Sec. 9.1.2 reviews the limits of such
a methodology, some of which have already been discussed in Chapter 3.
9.1.1 From traceroute paths to a tree-like mapping
TreeNET starts building its tree-like mapping of the target domain once it has collected subnet-
level data and (Paris) traceroute paths towards each inferred subnet. In practice, these paths are
obtained by using a pivot interface as the target. As a reminder, an interface of a provided subnet is
considered to be a pivot interface of this subnet when it does not belong to the ingress router (i.e.,
the last router crossed before reaching the subnet) and when it shares comparable properties with
other interfaces found within the same subnet (see also Sec. 4.1.2).
The subnets themselves act as the leaves of the tree, while the root replaces the vantage point.
The internal nodes model the individual hops of the traceroute paths and their succession, i.e.,
each internal node of depth N is labeled with a router interface that appears at the N th position in
one or more paths. The immediate result of this construction is that the internal nodes bordered
by multiple leaves constitute neighborhoods, i.e., network locations that are bordered by subnets
located at most one hop away from each other and which consist, in practice, of a single router or
multiple routers connected in mesh. Moreover, the internal nodes of a tree-like mapping can be
interpreted as a hop-level topology, and identifying the interfaces associated with each hop (e.g.,
from surrounding subnets) is a form of space search reduction for alias resolution [51] (cf. Sec. 3.1.1).
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Algorithm 13 Insertion of a subnet in the tree
Require: N , root node of the tree
1: procedure INSERT(Node N , Subnet S)
2: R ← S.getRoute()
3: if N .getNextChild(R[N .getDepth() + 1]) == ; then
4: Prev ← N
5: for i ← N .getDepth() : R.getLength() do
6: New ← new Node(R[i ])
7: Prev.addChild(New)
8: Prev ← New
9: Prev.addChild(new Node(S))
10: return
11: I ← INSERTIONPOINT(N , R)
12: INSERT(I , S)
13: P ← I .getParent()
14: while P 6= ; do
15: L ← R[P .getDepth()]
16: if L 6= P .getLabel() then
17: P .addLabel(L)
18: set ← NODESATDEPTH(N , P .getDepth())
19: for M ∈ set do
20: if L ∈ M .getLabels() then
21: P .merge(M)
22: P ← P .getParent()
23: return
Of course, TreeNET has to carefully handle the case of nodes that might feature multiple prede-
cessors in the paths. It does this by allowing nodes to model multiple router interfaces discovered
via (Paris) traceroute at the same distance TTL-wise. As a consequence, these nodes, which are
denoted as multi-label nodes (and already mentioned in Sec. 3.1.1), no longer model a single neigh-
borhood (when surrounded by leaves) but rather a superposition of multiple neighborhoods. They
are created while the tree is being built, using a specific tree construction process, summarized in
pseudo-code by Algorithm 13. Whenever a new subnet has to be added to the tree, TreeNET first
finds the insertion point in the tree, defined as the deepest internal node which shares a common
router interface (or label) with the route recorded for the new subnet (line 11). Finding this insertion
point can be implemented efficiently in practice by using a side data structure which lists all nodes
for a given depth, starting with the deepest nodes first. Then, the missing internal nodes (i.e., hops
between the matching label of the insertion point and the new subnet) and the new leaf are inserted
below the insertion point (lines 3– 10). TreeNET subsequently checks the tree from the insertion
point up to the root, inserting at each internal node the router interface found at the equivalent
TTL distance whenever the route of the new subnet differs from the data currently stored in the tree
(lines 12– 23). For each internal node, if the label from the route of the new subnet already appears in
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another internal node of the tree at the same depth, it is merged with the current node (lines 19– 21).
In the end, each router interface found in the traceroute data should appear only once in the tree
at a given depth. It is worth noting that, in the pseudo-code, the insertion of the missing nodes is
handled in a recursive manner to simplify the construction when the tree is empty or when a route
completely differs from the route data inserted up to that point. The pseudo-code also assumes the




























(c) After merging B ,C and C
Figure 9.2: Inserting S3 in a tree already containing S1 and S2 (topology of Fig. 9.1).
To complement Algorithm 13, Figure 9.1 and Figure 9.2 both represent a toy topology and how
it would be built as a tree-like mapping by TreeNET. Given the topology shown in Fig. 9.1, possible
(Paris) traceroute paths towards subnets S1, S2, and S3 could be {A, B, D}, {A, C, E}, and {A, C, D,
F} respectively. The insertion of S1 and S2 is immediate, as Fig. 9.2a shows. Fig. 9.2b and Fig. 9.2c
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illustrates how the insertion of S3 occurs, with the changes in the tree being highlighted in green.
The insertion point is obviously the node bearing the router interface D as a label. As the parent
node does not have the label C , such a label is added; however, label C already appears in the tree at
the same depth, therefore the branch is merged with the node containing both labels B and C . In
the final tree, all router interfaces recorded in the traceroute data appear only once in the tree. Of
course, a router interface will only appear once if and only if all its occurrences in traceroute data
appear at a fixed TTL distance (as defined in Sec. 4.1.2). If one router interface appears at different
TTL distances in the paths, it will appear in several internal nodes found at distinct depths.
The time complexity to build the tree-like mapping depends on two variables: N , the number of
subnets to insert into the structure, and M , the total number of router interfaces that are unique with
respect to a given TTL distance in the traceroute data (i.e., if an interface is observed at two TTL
distances, it is counted twice). Given that traceroute paths are short in length (i.e., usually much
less than 64), meaning the final tree will feature an equally small depth, and assuming the creation of
a leaf (i.e., single subnet) is O (1) (this can be done in practice by listing subnets within the parent
internal node), then the insertion of a single subnet can be O (log M) with efficient data structures (or
O (1) with hash maps, though having a hash map for each relevant TTL distance is costly). Therefore,
building the tree-like mapping starting with N subnets is O (N log M). The latest implementation of
TreeNET can be found online at the dedicated public GitHub repository 1.
9.1.2 Limits of the tree-like mapping
While easy to implement and suitable for simple topologies (such as the ULiège network, cf. Sec. 3.2),
the tree-like topology mapping implemented by TreeNET has several limitations. An immediate
limitation, already hinted at Sec. 9.1.1, is that TreeNET is not well armed against asymmetric paths
found in load balancing architectures [14]. Indeed, the tree construction guarantees a router interface
can only appear once at given depth, but does not guarantee it will occur only once in the whole
tree: if such an interface is observed at several distinct TTL distances in the traceroute data, it will
appear in multiple internal nodes as well. Because of this, the neighborhoods TreeNET attempts to
discover can be split into several smaller neighborhoods.
Another issue is the handling of anonymous hops, i.e., specific hops within traceroute paths
which could not be identified because the corresponding router did not reply to the traceroute
probe, either because of some network delay or because of its configuration (cf. Sec. 5.1.1). Since
anonymous hops can, in practice, account for multiple devices, nodes that model them 2 are difficult
to interpret, especially when they are multi-label and therefore bear several other router interfaces.
The fact that each node can only have one predecessor can also make the interpretation of a tree
more complex. In particular, multi-label nodes can only be correctly interpreted if the associated
router interfaces are further analyzed through alias resolution. While this can be a tool for discovering
1https://github.com/JefGrailet/treenet
2Such hops can be denoted by a special label or by the IP address 0.0.0.0 in practice.
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individual routers in load balanced architectures [50], this also means TreeNET is highly dependent
on the accuracy of alias resolution for a topology to be easy to interpret. As argued in Chapter 3,
alias resolution can be difficult to achieve in today’s Internet and can partly rely on space search
reduction – which TreeNET is meant to perform. This is why Sec. 3.3.5 suggests there were some large
alias resolution scenarii for specific target Autonomous Systems: there were simply some multi-label
nodes with large amounts of router interfaces, therefore amounting to multiple neighborhoods at
once (cf. Sec. 9.1.1) and restricting the benefits of space search reduction.
Overall, the root of all problems of TreeNET is that it was designed so that its tree-like mapping
accounts for the entirety of the recorded traceroute paths, therefore including their issues as well,
such as anonymous hops and consequences of load balancing. As such, TreeNET works well with
topologies where little traffic engineering is experienced, but can struggle to offer accurate topology
mapping otherwise. This suggests using the complete and raw traceroute paths should be avoided:
either the traceroute data is pre-processed, as will be discussed in Sec. 9.2, or it is handled so that
only the useful portions of each path is used, as will be elaborated in Sec. 9.3.
9.2 Detecting and correcting traceroute illnesses (RTrack)
In order to mitigate the various traceroute issues that complicate the interpretation of a tree-like
mapping as built by TreeNET (cf. Sec. 9.1), a stand-alone tool named RTrack [46] (whose name stands
for "Rate-liming Tracker") was designed during the first half of 2017 to quantify traceroute issues
outside the context of TreeNET (cf. Sec. 9.1). It therefore amounts to a traceroute extension that
aims at detecting three issues: anonymous hops induced by rate-limiting, route stretching, and route
cycling. RTrack not only detects such issues, but it also processes the collected paths to mitigate
them. Sec. 9.2.1 first details each of the three aforementioned problems and how RTrack mitigates
them, after which Sec. 9.2.2 reviews the benefits and drawbacks of such a strategy.
9.2.1 traceroute issues and correction heuristics
As already reminded in Sec. 9.1.2, anonymous hops [59, 68, 125] refer to hops in a traceroute path
where the corresponding probe has timed out, i.e., no reply was sent by any router. This can be a
default behaviour (some routers are configured not to reply to probes), but also the consequence of
rate-limiting . Rate-limiting is a type of policy implemented by routers to reduce the traffic coming
from a given source, which consists of dropping packets for a short period of time after a certain
number have been received. Such a policy can be useful to control the volume of the network traffic
but can also act as a security measure against network attacks.
The two other aforementioned problems rather characterize anomalies observed with non-
anonymous hops. On the one hand, route stretching simply refers to the fact that the same router
interface is observed at distinct TTL distances inside a set of traceroute paths as a consequence
of asymmetric paths in load balancing architectures [14]. As such, it amounts to a generalization of
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the phenomenon of warping trails discussed in Sec. 5.1.2. Route cycling , on the other hand, refers to
how the same router interface is observed multiple times within a same traceroute path, hinting at
a cycle in the routing. It therefore amounts to a generalization of the cycling hops (cf. Sec. 5.1.1).
Though all three issues are well known to the research community [14, 85], RTrack expands on the
state-of-the-art by implementing heuristics to quantify rate-limiting and to mitigate all three issues,
i.e., by producing corrected paths free from the observed anomalies. Such paths can be subsequently
used to improve the construction of a tree-like mapping as performed by TreeNET (cf. Sec. 9.1).
Listing 9.1: Set of traceroute paths hinting at a rate-limiting policy
1 0 . 0 . 6 4 . 1 , 1 0 . 0 . 6 4 . 1 2 8 , 1 0 . 0 . 6 4 . 1 9 2 , 1 0 . 0 . 6 5 . 3 2 , 1 0 . 0 . 6 5 . 6 4 , 10 .0 .12 8.1
1 0 . 0 . 6 4 . 1 , 1 0 . 0 . 6 4 . 1 2 8 , 1 0 . 0 . 6 4 . 1 9 2 , 1 0 . 0 . 6 5 . 3 2 , 1 0 . 0 . 6 5 . 6 4 , 10 .0 .12 8.3
1 0 . 0 . 6 4 . 1 , 1 0 . 0 . 6 4 . 1 2 8 , 1 0 . 0 . 6 4 . 1 9 2 , 1 0 . 0 . 6 5 . 3 2 , 1 0 . 0 . 6 5 . 9 6 , 10 .0 .12 8.4
1 0 . 0 . 6 4 . 1 , 1 0 . 0 . 6 4 . 1 2 8 , * , 1 0 . 0 . 6 5 . 3 2 , 1 0 . 0 . 6 5 . 9 6 , 10.0 .128 .7
Rate-limiting can be identified and mitigated with the help of the two policemen and a drunk
heuristic. The idea is the following: given a set of paths that feature the same observed interfaces at
given TTL distances, if the same sequence of three interfaces can be found in most paths while other
paths feature a comparable sequence where the middle interface is an anonymous hop, then this
anonymous hop can be replaced with the middle interface of the sequence without the anonymous
hop. Example 9.1 shows a small set of traceroute paths where the last path features an anonymous
hop that can be inferred with the help of the three other paths. Indeed, the first three paths feature
the sequence 10.0.64.128,10.0.64.192,10.0.65.32 while the last path contains 10.0.64.128,∗,10.0.65.32
at the same positions, suggesting the ∗ can be replaced with 10.0.64.192. At the same time, the router
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Figure 9.3: Heuristic used to estimate the rate-limiting experienced with a given router interface.
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To verify rate-limiting does occur with the interfaces used to fix anonymous hops with the two
policemen and a drunk heuristic, an algorithm can be used to quantify at which probing rate the
response rate (i.e., the number of replies divided by the number of probes) starts to decrease. This
algorithm, expressed as a flow-chart by Figure 9.3, consists of repeatedly sending a traceroute
probe adjusted for the allegedly rate-limiting interface for a short period of time. After this first round,
a second round is scheduled but sending two probes at once each time. A third round can then
be scheduled with four probes, then a fourth round with eight probes, etc., the number of probes
doubling each time. The heuristic stops as soon as the response rate becomes too low (below a
threshold, e.g. 0.1), or if it reaches a certain threshold of probes sent simultaneously during a round.
The number of probes sent simultaneously at the last round, if a low response rate appears, can be












(c) Fixed path towards B
Figure 9.4: Mitigating route stretching. The first path is used to correct the second one.
Route stretching does not require any particular heuristic to be detected, as it can simply con-
sists of making a census of the TTL distances at which a given router interface is observed in the
traceroute data (much like the detection of warping trails, cf. Sec. 6.3.3). As for its mitigation, i.e.
guaranteeing the router interfaces always appear at the same TTL distance, the traceroute paths
where the observed TTL distances are the smallest can be selected and the portion of these paths
up to the problematic interface can be used as a prefix. Then, for any path where the observed TTL
distance of the problematic interface is higher, the portion of this path after the interface can be
chosen as a suffix. The prefix, the problematic interface and the suffix are then put together into a
shorter route which is consistent with other paths when it comes to the TTL distances (a property
which is notably desirable in the context of TreeNET, cf. Sec. 9.1.2). A similar strategy can be applied
to mitigate route cycling: the portion of the route up to the first occurrence of the cycling interface
is used as a prefix, while the end of the route after the last occurrence is used as a suffix. Figure 9.4
shows a toy example where route stretching is observed and can be mitigated. The second path in
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the figure (Fig. 9.4b) is updated with the data from the first path (Fig. 9.4a) to produce an updated
path where the router interface observed at varying TTL distances, symbolized by the red router in
the Figure 9.4, is found at the same TTL distance as in the first path (Fig. 9.4c).
It is worth noting that the correction of paths where stretching was observed has been validated
back as far as 2017 on a Belgian ISP after running RTrack towards said ISP from the PlanetLab
testbed 3. A network administrator working for this ISP could verify that all corrected paths were true
to the topology and did not include false links. Interestingly, the administrator also noted that the
additional router interfaces appearing in the stretched paths were associated to back-up links.
9.2.2 Pre-processing traceroute paths: a good idea ?
Though RTrack [46] provides several treatments to the traceroute data that could benefit TreeNET
(cf. Sec. 9.1.2), it does not provide any treatment to address the main limitation of TreeNET: that each
internal node in the tree-like mapping can only have one predecessor. Indeed, if the probes sent by
TreeNET cross symmetrical paths in load balancers and pass through convergence points, i.e., devices
where multiple (possibly load balanced) paths converge [14], the final tree-like map will still feature
several multi-label nodes (cf. Sec. 9.1.1) that will be difficult to interpret. This notably mitigates the
benefits of TreeNET for alias resolution (cf. Sec. 3.3.5). Moreover, the heuristics implemented by
RTrack only partially mitigate anonymous hops and the effects induced by asymmetrical paths in
load balancers, with no particular benefit regarding the consequences of symmetric paths.
Not only is the pre-processing of the traceroute data offered by RTrack of no help to overcome
the main limitation of TreeNET, but it can also induce a biased and incomplete view of the topology
by hiding some links. In particular, while validating the corrected paths on a Belgian ISP (cf. Sec. 9.2.1),
the additional hops in the stretched paths proved to be back-up links. Including such links in a
topology mapping can be a valuable addition, since they play a critical role in the internal routing of
the target domain. Figure 9.4 also demonstrates this problem: if only the paths to A and B are known,
and if the path to B is corrected as shown by Fig. 9.4c, then the two routers on the left side in each
sub-figure will be left out of the final mapping based on the improved paths.
These limitations suggest that the very idea of turning traceroute data into a tree-like map only
works for ideal settings and can only offer a partial discovery upon probing complex target networks.
In particular, the proportion of (Paris) traceroute paths that are influenced by load balancing is
always non-negligible [12] and can be very large depending on the target network and the vantage
point (as previously discussed in Chapter 5). Naturally, this induces the probes in crossing multiple
convergence points with multiple predecessors. Therefore, a new topology mapping technique that
allows a node to have multiple predecessors should be designed. With this premise, the resulting
structure would no longer be a tree, but a directed acyclic graph (DAG). By design, this structure
should be much closer to the natural shape of raw traceroute data [98]. Sec. 9.3 presents the main
ideas used to design the new topology mapping scheme and extensively assess them.
3As with any validation in this thesis, no groundtruth data will be released for security and confidentiality concerns.
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9.3 From traceroute paths to a directed acyclic graph
This section introduces the main ideas used to map a target domain with a directed acyclic graph
rather than a tree-like structure in order to overcome the limitations of TreeNET (cf. Sec. 9.1). Sec. 9.3.1
first presents the intuitions and early observations that motivated this research direction. Then,
Sec. 9.3.2 formalizes the concepts that will act as the main tools for the systematic mapping of a
target network as a DAG. Finally, Sec. 9.3.3 assesses the soundness of these concepts with a validation
and an analysis of data collected from the PlanetLab testbed in the second half of 2019, both being
conducted with a slightly modified WISE [52, 53].
9.3.1 Early ideas and observations
In order to build a structure comparable to the tree-like mapping of TreeNET where each node can
have multiple predecessors just like in the traceroute data, the new structure should first make
sure the nodes still correspond to the neighborhoods, i.e., network locations that abstract individual
routers or meshes of routers (possibly involving Layer-2 equipment) that are typically bordered by a
set of subnets located at most one hop away from each other (cf. Sec. 3.1.1). As explained in Sec. 9.1.1,
each internal node in the tree built by TreeNET corresponds to a neighborhood, which therefore
corresponds in practice to an aggregate of subnets whose paths feature the same length and the same
last hop. Therefore, neighborhoods can be built on the basis of the penultimate hops towards their
respective bordering subnets 4, and if the length requirement (i.e., the paths should have the same
length) is excluded, then this way of discovering neighborhoods becomes more suitable for target
networks where traffic engineering induces varying TTL distances for the observed IP interfaces.
The key to building the neighborhood-based DAG of a target domain lies in finding how neighbor-
hoods are located in respect of each other. The mapping methodology of TreeNET does it by design,
but performing the same task without the tree paradigm requires more care, and will be elaborated
on in Chapter 10. However, reviewing the traceroute data for a set of subnets is sufficient to see
how often a neighborhood located at most one hop away from one or more other neighborhoods can
be found. Assuming most paths towards subnets ends with a well identified interface rather than
an anonymous hop 5, a census of all such penultimate hops should be done before reviewing each
route to check if any interface found before its penultimate hop corresponds to any of the other
penultimate hops found in other paths. The interface that is the closest to the penultimate hop which
satisfies this condition can be considered as a peer, i.e., the neighborhood built on the basis of this
interface will be next to the neighborhood identified by the penultimate hop. If the difference in hop
count between the peer and the penultimate hop is equal to one, then both associated neighborhoods
are located one hop away from each other.
4Careful readers will remark the notion of trail from Chapter 5 could be reused here. Sec. 9.3.2 will involve it.
5This would correspond, in WISE terminology, to an anomaly-free trail.
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To illustrate this notion of peer, Example 9.2 provides a sample of traceroute paths towards
subnets of AS224 collected on September 1st, 2017 with TreeNET from the PlanetLab testbed 6. The
penultimate hop for the two first subnets is 78.91.96.0, which also happens to be the interface found
just before the penultimate hop for the third subnet. 78.91.96.0 is therefore a peer of 78.91.96.49.
As a consequence, the neighborhood bordered by subnets 78.91.96.12/31 and 78.91.96.14/31
will be found next to the neighborhood bordered by 78.91.96.16/31, precisely one hop sooner.
Listing 9.2: Sample of traceroute paths for subnets of AS224 (September 1st 2017)
78.91.96.12/31: . . . , 128.39.46.86 , 7 8.91 .96.0
78.91.96.14/31: . . . , 128.39.46.86 , 7 8.91 .96.0
78.91.96.16/31: . . . , 128.39.46.86 , 7 8 . 9 1 . 9 6 . 0 , 78.91.96.49
If peers can be found one hop away from penultimate hops on a regular basis, then it becomes
possible to build a graph where vertices model neighborhoods and where each edge models the fact
that the two connected neighborhoods are next to each other in the topology. By following the peers
of each neighborhood, the graph can be built step by step, and this while using only the most useful
portions of each traceroute path. To support this intuition, a subset of the ASes measured with
TreeNET in early 2017 (cf. Sec. 3.3.1) were measured again on September 1st, 2017 from the PlanetLab
testbed, and the collected subnets and paths were parsed to see how close peers were on average 7.
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Figure 9.5: Distance in TTL between penultimate hops and their peers (September 1st, 2017).
Figure 9.5 presents, as a CDF, the distribution of the difference in TTL between a penultimate hop
and a peer in all paths collected on September 1st, 2017, regardless of the target network. The curve
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and some paths did not include any peers. Being unable to find a peer in a traceroute path simply
means the associated subnet(s) come first in the topology from the perspective of the vantage point
or are in a different location. Hopefully, the curve already reaches 0.9 for a difference of one hop, and
only slightly rises starting from a difference of 2 hops. This suggests that, in a vast majority of cases,
it is possible to detect neighborhoods and find their direct adjacencies by carefully analyzing the
traceroute data. Of course, such a task presents several challenges, but these early observations
were encouraging enough to warrant exploring this research direction. Before designing algorithms
for building graphs, Sec. 9.3.2 first defines precisely the concepts involved in such algorithms and
Sec. 9.3.3 assesses them thoroughly with the help of WISE [52] (cf. Chapter 6).
9.3.2 The building blocks of a graph: neighborhoods and their peers
The definition of neighborhood will first be reviewed. A neighborhood is formally defined as a
network location bordered by a group of subnets located at most one hop away from each other (see
also Sec. 3.1.1). As such, a neighborhood is in practice a single router or a mesh of routers that might
be connected together with Layer-2 equipment, e.g., Ethernet switches. As a result, building a graph
of neighborhoods amounts to building a map of the hop-level of the target network, which can be
seen as an initial approximation of the router-level of the same network. As explained in Sec. 9.3.1,
neighborhoods can be identified simply by aggregating subnets whose traceroute paths all end
with the same penultimate hop, an operation which has already been performed by the TreeNET
methodology (cf. Sec. 9.1.1) but with an additional constraint on the paths (i.e., they must have
the same length). If the terminology of subnet inference (cf. Sec. 4.1.2) and the concept of trail (cf.
Sec. 5.1.1) are re-used, the so-called penultimate hop can be redefined as the trail towards the pivot
interface(s) of a subnet. For the rest of this thesis, the trail of the pivot interface(s) of a subnet will
be referred to as the trail of this subnet. Therefore, a neighborhood can be inferred by aggregating
subnets that feature the same trail. Such a neighborhood is then said to have been identified by the
trail of these subnets. Figure 9.6 depicts a neighborhood as redefined with the WISE terminology.
Trail (same for all subnets)
Route hops observed before 
the trail
L2 / L3 mesh





Figure 9.6: The concept of neighborhood redefined with the WISE terminology.
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While Figure 9.6 implies the depicted trail is anomaly-free (cf. Sec. 5.1.1), the detection of neigh-
borhoods on the basis of trails is easily generalized to trails with anomalies. Subnets whose trails
feature anomalies can still be aggregated on this basis, but with the implication that the discovered
neighborhood might be larger than it actually is. If there is, for instance, one anomaly in a trail com-
mon to a set of subnets, it is possible there are multiple ingress routers, as the last non-anonymous
hop only belongs to a router preceding the actual last hop router(s) (as depicted earlier in Fig. 5.1).
This is why neighborhoods identified by trails featuring anomalies will be subsequently denoted as
best effort neighborhoods, since they are only an approximation of the actual neighborhood due to
the impossibility to clearly identify the last hop before the bordering subnets.
Additionally, there are two special cases of neighborhoods in the context of WISE terminology:
subnets with flickering trails and subnets featuring echoing trails, i.e., respectively built with the
fourth and the third rule of subnet inference (cf. Sec. 6.4.1). The former is only a small exception
in respect of the definition of trail for a subnet: any subnet displaying flickering trails (which are
anomaly-free by definition, cf. Sec. 5.1.3) within its address space can be considered as having
multiple trails. As a consequence, subnets with flickering trails can be aggregated on the basis of the
alias list including their trails: as long as one of their trails appears on the alias list, it can be assumed
that they border the same neighborhood as any other subnet whose trail also appears on the alias list.
Such a neighborhood is therefore said to be identified by an alias list (rather than a single trail).
Subnets featuring echoing trails also do not feature a single trail, as, by definition, all their pivot
interfaces have unique trails. To make up for this problem, these subnets are aggregated on the basis
of their pre-echoing hop(s), i.e., the router interface(s) that were observed just before the echoing
trails during the target scanning (cf. Sec. 6.3.2). Indeed, by design, WISE always probes at least one
hop prior to an (allegedly) echoing trail to ensure it is not a cycle stretching over multiple hops. This
additional hop can be used to aggregate subnets built on the third rule of inference. Therefore, the
neighborhoods built on this basis can be deemed as best effort too, as they are equivalent, in practice,
to aggregating subnets with trails bearing anomalies, and are identified by these pre-echoing hop(s).
NbNa




Figure 9.7: The concept of peer in neighborhood-based topology discovery. Nb is a peer of Na .
The notion of peer first hinted at by Sec. 9.3.1 will next be presented. In the context of neighborhood-
based topology discovery, the concept of peer can be formally defined as follows: for a given neigh-
borhood Na identified by a trail ta , a second neighborhood Nb identified by a trail tb is a peer of Na if
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and only if tb appears prior to ta in the traceroute paths towards the pivot interfaces of the subnets
bordering Na . This formal definition is depicted in Figure 9.7. By design, a trail can be a peer to a
neighborhood if and only if it is anomaly-free. Therefore, as will be elaborated in Chapter 10, best
effort neighborhoods can only appear as endpoints within a neighborhood-based graph.
Since it is not always possible to find a peer immediatly next to a trail in the traceroute data,
the concept of peer has also been given a best effort equivalent: remote peers. Remote peers simply
describe peers that are located several hops prior to the trail(s) used to identify a neighborhood, and
need to be treated differently to regular peers while building a graph. Non-remote peers can also be
called direct peers, while a neighborhood without peer(s) can be ruled as peerless.
9.3.3 An evaluation of neighborhoods and their peers
Before designing an algorithmic solution for building a neighborhood-based DAG (as will be done
in Chapter 10), the concepts of neighborhood and peer as defined by Sec. 9.3.2 must be assessed
carefully. To do so, the subnet inference tool WISE [52, 53], previously described in Chapter 6 and
assessed in Chapter 7, is extended to discover neighborhoods and their peers after first discovering
subnets. Sec. 9.3.3.1 briefly describes how WISE has been modified for this purpose and how it has
been deployed. Then, Sec. 9.3.3.2 thoroughly validates the neighborhoods detected by WISE on two
groundtruth networks, and Sec. 9.3.3.3 carefully evaluates the concept of peer in the wild.
9.3.3.1 Methodology
Neighborhood inference in WISE starts at the end of the subnet inference, i.e., after subnet post-
processing (as described in Sec. 6.4.2). In order to efficiently detect neighborhoods and their peers,
WISE begins by collecting (partial) traceroute paths towards subnets that are long enough to later
discover peers. This is done in two steps: first, WISEmakes a census of all IP addresses that correspond
to the anomaly-free trails of pivot interfaces found in any previously inferred subnet: these addresses
will be later used to discover neighborhoods, and therefore will subsequently also act as peers. For
convenience, these IP addresses will be denoted as peer addresses. Second, for each subnet, up to five
pivot interfaces are selected 8, and WISE schedules new backward Paris traceroute measurements
towards each, this process being identical to the one used during target scanning (cf. Sec. 6.3.2). There
is however a difference: WISE stops a traceroute measurement as soon as it gets a reply from an
IP address that matches a peer address. Indeed, from that point, WISE has already collected enough
data to discover a peer. This also reduces the overhead probing, as there will be only one additional
probe to discover direct peers. A traceroute measurement is only fully performed if and only if
WISE cannot find a peer address among the router interfaces that reply to the traceroute probes.
After this additional probing, WISE can infer neighborhoods by aggregating subnets on the basis
of their trails, though it performs additional operations when it has to aggregate subnets featuring
8Five is a default value chosen to have representative paths for large subnets; it can be modified upon running WISE.
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flickering or echoing trails to comply with the previously recommended best practices (cf. Sec. 9.3.2).
Once the neighborhoods have been formed, WISE can rely on the freshly collected traceroute data
to enumerate the peers of each one. In other words, much like the subnet inference itself, WISE
detects neighborhoods and their peers offline, i.e., after the additional traceroute measurements.
Since the neighborhood inference step in WISE was kept more or less unchanged in SAGE [48], the
topology discovery tool that implements neighborhood-based DAG discovery, the algorithmic details
of neighborhood inference and peer discovery will be provided in Chapter 10.
The upgraded WISE 9 was deployed on the PlanetLab testbed as early as September 2019. After
implementing some algorithmical improvements for peer discovery, an additional campaign was
conducted between November and December 2019 10 while targetting the same ASes as previously (cf.
Sec. 7.2.1) to collect enough data to accurately assess the concept of peer, this point being discussed
in Sec. 9.3.3.3. The campaign was planned exactly like previous WISE campaigns (with vantage point
rotation, cf. Sec. 5.2.1) in order to make the most of the available PlanetLab nodes. In addition to
these measurements in the wild, the same groundtruth networks as described in Sec. 7.1.1 were
again measured with WISE to validate the inferred neighborhoods. The results of this validation are
discussed in the next section (Sec. 9.3.3.2).
9.3.3.2 Validation of neighborhoods
In order to ensure the concept of neighborhood is sound with respect to actual networks, new
measurements of the same groundtruth networks as presented in Sec. 7.1.1 were conducted in late
September 2019, with a change: this time, the entire topology of the Belgian ISP was probed, rather
than just its backbone. For each network, the groundtruth partners provided a list of all IPv4 prefixes
associated with each router. By comparing the first IP addresses of these prefixes with the first IP
addresses of the subnets inferred by WISE, it was possible to match the majority of prefixes with the
inferred subnets and check how many prefixes associated to a given router were found around the
same neighborhood in the collected data. For the sake of completeness, the groundtruth partners
also provided details on how routers were grouped in their network to properly account for the few
meshes 11, since a neighborhood can also consist of a mesh of routers (cf. Sec. 9.3.2).
To validate the discovered neighborhoods, every possible pair of prefixes identified in both
the groundtruth networks and the WISE measurements will be considered and classified. A pair
found both around the same router ID (or distinct IDs from a known mesh) and around the same
neighborhood is classified as a true positive. A pair appearing around the same neighborhood but not
around the same router (or mesh) is categorized as a false positive. Likewise, two prefixes that are not
around either the same router (or mesh) or around the same neighborhood constitute a true negative,
and a pair found around a same router (or mesh) but not around the same neighborhood is ruled as a
false negative. To complete the analysis, a router whose all known prefixes appear exactly in the same
9As always, the source code is publicly available on GitHub: https://github.com/JefGrailet/WISE.
10Cf. https://github.com/JefGrailet/WISE/blob/master/Dataset/Campaign10.md
11As always, the groundtruth data will not be made public for security concerns.
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ULiège network Belgian ISP
True positives rate 77.27% 70.06%
True negatives rate 99.33% 99.83%
False positives rate 0.67% 0.17%
False negatives rate 22.73% 29.94%
Accuracy 98.13% 96.13%
Matched routers 60 91
Matched neighborhoods 45 133
Exact matches 26 (45.76%) 48 (52.75%)
Best effort neighborhoods 1 (2.22%) 106 (79.70%)
Table 9.1: Validation of neighborhoods on two groundtruth networks.
inferred neighborhood is referred to as a exact match. Finally, due to the Belgian ISP ground truth
network having a high number of echoing devices, many subnets found within it were discovered
through the 3rd subnet inference rule (cf. Sec. 6.4.1), and, consequently, most of its neighborhoods
can be deemed as best effort (cf. Sec. 9.3.2). To account for this, the best effort ratio provides the
ratio of best effort neighborhoods in respect of the total number of neighborhoods.
Table 9.1 provides the results of the validation 12. The first major result is the very low false positive
rate: less than 1% in both situations, demonstrating how WISE infers neighborhoods rarely produces
atypical results in respect of the groundtruth topologies. On the contrary, as demonstrated by the false
negative rate, such a methodology is rather pessimistic, but still accounts for 77% of true positives
for the ULiège network and 70% for the Belgian ISP. Careful analysis of the measurements showed
that false negatives are typically the results of incomplete subnets missing from large neighborhoods
due to measurement issues. For instance, a subnet can be observed at the end of an unique path
(therefore with a unique trail), or with a trail that includes anomalies due to temporary network
failures. In some cases, only the contra-pivot interface of a subnet could be seen during measuring
and was falsely identified as a pivot interface. As a consequence, if the subnet was not associated
with a new neighborhood, it was erroneously matched with another neighborhood, creating some
false positives. Nevertheless, these results demonstrate that the neighborhood inference offers a first
good approximation of the topology, with around half of the devices being fully matched with exactly
one neighborhood in both cases. This was a particularily good result in the case of the Belgian ISP:
as almost 80% of the neighborhoods were inferred with best effort strategies, the regular (and more
reliable) approach could not have been used, therefore showing how a best effort methodology can
offer good results too.
9.3.3.3 Peers in the wild
In addition to a consistent neighborhood inference, building the neighborhood-based DAG of a
target network also requires the ability to locate neighborhoods in respect of each other. The concept
of peer (cf. Sec. 9.3.2) is the main tool for achieving this. However, before designing algorithms relying
12The accuracy and rate metrics are identical to those of Sec. 3.2.
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on this notion to build graphs systematically, it should be checked whether discovering peers in the
wild is a regular occurrence, and if so, how often these peers are direct (i.e., the difference in TTL
distance with the associated neighborhood is equal to one). In other words, the intuitions discussed
in Sec. 9.3.1 must be confirmed. Indeed, if peers are actually difficult to find and/or are remote most
of the time, then building a graph by relying on the concepts described in Sec. 9.3.2 might not be
worth the effort. Hopefully, using snapshots of 12 distinct ASes captured with the upgraded WISE
(cf. Sec. 9.3.3.1) from the PlanetLab testbed between November 19th and December 6th, 2019, it
quickly became apparent that most peers detected in the wild are direct. Furthermore, the number
of peers identified for each neighborhood can vary significantly. This section supports these claims
by providing representative results depicted with figures, but all figures generated with the discussed
snapshots can be found online 13.
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Figure 9.8: Assessing the concept of peer with 12 snapshots of AS6453 (Fall 2019).
Figure 9.8 shows an evaluation of peers for AS6453 (TATA Communications), a Tier-1 AS, us-
ing all 12 snapshots captured with WISE from PlanetLab (using a different vantage point for each
snapshot) between November 19th and December 6th, 2019. Fig. 9.8a depicts the typical differences
in TTL distance between each inferred neighborhood and its peer(s) as a cumulative distribution
function. It should be noted that the results were weighted: because there were a certain number
of artefacts in the data (i.e., neighborhoods discovered with one or two subnets that could not be
considered as sound), the neighborhoods were weighted with the number of subnets bordering them
while counting the total number of neighborhoods having a given TTL difference with their peers.
Neighborhoods identified with many subnets, which can be deemed as more credible, were therefore
better represented. Fig. 9.8b illustrates the number of peers per neighborhood in the same manner,
again with the values for each neighborhood being weighted with the number of bordering subnets.
Given the weighting, Fig. 9.8a can be interpreted as follows: for a subnet picked at random in
all 12 snapshots, the chances of said subnet bordering a neighborhood featuring direct peer(s) are
slightly above 90%. This is an important result, especially given that each snapshot was captured
13Cf. https://github.com/JefGrailet/WISE/tree/master/Evaluation/Neighborhoods/Figures
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from a distinct vantage point and given that AS6453 is a Tier-1 AS featured in the top 10 of CAIDA’s
AS ranking [2]. This shows that, even for topologies that are difficult to measure, both the concepts
of neighborhood and peer are viable enough to use them as tools for building a neighborhood-
based DAG. Similar results were obtained with other Transit/Tier-1 ASes, such as AS3257 (though
the chances dropped from 90% to more than 80%). Fig. 9.8b shows the average subnet (i.e., around
65% of subnets) borders a neighborhood featuring only one peer, but a considerable number of
subnets rather border neighborhoods with between two and eleven peers. While this could suggest
some neighborhoods feature many predecessors in the topology, it should be kept in mind that,
at this stage, peers only consist of isolated IP addresses corresponding to anomaly-free trails (cf.
Sec. 9.3.2). As a consequence, to guarantee these peers do belong to separate devices, therefore
neighborhoods, an alias resolution scheme should be applied to the peer addresses gathered for
each neighborhood featuring multiple peers. How this can be done in practice will be covered in
Chapter 10. The variations in the number of peers nevertheless suggest the very concept of peer is
suitable to overcome the limitations of the TreeNET methodology (cf. Sec. 9.1.2). Interestingly, the
distributions do not reach exactly 1 as in Fig. 9.5: the differences with the highest values in both
distributions simply account for peerless neighborhoods.
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Figure 9.9: Assessing the concept of peer with 12 snapshots of AS286 (Fall 2019).
Figure 9.9 provides the same data visualization as Figure 9.8 for the 12 snapshots collected in
Fall 2019 for AS286 (KPN B.V.), a Dutch Transit AS. The results are comparable to those of Figure 9.8,
except that the ratio of subnets bordering neighborhoods with direct peers slightly drops to around
85% in Fig. 9.9a. Interestingly, the number of peers per neighborhood is frequently equal to one, as
shown by Fig. 9.9b, though there is a noticeable ratio of subnets whose neighborhood has from two
to six peers, showing that neighborhoods with multiple peers are not uncommon. This also further
shows TreeNET’s tree model is not well suited for measuring large networks in the wild.
In fact, neighborhoods with multiple peers can sometimes be a common occurrence. Figure 9.10
depicts with the same visual tools as before the results for AS1241 (Forthnet), a Greek ISP (Stub
AS), again using all 12 snapshots of this AS captured in Fall 2019. While Fig. 9.10a shows how a vast
majority of the discovered peers were direct peers, Fig. 9.10b surprisingly shows that only 20% of
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Figure 9.10: Assessing the concept of peer with 12 snapshots of AS1241 (Fall 2019).
subnets border neighborhoods with a single peer, and that slightly less than 50% of them border
neighborhoods with more than three peers. Such a large number of peers per neighborhood could
hide many adjacencies between neighborhoods as well as hide several convergence points (as
defined in Sec. 1.4). A glance at the snapshots shows the subnets discovered on AS1241 feature many
(aliased) flickering trails, therefore giving more credence to the latter hypothesis. However, such an
hypothesis could only be confirmed by performing alias resolution on peer addresses, as suggested
previously, to determine whether the discovered peers correspond to distinct devices or to a same
device reached through multiple paths. Therefore, a thorough graph building scheme should involve
both the concepts elaborated in Sec. 9.3.2 and alias resolution.
9.4 Closing comments on traceroute paths interpretation
Interpreting traceroute paths to build an accurate map of some target topology is a challenging
task that has kept the research community busy since the dawn of Internet topology discovery, as
discussed in Chapter 8. What makes this task so challenging with today’s Internet is how traceroute
paths are constantly being influenced by load balancing [12] and other routing policies (such as
rate-limiting), as already discussed in Sec. 8.1.1. This notably results in variations in the observed
distances for specific router interfaces or observing different router interfaces on the way to some
specific, well-narrowed network location, i.e., paths are rarely stable.
The topology discovery tool TreeNET [51, 55] (cf. Sec. 9.1) provides a topology mapping method-
ology relying on the idea that a collection of traceroute paths towards close locations (subnets,
in this instance) should be close to a tree, i.e., the first router interfaces in the paths should be the
same and start to diverge when going deeper into the topology of the target network. While this
strategy can provide a good picture with simple (or close) networks where little traffic engineering is
experienced, such as the ULiège network (cf. Sec. 3.2), it is easily impaired by the consequences of
load balancing, typically asymmetrical paths and convergence points [14]. While TreeNET partially
makes up for the consequences of load balancing architectures with its concept of multi-label nodes
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(cf. Sec. 9.1.1), such a strategy relies too heavily on alias resolution to break down multi-label nodes
into multiple predecessors in the topology, as in the traceroute data.
An approach to address TreeNET’s shortcomings consists of pre-processing the traceroute
paths to mitigate the effects of not only traffic engineering but also rate-limiting, as anonymous
hops also constitute a hurdle for building the tree-like mapping of a network. The traceroute
extension RTrack [46] (cf. Sec. 9.2) was designed to experiment with such a pre-processing while also
quantifying traceroute issues in the wild. While its approach for mitigating varying TTL distances
for specific interfaces (i.e., route stretching, cf. Sec. 9.2) could be validated on the topology of a Belgian
ISP, it has a tendency to hide interesting parts of a target network. In the case of the Belgian ISP, it
completely hid some back-up links which can play a key role in the internal routing of a network.
Moreover, though the heuristics implemented by RTrack can help TreeNET to some extent, they
do not address the problem of having each hop modeled in the tree-like mapping with a unique
predecessor, which usually takes the shape of a multi-label node when there are actually several
predecessors in the topology.
The solution chosen during the research work conducted for this thesis therefore consists of
keeping the concept of neighborhood while expanding it. Rather than creating a structure that would
eventually lead to the inference of neighborhoods (like the TreeNET methodology), the idea was to
go the other way around and build the neighborhoods first, then find how they are located in respect
of each other. To achieve this, the notion of neighborhood was complemented with the notion of
trail introduced with WISE [52] (see also Sec. 5.1.1). The concept of peer was created (cf. Sec. 9.3.2)
as a tool to discover neighborhood adjacencies [53]. WISE has been subsequently modified to be
able to infer neighborhoods and their respective peers after subnet inference, so that both concepts
could be extensively evaluated (cf. Sec. 9.3.3). A validation on two groundtruth networks and a study
of network snapshots collected in the wild from the PlanetLab testbed demonstrated that both
concepts were sound enough to design algorithms to build neighborhood-based directed acyclic
graphs (DAGs) [53], i.e., structures which are by design more faithful to the adjacencies observed in
traceroute data than the tree paradigm [98].
This approach not only overcomes one of the main limitations of TreeNET, but it is also more
suitable for dealing with consequences of traffic engineering. Indeed, much like the WISE methodol-
ogy for subnet inference, both the concepts of neighborhood and peer (as described in Sec. 9.3.2) do
not imply any requirements in terms of TTL distance or traceroute path straightness, i.e., always
discovering the same interfaces while probing a remote location. The next chapter (Chapter 10)
introduces SAGE [54], a topology discovery tool built on top of WISE that takes advantage of the
aforementioned concepts to systematically discover the hop-level topology of a target network in the












his chapter introduces a new topology discovery tool that systematically builds neighborhood-
based (cf. Sec. 9.3.2) directed acyclic graphs (DAGs): SAGE [54] (for Subnet AGgrEgation).
As such, it addresses research question 2 from Sec. 8.4. Sec. 10.1 first reviews the various
challenges SAGE must carefully overcome in order to easily and accurately build a neighborhood-
based DAG, and also the opportunities it opens. Sec. 10.2 then presents the workflow of SAGE, with a
focus on the inner workflow of the steps needed to build the DAG. Sec. 10.3 subsequently describes in
detail the algorithms used to build the DAG and analyzes their respective time complexity. Sec. 10.4
then comments on using the DAG for alias resolution. Finally, Sec. 10.5 concludes this chapter by
summarizing the benefits of SAGE and its perspectives for topology mapping and modeling.
10.1 SAGE challenges and opportunities
The purpose of SAGE will be first described. As stated at the end of Sec. 9.4, the purpose of this
new tool was to algorithmically build the neighborhood-based DAG of the target network it probes,
starting with subnet-level data it first gathered with the WISE [52, 53] methodology (cf. Chapter 6). In
such a graph, the vertices model individual neighborhoods while edges account for the links that exist
between them. Indeed, since neighborhoods correspond in the real world to individual routers or
meshes of routers, the links which exist between routers within neighborhoods also constitute links
between these neighborhoods. More broadly, neighborhoods can also be interpreted as individual
hops from the perspective of a measurement tool, and therefore, a neighborhood-based DAG can
also be defined as a directed hop-level graph. In practice, the direction of the edges only account for
the predecessor/successor relationship that exists between distinct hops in the traceroute data,
since network links go both ways.
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Typically, when a neighborhood Nb is a (direct) peer of a neighborhood Na (cf. Sec. 9.3.2), the
corresponding vertices in a neighborhood-based DAG will feature a common edge. In addition to
accounting for how neighborhoods are located in respect of each other, a neighborhood-based DAG
can also be annotated to provide a more complete picture of the topology. Indeed, because the links
between routers usually consist of subnets, it may be possible to infer which discovered subnet
corresponds to which edge. The very idea of discovering which subnets correspond to each network
link has been already explored by TraceNET [116] (cf. Sec. 4.2.1), the main difference being that
TraceNET was designed to infer subnets that accommodate the interfaces observed in traceroute
data while SAGE is supposed to already have subnet-level data upon building a graph by design.
Moreover, since an edge in a neighborhood-based DAG only accounts for a relationship between
two neighborhoods, subnets that act as LANs between multiple neighborhoods can be, in practice,
mapped to several edges. Figure 10.1 pictures a toy example of an annotated neighborhood-based
DAG. In this example, the subnet S3 is mapped to two edges in the DAG, suggesting S3 is in practice a














Figure 10.1: Toy example of an annotated neighborhood-based DAG.
Annotating a neighborhood-based DAG with previously discovered subnets is not just a con-
venient addition: it is meant to already prepare the graph for its subsequent transformation into a
bipartite graph. Indeed, because subnets can bind two or more routers in a network topology, they
make a convenient first party for a bipartite formalism. Bipartite graphs are out of the scope of this
chapter, but will be more extensively detailed in Chapter 12.
Moreover, before considering bipartite graphs, several challenges must be overcome to accurately
build a neighborhood-based DAG to begin with. Sec. 10.1.1 covers the problem of identifying whether
multiple peers listed for a neighborhood belong to the same device, as peers initially show as IP
addresses, also denoted as peer addresses (cf. Sec. 9.3.3.1). Indeed, a topology can very well feature
one or more convergence points (cf. Sec. 1.4) due to symmetrical load balanced paths. Sec. 10.1.2
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proceeds with the detection of unidentified peers that could not initially be mapped with a neighbor-
hood in the first place, also called blindspots. Finally, Sec. 10.1.3 reviews how the edges of the final
graph can be mapped with subnets but also categorized for convenience.
10.1.1 Identification of convergence points
The first challenge SAGE must tackle is the detection of convergence points. Indeed, when a neigh-
borhood features several peers (which are by definition anomaly-free trails, cf. Sec. 9.3.2), there is no
guarantee that the IP addresses associated with these peers (i.e., peer addresses) are strictly from
distinct devices. For instance, a neighborhood can first appear as several smaller neighborhoods
because the probes have reached the interfaces used to identify them (i.e., the associated trails) from
distinct paths instead of always reaching the same interface (therefore the same trail). In other words,
it is possible a neighborhood acts as a convergence point, i.e., a device where distinct (possibly load
balanced) paths converge and which is best identified by an alias list. Such a device can be compared
to the ingress router of subnets featuring flickering trails (cf. Sec. 5.1.3) and can therefore be detected,









Peers of Nb :
Nα (tα), 
Nβ (tβ)
Peers of Nc :
Nβ (tβ), 
Nγ (tγ)










(b) After alias resolution
Figure 10.2: Discovering a convergence point with SAGE.
To address this challenge, SAGE must identify the router interfaces that might belong to an
hypothetical convergence point and conduct alias resolution on them. An elegant solution to this
problem consists of anticipating the largest sets of alias candidates that might correspond to (distinct)
convergence points and resolving them with the help of the fingerprint-based framework introduced
by Chapter 2. After listing the peers for all neighborhoods, the lists featuring multiple peers can be
collected and merged them when they share common interfaces, relying on the property of alias
transitivity (first defined in Sec. 1.2). As a reminder, this property works as follows: given three
interfaces A, B , and C , if A and B are aliases and if B and C are aliases too, then A and C are aliases
as well. Thanks to this trick, the largest hypothetical alias lists only need to be resolved once to avoid
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verifying one alias pair multiple times while reviewing the peers of each neighborhood. When an alias
pair/list is discovered, this means a convergence point has been discovered, and the neighborhoods
identified by each alias candidate/peer address can be subsequently merged together.
Fig. 10.2 shows a toy topology where SAGE should discover a convergence point by applying
subsequently alias transitivity and alias resolution (with the framework of Chapter 2). In this toy
example, the two neighborhoods Nb and Nc initially have the lists of peers (as IP addresses) tα, tβ,
and tβ, tγ, respectively (Fig. 10.2a), given that tα, tβ and tγ each identify a separate neighborhood.
By aggregating these peers to create the largest hypothetical alias {tα, tβ, tγ}, SAGE can recover the
(initially split) neighborhood Na depicted in Fig. 10.2b as long as tα, tβ, and tγ are aliased together.
10.1.2 Detection of blindspots (unidentified peers)
There is another challenge that lies in the detection of convergence points. In fact, the convergence
point detection presented in the previous section (Sec. 10.1.1) assumes that each IP address found in
the traceroute data will identify a neighborhood. Of course, this is not always verified in practice,
and it is possible that an interface that could belong to a convergence point does not appear as a trail
for any subnet and therefore cannot be considered either as a potential peer address or as a tool to
identify a neighborhood. This can be a problem if such an interface still appears in the traceroute
data, because it can induce some neighborhoods to have remote peers despite being one hop away
from a convergence point in the real topology. In SAGE terminology, such an interface is referred to
as a blindspot. More broadly, router interfaces not identifying neighborhoods that appear in the
traceroute data used to discover peers are called miscellaneous hops. In other words, blindspots






Na is a peer of Nb;
ma seen at same TTL





Figure 10.3: Because it does not identify a neighborhood, ma could constitute a blindspot.
Figure 10.3 depicts a toy scenario where the blindspot issue could arise, reusing the same visual
tools as Fig. 10.2. In the figure, the miscellaneous hop ma is not initially identified as a peer address
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but appears at the same TTL distance as ta (which identifies neighborhood Na) in the traceroute
data used to discover peers of Nb . Because the traceroute data used to find the peers of Nc does
not contain any router interface other than ma at a distance of one hop, Nc can only have remote
peer(s) on paper. However, if ma could be relabelled as a blindspot by demonstrating it is actually an
alias of some peer address, therefore showing it belongs to a convergence point, it would become
feasible to use it as a direct peer of Nc .
Hopefully, blindspots can be detected to some extent: while listing the peers of each neighbor-
hood, SAGE can also list the miscellaneous hops appearing at the same TTL distance and include
them as additional alias candidates in the alias resolution process. If they end up on an alias pair/list
with one or several peer addresses, these miscellaneous hops can be relabelled as blindspots. After
detecting all potential blindspots, SAGE can review all neighborhoods with remote peers to verify
whether these blindspots appeared earlier in the traceroute data so these neighborhoods can get
closer (and ideally direct) peers. In Figure 10.3, successfully aliasing ta and ma together would lead
to the discovery of one direct peer for Nc . The frequency of blindspots and their cost in terms of alias
resolution will be commented on in Sec. 10.3.5.
10.1.3 Characterization of edges in a neighborhood-based DAG
One last issue SAGE should tackle, which is more an opportunity than a challenge, lies in mapping
previously discovered subnets to the edges of the final graph. Indeed, in the real world, subnets
can notably act as point-to-point links between two devices (typically, point-to-point links are /30
or /31 subnets). For each edge it infers, SAGE can look for the subnet that could correspond to the
practical network link. Doing so, SAGE not only outputs a true picture of the hop-level adjacencies in
the shape of a neighborhood-based DAG, but also complements it with subnet-level data, resulting
in an annotated graph that accounts for the neighborhood – subnet topology of the target network.















Figure 10.4: The subnet Sa (bordering Na) can be identifed as the link between Na and Nb .
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In practice, this task simply consists of looking at the router interface(s) identifying a non-best
effort neighborhood and finding the subnet whose prefix encompasses (one of) these interface(s).
Such a subnet can therefore be mapped to one or several edges connecting this neighborhood to
its direct peer(s). Fig. 10.4 shows a simple example: given two juxtaposed neighborhoods Na and
Nb , respectively identified by router interfaces/anomaly-free trails ta and tb , Na being closer to the
vantage point, a subnet Sa bordering Na encompasses tb . As a consequence, Sa can be considered as
the subnet connecting Na and Nb together.
In practice, the subnet which connects two neighborhoods does not always appear around the
neighborhood closest to the vantage point, and can also border a third neighborhood, depending on
the size of the subnet (a large subnet can be mapped to several edges) and/or the internal routing of
the target network. This is why the subnet mappings are categorized in two in SAGE terminology:
• direct links are subnet – edge mappings whose subnet borders the neighborhood (connected
by the edge) closest to the vantage point, and
• indirect links are subnet – edge mappings whose subnet borders a neighborhood that differs
from the neighborhoods connected by the edge. Contrary to direct links, indirect links can have
no mapping, i.e., they account for unmapped parts of the subnet-level. They also constitute
the default solution to model edges towards best effort neighborhoods (cf. Sec. 9.3.2).
Direct links are so called because they naturally arise from both the subnet-level and the traceroute
data. Indirect links might first be seen as a measurement artifact, but can be actually explained
by several factors. For instance, a subnet might be used as a link in the topology while not being
routed in the same manner, i.e., the probes used to discover the subnet do not take the same path
as the probes crossing the same subnet while targeting another part of the network. Indirect links
also encompass larger subnets which can appear in both direct and indirect links, and as such, can
reveal new adjacencies between neighborhoods. However, indirect links can occasionally result from
undetected convergence points, as will be discussed in Chapter 11.
Finally, as (in)direct links only account for edges between neighborhoods that are found one hop
away from each others, a third kind of link is also used by SAGE to account for remote peers. Remote
links are special edges that store all unique sequences of intermediate hops observed between a
neighborhood and its remote peer(s) rather than storing a mapping with some subnet, since there is,
by definition, more than one intermediate link with remote peers. The main motivation behind this
mechanism is practical: this way, SAGE can keep track of intermediate traceroute paths without
adding any additional vertex to the graph, as intermediate paths can sometimes be quite long and
would require many intermediate vertices to be fully depicted – without any subnet bordering them.
This way, a visual render of a graph as discovered by SAGE can highlight only the measured topology,
as intermediate paths can notably be caused by detours that cross other networks that were not




As explained in Sec. 9.4, SAGE [54] is built on top of WISE [52, 53], i.e., it reuses exactly the same
methodology to discover the subnets it requires to discover neighborhoods and build an (annotated)
neighborhood-based DAG. After discovering the subnets, SAGE runs a fourth main algorithm step to
build the neighborhood-based DAG that will be subsequently denoted as neighborhood inference.
Indeed, the main challenge for building the final graph consists of accurately discovering the vertices
of the graph, i.e. neighborhoods, and how they are located in respect of each other. In particular, the
detection of convergence points (cf. Sec. 10.1.1) is crucial to recover neighborhoods for which trail-
based inference (cf. Sec. 9.3.3.1) is not sufficient. In addition to the neighborhood inference, SAGE also
performs a fifth and final algorithm step, nicknamed full alias resolution, which simply reuses the
alias resolution methodology of TreeNET [51] to discover alias pairs/lists within each neighborhood
(cf. Sec. 10.4). These additional alias pairs/lists can be used to later recover a router-level graph, as
will be discussed in Chapter 12.
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Figure 10.5: The complete workflow of SAGE (Subnet AGgrEgation).
Figure 10.5 provides the complete workflow of SAGE. As emphasized by this figure, SAGE reuses
most of the WISE methodology (cf. blue rectangles) and benefits from its linear time complexity.
As a consequence, it can easily be deployed from a single vantage point to capture a snapshot (as
defined in Sec. 5.2.1) of a given target network, notably because its own algorithmical additions can
be easily implemented in (quasi-)linear time (cf. Sec. 10.3). This difference already sets SAGE apart
from previous topology discovery tools, such as Rocketfuel [113] and MERLIN [83], both tools involving
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hundrends or at least dozens of vantage points. Just like WISE, SAGE is an open source tool written in
C/C++ whose code can be browsed online at the dedicated GitHub repository 1. Because WISE itself
has not been implemented for IPv6, SAGE is available for IPv4 only as well. Nevertheless, SAGE is as
easy to deploy as WISE, and only requires some target IPv4 prefixes to start running. Example 10.1
shows the command line that could be used to run the public implementation of SAGE to probe the
ULiège network 2, with the -l option providing a prefix for the various output files.
Listing 10.1: Running SAGE to measure the ULiège network
$ sudo . / sage 139.165.0.0/16 ,193.190.228./24 ,193.190.252.0/24 − l ULiege_net
Before diving into its inner workings in Sec. 10.3, it should be noted that the neighborhood
inference step has its own workflow. This step first starts with a preliminary traceroute probing that
aims to collect (partial) traceroute paths towards each subnet so that SAGE already has all the data
it requires to infer both neighborhoods and their peers. This additional probing starts with a census
of the anomaly-free trails of all subnets, i.e. peer addresses (as defined in Sec. 9.3.3.1), so that the
traceroute probing for a given target IP address can be minimized by stopping at peer addresses
(the details of such an operation will be provided in Sec. 10.3.2).
Once both subnets and the additional traceroute data are available, the actual neighborhood
inference can start. Its workflow, summarized in Figure 10.6, consists of the five sub-steps detailed
below. In the figure, each sub-step is annotated with the challenges it must tackle in order to guarantee
the final neighborhood-based DAG is a true snapshot of the target network.
1. Subnet aggregation: the subnets previously discovered via the WISE methodology are aggre-
gated into neighborhoods, based on their respective trails (with additional operations for
subnets with flickering/echoing trails, cf. Sec. 9.3.2).
2. Peer discovery: using the traceroute data collected preliminarily, peers are listed for each
previously discovered neighborhood. Miscellaneous hops (cf. Sec. 10.1.2) are also listed.
3. Peer aggregation: the previously listed peers are aggregated to form the largest hypothetical
alias lists to detect convergence points through alias resolution. Blindspots (cf. Sec. 10.1.2) are
also detected in the process and used to reduce the total number of remote peers.
4. Vertex creation: using the knowledge on convergence points (if any), the final vertices of the
neighborhood-based DAG are created.
5. Edge creation: the edges between juxtaposed neighborhoods are created and mapped with
a previously discovered subnet when it is possible. Remoke links are inserted in the graph to
account for remote peers and enumerate the (observed) intermediate paths.
1Cf. https://github.com/JefGrailet/SAGE
2This will only produce satisfying results if run from the ULiège WiFi network, as mentioned in Sec. 3.2.1.
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Figure 10.6: The workflow of the neighborhood inference step of SAGE.
Depending on the implementation, each sub-step of the neighborhood inference can be achieved
in linear or quasi-linear time in respect of the inputs. The public implementation of SAGE opts for the
latter option for convenience (i.e., it takes advantage of standard libraries of C++), but using specific
data structures can, in theory, result in a linear time complexity for most of the algorithmic steps.
10.3 SAGE neighborhood inference
This section completely reviews the neighborhood inference step of SAGE [54] as well as some of its
additional operations. Sec. 10.3.1 first reviews some implementation details of WISE (cf. Chapter 6)
that have been reused in SAGE. Sec. 10.3.2 subsequently reviews the preliminary partial traceroute
probing required to discover neighborhood adjacencies with the concept of peer (cf. Sec. 9.3.2).
Subsequent sections proceed with the review (algorithm(s) and time complexity) of each sub-step of
the neighborhood inference: subnet aggregation (Sec. 10.3.3), peer discovery (Sec. 10.3.4), peer aggre-
gation (Sec. 10.3.5; with practical results), vertex creation (Sec. 10.3.6) and edge creation (Sec. 10.3.7).
10.3.1 Implementation requirements
As it is built upon WISE [49], SAGE not only reuses the same methodology for subnet inference but
also parts of its implementation. In particular, SAGE reuses all three dedicated data structures first
discussed in Sec. 6.2: the IP dictionnary, the alias set and the IP aggregator. The IP dictionnary is used,
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as always, to register new details concerning the IP addresses involved in the various algorithms,
while the alias set and the IP aggregator are required to handle the discovery of convergence points
and the subsequent merging of several neighborhoods associated with them (cf. Sec. 10.1.1).
Naturally, SAGE also relies on the data previously collected with the WISE methodology: the IP
dictionnary SAGE works, with starting from the neighborhood inference, is the final IP dictionnary
obtained by WISE at the end of subnet inference, while the alias set that registers the alias pairs/lists
discovered through the analysis of flickering trails (cf. Sec. 6.3.3 and Sec. 6.4.1) should be kept "as is".
In fact, the public implementation of SAGEmanages multiple alias sets, each set being associated with
a different algorithmic step: the alias set computed by discovering convergence points is in practice
distinct from the set computed for subnet inference. Doing so allows this public implementation
to clearly distinguish the alias pairs/lists used during subnet inference from those used during
neighborhood inference, but also to avoid re-resolving some alias candidates during the latter.
Indeed, SAGE implements an alias transitivity heuristic to make the most of the alias pairs/lists
discovered during target scanning (cf. Sec. 6.3.2). When listing the peers of each neighborhood (cf.
Sec. 10.3.4), SAGE verifies if any peer addresses match an alias pair/list found during target scanning.
If this is the case, any occurrence of each IP address found in the pair/list is removed for the list of
peers and the first IP address of the pair/list is inserted instead. The underlying idea is to exploit
once more the property of alias transitivity (cf. Sec. 1.2): if an alias list {A,B ,C } was discovered at
the end of target scanning and if a list of peers for a neighborhood consists of {A,B ,C ,D,E ,F }, then
the list of peers can be simplified into {A,D,E ,F }, because if D (for instance) is later found to be
an alias of A while discovering convergence points (cf. Sec. 10.3.5), then it is also, by transitivity, an
alias of both B and C . A can later be replaced again with {A,B ,C } (i.e., after discovering convergence
points) so the final alias pairs/lists can remain exhaustive. Such an heuristic slightly reduces the
overhead probing (though there are usually a few flickering trails, cf. Sec. 6.4.1.2) but also avoids an
alias pair/list from being later invalidated as a consequence of a temporary network failure. Whether
this heuristic should be used or not is up to the implementation, but is nevertheless recommended.
10.3.2 Preliminary partial traceroute probing
While SAGE normally has enough data to infer neighborhoods by the end of the WISE subnet inference,
it does not already have the data it requires to exhaustively detect their respective peers. In other
words, while it would be capable of inferring neighborhoods, SAGE may not be able to find out how ex-
actly they are located in respect of each other, which is essential to build a neighborhood-based DAG.
This is why the neighborhood inference starts with a preliminary additional traceroute probing.
This probing consists of running new backward Paris traceroute measurements towards a subset of
pivot interfaces of each subnet so peers can be discovered just after discovering neighborhoods. In or-
der to minimize the number of additional probes, SAGE also manages to collect partial traceroute
paths, i.e., paths that only contain the data required to eventually discover how neighborhoods are
located in respect of each other.
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Before running the traceroute probing, SAGE makes some preparations. First, it makes a census
of all the anomaly-free trails associated with the pivot interfaces of all discovered subnets and records
them as such in the IP dictionnary (cf. Sec. 6.2.1). Indeed, such trails are the basis for building the
neighborhoods that can later act as peers, since a peer can only be an anomaly-free trail (cf. Sec. 9.3.2),
and is why they can also be called peer addresses (cf. Sec. 9.3.3.1). Flagging these addresses therefore
allows SAGE to prepare peer discovery without first aggregating subnets into neighborhoods. The next
step consists of building a list of target IP addresses for the new traceroute probing. This consists of
listing a certain number of pivot interfaces per subnet, bounded by a fixed number 3. Listing several
pivot interfaces per subnet allows SAGE to find a more exhaustive list of peers and/or miscellaneous
hops with large subnets, which is important to achieve exhaustive discovery of convergence points,
and also to detect potential blindspots (cf. Sec. 10.1.2).
The final list of targets can be subsequently divided between multiple threads, exactly as with the
target scanning step of the WISE methodology (cf. Sec. 6.3.2). Regardless of multithreading, each of
the listed pivot interfaces has to be re-probed with backward Paris traceroute (much like during
target scanning, cf. Sec. 6.3.2), using the TTL distance for the trail associated with the pivot interface
minus one as the initial TTL value. For example, if the TTL distance for a given pivot interface is
equal to 15, then its (anomaly-free) trail is normally equal to 14 and the TTL value of the first probe
will be equal to 13. If the trail contains anomalies, its TTL distance is evaluated as the TTL distance
for the associated non-anonymous, non-cycling router interface. Backward traceroute probing
is subsequently performed until a reply comes from a router interface which is recorded in the IP
dictionnary as a peer address or until the TTL value of the next probe reaches zero (i.e., this amounts
to collecting a full traceroute path). While ensuring a route hop matches a peer address, SAGE must
also prevent a minor issue called self-peering . If the route hop matches a peer address, it should be
unrelated to the subnet encompassing the target pivot (i.e., it is neither encompassed by the subnet
nor a trail for it) and should not be an alias of the trail associated to the target pivot. Without these
additional verifications, there is a minor risk of eventually discovering a neighborhood that is a peer
for itself, which can make subsequent operations ambiguous.
If a route hop discovered through the additional backward Paris traceroute probing turns out
to match a peer address and shows no risk of induced self-peering, the probing stops and the partial
route is recorded. Ideally, when the peer address is found one hop sooner than the trail for the target
pivot, SAGE only sends one additional probe and already gets the data it needs to eventually discover
peers. This is why this additional traceroute probing results in partial records most of the time (cf.
the quantification of direct peers of Sec. 9.3.3.3), as full traceroute measurements are performed
if and only if SAGE cannot find a valid peer address among the replies. Being unable to find a peer
usually means the target subnet is one of the subnets closest to the vantage point or belongs to a
different component of the target network. It is up to the implementation to decide whether full
routes should be recorded too, as they can constitute additional useful data for the user.
3Like WISE, SAGE uses up to 5 pivot interfaces by default. This can be tuned by the user upon running the tool.
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10.3.3 Subnet aggregation
10.3.3.1 Algorithm
Subnet aggregation, i.e. aggregating subnets into neighborhoods, can be simply achieved by grouping
together subnets that feature the same trail(s). More precisely, if the trail of a subnet is not a flickering
or an echoing trail, it will be grouped with all subnets that share the exact same trail. If the trail of
a subnet is, on the contrary, flickering, it will be grouped with other subnets based on the alias list
encompassing their respective trail(s).
Subnets featuring echoing trails, therefore built with the third rule of inference (cf. Sec. 6.4.1),
cannot be aggregated into neighborhoods by the same means. However, a best effort strategy can
be used: subnets with echoing trails can be aggregated on the basis of their respective pre-echoing
hop(s) (cf. Sec. 9.3.2), i.e., the hops observed before their echoing trails. These pre-echoing hops can
also be combined with the TTL distance of the pivot interfaces to make sure the resulting best effort
neighborhoods are not too large: indeed, subnets featuring echoing trails should have very regular
TTL distances by design (cf. the third rule of WISE subnet inference, Sec. 6.4.1). While the best effort
neighborhoods built this way might be oversized in respect of the actual network, previous research
has showed that this strategy can provide a very satisfying approximation [53] (cf. Sec. 9.3.3.2).
Regardless of which variables are used to aggregate subnets, subsequently denoted aggregation
properties, the practical algorithm for building the neighborhoods is the same: given a list of subnets,
a map of lists, where each unique property is mapped to a list of subnets, can be built. The aggregation
property of a subnet can then be used to add it to the list associated with this property or to create a
new list if this property was not in the map before. After inserting all subnets into the map, the lists
stored in the map can be enumerated and individually turned into neighborhoods.
Algorithm 14 Subnet aggregation (first sub-step of neighborhood inference)
Require: S, a list of subnets
1: function AGGREGATE(List<Subnet> S)
2: listsByProperty ← new Map<Property, List<Subnet> >()
3: for subnet ∈ S do
4: property ← subnet.getAggregationProperty()
5: propertyList ← listsByProperty.find(property)
6: if propertyList 6= ; then
7: propertyList.push_back(subnet)
8: else
9: newList ← new List<Subnet>()
10: newList.push_back(subnet)
11: listsByProperty.insert(property, newList)
12: neighborhoods ← new List<Neighborhood>()
13: for element ∈ listsByProperty do
14: label ← element.getNeedle()
15: subnets ← element.getContent()
16: neighborhoods.push_back(new Neighborhood(label, subnets))
17: return neighborhoods
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Algorithm 14 shows the generic pseudo-code for subnet aggregation, starting with a given list
of subnets S whose aggregation properties have been prepared (e.g., if a subnet features flickering
trails, its aggregation property is the corresponding alias pair/list). After creating the map (line 2),
the algorithm iterates over the subnets, inserting each one on a list stored in the map and identified
by an aggregation property (lines 3–11). If a property is not yet known, a new list will be created
(lines 9–11). Once all subnets have been inserted into the map, each list in the map is turned into
a neighborhood. Finally, all the created neighborhoods are stored on another list returned by the
function (lines 12–17).
An alternative way to build neighborhoods bordered by subnets featuring several trails (because
of flickering) can be by applying Algorithm 14 to all subnets without echoing trails, then processing
the final lists more carefully (i.e., those used at line 16 to instantiate the neighborhoods). When the
aggregation property associated to a list (line 14) corresponds to a flickering trail, its encompassing
alias list can be looked up in the alias set produced by the WISE methodology (cf. Sec. 10.3.1), and
therefore, all lists corresponding to IP addresses found in the alias list can be extracted then merged
before creating the final neighborhood (line 16). This is what the public implementation of SAGE does
in practice, with the implementation simply repeating Algorithm 14 to subsequently aggregate the
remaining subnets, i.e., with echoing trails. Note, also, how the aggregation property in the pseudo-
code is used as a label for the neighborhoods (line 14): this means a neighborhood is identified by an
alias list if its subnets have flickering trails, by the combination of pre-echoing hops and TTL distance
if they exhibit echoing trails, or by a trail if subnets do not exhibit flickering or echoing trails. As such,
the resulting neighborhoods can be individually identified exactly as described in Sec. 9.3.2.
10.3.3.2 Time complexity
The time complexity of subnet aggregation will depend on the complexity of the look-up operation
in the map. The number of subnets to aggregate into neighborhoods will be represented by N
while the total number of unique aggregation properties (therefore the number of neighborhoods
obtained in the end) is denoted by M . If the look-up of a list of subnets based on a property is in
constant time (O (1)), then the complexity of subnet aggregation can be expressed as O (N +M), since
there is one loop for iterating the subnets and a second loop for turning each list of subnets into
a neighborhood. At worst, one neighborhood will be created per subnet, therefore at worst N = M
and the complexity can be re-expressed as O (2N ) →O (N ). If the look-up in the map is O (log M) (for
instance, because the map is implemented with a tree in practice), then the complexity becomes
O (N log N ). Indeed, the complexity can first be re-expressed as O (N log M +M), due to the access to
the map in O (log M). Since the worst case consists, again, of building one neighborhood for each
subnet, then O (N log N +N ) is obtained, which can be simplified into O (N log N ). In summary, it is
possible to perform this sub-step in linear time (e.g., if the map is implemented with a hash table).
However, using a map with a look-up operation in logarithmic time will not significantly worsen the
time complexity and can be a good compromise to miminize the amount of memory used by SAGE.
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10.3.4 Peer discovery
10.3.4.1 Algorithm
Subnet aggregation is immediately followed by peer discovery, which consists of reviewing the
previously collected partial traceroute records (cf. Sec. 10.3.2) towards the subnets bordering a
given neighborhood to discover its peer(s). This sub-step therefore begins by enumerating all the
partial routes collected towards each subnet bordering it for each neighborhood. In order to get an
exhaustive list of peers while staying as close to the neighborhood as possible, a peer offset can be
computed as the difference in TTL distance between the trails of the aggregated subnets and the
closest potential peer(s). To do so consists of initially setting the offset to one and checking all the
last hops of the partial routes. If none of the hops correspond to a recorded peer address, the offset
is incremented and the search resumes with the route hops located one hop closer to the vantage
point. The process is halted when a (remote) peer is found or when the peer offset goes beyond
the limits of all partial routes. In the latter case, no peer offset can be actually computed and the
neighborhood is considered as peerless (cf. Sec. 9.3.2). If a peer offset can be computed, then all
route hops corresponding to this offset are gathered in two lists, one for peers (as addresses) and a
second one for miscellaneous hops, the second list being later involved in the detection of blindspots
(cf. Sec. 10.1.2) during peer aggregation (cf. Sec. 10.3.5). The peer discovery for a given neighborhood
ends by sorting both lists and purging them of duplicates.
Algorithm 15 summarizes, in pseudo-code, the peer discovery sub-step for a single neighborhood
N . It is worth noting that this pseudo-code assumes that the (partial) routes collected at the start of
neighborhood inference (cf. Sec. 10.3.2) can be accessed via the subnet interfaces which were targeted
to obtain them. This notably allows all such routes to be enumerated by reviewing the interfaces of
each subnet bordering N without going back and forth in a side data structure (lines 2–7). Once the
routes have been listed, the peer offset can be computed by using a double loop to review all listed
routes at offset 1, 2, 3... until a peer is found or until the offset is too large for all routes (lines 10–19). If
peer(s) are found at a given offset, all peers and other miscellaneous hops appearing at this offset will
be enumerated and memorized along with the offset itself in the neighborhood object (lines 22–28).
It is worth noting that this pseudo-code does not explicitely show the instructions used to sort and
clean the lists of peers/miscellaneous hops, as this task is implicitely carried out by the addPeer() and
addMiscellaneousHop() methods shown respectively at lines 26 and 28. Whenever the peer discovery
can rule out the possibility that N has peers, it stops (lines 8 and 20).
10.3.4.2 Time complexity
The time complexity of peer discovery mostly depends on the number of partial traceroute paths
being reviewed for each neighborhood. For a given neighborhood bordered by S subnets, there
is a number of paths proportional to S: indeed, the number of traceroute paths per subnet is
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Algorithm 15 Peer discovery (second sub-step of neighborhood inference)
Require: N , a neighborhood (as an object)
1: procedure DISCOVERPEERS(Neighborhood N )
2: routes ← new List<Vector<RouteHop> >()
3: for subnet ∈ N .getSubnets() do
4: subnetIPs ← subnet.getInterfaces()
5: for interface ∈ subnetIPs do
6: if interface.hasRoute() then
7: routes.push_back(interface.getRoute())
8: if routes.size() == 0 then
9: return
10: offset ← 0
11: foundPeers ← f al se
12: for !foundPeers do
13: offset++
14: for route ∈ routes do
15: routeLength ← route.size()
16: if routeLength ≥ offset then
17: if route[routeLength − offset].isPeer() then
18: foundPeers ← tr ue
19: break
20: if !foundPeers then
21: return
22: N .setPeerOffset(offset)
23: for route ∈ routes do
24: hopIndex ← route.size() − offset




bounded by design 4 and is equal to one for small subnets (i.e. /30, /31) which are usually the most
common subnets to be found in the Internet (cf. Sec. 7.2.4). Finding the peer offset depends on
S due to the size of routes being bounded (255 at the very worst, much less in practice), again
by design. Since enumerating peers and miscellaneous hops afterwards consists of looking at the
selected offset in each route, this part of the algorithm also scales with S. The enumeration of routes
(lines 2– 7 in Algorithm 15) can also be considered to scale with S, because the size of subnets is
bounded by a relatively small constant: if the smallest subnet prefix is /20 5, there are, at worst, 4096
interfaces to review (fully populated prefix). In practice, this part does not significantly slow down
the peer discovery because large subnets (e.g. /20, /21 or /22 subnets) are less frequent (cf. Sec. 7.2.4).
Therefore, peer discovery for a single neighborhood is O (S). In the end, if all neighborhoods are
considered, peer discovery can be considered as being O (N ) if N denotes the total number of subnets
bordering all discovered neighborhoods.
4For reminders, by default, SAGE collects up to 5 partial routes per subnet.
5For reminders, this is the smallest subnet prefix length allowed in WISE, therefore also in SAGE.
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10.3.5 Peer aggregation
10.3.5.1 Algorithm
Peer discovery is followed by the most important sub-step of neighborhood inference: peer aggre-
gation. As already explained in Sec. 10.1.1, there is no guarantee that several peers detected for one
neighborhood belongs to distinct devices (and therefore, distinct neighborhoods) or not. It is indeed
possible that a large neighborhood acts in the topology as a convergence point of a load balancing
architecture. Because of this, a convergence point can first appear as several neighborhoods during
subnet aggregation (cf. Sec. 10.3.3). Therefore, before actually building the neighborhood-based
DAG, SAGE must solve this problem by building hypothetical alias lists that could correspond to
convergence points and resolve them (as already suggested in Sec. 10.1.1). The discovered alias
pairs/lists will help SAGE to re-construct large neighborhoods during the next sub-step, a.k.a. vertex
creation (cf. Sec. 10.3.6), in order to provide a more accurate picture of the topology.
Peer aggregation is best implemented by using an IP aggregator (cf. Sec. 6.2.3), though, in practice,
its behaviour can be simulated with a carefully updated map. For each neighborhood, the list of peers
and the list of miscellaneous hops found at the same peer offset are copied, merged together and
inserted into the aggregator. After inserting the merged lists of all neighborhoods, the aggregator
naturally contains the largest hypothetical alias lists, i.e., the largest potential convergence points.
These alias lists can then be resolved with the help of the fingerprint-based framework introduced in
Chapter 2, as the size of the largest hypothetical alias lists is usually small, i.e., Internet-scale methods
such as MIDAR [73] (cf. Sec. 1.3.3) are unnecessary for this (see practical results in Sec. 10.3.5.3).
Regardless of how alias resolution is performed, the peer aggregation should result in a new
alias set (cf. Sec. 6.2.2), as using each alias list (if any) to refine neighborhoods constitutes the task
of the next sub-step (vertex creation, cf. Sec. 10.3.6). However, before this sub-step, the alias set
can be used to detect blindspots (cf. Sec. 10.1.2) to eventually discover new (and closer) peers for
some neighborhoods: it is possible to review the miscellaneous hops listed for each neighborhood
(if any) to see if any have been aliased to at least one peer address during peer aggregation. If this
hypothesis turns out to be correct, then each miscellaneous hop can be considered to be a blindspot.
Once blindspots have been detected, a simplified peer discovery (cf. Sec. 10.3.4) can be run on
neighborhoods with remote peers to see if any blindspot appears sooner in the partial routes.
Peer aggreation is also the step where SAGE can use the alias transitivity heuristic proposed in
Sec. 10.3.1 to benefit from the first alias set built by the WISE methodology while reviewing flickering
trails. The public implementation of SAGE uses this heuristic between peer discovery and peer
aggregation: if a list of peers includes at least one address matching an an alias list first discovered
at the end of target scanning (cf. Sec. 6.3.3), this list is cleaned of any IP address belonging to the
alias list and replaced with the first IP address of the same list. Peer aggregation can then be carried
out normally, and the alias pairs/lists with flickering trails can later be used to complete (by alias
transivity) the alias pairs/lists discovered during peer aggregation.
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Algorithm 16 Peer aggregation (third sub-step of neighborhood inference)
Require: N , list of discovered neighborhoods (as objects)
Require: A, an alias resolution utility (object)
1: function PEERAGGREGATION(List<Neighborhood> N , AliasResolver A)
2: aggregator ← new IPAggregator()
3: for neighborhood ∈ N do
4: peers ← neighborhood.getPeers()
5: miscellaneousIPs ← neighborhood.getMiscellaneousIPs()
6: hypotheticAlias ← MERGELISTS(peers, miscellaneousIPs)
7: aggregator.update(hypotheticAlias)
8: hypotheses ← aggregator.getClusters()
9: newSet ← new AliasSet()
10: for hypothesis ∈ hypotheses do
11: newAliasLists ← A.resolve(hypothesis)
12: for newAlias ∈ newAliasLists do
13: newSet.addAlias(newAlias)
14: return newSet
Algorithm 16 shows the pseudo-code of peer aggregation, which starts with N , the list of neigh-
borhoods discovered during subnet aggregation (cf. Sec. 10.3.3) annotated with peer data inferred
during peer discovery (cf. Sec. 10.3.4). In addition to N , the pseudo-code also involves A, an alias
resolution utility provided as an object. The reason why the pseudo-code includes this parameter
is because such an utility accounts not only for alias resolution in general but also for additional
operations, such as interacting with the IP dictionary to map a raw IP address with an entry and
to get the side data that could be relevant to the resolution process (if necessary). In practice, the
public implementation of SAGE uses similar utilities during peer aggregation. It also uses the alias set
data structure recommended in Sec. 6.2.2 (line 9), in this case to return the alias pairs/lists of peer
aggregation whilst, at the same time, ensuring they are isolated from the alias pairs/lists discovered
by the WISE methodology (as suggested in Sec. 10.3.1). The process of aggregating IP addresses into
the largest hypothetical alias lists is also abstracted by an IP aggregator structure (cf. Sec. 6.2.3; line 2).
All in all, if all recommended structures are used, peer aggregation becomes straightforward:
the IP aggregator is created then updated with the peer data of each neighborhood (lines 2–7), after
which the largest hypothetical alias lists (called hypotheses in the pseudo-code) are collected and
resolved via the alias resolution utility A (lines 8–13). The resulting alias pairs/lists can be returned
immediatly as a new alias set (line 14). However, it should be noted that the alias set should only
contain alias lists with more than one IP address, i.e., IP addresses that were not aliased to others
should be omitted. This is implicit in Algorithm 16, since the goal is to discover which peers have
aliases (unaliased peers will not change anything during the subsequent steps).
10.3.5.2 Time complexity
N stands for the number of neighborhoods. Because peers are by definition (anomaly-free) trails of
subnets, which are used to denote neighborhoods, it can be assumed that the number of peers for a
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given neighborhood is always strictly inferior to N , since it is impossible for a neighborhood to be a
peer for itself (the preliminary traceroute probing eliminated the risk, cf. Sec. 10.3.2). Moreover, it
is very unlikely that a neighborhood will have all other neighborhoods as peers and reciprocally. At
worst, all the others can be peers, but these neighborhoods are likely to have few peers (or none) in
comparison because of traceroute data. Furthermore, previous results with WISE showed that most
neighborhoods usually have one or few peers [53] (cf. Sec. 9.3.3.3). Therefore, the average number of
peers per neighborhood can be considered to be log N , as a close approximation to reality.
The main algorithmic challenge of peer aggregation is the computation of the largest hypothetical
alias lists. It means taking all log N peers of a neighborhood and updating the IP aggregator (or
comparable structure) for all of them. Assuming this IP aggregator is implemented with a map which
binds an IP address to a list of its potential aliases, since all subnet trails (proportional to N ) can be
present in the map, and assuming there is one list update per peer (due to the content of the map),
the update of the map can be O (log N ) if the look-up operation with the map is O (1) or O (log 2N ) if
the same operation is in logarithmic time. Therefore, for N neighborhoods, the complexity of the
aggregation itself is either O (N log N ) or O (N log 2N ).
The complexity for the subsequent alias resolution depends on which alias resolution method is
being used and how it is implemented. In the case of the public implementation of SAGE, the alias
resolution is done in linear time with the fingerprint-based framework introduced in Chapter 2. Since
the total of alias candidates to resolve is, at worst, the total number of peers, which is itself, at worst,
equivalent to N (because neighborhoods are built on the basis of the same IP addresses as peers),
then the alias resolution can be done in O (N ) regardless of the number and size of the alias lists to
resolve, assuming the alias resolution itself can be done in linear time.
As an aside, blindspot detection and the subsequent improvement of peers should feature time
complexities very close to the two previous steps. Indeed, blindspot detection only consists of testing
whether (known) miscellaneous hops associated to each neighborhood (if any) match a previously
discovered alias pair/list, and it therefore scales with the number of neighborhoods. While the number
of miscellaneous hops for a given neighborhood has no relationship with N , it can be assumed that
such a number is much smaller than the total number of neighborhoods and close to the number
of peer addresses, meaning that log N can be kept as a fair approximation. Depending on how the
alias set is implemented, the time complexity is O (N log N ) (if getting an alias pair/list is in O (1)) or
O (N log 2N ) (if getting an alias is in logarithmic time). Due to its proximity with peer discovery, the
process of improving the peers afterwards can be in linear time too (cf. Sec. 10.3.4.2). In practice,
because blindspots are not frequent, detecting them and using this knowledge to improve peers
should constitute a light operation, as will be discussed in the next section (Sec. 10.3.5.3).
10.3.5.3 Practical results
To complement the time complexity analysis (cf. Sec. 10.3.5.2) and discuss the soundness of peer
aggregation, Table 10.1 provides various metrics about peer aggregation based on the measurements
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from April 2021 conducted with the public implementation of SAGE from the Montefiore Institute
(already discussed in Sec. 2.2.4 and Sec. 6.3.2). For each target network, the table shows – among
others – the total number of alias candidates (including both peer addresses and miscellaneous
hops) involved in the detection of convergence points, how many IP addresses were listed under
the largest hypothetical convergence point and how many IP addresses were included in the largest
discovered alias list. Finally, the number of peer lists (equivalent to a number of neighborhoods)
featuring blindspots at the end of peer aggregation is also provided.
Metrics ULiège AS12956 AS13789 AS224 AS6453
Total of alias candidates 9 341 20 33 149
Discovered alias lists 4 40 7 4 29
Largest hypothesis (#IPs) 3 121 2 3 19
Largest alias list (#IPs) 3 40 2 3 8
Aliased IP addresses 9 (100%) 214 (62.7%) 14 (70%) 9 (27.2%) 86 (57.7%)
Most common method Group (75%) Ally (72.5%) Ally (85.7%) Ally (50%) Ally (82.7%)
Peer lists w/ blindspots 1 32 0 1 3
Table 10.1: Quantifying peer aggregation results in SAGE (April 2021).
AS12956 and AS6453 clearly stands out in Table 10.1, both being Tier-1 ASes with complex archi-
tectures (involving some load balancing), but the metrics still demonstrate that the hypothetical alias
lists and actual alias lists were quite small. For instance, at most 19 IP addresses were considered
together while probing AS6453, and the largest alias list (obtained with the Ally-like method, cf.
Sec. 2.3.1.2) only consisted of 8 router interfaces. The largest hypothetical list with AS12956 encom-
passed 121 IP addresses, which remained small enough to be resolved with the fingerprint-based
framework of Chapter 2. While the largest alias list (40 interfaces) was obtained by grouping interfaces
by fingerprint, due to the lack of other exploitable methods, the second largest list (35 interfaces) was
obtained with Ally, suggesting that the former might not be as oversized as it first seemed 6. Finally,
the metrics for the ULiège network, AS13789 and AS224 shows there were potential convergence
points for all measurements, several of them being confirmed through alias resolution. Though the
alias lists for the ULiège network were built on the basis of fingerprints (again, because other methods
could not be used), groundtruth data showed they corresponded to actual routers.
Finally, the last line of Table 10.1 shows that there were few neighborhoods with blindspots (cf.
Sec. 10.1.2). In fact, during these measurements, no neighborhood obtained better peers through
blindspot discovery. However, snapshots of AS12956 captured from the EdgeNet cluster during 2021
included neighborhoods whose peers were occasionally improved through blindspot detection.
Overall, Table 10.1 shows that peer aggregation is not a computationally difficult task, but also
demonstrates its necessity: convergence points can be observed even with (allegedly) simple topolo-
gies. Moreover, as mentioned in Sec. 6.4.1.2, SAGE already previously found convergence points via
flickering trails, not counted in Table 10.1 due to the alias transitivity heuristic (cf. Sec. 10.3.1).
6It is worth noting that the public implementation of SAGE provides an optional parameter to force peer aggregation
to only keep alias pairs/lists discovered via the Ally-like and iffinder-like methods for the sake of accuracy.
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10.3.6 Vertex creation
10.3.6.1 Algorithm
With the knowledge of the peers and their respective aliases, SAGE can finally start building the
neighborhood-based DAG with vertex creation, i.e., creating the final vertices of the DAG. This sub-
step starts by compiling the peer data in a new map that will be subsequently denoted as the peers
map. In this map (or haystack), the keys (or needles) are individual IP addresses while the values
are the final peers, i.e., either the alias lists discovered during peer aggregation (cf. Sec. 10.3.5) or
individual IP addresses (i.e., unaliased peer addresses). Building and completing this map allows
SAGE to easily list the termini neighborhoods (or termini vertices), i.e., neighborhoods that do not act
as peers to other neighborhoods themselves and constitute the ends of the DAG. Naturally, termini
vertices always include all best effort neighborhoods, since the latter cannot be peers by design (cf.
Sec. 9.3.2). Listing such neighborhoods simplifies the creation of vertices: indeed, termini neighbor-
hoods can be directly translated as vertices and can be omitted from the subsequent processing of
the peer data (e.g., merging chunked neighborhoods as a consequence of peer aggregation).
With the peers map at hand, the existing neighborhoods can be reviewed to prepare the final
data for creating the vertices. Each neighborhood that is identified by one or several subnet trails
(several trails corresponding to flickering trails aliased together) is categorized as a terminus vertex if
and only if there is no value in the peers map for any of its trails. Otherwise, the neighborhood can be
stored in another structure mapping each subnet trail with the corresponding neighborhood. This
additional temporary structure helps to list the neighborhoods to merge upon creating the final vertex
corresponding to a convergence point (detected during peer aggregation). While identifying termini
neighborhoods and organizing the data to merge neighborhoods more easily, the neighborhoods
themselves can be updated with the final peer data, since peers are now either individual IP addresses
or alias lists. For convenience, they can be managed as objects (initially, the peer data stored in
neighborhoods only consists of IP addresses). Alternatively, storing the final peer data for each
neighborhood can be done with another side map, but if an implementation of SAGE uses the object-
oriented paradigm (like the public implementation [48]), the former is more elegant.
Algorithm 17 shows the pseudo-code to prepare the data for vertex creation, starting with the
list of neighborhoods N and the alias set A produced by peer aggregation. This pseudo-code both
creates the peers map and uses it to spot the termini neighborhoods while preparing the data. The
complete peers map can be easily built by browsing the neighborhoods with a loop (lines 2–14).
For each neighborhood, the peers (as individual IP addresses) are reviewed (starting from line 4). If
the peer address already exists as a value in the map, the current iteration can be skipped (line 6).
Otherwise, the code determines whether an alias pair/list for this peer address exists in A. If it does,
the corresponding Peer object is created and inserted in the map for any IP address that is part of
its alias list (lines 8–12). If no alias pair/list can be found, then a Peer object encapsulating a single
IP address can be created and inserted in the map instead (line 14). After this first loop, the peers
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Algorithm 17 Preparing the data for vertex creation (fourth sub-step of neighborhood inference)
Require: N , the list of discovered neighborhoods (as objects)
Require: A, the alias set built by peer aggregation
1: function PREPARE(List<Neighborhood> N , AliasSet A)
2: peersMap ← new Map<IP, Peer>()
3: for n ∈ N do
4: peerIPs ← n.getPeerIPs()
5: for IP ∈ peerIPs do
6: if peersMap.find(IP) 6= ; then
7: continue
8: aliasList ← A.findAliasList(IP)
9: if aliasList 6= ; then
10: newPeer ← new Peer(aliasList)
11: for alias ∈ aliasList do
12: peersMap.insert(alias, newPeer)
13: else
14: peersMap.insert(IP, new Peer(IP))
15: termini ← new List<Neighborhood>()
16: neighborsMap ← new Map<IP, Neighborhood>()
17: for n ∈ N do
18: n.listFinalPeers(peersMap)
19: labels ← n.getIdentifiyingIPs()
20: isPeer ← f al se
21: for IP ∈ labels do
22: if peersMap.find(IP) 6= ; then
23: isPeer ← tr ue
24: neighborsMap.insert(IP, n)
25: if !isPeer then
26: termini.push_back(n)
27: return termini, neighborsMap
map can be used to isolate the termini via a second loop (lines 15–26). If a neighborhood is found
to be a peer, it is also stored in the side map neighborsMap, which will be used later to look up
neighborhoods upon creating vertices that correspond to convergence point (line 24).
Once the data is fully prepared, vertex creation becomes a purely technical operation. The termini
neighborhoods can be directly translated into vertices while the remaining vertices, i.e. the peers,
will be created either with a single neighborhood (if the associated peer address was not aliased
to any other) or with a list of neighborhoods (if the associated peer addresses were previously
aliased), preliminarily gathered in a side map (neighborsMap) if following strictly the operations of
Algorithm 17. The peer data stored by each neighborhood can be transmitted to the final vertices as
well, as a starting point for the final sub-step of neighborhood inference: edge creation (cf. Sec. 10.3.7).
10.3.6.2 Time complexity
Considering Algorithm 17, there are two main algorithmic operations: on the one hand, building
the peers map, and on the other hand, isolating the termini neighborhoods. Before reviewing the
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first operation, N will be used to denote the number of neighborhoods. In the same way as for peer
aggregation, the average number of peers per each neighborhood can be approximated by log N
for the same reasons as before (cf. Sec. 10.3.5.2). Because the total number of IP addresses present
in the alias set should be close to N (i.e., total of peer addresses used to identify neighborhoods
with an epsilon accounting for miscellaneous hops), the look-up of one alias within the alias set is
O (log N ) if the map is implemented with a tree and O (1) if the same map is implemented with a hash
table. Knowing this, the time complexity of building the peers map is O (N log N ) if the look-up in
both the map and the alias set is in constant time and O (N log 2N ) if the look-up is performed in
logarithmic time. Indeed, each iteration of the outer loop reviews each peer address recorded for
each neighborhood (N neighborhoods, each with log N peers). Then, it looks for each peer address
in both the peers map and the alias set at worst, which means the complexity of one iteration of the
inner loop is O (2∗ log N ) if using tree structures, i.e., O (log N ) overall and O (1) if using hash tables.
The complexity for listing the termini neighborhoods is simpler: this consists of a single loop
browsing the N neighborhoods, with each iteration performing a single look-up operation in the peers
map. While there can be several labels (i.e., trail(s) denoting the neighborhood) for a neighborhood
at this stage due to the existence of flickering trails, it is safe to assume that the cost of iterating
over such labels is negligible in practice due to flickering trail analysis producing small alias lists (cf.
Sec. 6.4.1.2), and this is even more simple if the alias transitivity heuristic (cf. Sec. 10.3.1) is used. In
other words, the only constraining factor in an iteration of the loop finding termini neighborhoods is
the look-up in the peers map. Therefore, the time complexity of this operation should be O (N ) if the
look-up in the map is in constant time (hash table implementation) and in O (N log N ) if the same
operation is in logarithmic time (tree implementation).
Finally, the creation of the vertices consists, in practice, of directly translating the termini neigh-
borhoods into vertices (O (T ) if T is the number of termini neighborhoods) while the other vertices are
created with the help of a list of peers and a map associating each peer address with a neighborhood.
If P denotes the number of neighborhoods acting as peers, it would be safe to assume this operation
scales in the same manner as previous operations, i.e. O (P logP ) if using a map with constant time
look-up and O (P log 2P ) if the same operation is in logarithmic time.
10.3.7 Edge creation
10.3.7.1 Algorithm
As already explained in Sec. 10.1.3 and Sec. 10.2, edge creation does not just consist of creating
the edges between the final vertices of the neighborhood-based DAG, as the adjacencies between
neighborhoods are already accounted for by the peer data. The purpose of this sub-step is actually to
find out what the real-life like might consist of when this link binds together two juxtaposed neigh-
borhoods (i.e., separated by a TTL distance of one hop) and to enumerate all possible intermediate
routes between two neighborhoods when one is a remote peer of the second (as defined in Sec. 9.3.2).
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To start this sub-step first requires a list of the final vertices (created by the previous sub-step,
cf. Sec. 10.3.6), each vertex having recorded its peers as their vertex equivalent. I.e., rather than just
knowing the peer addresses or the alias lists corresponding to final peers (when aliased), a neighbor-
hood translated as a vertex should already have a pointer/reference to each vertex corresponding
to a (final) peer. Doing this mapping is recommended prior to edge creation to spare the effort of
maintaining side data structures to determine which peer address corresponds to which vertex.
In order to further ease edge creation, it is also recommended creating a data structure for
efficiently finding a subnet containing a given IP address. Such a structure, which will be subsequently
denoted as subnet dictionnary, can considerably help to find a subnet upon creating an indirect link
(as defined in Sec. 10.1.3), which is considered as soon as the possibility to create a direct link is ruled
out. While there are several ways to approach this problem, a time/memory trade-off (very similar to
what was recommeded to implement the IP dictionnary, cf. Sec. 6.2.1) can be relied on: the X first
bits of the provided IP address are used to compute an index for a large array of lists, so that the list
contains a bounded number of subnets (a value for X can be 20, since subnets in WISE/SAGE cannot
have a prefix length shorter than 20). Then, the problem comes down to finding the subnet in the
selected list that encompasses the given IP, which will be in O (1) due to the bounded size. Ideally, the
subnets should also be annotated with the neighborhood they are bordering prior to this operation
for the sake of completeness.
If all previous recommendations are strictly adhered to, edge creation can be solved as follows.
First, the tool can instantiate an object or structure modeling the neighborhood-based DAG as a
whole, such an object/a structure including the previously described subnet dictionnary. Then, the
initial list of vertices is processed in order to add all the subnets bordering each neighborhood in
the subnet dictionary. At the same time, the gates of the DAG are identified and memorized in the
graph object, gate simply being a shorter name for a peerless neighborhood (cf. Sec. 9.3.2). The name
simply refers to how peerless neighborhoods are typically the neighborhoods closest to the vantage
point. Vertices that do not fall under this definition are kept in order to create their incident edges
with the help of a last loop. For each vertex v , its peers (as vertices) are listed and reviewed. If such
peers are remote, then remote links (cf. Sec. 10.1.3) are inserted to connect v to each of its peers, with
a side operation enumerating the routes that exist between them. If the peers are direct, it must first
be checked that v is not a best effort neighborhood (cf. Sec. 9.3.2), otherwise an indirect link without
a mapping is inserted. Indeed, because best effort neighborhoods are not, by design, identified by
anomaly-free trails, it is not possible to map a subnet to their incident edges. Then, for each peer u,
each subnet Su bordering u must be checked to see if it contains one of the subnet trails tv used to
identify v . If such a subnet exists, then a direct link is created between u and v and mapped to Su .
Otherwise, only an indirect link can be created between u and v . A subnet Sw (bordering a vertex w)
encompassing any subnet trail tv of v should then be looked for in the subnet dictionary. If no such
subnet can be found, the indirect link is inserted without a mapping, otherwise it is mapped to Sw .
Algorithm 18 shows the pseudo-code for edge creation, starting with a list of vertices V which are
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Algorithm 18 Edge creation (final sub-step of neighborhood inference)
Require: V , the list of the final vertices (as objects)
1: function BUILDDAG(List<Vertice> V )
2: dag ← new DirectedAcyclicGraph()
3: toConnect ← new List<Vertice>()
4: for v ∈ V do
5: dag.addToSubnetDict(v.getSubnets())




10: for v ∈ toConnect do
11: peerOffset ← v.getPeerOffset()
12: peers ← v.getPeers()
13: for u ∈ peers do
14: if peerOffset == 1 then
15: if v.isBestEffort() then
16: u.addEdge(new IndirectLink(u, v))
17: continue
18: connectingSubnet ←;
19: labels ← v.getIdentifiyingIPs()
20: for label ∈ labels and connectingSubnet == ; do
21: connectingSubnet ← u.getSubnetContaining(label)
22: if connectingSubnet 6= ; then
23: u.addEdge(new DirectLink(u, v, connectingSubnet))
24: continue
25: for label ∈ labels and connectingSubnet == ; do
26: connectingSubnet ← dag.getSubnetContaining(label)
27: if connectingSubnet 6= ; then
28: u.addEdge(new IndirectLink(u, v, connectingSubnet))
29: else
30: u.addEdge(new IndirectLink(u, v))
31: else
32: routes ← v.enumerateIntermediateRoutes(u.getLabels())
33: u.addEdge(new RemoteLink(u, v, routes))
34: return dag
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assumed to have updated peer data (i.e., their respective peers are listed in their vertex form). This
algorithm starts by identifying the gates of the graph and preparing the subnet dictionary (lines 2–9).
All vertices but the gates are then processed to be connected with their respective peers with either
a direct, either an indirect or a remote link (lines 10–33). The loop first starts by collecting the peer
data (lines 11–12) then verifies how it can connect u (the current peer) with v (the current vertex for
which incoming edges are created). If u is a remote peer of v (tested at line 14), then the algorithm
should create a remote link between u and v and enumerate the intermediate routes between them
to complement the data (lines 32–33). The process of enumerating the routes, while not shown here,
simply consists of browsing once more the traceroute data collected for the subnets bordering v to
find the routes containing occurrences of the anomaly-free trail(s) identifying u (denoted as label in
the pseudo-code) and to extract the portion of these routes separating u from v . For direct peers,
the code first checks whether v is a best effort neighborhood and creates an indirect link without
a mapping if this is the case (lines 15–17). If v is not a best effort neighborhood, the code looks for
a subnet bordering u that contains any of the trails identifying v (again denoted label). If such a
subnet can be found, a direct link binding u and v together can be created (lines 20–24). Otherwise,
an indirect link is created, and is mapped to a subnet bordering a third neighborhood w if such a
subnet can be found in the subnet dictionary (lines 25–30), otherwise it is left without being mapped.
It is worth noting that Algorithm 18 does not insert anything into the DAG object (simply denoted
as dag) while connecting the vertices together (at lines 10–33): indeed, by design, it will be possible to
reach all vertices in the DAG by just following the edges starting from any gate. In fact, any traversal
of a neighborhood-based DAG consists of starting the visit at a given gate then following the edges.
Because cycles can occasionally exist, any traversal should keep track of the vertices that have already
been visited to avoid cycling in the DAG while following the edges. In practice, the public implemen-
tation of SAGE does a very first visit of the freshly built graph in order to number the neighborhoods,
so that a third party software designed to parse and to analyze/process neighborhood-based DAGs
can refer to any neighborhood with a unique integer ID.
10.3.7.2 Time complexity
The time complexity of edge creation scales with two variables: N , the number of neighborhoods,
and S, the total number of subnets bordering all neighborhoods. Again, it can be considered (for the
same reasons as in Sec. 10.3.5.2) that log N can denote the number of peers for each neighborhood
as a fair approximation. It is worth noting that, in practice, there are in fact less peers after creating
the final vertices as a consequence of peer aggregation (if alias pairs/lists were discovered), though
this should not change the notation. The number of subnets per neighborhood, on the other hand,
is more complicated to denote: at worst, there will be one neighborhood per subnet. The opposite
worst scenario is a trivial case: if all subnets are under the same neighborhood, then N = 1 and there
are no edges to create. However, because there are multiple possible subnet distributions in the wild
(depending on the architecture of a network), there can be dozens (even hundreds) of subnets for one
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neighborhood and only one or two in other cases. The average number of subnets per neighborhood
will therefore be expressed as S/N .
The time complexity of the first part of Algorithm 18 can be expressed as O (N ∗S/N ) → O (S)
since the only constraining factor in an iteration of the loop is the insertion of the S/N subnets
into the subnet dictionary, other operations being in O (1). The second loop (creation of the edges)
scales with N , because there is at worst a single gate (therefore, N −1 vertices to connect, which can
be simplified as N ). Each iteration of this second loop also scales with the number of subnets of u
due to the code at least looking for a subnet Su bordering u encompassing an (anomaly-free) trail
identifying v in an attempt to create a direct link between u and v (the list being completely visited
only if no subnet can be found). However, the loops iterating over the anomaly-free trails identifying
v should also be accounted for (denoted as labels in the pseudo-code of Algorithm 18). Because
of peer aggregation (cf. Sec. 10.3.5), this number can no longer be considered negligible (though it
can stay computationally small, cf. Sec. 10.3.5.3). A safe approximation of the maximum number of
(anomaly-free) trails identifying one neighborhood can be S/N : at worst, there will be as many trails
as there are subnets (assuming neighborhoods with a single subnet have been aggregated). It would in
fact mean each subnet bordering v to have its own unique trail in order to have more than S/N trails,
which is not a frequent occurrence in the wild. This gives us the complexity O (S2/N 2) for an iteration
(the worst case consisting in not finding connecting subnet for a direct link). Therefore, if other
operations during an iteration are in O (1) (if the subnet dictionary is designed as recommended), this
means the complexity of this operation is O(N ∗S2/N 2) →O (S2/N ). This time complexity becomes
O (S) if there is one subnet per neighborhood (S = N ). If there is only one neighborhood, no operation
is actually carried out in practice, since a single neighborhood bordering by all S subnets cannot have
peers, meaning the complexity always stays below O (S2).
It could then be argued that, because of its O(1) access (if using the recommended approach),
using the dictionary to find a subnet for a direct link could be in fact more interesting as long
as the subnet object provides the neighborhood it borders. This would lead to O(S) complexity
(O (N ∗S/N ) →O(S) where S/N denotes the maximum of subnet trails identifying a neighborhood).
In practice, it should be borne in mind that the public implementation of SAGE implements the
subnet dictionary with a large array of lists to operate a time/memory trade-off (in the same manner
of its IP dictionary, see Sec. 6.2.1). Depending on how large the array is, the maximum size of the
lists can still be greater than the number of iterations for a (failed) search of a subnet to create a
direct link. In addition, having as many trails as there are subnets will most likely occur with small
neighborhoods, and very rarely with large ones, due to such a configuration requiring all subnets to
have their own unique trails. As a consequence, Algorithm 18 should, in practice, behave well and
should be considered especially if the implementer decides to use another solution for the subnet
dictionary to use less memory at the cost of a slightly worse time complexity for finding a subnet.
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10.4 Alias resolution with the neighborhood-based DAG
In addition to providing a hop-level mapping of a target network, a neighborhood-based DAG as
built by SAGE [54] can also be used to perform alias resolution as with TreeNET [51, 55]. The tree-
like mapping of TreeNET (cf. Sec. 3.1.1) has been previously taken advantage of as a space search
reduction scheme for the fingerprint-based framework presented in Chapter 2. Since a neighborhood-
based DAG mainly differs from a tree-like mapping by allowing individual vertices to have multiple
predecessors in the topology, it can be used in exactly the same manner to perform alias resolution:
for a given neighborhood, the anomaly-free trails identifying a neighborhood (if any) can be listed
along with the contra-pivot interfaces of the bordering subnets to create a list of alias candidates.
For instance, in Figure 9.6 (Sec. 9.3.2), the trail identifying the neighborhood and the contra-pivot
interfaces (i.e., the grey squares) form an alias resolution scenario which could correspond to a single
router. Any list of candidates deduced from each neighborhood can be fed to the fingerprint-based
framework of Chapter 2 to discover one or several alias pairs/lists, therefore facilitating, in practice,
the detection of the (meshes of) routers that constitute the neighborhoods.
The public implementation of SAGE also provides such an alias resolution scheme, given that the
framework it uses is already implemented to perform alias resolution on flickering trails and (hypo-
thetical) convergence points. This final alias resolution comes as the fifth and final algorithmic step
of the complete SAGE workflow (cf. Sec. 10.2). If the recommended alias set structure (cf. Sec. 6.2.2) is
used, the alias pairs/lists discovered during this final alias resolution can be stored in a third set to
segregate them from the pairs and lists discovered just before subnet inference (cf. Sec. 6.3.3) and
during peer aggregation (cf. Sec. 10.3.5). To make the most of previously discovered alias pairs/lists,
the previously described alias transitivity heuristic (cf. Sec. 10.3.1) can also be reused.
The practical algorithm of the final alias resolution simply consists of combining a graph traver-
sal (shortly described in Sec. 10.3.7.1) with alias resolution utilities. For the sake of completeness,
Algorithm 19 provides a pseudo-code for this operation. The parameters of the provided procedure
deserve some commentary: in addition to a current vertex N (for Neighborhood), the procedure
also requires a boolean array V to remember which neighborhoods have been already visited (and
resolved), an alias resolution utility A and an alias set R (for Result). In particular, these two last
parameters are used in the same manner as in Algorithm 16, with A abstracting how alias resolution
is actually performed as well as how it accesses side data, the only difference being that the alias set
R is not returned but completed progressively (and assumed to have been created before starting the
graph traversal). This procedure is recursive, and starts with checking if N has been already visited
(line 2) and recording the visit if this is not the case (line 4). For next step, the alias candidates (lines 5–
11) are listed and subsequently resolved with A with the results being stored in R (lines 12–14). The
procedure ends by making recursive calls on the subsequent vertices in the DAG (lines 15–17). In the
pseudo-code, an edge u → v has the tail u and the head v , which is why the method getTail() is used
to retrieve the next vertex to visit. Finally, it goes without saying that the procedure of Algorithm 19
must be started from every gate of the DAG to completely process it.
195
CHAPTER 10. SAGE: SUBNET AGGREGATION
Algorithm 19 Final alias resolution in SAGE
Require: N , a vertex (neighborhood) of the neighborhood-based DAG
Require: V , an array to remember already visited vertices
Require: A, an alias resolution utility
Require: R, the alias set storing the discovered aliases
1: procedure RESOLVE(Vertex N , Bool V [], AliasResolver A, AliasSet R)
2: if V [N .getNumber() −1] then
3: return
4: V [N .getNumber() −1] ← tr ue
5: aliasCandidates ← new List<IP>()
6: for trail ∈ N .getIdentifyingIPs() do
7: aliasCandidates.push_back(trail)
8: for subnet ∈ N .getSubnets() do
9: contrapivots ← subnet.getContrapivotIPs()
10: for contrapivot ∈ contrapivots do
11: aliasCandidates.push_back(contrapivot)
12: newAliasLists ← A.resolve(aliasCandidates)
13: for newAlias ∈ newAliasLists do
14: R.addAlias(newAlias)
15: outEdges ← N .getEdges()
16: for edge ∈ outEdges do
17: RESOLVE(edge.getTail(), V , A, R)
The time complexity of the final alias resolution depends on two variables: the number of neigh-
borhoods (or vertices), subsequently denoted by N , and the number of subnets, denoted by S.
Because the number of subnets can vary significantly from one neighborhood to another, the num-
ber of subnets per neighborhood can be modeled, again, by the average number of subnets S/N
(already used in Sec. 10.3.7.2). For each neighborhood, the operations performed in Algorithm 19
scales with the number of subnets bordering this neighborhood (O (S/N )). Indeed, each subnet pro-
vides a bounded number of contra-pivot interfaces (maximum 5 in WISE/SAGE by default). Moreover,
the selection of contra-pivot interfaces among each subnet is in constant time: since the subnet
prefix length has a minimum value, the number of interfaces listed for each subnet is bounded. If
the implementation chooses to store contra-pivot interfaces in a list separating them for all other
known interfaces, then the upper boundary is reduced to the maximum number of contra-pivot
interfaces per subnet the tool accepts. While the number of trails used to identify the neighborhood
(which are part of the alias candidates) can vary, this number will rarely be greater than the average
number of subnets S/N (as already explained in Sec. 10.3.7.2). If all subnets have the maximum
of contra-pivot interfaces max, then it can be said that there is a maximum of alias candidates
S/N +max∗S/N → (max+1)∗S/N , and the time complexity to perform alias resolution on a single
neighborhood is O (S/N ). Since the overall complexity for the final alias resolution also scales with
N (the number of neighborhoods), it can be expressed as O (N ∗S/N ) → O (S), but only as long as
the alias resolution scales with the number of alias candidates (in the same manner as with the
fingerprint-based framework from Chapter 2).
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10.5 Closing comments on SAGE
In this chapter, how SAGE [54] manages to systematically build a neighborhood-based DAG to map
the hop-level of a target network has been covered in detail. The challenges SAGE has to tackle
and the workflow of the neighborhood inference have been discussed at length, particularly the
time complexity of each sub-step, to make it clear how any step of SAGE can be implemented so
that their respective complexity is clearly better than quadratic (i.e., O (N 2)). Most of the time, a
quasi-linear (i.e., O (N log N )) or a linear complexity is easily obtained, depending on the choices of
implementation. Practical measurements with SAGE (cf. Sec. 10.3.5.3) were also used to show the
real-life challenges SAGE must tackle remain computationally reasonable, making SAGE a suitable
topology mapping extension to WISE [52, 53].
The practical results also showed that the detection of convergence points is critical to achieve
accurate topology mapping, as several such points were discovered not only in large complex net-
works (i.e., Tier-1 ASes) but also within networks whose topologies would usually be considered
as simple (such as the ULiège network). Another major contribution of SAGE is how it shows that
topology mapping is achievable with partial traceroute measurements: while previous research
already aimed at reducing the traceroute overhead probing [39, 65] (see also Sec. 8.1), SAGE not
only reduces traceroute probing but can also virtually achieve topology mapping without collecting
complete traceroute paths, i.e., from end to end. In practice, SAGE still collects complete paths for
peerless neighborhoods to guarantee they have no peers at all (cf. Sec. 10.3.2), but heuristics could
easily be designed to stop complete traceroute measurements sooner, based on the TTL distances
that are available in the IP dictionary by the end of subnet inference (cf. Sec. 10.3.1).
However, before exploiting data captured with SAGE, the tool must be first assessed on groundtruth
topologies to show that its neighborhood-based DAGs are true to the topology. Moreover, SAGE should
also be evaluated on the basis of snapshots captured in the wild, notably in order to demonstrate
that SAGE can capture comparable snapshots of one target network regardless of the vantage point.













his chapter assesses SAGE [54], the topology discovery tool previously described in Chapter 10,
by validating it on groundtruth networks and evaluating it in the wild after deploying it on the
PlanetLab testbed. This therefore answers research question 3 from Sec. 8.4: as a reminder,
the question was to determine whether or not SAGE could capture accurate snapshots of target
networks, regardless of the vantage point. Sec. 11.1 first presents the validation of SAGE, conducted
on two groundtruth networks using a unique approach to confirm the discovered links are true to the
topology. Sec. 11.2 proceeds with the evaluation in the wild, notably discussing the ability of SAGE to
capture comparable pictures of a same target network despite changing the vantage point. Sec. 11.3
concludes this chapter by summarizing the perspectives offered by the SAGE methodology.
11.1 SAGE validation
This section validates SAGE assisted by two groundtruth networks. Sec. 11.1.1 first presents the
methodology used to validate the tool, which relies on a unique way of collaborating with the
groundtruth partners to verify the discovered links. Sec. 11.1.2 subsequently provides the results and
discusses the merits of SAGE as well as why a few links were not correctly inferred.
11.1.1 Validation methodology
To validate SAGE, the groundtruth networks previously introduced in Sec. 7.1 to validate WISE [52, 53]
(as well as the concept of neighborhood, see Sec. 9.3.3) were measured again with the former in
September 2020. It should be repeated that these groundtruth networks consist of the ULiège network
(one /16 IPv4 prefix completed by two other /24 prefixes for the backbone) and the backbone of a
Belgian ISP whose IPv4 prefixes cover hundreds of thousands of attributable IP addresses 1.
1As always, the details of each groundtruth network and the collected data will not be made public for security.
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Validating a neighborhood-based DAG (as defined in Sec. 10.1) might, at first glance, seem to be
a challenging task. Not only is it necessary to confirm that the overall shape of the graph is true to the
topology, i.e., the successor/predecessor relationships accounted by the edges are accurate, but the
subnets mapped to each edge need to be checked to ensure they are also correct. In other words, a
complete verification of a neighborhood-based DAG requires audits at both the router-level and the
subnet-level, and requesting exhaustive data at these levels could be considered as too intruisive by a
network operator.
Hopefully, a strategy to thoroughly verify the links discovered by SAGE while minimizing the time
spent on network audits by the groundtruth partners could be designed. The key idea is to take
advantage of the output of the show ip ro IP command (where IP is a given IP address) available
on most routers. Indeed, the output of this command demonstrates whether the provided IP address
is located next hop and also provides the subnet prefix corresponding to the outgoing link towards
which packets would be routed for this specific target address. Of course, such a command line also
has to be run from the correct device. Since neighborhoods discovered by SAGE are usually identified
by one or several router interfaces previously discovered with traceroute probing (cf. Sec. 10.3.3)
and alias resolution (cf. Sec. 10.3.5), providing the associated IP address(es) to a groundtruth partner is
sufficient for this partner to recognize a specific router and log onto it to run one or several commands.
Then, for each neighborhood, a show ip ro command can be generated for each outgoing edge,
with the IP address completing the command being associated with the next neighborhood.
For example, if the neighborhood-based DAG contains an edge N32 → N33 via x.y.z.0/30 2
where N32 is identified by the IP address a.b.c.1 and N33 by x.y.z.2, then the network operator has
to log onto the router bearing the interface a.b.c.1 and run the command show ip ro x.y.z.2.
The network operator’s involvement stops here: the output of each command can be requested to
subsequently verify whether or not the initial edge is correct. If the output states that the provided
IP address is directly connected, this means that the edge discovered by SAGE corresponds to a real
life link. If this output is parsed to extract the subnet prefix associated to the outgoing link, it then
becomes possible to compare the subnet mapped to the edge in the DAG discovered by SAGE (if any)
with the groundtruth prefix. Ideally, the inferred prefix should coincide with the groundtruth prefix,
but small differences in prefix length can be considered as an acceptable result depending on how
many subnet interfaces are visible to probes (as discussed in Sec. 7.1.2).
Not only does this strategy determine whether the discovered links are true to the topology, but it
can also be a way of assessing the discovered convergence points. Indeed, when noticing a router
identified by multiple IP addresses in SAGE data, the operator can also confirm whether or not the
listed addresses are attributed to the same device. The present methodology is therefore capable of
verifying the observed properties of a topology at both the router-level and the subnet-level while
not being too intrusive, i.e., the groundtruth partners do not have to send an exhaustive description
of their respective network as they only confirm observations.




Metrics ULiège network Belgian ISP backbone
Subnets
Covered prefixes 95.93% 88.95%
Exact inferred prefixes 57.55% 46.98%
Differing by a most one bit 79.94% 74.09%
DAG
Neighborhoods 51 121
Discovered links 34 113
Direct links 29 108
Indirect links 5 5
Correct links 34 (100%) 108 (95.58%)
False direct 0 (0%) 3 (2.78%)
False indirect 0 (0%) 2 (40%)
Subnets as links
Matched 34 108
Exact prefix 33 (97.06%) 93 (82.3%)
Mean prefix difference 1 1.2
Table 11.1: Validation of SAGE on the ULiège network and the backbone of a Belgian ISP.
Table 11.1 provides the results of the validation of SAGE on both groundtruth networks, divided
into three parts: one for subnet inference, another one for the DAG and a third one for the subnet
mappings. The first part of Table 11.1 serves as a quick reminder that the subnets discovered with the
WISE methodology (reused by SAGE, cf. Sec. 10.2) are sound but also exhaustive in respect of both
target networks. The metrics are the same as in Sec. 7.1.2. The two other parts assess the ability of
SAGE to build a consistent neighborhood-based DAG.
The main highlight of Table 11.1 is that SAGE consistently finds accurate links: as shown by the
second part of the table, the vast majority of the discovered links were true to the topology for both
networks, with 100% of the links discovered on the ULiège network being correct and 95% of the links
found on the Belgian ISP backbone being true to the topology as well. As demonstrated by the third
part of Table 11.1, the subnets that were mapped to the detected links were also overwhelmingly
accurate: only one subnet had a prefix greater by one bit within the ULiège network, while a dozen of
subnets mapped to links featured prefixes longer by one bit within the Belgian ISP backbone (only
three prefixes were longer by two bits). A careful analysis of the validation results for the Belgian ISP
backbone also revealed that all five incorrect links (including two indirect links) corresponded to
subnets incorrectly routed because of a BGP configuration error, resulting in incorrect trails (therefore
incorrect neighborhoods). Interestingly, the subnets themselves were still matching the groundtruth
(though not counted in the metrics). While not mentioned in Table 11.1, all convergence points
discovered by SAGE were correct in respect of the topology in both cases. In fact, in the case of the
ULiège network, a closer inspection of the data with the friendly help of the SeGI 3 rather showed
that SAGE had only missed one convergence point because the collected traceroute data did not
suggest its existence during peer discovery (cf. Sec. 10.3.4).
3For reminders, the SeGI (Service Général d’Informatique) is the company maintaining the ULiège network.
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An interesting observation to be made is that both measurements included a small number of
indirect links (as defined in Sec. 10.1.3), the majority of which were still ruled as true to the topology:
only two such links were inaccurate in the case of the Belgian ISP backbone. As a reminder, an
indirect link simply accounts for an edge u → v whose mapped subnet is not in the vicinity of u
(i.e., the neighborhood that is closer to the vantage point), but rather around a third neighborhood.
Interestingly, in the case of the ULiège network, all subnets mapped to the indirect links bordered
the two neighborhoods that should have been merged due to the (missed) convergence point: each
neighborhod had a few outgoing edges mapped with a subnet from the other half (and vice versa).
This observation suggested that both neighborhoods were related, and could be used to design a post-
processing of the DAG. However, the correct indirect links found within the Belgian ISP backbone
did not suggest a convergence point was missed, and in fact supports the intuition (mentioned in
Sec. 10.1.3) that subnets can occasionally be routed (i.e., reached with direct probes) and crossed
(i.e., the probes pass through them) differently. Interestingly, such links can reveal adjacencies that
are not directly observed via (Paris) traceroute probing, especially if the mapped subnets are large
enough to bind together multiple routers (this will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 12).
Finally, it should be noted that the graphs provided slightly more neighborhoods than edges:
this is due to having a few neighborhoods without peers (often because they were the closest to
the vantage point), but also due to having several connected components in the case of the ULiège
network. In fact, SAGE will rarely discover all the links within a network since it typically runs from a
single vantage point. Discovering all links would require probing the same network from different
vantage points and combining the results. However, whether or not the neighborhood-based DAG
is representative of a target network can be checked by verifying the subnet-level data exhaustively
covers the groundtruth data. It is for this reason that Table 11.1 also provides subnet metrics to
demonstrate that SAGE (via WISE) accurately covered most of both networks, with the ratio of inferred
prefixes differing by at most one bit being close to the ratio of covered prefixes. Such a ratio accounts
for subnets which the (lack of) live interfaces prevents finding the exact prefix (cf. Sec. 7.1).
11.2 SAGE in the wild
This section evaluates SAGE in the wild, using data collected from various Autonomous Systems (or
ASes) from the PlanetLab testbed. Sec. 11.2.1 first briefly describes how SAGE has been deployed.
Sec. 11.2.2 subsequently discusses the ability of SAGE to capture comparable pictures of a same
network despite changing the vantage point at each new measurement.
11.2.1 Deployment on PlanetLab
The first complete implementation of SAGE 4 was deployed by the end of 2019 on the PlanetLab
testbed. Before going any further, it is important to note that the termination of the PlanetLab testbed
4The (open source) code can be found on GitHub: https://github.com/JefGrailet/SAGE.
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was planned for May 2020 [99], and that very few nodes were still usable by Fall 2019. In fact, only two
or three dozens of PLE (PlanetLab Europe) nodes, i.e. all located in Europe, could be used to deploy
WISE or SAGE at the time. Hopefully, the PlanetLab testbed got a spiritual successor in the EdgeNet
cluster [108], which became usable starting from Spring 2020 and with which more SAGE snapshots
have been captured. How they have been performed will be discussed in Sec. 12.2.1.
Due to the state of the PlanetLab testbed as of early 2020, SAGE has been initially deployed in
the same manner as WISE (cf. Sec. 7.2.1), i.e., SAGE was run each time from a single vantage point to
probe a single Autonomous System and capture a snapshot of it (as defined in Sec. 5.2.1). To optimize
the usage of the remaining PLE nodes, SAGE measurements were also scheduled with vantage point
rotation (again, see Sec. 5.2.1), i.e., each target AS was measured once from each node from a subset of
the available PLE nodes at the time. Hopefully, this strategy made it possible to study the differences
between the neighborhood-based DAGs built by SAGE from each vantage point, as will be discussed
in Sec. 11.2.2. Finally, Table 11.2 lists the ASes measured with SAGE in early 2020 from the PlanetLab
testbed. Several target ASes already probed with WISE in 2019 were kept (cf. Table 7.2), with a few
additions and extractions. These 12 ASes were measured by two campaigns: the first one beginning
on December 29th, 2019 and ending on January 15th, 2020 and the second one during March 2020,
more precisely from March 6th to March 20th.
ASN Name Origin Category
12956 Telefonica Global Solutions Spain Tier-1
3257 GTT Communications Inc. USA Tier-1
6453 TATA Communications USA Tier-1
6762 Sparkle Italy Tier-1
13789 Internap Corporation USA Transit
286 KPN B.V. Netherlands Transit
50673 Serverius Holding B.V. Netherlands Transit
6939 Hurricane Electric LLC USA Transit
8928 Interoute Communications UK Transit
9198 JSC Kazahtelecom Kazakhstan Transit
1241 Forthnet Greece Stub
224 UNINETT Norway Stub
Table 11.2: Summary of the 12 Autonomous Systems probed with SAGE in early 2020.
11.2.2 Graph isomorphism
While the results of the validation of SAGE on groundtruth networks are promising (cf. Sec. 11.1), both
involved groundtruth networks primarily consisting of end systems. Moreover, the measurements
themselves were not affected to any great extent by traffic engineering, though multiple convergence
points could be detected, notably within the Belgian ISP backbone. In the wild, not all subnets or
routers of a specific AS will be visible to probes (e.g., because of filtering policies), meaning the graphs
built by SAGE will not always be as complete as with our two groundtruth networks.
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Hopefully, SAGE can be assessed in the wild by comparing the graphs captured on one target
network but on different days and from distinct vantage points. As a reminder, all the data captured
by SAGE for a given target network (usually an entire AS) on a given date and from a given (and
single) vantage point is called a snapshot (cf. Sec. 5.2.1). If two snapshots from one AS captured from
distinct vantage points on separate dates provide comparable neighborhood-based DAGs, in the
sense that they provide similar or identical vertices and edges, then these DAGs are isomorphic to
some extent. As a reminder, in graph theory, two graphs are isomorphic when they share the same
number of vertices and if these vertices are connected in the same manner in both graphs. Finding
isomorphic components in two DAGs as captured by SAGE from distinct vantage points is a way to
show its hop-level inference is consistent regardless of the vantage point. Of course, two snapshots
will likely never provide strictly identical DAGs (e.g., because the target AS may be routed differently
depending on the vantage point), but a large amount of similarities between a pair or a collection
of snapshots would imply that the same architecture was captured each time with a few different
vertices and edges because of the change of vantage point.
The similarities between neighborhood-based DAGs can be quantified as follows. A set of snap-
shots collected for a given AS such that each snapshot was captured on a different date and from a
different vantage point can be first selected. Then, the very first snapshot can be picked as a reference
that will be compared with each subsequent snapshot. Second, for each pair, how many neighbor-
hoods appear in both snapshots can be quantified by comparing their respective labels, i.e., how
each neighborhood is uniquely identified. The non-best effort neighborhoods, also called regular
neighborhoods, deserves particular attention as they are clearly identified by one or several router
interfaces. Best effort neighborhoods (cf. Sec. 9.3.2), on the other hand, are less likely to always be
identified in the same way due to differences in TTL distances (cf. Sec. 10.3.3.1) and routing.
The number of neighborhoods found identically in both snapshots (e.g., because they are identi-
fied by the same router interface(s)) can be divided by the total number of neighborhoods present
in the reference snapshot to obtain a redundant vertex ratio (RVR). This ratio can be subdivided
into two metrics by excluding or including best effort neighborhoods. The redundant vertex ratio
without best effort neighborhoods will be simply denoted as RVR, while the same ratio including best
effort neighborhoods will be expressed as RVR with BE (Best Effort). The former should be usually
slightly higher than the latter, as best effort neighborhoods are less likely to appear identically in two
snapshots of a same network. When the redundant vertex ratio (with or without best effort) is close
to 1, this means that both snapshots provide a large number of identical vertices. Conversely, if the
ratio is close to 0, then both snapshots differ greatly from each other. This can notably occur when
one of both snapshots was captured from a vantage point with poor reachability.
The redundant vertex ratio(s) can be completemented by an additional metric, the intersection
ratio (IR), which is computed by dividing the number of regular neighborhoods that appear in all
selected snapshots without exception by the number of regular neighborhoods found in the reference
snapshot. Having a high intersection ratio means that a large share of the (regular) neighborhoods
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identified in the reference snapshot always appear regardless of the vantage point.
When two snapshots share many neighborhoods in common, it becomes possible to quantify
how many edges can exist in both snapshots: for any edge u → v found in the reference snapshot, if
neighborhoods u and v exist in both snapshots, then u → v can exist in the second snapshot as well.
The same edge is said to be redundant when it does appear in the second snapshot, i.e., the edge
exists in both snapshots. The total of redundant edges can be divided by the total of edges that can
appear in both snapshots to obtain a redundant edge ratio (RER). Therefore, a redundant edge ratio
close to 1 expresses the fact that, for any edge that can exist in both snapshots, this edge is most likely
redundant. Consequently, if two snapshots of a same target network captured from distinct vantage
points feature a redundant vertex ratio and a redundant edge ratio that are both close to 1, then these
snapshots provide neighborhood-based DAGs that are isomorphic to a great extent.




















RER IR RVR (w/ BE) RVR
Figure 11.1: Graph isomorphism on AS6453 (December 29th, 2019 to January 15th, 2020).
Fig. 11.1 quantifies graph isomorphism for AS6453, using 12 snapshots collected from the Planet-
Lab testbed between December 29th, 2019 and January 15, 2020th, each snapshot being collected
from a different vantage point. AS6453 (TATA Communications Inc.) was selected because it is a
major Tier-1 AS found in the top 10 of CAIDA’s AS ranking [2] that could also be measured on a
daily basis. In the figure, the black line shows the redundant edge ratio of each comparison, i.e.,
the edges that exist in both the reference snapshot and the snapshot of the X-axis. Light gray bars
show the redundant vertex ratios with best effort neighborhoods while the dark gray bars depict the
same ratios but excluding best effort neighborhoods. Finally, the blue dashed line represents the
intersection ratio, i.e., the ratio of regular neighborhoods that appear in all snapshots.
In Fig. 11.1, more than 70% of the regular neighborhoods appear in both the reference and
the compared snapshot, while the redundant edge ratios are close to 1 (above 0.95) for all pairs of
snapshots. When best effort neighborhoods are included, the redundant vertex ratios remain above
or around 0.6, while the intersection ratio is slighty greater than 0.5. These results clearly suggest
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SAGE captured a similar hop-level topology in each snapshot of AS6453, despite being a Tier-1 AS.




















RER IR RVR (w/ BE) RVR
Figure 11.2: Graph isomorphism on AS3257 (December 29th, 2019 to January 15th, 2020).
To complement Fig. 11.1, Fig. 11.2 provides a comparable analysis (i.e., same methodology) for
AS3257 (GTT Communications, Inc.), again using snapshots captured from PlanetLab in January 2020.
Again, the redundant vertex ratios are good, with more than 70% of common regular neighborhoods
for all pairs except for the comparison between the reference and the snapshot from December 30th,
2019. The redundant vertex ratios are also clearly above 0.5 if including best effort neighborhoods,
thouh only a few snapshots feature around 60% of redundant vertices in this scenario. The redundant
edge ratios are satisfying too but worse than previously: most pairs of snapshots provide a ratio above
0.8, while three pairs provide ratios slightly higher than 0.75. Such a difference to Fig. 11.1 could
be explained by the fact that AS3257 is both a Tier-1 AS but also a larger target AS for SAGE: in fact,
its IPv4 prefixes cover more than two millions of attributable IP addresses, while the IPv4 prefixes
associated with AS6453 cover only slightly more than half a million of attributable IP addresses.
Finally, Fig. 11.3 provides the same visual tools as Fig. 11.1 and Fig. 11.2 but for AS224 (UNINETT),
using the same methodology and dataset as before. This last figure provides better metrics overall, as
only the redundant edge ratios are slightly worse than those depicted in Fig. 11.1 though they remain
close to 1. In particular, the intersection ratio is excellent, as more than 70% of the regular neighbor-
hoods from the reference snapshot reappeared in all subsequent snapshots. While excluding the best
effort neighborhoods, the redundant vertex ratios are above 0.9 in several instances. These metrics
should however not be unexpected, considering AS224 is a Stub AS (though it covers approximately
one million of attributable IP addresses) and considering that both previous examples illustrated
metrics for two Tier-1 ASes, which usually have more complex topologies.
All three previously discussed figures demonstrate that SAGE is able to capture comparable graphs
despite changing the vantage point, even when considering complex networks. Interestingly, however,
there is always a noticeably amount of vertices and edges that are not redundant. In particular, the
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RER IR RVR (w/ BE) RVR
Figure 11.3: Graph isomorphism on AS224 (December 29th, 2019 to January 15th, 2020).
redundant edge ratios in Fig. 11.2 are clearly worse than in both other figures, being around 0.8 rather
than above 0.95. As already discussed in Sec. 11.1.2, this could motivate combining several DAGs
collected from different vantage points together: as comparable vertices could be found between two
snapshots, it should be possible to merge the vertices and edges of two snapshots (and possibly other
parts of the data, such as the inferred subnet-level) to produce a more exhaustive neighborhood-
based DAG. Such a strategy is left for future work. It should be noted that this section only discussed
the results for three ASes, but figures for other ASes listed in Table 11.2 can be browsed online at the
SAGE public GitHub repository 5.
Finally, it should also be noted that redundant vertices quantified by the previous figures also
include convergence points, though there is often only a small number of common convergence
points between two snapshots: in the data discussed above, there is usually between 10 and 20%
of convergence points from the reference snapshot that reappear identically in any other snapshot
in the case of Transit/Tier-1 ASes, and sometimes up to 60% with Stub ASes. Such a result is not
particularly surprising: because of the change of vantage point, there is little chance that the probes
sent towards the target AS get routed exactly in the same way, therefore little chance they go through
exactly the same load balanced paths. As a consequence, the observed convergence points are more
likely to differ from one snapshot to another than other regular neighborhoods. This observation
also suggests that the share of non-redundant vertices observed for each pair of snapshots might
consist of unique paths/access points to the target network, while the redundant vertices constitute a
kind of backbone which can be – in theory – observed from any vantage point. If multiple snapshots
were to be combined into one unique DAG to get a comprehensive graph of the target domain, the
convergence points observed in each snapshot should also be comprehensively checked and possibly
merged by relying on alias transitivity (cf. Sec. 1.2).
5Cf. https://github.com/JefGrailet/SAGE/tree/master/Python/Isomorphism/Figures
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11.3 Closing comments: on the potential of neighborhood-based DAGs
In this chapter, the consistency of the neighborhood-based DAGs built by SAGE [54] has been demon-
strated. One the one hand, SAGE could be reliably validated on two groundtruth networks (Sec. 11.1).
This validation demonstrated that both the discovered links and the subnets mapped to them were
overwhelmingly true to the topology, though a small number of links were not correct for a variety of
reasons, such as unexpected trails for a few subnets in the Belgian ISP backbone (because of a BGP
configuration error). On the other hand, a large collection of snapshots captured on 12 ASes from the
PlanetLab testbed in early 2020 showed that SAGE can discover comparable neighborhood-based
DAGs for one target network regardless of the vantage point (cf. Sec. 11.2). In particular, the vast
majority of graph edges that could exist in two snapshots of a pair (because the associated vertices
were present in both) usually appeared in both, more than 95% of such edges being redundant in
snapshots collected on AS6453 and AS224, respectively Tier-1 and Stub ASes (cf. Sec. 11.2.2).
Observations in the collected data also showed that SAGE regularly discovered convergence points
through alias resolution, even in simple topologies such as the ULiège network (cf. Sec. 11.1.2). In
fact, the present evaluation tends to suggest that SAGE is more likely to miss convergence points than
to incorrectly infer them, since convergence points are an observed consequence of load balancing,
which will vary from one vantage point to another, as already indicated while evaluating subnet
inference challenges in a previous chapter (cf. Sec. 5.2.2). Previous practical results with SAGE also
showed that convergence points in traceroute data can usually be quite small regarding the total
number of alias candidates considered at once (cf. Sec. 10.3.5.3).
All these results support the idea that neighborhood-based DAGs are a good paradigm to study
the intra-domain topologies hop-level, especially if alias resolution is eventually performed on each
individual neighborhood to have a glance at the router-level (cf. Sec. 10.4). Moreover, while SAGE is
designed so that it could easily run from a single vantage point, it could be potentially deployed from
multiple vantage points to capture more exhaustive maps of some target domain by comparing and
combining the collected snapshots, as already suggested in Sec. 11.2.2.
While neighborhood-based DAGs are very interesting from a measurement perspective, they
may not, however, be the best way to model a target domain and study its topological properties.
For instance, since several edges in a DAG can be mapped with the same subnet (e.g., if the subnet
is a large one, such as a /25 subnet), the DAG itself is not the ideal way to account for the role
played by the subnet-level, despite accounting accurately for the hop-level adjacencies. However,
a neighborhood-based DAG can be easily translated into a bipartite graph (cf. Sec. 8.3.2): indeed,
because neighborhoods are never connected directly but rather with a subnet in between, a bipartite
graph where the > vertices correspond to neighborhoods while ⊥ vertices account for subnets can be
built. Moreover, if neighborhoods are further analyzed through alias resolution, it becomes possible
to replace them with routers and Layer-2 devices, resulting in a tripartite graph that re-uses the
ideas introduced by Tarissan et al. in 2013 [114]. The conversion of neighborhood-based DAGs into










MODELING NETWORKS WITH BIPARTITE GRAPHS
T
his final chapter analyzes the data collected by SAGE [54] with bipartite graphs to address
research question 4 from Sec. 8.4. The question was to determine whether or not bipartite
formalisms could be suitable to study the topology of the target networks measured by SAGE.
While SAGE natively builds a comprehensive map of a target network as a neighborhood-based DAG
(cf. Chapter 10), this model could be reinterpreted with bipartite formalisms to highlight topological
features more easily. Sec. 12.1 presents two possible bipartite formalisms that could be applied
on SAGE data to study the properties of the measured networks, while Sec. 12.2 summarizes how
SAGE data was collected during 2020 and 2021 and subsequently reinterpreted with the proposed
formalisms. Sec. 12.3 discusses the topological features that can be extracted from the first formalism,
followed by a similar discussion with the second proposed model in Sec. 12.4. Finally, Sec. 12.5
concludes both this chapter and the third part of this thesis by summarizing its main contributions
and discussing, as future work, ways to improve the SAGE methodology and its bipartite analysis.
12.1 Bipartite models for SAGE data
Despite offering a comprehensive map of a target domain when annotated with subnet mappings
(cf. Sec. 10.1.3), a neighborhood-based DAG as built by SAGE only accounts for the hop-level when it
comes to its structure. As such, it can provide some insight on the hop-level via classical graph metrics,
but requires additional processing to compute some metrics, notably to study comprehensively the
subnet-level. For reminders, the subnet mappings inferred by SAGE allow a same subnet to be
mapped to multiple edges: indeed, it is possible a larger subnet (e.g., a /27 subnet) acts as a hub
between several (meshes of) routers, therefore several neighborhoods. Moreover, it is also possible a
subnet gets mapped at the same time to both direct or indirect links (cf. Sec. 10.1.3), i.e., the subnet
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mapped to an edge might not be in the vicinity of the neighborhoods connected through said edge.
As a consequence, identifying the exact amount of neighborhoods a subnet is connecting together
requires a careful reading of the neighborhood-based DAG, and discovering other topological features
(such as structural cycles) involving subnets can require further analysis of the DAG.
Hopefully, studying the topological properties tied to the subnet-level can be achieved more easily
by relying on a bipartite formalism (cf. Sec. 8.3.2). Indeed, a neighborhood-based DAG features two
main components: neighborhoods and subnets. Moreover, by design, two adjacent neighborhoods
should be linked together via an intermediate subnet. Likewise, two subnets cannot be directly
connected and must have at least one intermediate (Layer-3) device between them, as a subnet
delimits, by definition, a set of devices that can reach other directly at the datalink layer (cf. Sec. 4.1.1).
The intermediate device(s) can be abstracted by a neighborhood. Therefore, neighborhood-based















N1 N2 N3 N4
S2 S3S1 +3 +2 +7 +3
Link subnets Other subnets
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⊥
(b) As a bipartite graph
Figure 12.1: Translating a neighborhood-based DAG into a bipartite graph.
Figure 12.1 shows a toy example of a neighborhood-based DAG which is reinterpreted as a
neighborhood (>) – subnet (⊥) bipartite graph. Fig. 12.1a shows the initial DAG 1 while Fig. 12.1b
depicts its bipartite equivalent. Not only this example demonstrates the original DAG can be easily
reinterpreted as a bipartite graph without changing anything in the initial data, but it also shows
that such a model can also reveal new adjacencies that were not initially visible in the traceroute
data collected by SAGE. Indeed, in Fig. 12.1a, the neighborhoods N3 and N4 share no common edge,
but the edges going from N2 to N3 and N4 are mapped to the same subnet S3. As a consequence, it
can be inferred that S3 is a hub between N2, N3, and N4, which means N3 and N4 are adjacent too. A
strict reading of the IP-level DAG arising from the initial traceroute data collected by SAGE would
not have suggested this at first. Because S3 is modeled by a single vertex in Fig. 12.1b, the bipartite
graph naturally accounts for the adjacency of N3 and N4 without modifying the initial data.
Not only the neighborhood – subnet bipartite formalism can reveal new adjacencies, but it is
also a convenient tool to get back to simpler graphs thanks to the mecanism of bipartite projection
(cf. Sec. 8.3.2). For example, a projection on the neighborhoods (>), also called >-projection, could
1This figure is actually identical to Fig. 10.1. It is reused here to allow a convenient comparison.
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be performed to generate a hop-level graph which accounts more accurately for the hop-level
adjacencies than the initial neighborhood-based DAG: indeed, the new adjacencies revealed in
the bipartite graph are also taken account of in the projection. As a result, this bipartite formalism
makes it possible to study two distinct definitions of the neighborhood degree: in a bipartite graph,
this degree simply amounts to the number of neighboring subnets, therefore the number of edges
shared with ⊥ vertices, while the degree in the projection amounts to total number of adjacent
neighborhoods. Finally, software libraries such as the NetworkX library for Python [34] provides many
convenient tools to extract topological features from bipartite graphs and to visualize them.
However, the neighborhood – subnet bipartite model is not the only one that can be applied to
SAGE data. For reminders, neighborhoods themselves can hide a single router as well as a mesh of
routers, possibly involving Layer-2 equipment. Furthermore, SAGE itself ends its execution with a
final alias resolution step (cf. Sec. 10.4) that is in practice very similar to the TreeNET alias resolution
stept [51], i.e., it builds lists of alias candidates on the basis of each neighborhood (see also Sec. 3.1.1)
and subsequently resolve them. Moreover, previous research already highlighted the practical effects
of Layer-2 devices on the router degree [90] (cf. Sec. 8.3.1) and explored the possibility of including
Layer-2 devices in a bipartite formalism [114] (cf. Sec. 8.3.2). The neighborhood – subnet paradigm
can therefore be extended as follows: first, the neighborhoods themselves can be replaced with the
routers they contain, using alias resolution results previously collected by SAGE. Second, the router
– subnet bipartite graph can be completed by a third party that represent (hypothetical) Layer-2
devices. This additional party accounts for the connections that exist between routers of a same
neighborhood, hinting a full mesh rather than a single device.
R4











Figure 12.2: The DAG from Fig. 12.1a reinterpreted as a tripartite graph.
Figure 12.2 depicts a possible tripartite graph that could be derived from Fig. 12.1a. In this new
example, it is assumed that N1, N3, and N4 have all been identified as being single routers (rather
than meshes) while the alias resolution (hypothetically) discovered two routers within N2. There are
therefore five routers: R1 (N1), R2 and R3 (N2), R4 (N3), R5 (N4). To account for R2 and R3 being found
in the same neighborhood, an hypothetical Layer-2 device E1 (for Ethernet switch, a common type
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of Layer-2 equipment) is added to the tripartite graph (top of Figure 12.2) to connect both routers
together, Figure 12.2 highlighting the original neighborhood N3 to ease comparison with Fig. 12.1b.
As a result, the final Layer-2 – Layer-3 – subnet graph provides the same adjacencies as the original
DAG, but includes the router-level knowledge gained by SAGE during its final step.
The main advantage of the tripartite model, other than being more realistic with respect to
network components, is that it is suitable to study and compare the router-level with the hop-level.
Indeed, in this model, the router degree is at best equal to the neighborhood degree (bipartite
definition), i.e., the degree of each individual router is equal to the degree of the encompassing neigh-
borhood if it turns out – via alias resolution – to consist of a single device. When there are multiple
routers within a same neighborhood, the presence of Layer-2 equipment could also be inferred by
assessing whether or not it would be advantageous: indeed, when a neighborhood includes two or
three routers, having them in full mesh only requires one or two additional connections for each.
Conversely, identifying a dozen of routers within the same neighborhood suggests there might be
Layer-2 equipment, because having a single datalink layer connection with a Layer-2 device to obtain
a full mesh is much simpler than using a dozen connections.
Both models are discussed in this chapter. Sec. 12.3 reviews the neighborhood – subnet model,
while Sec. 12.4 comments the Layer-2 – Layer-3 – subnet model. In both cases, how the neighborhood-
based DAGs can be translated in practice into each model will be explained, and various results
obtained from snapshots collected by SAGE from the EdgeNet cluster will presented and discussed.
The practical details of the deployment of SAGE on EdgeNet and the handling of its snapshots are
commented in the next section.
12.2 Getting and handling SAGE data for bipartite analysis
Due to the planned termination of the PlanetLab testbed by May 2020 [99], data collection with SAGE
had to be moved to the EdgeNet cluster [108], a new system dedicated to network research created
by the former PlanetLab Europe staff. Moreover, to analyze SAGE data easily while minimizing the
implementation work, a dedicated library in Python involving the NetworkX library [34] has been
designed in 2020 and progressively extended since then. Sec. 12.2.1 briefly comments on how the
EdgeNet cluster works and how SAGE has been deployed from it. Sec. 12.2.2 introduces INSIGHT, the
custom Python library used to manipulate and analyze SAGE data with the help of NetworkX.
12.2.1 SAGE deployment on the EdgeNet cluster
Created early in the early 2000’s, the PlanetLab testbed has been a very useful tool for network
research as a whole as well as this thesis: in particular, it has been used to deploy TreeNET [51, 55]
and WISE [52, 53] as well as to conduct the very first measurements with SAGE [54] (cf. Sec. 11.2.1).
However, as already hinted several times in this work (see notably Sec. 5.2.1), the PlanetLab testbed
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was very cumbersome to maintain: dedicated machines had to be installed around the world 2
and were maintained by centralized authorities. Because of the vast amount of machines 3 and
centralized management, nodes were updated at a slow pace. Late in the 2010 decade, many PLC
nodes (PlanetLab Central) were still running with the Fedora 8 operating system, a Linux distribution
which was released on November 8th, 2007 and whose support ended on January 7th, 2009. The
termination of the PlanetLab testbed was eventually announced for May 2020 [99].
Of course, since the early 2000’s, several other platforms have been proposed for network mon-
itoring and/or topology mapping, such as CAIDA’s Archipelago [1], RIPE Atlas [9] or MONROE [7].
However, these platforms are not suitable to deploy WISE/SAGE because they have either specific
goals (e.g., the MONROE project is focused on mobile networks) or restrictions when it comes to the
tools that can be deployed (e.g., RIPE Atlas [9] only allow basic tools, such as traceroute [119] and
ping). To offer the same degree of freedom as PlanetLab while modernizing its infrastructure, the
late PlanetLab Europe staff created the EdgeNet cluster [108]. The EdgeNet cluster has been designed
with the state-of-the-art technologies in cloud computing, as it relies on Docker [3] to containerize
applications and Kubernetes [6] to deploy them. As such, it allows any programming environment on
any EdgeNet node, the nodes themselves being simpler to manage than past PlanetLab nodes.
However, the EdgeNet cluster is still in its infancy, having around 50 available nodes at the time of
writing these lines (to compare with the hundreds of PlanetLab nodes). Moreover, due to Kubernetes
adding resource management in the equation, node availability also depends on the current node
usage. Because of this, but also because EdgeNet features more working nodes than PlanetLab as of
early 2020, SAGE measurements from the EdgeNet cluster no longer involves vantage point rotation
(as first defined in Sec. 5.2.1). Instead, a dynamic scheduling strategy was designed so that nodes
that appear to have limited resources are avoided while each target AS gets measured from as many
different vantage points as possible. This strategy, implemented with a mix of Bash and Python
scripting, allows one to perform frequent measurements from a large variety of vantage points in an
semi-automated manner. The scripts are publicly available on the SAGE GitHub repository 4.
Though the measurement strategy slightly changed with respect to Sec. 11.2.1, the target Au-
tonomous Systems remained more or less the same, as shown by Table 12.1. The main changes in
Table 12.1 with respect to Table 11.2 are the removal of AS8928 (Interoute Communications) and the
addition of two Transit networks, AS1273 (Vodafone Group) and AS4637 (Telstra International), and
one additional Tier-1 network: AS6461 (Zayo Group). AS8928 was removed from the measurement
campaign due to most EdgeNet nodes having poor reachability towards this specific network, while
the three additional ASes were selected with the same methodology as before, i.e., using CAIDA’s AS
ranking [2] and the Hurricane Electric BGP toolkit [4] to select major networks whose IPv4 prefixes
could be fully probed by SAGE in a few hours.
2The Montefiore-Fry machine, mentioned a few times in this work, is a "recycled" PlanetLab node.
3PlanetLab had 1353 nodes in 717 sites at its peak [8].
4https://github.com/JefGrailet/SAGE/tree/master/Dataset/Scripts
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ASN Name Origin Category
12956 Telefonica Global Solutions Spain Tier-1
3257 GTT Communications Inc. USA Tier-1
6453 TATA Communications USA Tier-1
6461 Zayo Group USA Tier-1
6762 Sparkle Italy Tier-1
1273 Vodafone Group PLC European Union Transit
13789 Internap Corporation USA Transit
286 KPN B.V. Netherlands Transit
4637 Telstra International Limited Hong Kong Transit
50673 Serverius Holding B.V. Netherlands Transit
6939 Hurricane Electric LLC USA Transit
9198 JSC Kazahtelecom Kazakhstan Transit
1241 Forthnet Greece Stub
224 UNINETT Norway Stub
Table 12.1: Summary of the 14 ASes probed with SAGE from the EdgeNet cluster in 2021.
12.2.2 Analyzing SAGE data with INSIGHT
In order to easily transform and analyse the data captured by SAGE from either the PlanetLab testbed
or the EdgeNet cluster, a custom Python library has been designed. The choice of Python as a
programming language is motivated not only because the language features many useful libraries
for plotting figures, but also by the possibility to take advantage of the NetworkX library [34]. The
NetworkX library is indeed a very useful tool to analyze graphs of all kinds, providing both a large
variety of metrics and tools for rendering a graph as a 2D PDF figure. Of course, the data that should
be fed to NetworkX graph building utilities must be first pre-processed, or at least managed so that
the final graphs account for all adjacencies observed directly in the SAGE data or inferred from it
(cf. Sec. 12.1. Moreover, additional details on subnets or discovered alias pairs/lists (i.e., discovered
during the final step of SAGE, see Sec. 10.4) should also be extracted from a snapshot to perform
additional verifications or transformations for consistency’s sake.
The INSIGHT library (Investigate Networks from Subnet Inference to GrapH Transformations)
combines all at once the NetworkX library, the plotting utilities of Python (such as pyplot) and
custom modules to parse and manage SAGE data so that SAGE snapshots can be quickly translated
then analyzed as bipartite graphs. Moreover, having INSIGHT as a side library ensures the way SAGE
maps a target network is completely decoupled from how the resulting the data is interpreted. Just
like SAGE itself, INSIGHT is open source: in fact, it is provided in the same GitHub repository due to
being inseparable from SAGE itself 5. The intricate implementation details of INSIGHT are out of the
scope of this document; however, guidelines for processing the raw data (i.e., as provided by SAGE)
and turning it into bipartite graphs are subsequently described in Sec. 12.3.1 and Sec. 12.4.1.
5https://github.com/JefGrailet/SAGE/tree/master/Python/INSIGHT
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12.3 A simple bipartite model: neighborhood (>) – subnet (⊥)
This section discusses in details the first bipartite model mentioned in Sec. 12.1, i.e., the neighborhood
(>) – subnet (⊥) bipartite formalism. Sec. 12.3.1 first provides a few guidelines for translating a
neighborhood-based DAG built by SAGE into this first bipartite model, while Sec. 12.3.2 presents
interesting observations made in the wild on various target networks.
12.3.1 Guidelines for building a simple bipartite graph
Building a neighborhood – subnet bipartite graph is not a hard task: the vertices of the original
neighborhood-based DAG are re-used "as is" as the set of > vertices, while the ⊥ vertices can be
easily computed by reading the subnet mappings while not creating duplicate vertices when a subnet
turns out to be mapped more than once to some edge in the initial DAG. Moreover, direct links (as
defined in Sec. 10.1.3) are immediate to account for in the bipartite graph: once the corresponding
vertices (two neighborhoods and one subnet) are identified, all it takes to account for the adjacency
of both neighborhoods and the intermediate subnet is to insert the corresponding edges. I.e., if the
neighborhood-based DAG announces N2 → N3 via 10.0.8.0/30, assuming both neighborhoods
keep the same labels (N2 and N3) while 10.0.8.0/30 is labeled as S2, then the edges N2 ↔ S2 and
N3 ↔ S2 can be simply added to the bipartite graph to account for this link 6.
Of course, other types of edges (as defined in Sec. 10.1.3) have to be handled with more care. Each
type of edge, other than direct links, will be subsequently denoted as a (translation) scenario. Three
such scenarios have to be addressed:
1. indirect links with a subnet mapping,
2. indirect links without a subnet mapping, also called incomplete links,
3. remote links.
Scenario 1 can be considered as a variant of the translation of a direct link. I.e., the same bipartite
edges will be created, but a third additional edge should be created to connect the subnet with the
neighborhood it borders, as long as this edge does not exist already 7. For example, if the initial
DAG provides the indirect link N2 → N3 via 10.0.8.0/28 (From N5), assuming all three neigh-
borhoods keep the same labels (N2, N3 and N5) while 10.0.8.0/28 is labeled as S2, then the indirect
link can be accounted for by inserting the three following edges: N2 ↔ S2, N3 ↔ S2 and N5 ↔ S2. Of
course, the edge N5 ↔ S2 has to be inserted only if it does not exist yet, unless the implementation
automatically ignores insertions of redundant edges.
Scenarios 2 and 3 can be handled in a similar manner. In particular, in scenario 2, the subnet
connecting the neighborhoods could not be found in the subnet-level data, either because the second
6The single direction found in SAGE data disappears, as network links are not directed.
7It is worth noting duplicate edges are not an issue with NetworkX [34], as it automatically ignores redundant edges.
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neighborhood is a best effort one (cf. Sec. 9.3.2), meaning it is not clearly identified by one or several
router interface(s), either because the connecting subnet was invisible to probes. Scenario 3 is a
generalization of this issue, because there are not one but several unknown subnets and at least one
unknown neighborhood. A simple way to account for both scenarios consists of using hypothetical
subnets, i.e., subnets that are not part of the data but should exist in the topology. In INSIGHT, such
subnets are labeled differently: while regular (real) subnet vertices are named Sx , subnets used for
incomplete links are named Ty and subnets accounting for remote links are named Uz . All three x, y ,
and z are unique integers, either in general either with respect to their own category of subnet (e.g.,
S1 and T1 can coexist because the prefix letter already distinguishes them).
For each edge (in the DAG) corresponding to either Scenario 2 or Scenario 3, an hypothetical
subnet can be created then linked to both neighborhoods connected by the edge. Not only these
hypothetical subnets account for the adjacencies found in the initial DAG, but labeling them so they
are clearly distinguished from regular subnets (like in INSIGHT) allows to include or omit them in
function of the subsequent operations. For instance, while computing the distribution of the subnet
degree (i.e., how many > vertices a subnet is connected to), hypothetical subnets should ideally be
omitted from the distribution to focus on inferred subnets, especially since hypothetical subnets
always have a degree of two if one such subnet is created for each instance of Scenarios 2 and 3.
It is important to note that, after fully processing the neighborhood-based DAG and before
computing any metrics from the bipartite graph, any subnet found in the SAGE snapshot that is
not mentioned among the subnet mappings from the DAG should also be added to the bipartite
graph. These subnets, which can be denoted as degree-1 subnets, are important to compute accurate
metrics for > vertices, i.e. neighborhoods, such as their final degree, i.e., how many subnets they
are connected to (which typically includes the subnets mapped to incident edges and the bordering
subnets). However, the bipartite graph without degree-1 subnets can be very convenient to create
visual renders: because degree-1 subnets add little information, a visual render only shows the
subnets that act as the links between neighborhoods. Moreover, by colouring subnets depending
on whether they are real or hypothetical, the one-hop adjacencies can be clearly differentiated from
multi-hop adjacencies while reviewing the render. Fig. 12.3 depicts the topology of AS13789 (a small
Transit AS) as a neighborhood – subnet bipartite graph, as rendered by INSIGHT using a snapshot
captured on March 14th, 2021 from the EdgeNet cluster. The hypothetical subnets accounting for
remote links are green in color while other hypothetical subnets are light red. Note that Fig. 12.3 only
shows the main connected component, other small components being visible in the full render 8.
12.3.2 Observations in the wild
A wide collection of snapshots of the ASes listed in Table 12.1 have been captured by SAGE from
both the PlanetLab testbed and the EdgeNet cluster in 2020 and from the EdgeNet cluster only
during Spring 2021. These snapshots have been subsequently processed into simple bipartite graphs
8https://github.com/JefGrailet/SAGE/blob/master/Python/INSIGHT/Results/AS13789/2021/03/14/
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Figure 12.3: A visual render of AS13789 as a simple bipartite graph (March 14th, 2021; EdgeNet).
(as described in Sec. 12.1) with INSIGHT, and their analysis led to several interesting observations.
Sec. 12.3.2.1 first discusses the degree distribution of both > and ⊥ vertices (i.e., neighborhoods
and subnets, respectively) and the local density of the former, and how both may be linked to the
role played by the modeled network in the Internet. Sec. 12.3.2.2 then comments on the structural
cycles discovered within the bipartite graphs and what they imply regarding the Internet. Sec. 12.3.2.3
subsequently compares both definitions of the neighborhood degree (cf. Sec. 12.1), i.e., in the initial
bipartite graphs and their >-projections, and explains how the distributions corroborates previous
claims in the field of topology discovery. Finally, Sec. 12.3.2.4 shortly comments some residual issues
observed in the graphs, and how they could be prevented or mitigated. Note that all results presented
in this section constitute a small part of the figures and metrics generated by INSIGHT, which can
be all browsed at the SAGE GitHub repository, along with visual renders of the graphs 9, which are
provided as additional information.
9https://github.com/JefGrailet/SAGE/tree/master/Python/INSIGHT/Results
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12.3.2.1 Degree distribution (> and ⊥) and local density (>)
One of the key advantages of the neighborhood – subnet bipartite formalism is its suitability to study
the subnet degree. In this context, the subnet degree is defined as the total number of neighborhoods,
i.e. hop-level nodes, a same subnet binds together in the topology. Typically, a /30 or /31 subnet
acting as a point-to-point link between two neighborhoods has a degree or 2, while a larger subnet
(e.g., /29) acting as a hub between four distinct neighborhoods has a degree of 4. Obviously, this
degree is strictly equivalent to the total number of edges to which a ⊥ vertex (therefore a subnet) is
connected in the bipartite graph. This property arises naturally from the bipartite conversion itself
(cf. Sec. 12.3.1), as a same subnet being mapped to multiple edges in a neighborhood-based DAG
ends up sharing an edge with each neighborhood it connects in the initial neighborhood-based DAG
built by SAGE. Analyzing both the neighborhood degree (in the bipartite graph) and the subnet degree
can shed light on the measured topology and its role in the Internet as a whole.




































(a) AS6453 (TATA Com.), September 20th, 2020









































































(c) AS286 (KPN B.V.), September 20th, 2020




































(d) AS1241 (Forthnet), September 12th, 2020
Figure 12.4: > and ⊥ degree distribution for various Autonomous Systems.
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Figure 12.4 provides cumulative density functions (CDFs) for both the neighborhood (>) degree
and the subnet (⊥) degree of bipartite graphs obtained from four snapshots of distinct Autonomous
Systems: AS6453 (TATA Communications; Tier-1), AS6939 (Hurricane Electric LLC; Transit), AS286
(KPN B.V.; Transit) and AS1241 (Forthnet; Stub). All four snapshots were captured in September
2020 from the EdgeNet cluster. While the provided figures relate to four specific snapshots, it should
be noted that the depicted distributions (and other topological features) are representative of the
snapshots captured over the same period for the same ASes: variations can be observed when
confronting distributions from Figure 12.4 with those obtained on other snapshots, but the orders of
magnitude and overall shapes remain comparable 10.
Within Figure 12.4, the CDFs of AS1241 (Fig. 12.4d) stand out. Indeed, the CDF for ⊥ vertices
(subnets) shows slightly more than 15% of the discovered subnets (3,052 in this snapshot) had a
degree of two or more, with a maximum of 14 (corresponding to an inferred /20 subnet). Meanwhile,
the CDF for > vertices (neighborhoods) suggests there were a few very high degree neighborhoods,
most neighborhoods (i.e., above 90%) having a degree smaller than or equal to 10. The CDFs for
AS6453 (Fig. 12.4a) and AS6939 (Fig. 12.4b) rather show their respective neighborhoods had higher
degrees overall, but smaller maxima. Likewise, their subnets had smaller maxima too, and the share
of subnets having a degree of two or more was noticeably smaller, though they hid dozens of such
subnets in practice due to the large number of discovered subnets featured in both snapshots (8,188
for AS6453 and 10,645 for AS6939). Such observations can be explained by the roles played by these
ASes: AS1241 is indeed operated by a Greek ISP, while AS6453 and AS6939 are respectively Tier-1 and
Transit, both being featured in the top 10 of CAIDA’s AS ranking [2]. As such, the latter ASes might rely
more often – on average – on point-to-point links, perhaps involved in traffic engineering schemes,
while large subnets might be used within AS1241 to connect the most important (meshes of) routers
with other parts of the network more easily 11.
Interestingly, AS6453 had smaller maxima than both AS6939 and AS1241 despite being a Tier-1
AS. However, the smallest maxima were found in AS286 (Fig. 12.4c), though its ⊥ distribution was
reminescent of the one observed for AS6453 (Fig. 12.4a) while its > CDF was comparable to that of
AS6939 (Fig. 12.4b). The lower maxima can be explained by the fact that much less subnets were
discovered in AS286 at the time: on September 20th, 2020, only 995 subnets were discovered and
covered roughly 7% of the IPv4 prefixes announced for this AS. Naturally, other snapshots from the
same period provide comparable numbers. Such a small picture of the target domain might account
for a backbone, the rest of the network being shielded from SAGE probes via filtering policies. It is
nevertheless interesting to see that, even in such a small snapshot, the distributions of both > and ⊥
vertices were comparable to those observed on much larger snapshots for Tier-1 and Transit ASes
and very different from those of a Stub AS such as AS1241.
To complete the distributions depicted in Figure 12.4, Figure 12.5 provides, for the same bipartite
10Given the evaluation provided in Sec. 11.2.2, this should not come as a surprise.
11This is actually visible in the associated visual render as red vertices with multiple edges towards blue ones, cf.
https://github.com/JefGrailet/SAGE/tree/master/Python/INSIGHT/Results/AS1241/2020/09/12/.
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(a) AS6453 (TATA Com.), September 20th, 2020











































(c) AS286 (KPN B.V.), September 20th, 2020





















(d) AS1241 (Forthnet), September 12th, 2020
Figure 12.5: Clustering coefficients of > vertices in function of their degree.
graphs built from the same snapshots, the clustering coefficients of the neighborhoods (Y axis) in
function of their degree (X axis). For reminders, the clustering coefficient is a classical graph metric
evaluating the probability that two vertices sharing a common neighbor vertex also shares a common
edge. It is typically used to assess the local density of vertices, i.e., the tendency of vertices to cluster
themselves together in a graph. In the case of Figure 12.5, the coefficients were computed with a
formula specifically designed by Latapy et al. in 2008 for bipartite graphs [77]. More precisely, the
min-clustering formula was used: this version of Latapy’s bipartite clustering coefficient was designed
for cases where the vertices whose coefficients are being computed tend to have higher degrees
than vertices from the other party. This is typically the case of > vertices in a neighborhood – subnet
bipartite graph, as already demonstrated by Figure 12.4.
Figure 12.5 notably highlights that the clustering coefficients can vary considerably for a same
neighborhood degree (bipartite definition). In particular, results for AS6453 (Fig. 12.5a) and AS6939
(Fig. 12.5b) took the appearance of point clouds. The same could be said for AS286 (Fig. 12.5c) and
AS1241 (Fig. 12.5d), though there are fewer neighborhoods to consider, resulting in less striking
figures. Another result is that high degree neighborhoods did not necessarily feature a high clustering
coefficient: for instance, in the case of AS286 (Fig. 12.5c), the coefficients of the highest degree
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neighborhoods were around or under 0.3. The same could be said about AS6453 (Fig. 12.5a), where
the highest degree neighborhood had a lower coefficient than many nodes whose degrees were
comprised between 10 and 100. Interestingly, however, the highest degree neighborhoods from the
bipartite graph generated for AS1241 (Fig. 12.5d) featured high clustering coefficients in respect of
the large majority of > vertices, reaching almost 0.5 for some. Such metrics suggests AS1241 consists
of a few very important (meshes of) routers with high local density 12, as already hinted by Fig. 12.4d.
Finally, clustering coefficients for AS6939 (Fig. 12.5b) suggest the highest degree > vertices also
tended to have a higher local density than most vertices, though they were comparatively lower with
respect to those of AS1241, in addition to being contrasted by a large number of neighborhoods
with small clustering coefficients. In comparison, the coefficients for AS6453 appeared to be more
uniformly distributed. This further reinforces the idea that the observed topology of AS6453 was the
most distributed of all, while AS1241 definitely standed out as a topology due to featuring a few very
high degree neighborhoods with high local density. Both observations could be linked to the role
assumed by each AS in the Internet.
12.3.2.2 Topological cycles
Simple bipartite graphs can also constitute tools to study topological cycles. In this context, a topo-
logical cycle simply refers to a graph cycle upon considering a graph mapping the topology of a target
network, and as such, should not be confused with cycles experienced during traceroute probing:
while the latter might be caused by the former, previous research demonstrated traceroute cycles
could also be experienced due to traffic engineering or MPLS tunnels [85]. What also makes bipar-
tite graphs interesting for this purpose is that they are non-directed: indeed, neighborhood-based
DAGs are directed by design to better reflect the traceroute data and do not feature cycles unless
traceroute problems induce them 13. Moreover, simple bipartite graphs not only are non-directed
but also provide new adjacencies by design (cf. Sec. 12.1). Therefore, they are well suited to highlight
topological cycles, even though such cycles take a specific shape: indeed, each cycle features an
even amount of vertices as well as an alternation of neighborhoods and subnets due to the bipartite
formalism. This section will also focus on base cycles, i.e., cycles that cannot be decomposed into
simpler cycles, notably because the NetworkX library [34] used by INSIGHT already provides all the
tools to extract those cycles from a given bipartite graph.
Before going any further, it should be noted that actual instances of cycles in bipartite graphs
could be observed and subsequently assessed with INSIGHT. In particular, the SAGE snapshot of
the Belgian ISP backbone discussed in Sec. 11.1 contained three topological cycles after bipartite
conversion. These cycles could be validated at the hop-level, i.e., the neighborhoods involved in the
cycles were correct and did feature the adjacencies enumerated by each cycle. However, the subnets
involved in these cycles were not entirely correct, as each involved one of the six subnets which
12This is made even more obvious by the visual render of the bipartite graph:
https://github.com/JefGrailet/SAGE/tree/master/Python/INSIGHT/Results/AS1241/2020/09/12/.
13Some were observed with complex topologies in the later development stages of SAGE, but this is uncommon.
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were attributed to the wrong neighborhood because of a BGP configuration error (cf. Sec. 11.1.2).
Nevertheless, the neighborhoods they connected still shared a common link in the groundtruth.
However, looking for cycles with the SAGE snapshot of the ULiège network (cf. Sec. 11.1) also
resulted in the detection of two topological cycles, which both involved the two neighborhoods which
corresponded to the undetected convergence point (cf. Sec. 11.1.2). As a consequence, topological
cycles detected by INSIGHT (with the help of NetworkX) should be handled with special care, because
they can result from measurement artifacts such as undetected convergence points, routing issues or
overgrown subnets. One way to detect potential artifacts consists of checking whether the subnets
involved in each cycle are large enough for their respective degree. E.g., a degree of 10 for a /29 subnet
is obviously not possible, because such a subnet can only host up to 8 interfaces and therefore connect
at most 8 devices (considering it uses the prefix and broadcast addresses too, despite subnetting
conventions [92]). Cycles featuring subnets with inconsistent degree can therefore be ruled as bogus
cycles, i.e., they might be the consequence of measurement artifacts. Conversely, cycles where each
subnet features a consistent degree can be deemed as sound cycles. For instance, the two cycles
found in the ULiège topology are deemed as bogus cycles by INSIGHT. It shoud also be noted that
the so-called bogus cycles may not necessarily be erroneous in reality: they can also be the result of
undergrown subnets, in which case said cycles might be true to the topology anyway.
Figure 12.6 shows the distributions of both sound and bogus cycles found in bipartite graphs
resulting from the same four snapshots as in Figure 12.4 and Figure 12.5. Each bar stacks the number
of bogus cycles on top of the number of sound cycles, and is annotated with the sum of the raw
numbers, i.e., X +Y means there were X sound cycles and Y bogus cycles. The cycles are also
quantified by their number of hops rather than their actual length in the bipartite graph: indeed, due
to the bipartite formalism, their actual length is always an even number due to the alternation of
neighborhoods and subnets. Dividing this actual length by two therefore gives how many hops are
needed to complete the cycles. Because a cycle is at least two hops long, no distribution advertises
topological cycles for x = 1. Two hops cycles are also a particular case, as they correspond to going
back and forth between two neighborhoods: as such, they can be considered to be back-up links.
Figure 12.6 provides two results. First, potential back-up links tend to be the most common
occurrence of topological cycles (regardless of being sound or bogus). Second, there can be a large
variety of cycles within the same topology regardless of the nature of the network. In particular,
the bipartite graph generated for AS1241 (Fig. 12.6d) includes numerous sound topological cycles,
the longest being eight hops long. The noticeable share of subnets featuring a large degree within
this specific topology (cf. Fig. 12.4d) partially explains why topological cycles appeared to be more
common than in other measured topologies, though AS6939 also appeared to feature many consistent
cycles but comparatively less than AS1241 (Fig. 12.6b). Conversely, the bipartite graph for AS6453
included several cycles deemed as bogus (Fig. 12.6a): due to the nature of this particular network, it
is likely many of these problematic cycles resulted from missing one or several convergence points,
though they could also have resulted from undergrown subnets.
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Figure 12.6: Topological cycles for various Autonomous Systems.
To better assess the frequency of back-up links, the topological cycles can be viewed at a larger
scale, i.e., across several snapshots. Figure 12.7 shows, as CDFs, the distribution of all sound cycles
found within two collections of snapshots captured by SAGE during the year 2020 (Fig. 12.7a) and
during Spring 2021, i.e., from March to May included (Fig. 12.7b). Both Fig. 12.7a and Fig. 12.7b shows
strikingly similar distributions: in both cases, slightly less than 60% of all sound cycles were back-up
links, while slightly less than 90% of the same cycles were 5 hops long or less. This suggests, at the
very least, that topological cycles did not result from capturing the snapshots from specific vantage
points nor from targetting specific networks: a large share of 2020 snapshots were still collected
from the PlanetLab testbed (mostly European nodes at the time), while all Spring 2021 snapshots
were captured from the EdgeNet cluster (most EdgeNet nodes being located in the USA at the time).
Moreover, the target ASes in 2021 differed from 2020 due to the addition of new target ASes but also a
few considerable changes in the advertised IPv4 prefixes 14.
There is however one major difference between Fig. 12.7a and Fig. 12.7b: the largest hop counts
14E.g., AS286 now features larger advertised prefixes; as a result, its 2021 snapshots are much larger than those of 2020.
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Figure 12.7: Distribution of structural cycles across large sets of snapshots.
drastically differ, with 2020’s longest observed cycle being 22 hops long (found in a snapshot of
AS3257) while 2021’s longest cycle is 45 hops long (found in a snapshot of AS286). However, this latter
cycle might be an artefact, as it was captured in its target AS only once, most topological cycles for
the same target AS being included between 2 and 9 hops. Interestingly, in both 2020’s CDF and 2021’s
CDF, the curve noticeably rises between 10 and 20 hops, suggesting long topological cycles are not
that rare. In fact, long topological cycles may hint at more complex network constructions, such as
load balancers, which may initially appear in SAGE data as diamonds [14]. A better characterization
of topological cycles is left for future work.
12.3.2.3 Neighborhood degree in bipartite graphs and in >-projections
Thanks to the mecanism of >-projection, a neighborhood – subnet bipartite graph can be used to
get a more accurate hop-level map of some target network by accounting for the new adjacencies
revealed by the bipartite conversion itself (cf. Sec. 12.1). Comparing the neighborhood degrees in both
types of graphs can be a way to reconcile old and new observations made on the router-level of the
Internet (cf. Sec. 8.3.1): for reminders, an old but popular claim on the router-level states the router
degree (i.e., how many routers a given router is adjacent to in the topology) naturally follows a power
law shape [40]. However, this claim has been challenged multiple times [26, 28, 76, 78, 89], and IGMP
probing (cf. Sec. 8.2) could be used to explain why power laws tend to appear: inference of Layer-2
equipment with mrinfo [90] was used to demonstrate the router degree might be overestimated
because of the effects of Layer-2 devices (e.g., Ethernet switches).
Because a neighborhood abstracts one node at the hop-level, it can consist of either a single
router or a full mesh with or without Layer-2 equipment. Moreover, neighborhoods are a tool for
alias resolution (cf. Chapter 3), which means they can be used "as is", like in this section, or can
be combined with alias resolution to study the router-level more precisely, as will be discussed in
Sec. 12.4. If we stick to previous observations, the distribution of the neighborhood degree in the
Internet should follow a power law, but such a property would not be mutually exclusive with a
thorough study of the router-level that corroborates more recent research.
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Figure 12.8: Distribution of the neighborhood degree in bipartite graphs and their >-projections.
Figure 12.8 plots the distribution of both definitions for the neighborhood degree, i.e., in bipartite
graphs and their >-projections (as performed by the NetworkX library [34]), respectively. To better
view the power law property, both axes are in logarithmic scale, and the distribution is plotted as
a complementary cumulative distribution function (or CCDF). Much like Figure 12.6, Figure 12.8
accounts for large collections of snapshots to be more representative of the Internet as a whole, with
Fig. 12.8a being based on 2020’s snapshots and Fig. 12.8b resulting from Spring 2021’s snapshots.
In both Fig. 12.8a and Fig. 12.8b, the neighborhood degree in bipartite graphs follows almost
exactly a power law until a degree of 103, while the neighborhood degree in >-projections follows
closely the former distribution until shortly before a degree of 102. In both cases, upon diverging from
the power law shape, the curves already account for more than 99% of the discovered neighborhoods.
Such observations corrobate aforementioned claims on the Internet [40, 90] and further reinforce
the idea that neighborhoods can be a credible tool for topology discovery, especially given that the
datasets used to compute the distributions are quite different (as already argued in Sec. 12.3.2.2). Of
course, Figure 12.8 also shows that the neighborhood inference as performed by SAGE (cf. Chapter 10)
is still prone to produce artifacts: in both 2020 and 2021, some snapshots resulted in bipartite graphs
where one neighborhood featured a degree higher than 10,000, which seems unrealistic. An in-depth
look at the data led to the conclusion that such a neighborhood was a measurement artifact, being
observed only once on the associated target AS across all snapshots. Various phenomena can explain
such an outlier: large numbers of undergrown subnets, unusually large alias resolution scenarios that
were processed in a too tolerant way 15 or inaccurate traceroute probing. Nevertheless, in the vast
majority of the measurements, neighborhoods appear to provide a credible picture of the hop-level.
12.3.2.4 Residual issues
While this section has presented many interesting results, measurement artifacts or incoherent
observations have been mentioned multiple times, and show that, while SAGE is a quite accurate
15I.e., accepting alias pairs/lists during neighborhood inference with methods other than Ally-like/iffinder-like.
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tool (as discussed in Chapter 11), more accurate subnet inference or convergence point detection
would be needed to refine the observations made with the help of INSIGHT. In particular, overgrown
subnets can be a problem to accurately infer the edges of a simple bipartite graph: overgrown subnets
tend to replace multiple links at once, leading to unusually large subnet degrees. A large number of
snapshots of AS224 captured during 2020 16 are very good examples: in multiple snapshots, one large
/21 subnet appears to have a large subnet degree, as if it was a key hub in the topology. However, a
deeper look in the data shows the associated inferred subnet features very few interfaces, but many
router interfaces detected via traceroute probing during various stages of SAGE fall into the address
range of this subnet. The problem is actually quite simple: many interfaces in the address range do
not reply to ICMP echo-request probes typically used during subnet inference (cf. Chapter 6), but
do reply to traceroute probes when the TTL value expires. As a consequence, the /21 subnet can be
ruled as a measurement artifact that might actually cover many smaller subnets (e.g., /30 subnets
acting as point-to-point links). One way to fix this would consist in modifying the WISE methodology
so that it also considers router interfaces exclusively observed via traceroute probing that are part
of the initial target IPv4 prefixes.
Adjusting the target IPv4 prefixes provided to SAGE at start may be another way to improve the
snapshots, and in particular, to reduce the amount of remote links (cf. Sec. 10.1.3). Indeed, the
intermediate paths due to which SAGE resorts to remote links can sometimes include legitimate
router interfaces that were just not included in the initial target prefixes, therefore not included in any
inferred subnet/neighborhood. Including additional prefixes and re-running a measurement could
"fill in the blanks", resulting in more complete snapshots. Interestingly, remote links are not uniformly
distributed in DAGs and tend to be clustered around the same neighborhoods. In particular, in visual
renders of bipartite graphs produced by INSIGHT, they typically appear as small cluster of green
vertices 17. Such observations may hint that sections of a network may be hidden, may be isolated
and accessed through intermediate ASes or may consist of various sorts of tunnels.
Finally, accurate convergence point inference is another critical point. As discussed in Sec. 12.3.2.2,
missing convergence points may exaggerate the number of topological cycles (as notably shown by
Fig. 12.6a). Since previous or contemporary research provided algorithmical approachs for enumerat-
ing load balanced paths [14, 65, 122], SAGE may include some of these approachs to improve its peer
discovery and subsequent peer aggregation steps which result in convergence point detection (cf.
Chapter 10). Obviously, the accuracy of alias resolution is critical too: as mentioned in Sec. 12.3.2.3,
running SAGE with a tolerant alias resolution (i.e., tolerating alias pairs/lists not produced by the
Ally-like/iffinder-like methods) may result in unnecessarily large convergence points clustering
too many components of the network at the same node in the graph. More generally, an accurate and
exhaustive alias resolution scheme is capital for correctly inferring routers, which are critical for the
tripartite model discussed in the next section.
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formalism itself. On the contrary, the neighborhood – subnet model shows promising results for
accurately assessing the importance of the subnet-level and more generally the network links it
corresponds to. Moreover, the hop-level modeled by the neighborhoods and their adjacencies act as
a first approximation of the router-level and may be used to study the internal routing of a target
network without requiring exhaustive router-level discovery. The next section will nevertheless
introduces one additional model designed to more accurately account for the router-level and to
evaluate the likelihood of Layer-2 equipment being used.
12.4 A tripartite model: Layer-2 – Layer-3 – subnet
This section reviews the tripartite model first described in Sec. 12.1, i.e., the Layer-2 – Layer-3 – subnet
tripartite formalism. First, Sec. 12.4.1 reviews how a SAGE snapshot can be turned into such a graph,
and second, Sec. 12.4.2 discusses the router degree, how it compares with the neighborhood degree
(bipartite definition) and how it can hint the presence of Layer-2 equipment.
12.4.1 Guidelines for building a tripartite graph
While the construction of a neighborhood – subnet simple bipartite graph is almost immediate (cf.
Sec. 12.3.1), building a tripartite graph requires more care: indeed, in the final graph, only the subnets
will remain unmodified with respect to the initial snapshot, while each neighborhood will be replaced
by either one router, either several routers connected with (hypothetical) Layer-2 devices. Moreover,
the routers resulting from this transformation needs to be connected with the right bordering subnets,
based on the IP interfaces being part of their respective alias pair/list: e.g., given an alias list {A,B ,C },
the associated router will be connected to a subnet Sa if Sa encompasses A. The combination of the
underlying (inferred) routers and their associated subnets will be subsequently denoted as a post-
neighborhood. In fact, INSIGHT builds tripartite graphs by first converting the initial DAG vertices
into post-neighborhoods, using the alias resolution data collected during the final step of SAGE (cf.
Sec. 10.4), then by reading the neighborhood-based DAG to account for the edges that connect the
initial neighborhoods together.
Hopefully, post-processing neighborhoods can be a trivial operation. If the final alias resolution
step resulted in discovering exactly one alias pair/list for a given neighborhood, it can be modeled
by a single router connected to all neighboring subnets due to having no hint for additional routers.
Occasionally, there can be no alias pair/list at all: this notably occurs with best effort neighborhoods
whose surrounding subnets feature no contra-pivot interface to consider for an alias resolution
scenario (cf. Sec. 3.1.1). In this case, the neighborhood is modeled by a single hypothetical router
as a best effort strategy. Like hypothetical subnets, hypothetical routers account for devices which
should theoretically exist but which could not be detected during a measurement with SAGE.
When multiple alias pairs/lists are associated to a same neighborhood, multiple routers have to
be created. For each alias pair/list, a new router can be created then associated with any neighboring
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subnet that encompasses one of its IP interfaces. Indeed, because alias pairs/lists typically include
the contra-pivot interfaces of the neighboring subnets, the IPv4 ranges covered by each subnet can
be relied on to identify which one the router provides access to. Of course, this is only possible if
a subnet features one or several contra-pivot interfaces. This is why all neighboring subnets that
cannot be mapped to any known alias pair/list (therefore any inferred router) should be mapped to
one or several hypothetical router(s), again as a best effort strategy to ensure each subnet is eventually
mapped to a router in the final graph. In the case of INSIGHT, a single hypothetical router is created




{10.0.0.2, 10.0.2.1, 10.0.2.129} Hypothetical
Neighborhood identified by 10.0.0.2
R1 R2 I1
Figure 12.9: A toy example of post-neighborhood.
Figure 12.9 depicts a toy example of post-neighborhood. In the figure, the initial neighborhood
is identified by 10.0.0.2 and bordered by six different subnets. Two alias lists are discovered on it,
with the second including the router interface 10.0.0.2 itself. The first alias list is mapped to the
three first subnets (all prefixed with 10.0.1) while the second alias list is mapped to both subnets
whose prefix address starts with 10.0.2. Finally, because 10.0.3.192/26 does not encompass any
aliased interface (because it does not feature any contra-pivot interface), said subnet is mapped to
an hypothetical router I1 (I for Imaginary) since it cannot be mapped to neither R1 or R2. While
not shown in Figure 12.9, an hypothetical Layer-2 vertex will be eventually included in the final
tripartite graph to glue R1, R2 and I1 together to keep track of the fact they correspond to the same
neighborhood/hop-level node in the topology.
Once all neighborhoods have been processed into post-neighborhoods, the tripartite graph can
be finalized by integrating the adjacencies accounted for by the initial neighborhood-based DAG as
additional router – subnet edges. The process can actually be very similar to the one used to build
neighborhood – subnet bipartite graphs (cf. Sec. 12.3.1), and in particular, hypothetical subnets
will also be used to model remote links and edges without a mapping. However, to do so, there
is one specific requirement: establishing an entry router for each neighborhood. An entry router
corresponds to the router whose alias pair/list includes the router interfaces that first identified the
parent neighborhood: for instance, in Figure 12.9, R2 would be the entry router. When a neighborhood
is post-processed into a single router, it also becomes its entry router. In the case of a best effort
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neighborhood, i.e. which is not identified by observed router interface(s), the entry router is either
an hypothetical router, either the first router listed for the associated post-neighborhood.
An entry router not only accounts for the router interfaces identifying the initial neighborhood,
but also acts as a default solution when no router can be clearly identified to add a router – subnet
edge corresponding to a neighborhood adjacency. Since it accounts for the IP-level by including
router interfaces discovered by traceroute probing (if any are visible), the entry router is used to
connect the post-neighborhood to any hypothetical subnet. Doing so, any adjacency found in the
initial neighborhood-based DAG can be present in the final tripartite graph as well.
In practice, because all subnets are already connected to a router vertex as a result of generating
post-neighborhoods, each type of edge in SAGE data (cf. Sec. 10.1.3) can be processed as follows.
• In the case of a direct link, an additional router – subnet edge can be added to the graph to
connect the subnet associated to the link with the entry router of the second neighborhood.
E.g., given a direct link N2 → N3 via v.w.x.y/z, an edge connecting v.w.x.y/z to the entry
router of N3 is inserted.
• For an indirect link mapped to a subnet, two router – subnet edges will be inserted, each one
connecting the subnet with the respective entry router of each neighborhood. Contrary to
simple bipartite conversion (cf. Sec. 12.3.1), there is no need to create a third edge since the edge
between the subnet and a router of the neighborhood it borders already exists. E.g., given an
indirect link N2 → N3 via v.w.x.y/z (from N7), two router – subnet edges are inserted:
one between v.w.x.y/z and the entry router of N3 and a second one between v.w.x.y/z and
the entry router of N2.
• The process is identical for an indirect link without a mapping, except that a new hypothetical
subnet is created to replaced the missing subnet.
• The same goes for a remote link, except that the hypothetical subnet should be labelled so
that it can be clearly distinguished from hypothetical subnets modeling one-hop adjacencies,
just like with the simple bipartite formalism (cf. Sec. 12.3.1).
Once the adjacencies found in neighborhood-based DAG have all been inserted, following the
aforementioned guidelines, the Layer-2 – Layer-3 – subnet tripartite graph is complete. If a visual
render of it is required, however, all degree-1 components should be removed from the graph to
begin with. Indeed, all subnets are accounted for during the post-neighborhood creation, but degree-
1 subnets are useless in a visual render and can only make it unnecessarily difficult to read. For
readability’s sake, hypothetical Layer-2 components and hypothetical routers should also be colored
differently: in INSIGHT, the former are colored in yellow and the latter in light blue.
Figure 12.10 provides a visual render of a tripartite graph based on a snapshot of AS13789,
collected on April 10th, 2021 from the EdgeNet cluster. In this render, red nodes represent subnets,
blue nodes account for routers and yellow nodes model (hypothetical) Layer-2 devices, with green
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Figure 12.10: A visual render of AS13789 as a tripartite graph (April 10th, 2021; EdgeNet).
nodes representing multi-hop adjacencies. Naturally, Figure 12.10 only depicts the main connected
components: a few small connected components are omitted, but can be viewed in the full render 18.
Note the visual similarities with Figure 12.3, but also the differences induced by the addition of
the Layer-2/Layer-3 components, such as the small aggregates of routers connected with a same
hypothetical Layer-2 component (aggregates of blue vertices with a single yellow vertex). Whether
these aggregates hint actual Layer-2 components is discussed in the next section.
12.4.2 Router degree in the wild
As already discussed in Sec. 8.3.1, the router degree, i.e., how many routers a given router is adjacent
to, has been studied and commented multiple times in the literature. In particular, many studies
discussed the distribution of this degree in the Internet: early studies compared it to a power law [40],
but ulterior research suggested the router degree may be overestimated because of other network
components (Layer-2 equipment, in particular) [90]. However, as discussed in Sec. 12.3.2.3, the
neighborhood degree does follow a power law shape while neighborhoods themselves can consist of
either a single router or a mesh. As a consequence, the degree of the actual router(s) found within
a neighborhood should always be equal or inferior to the degree of this neighborhood, and the
distributions of both types of degree might hint the presence of Layer-2 equipment.
18Link provided after the next GitHub repository update.
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However, defining precisely the router degree in the context of a tripartite graph requires some
nuance. While each neighborhood consisting of multiple routers will be translated in the graph as a
virtual Layer-2 device connecting these routers by design, the existence of this device in practice is
not necessarily likely. It is indeed possible, in some circumstances, that routers are directly connected
together at the datalink layer without intermediate Layer-2 equipment. Moreover, because the total
number of routers will be greater or equal to the total number of neighborhoods, a distribution of
the router degree versus a distribution of the neighborhood degree may not reflect accurately the
difference between both kinds of degree.
This is why this section will subsequently use four different definitions of the router degree. Let
us first define the base router degree as the total number of adjacent routers a router can reach
through its adjacent subnets in the tripartite graph. E.g., if a router has three adjacent subnets with
degrees 2, 2, and 3 (as defined in Sec. 12.3.2.1), its base degree will be equal to 4 because four routers
are adjacent via the three adjacent subnets 19. With this base degree in mind, four different router
degrees can be defined as follows.
• Experienced degree (router-exp): denotes the degree of the encompassing neighborhood.
It is equal to the sum of the base degrees of all routers it encompasses, or to put it another
way, to the sum of the base degrees of all routers connected through the same virtual Layer-2
device in the tripartite graph. By definition, the experienced degree of all routers of a same
neighborhood is identical.
• Minimal degree (router-min): denotes the router degree if all virtual Layer-2 devices in the
tripartite graph are considered as plausible. It is therefore equal to the base degree incremented
once (to account for the additional connection to the Layer-2 equipment) if the encompassing
neighborhood consists of multiple routers, and to the base degree if the neighborhood consists
of only one router.
• Maximal degree (router-max): denotes the router degree if all virtual Layer-2 devices in the
tripartite graph are considered as implausible. I.e., all meshes are implemented by connecting
each router to every other router in the neighborhood without intermediate equipment. It is
therefore equal to the base degree plus the total number of routers found in the encompassing
neighborhood minus one (to not account for the router itself).
• Conditional degree (router-mix): denotes the router degree if all virtual Layer-2 devices
in the tripartite graph are considered as plausible above a certain number of routers per
neighborhood, and implausible otherwise. Given a threshold, it is therefore equivalent to the
minimal degree if the total number of routers in the encompassing neighborhood is greater
than the threshold, and equivalent to the maximal degree otherwise.
19For simplicity’s sake, potential back-up links will be considered negligible at the scale of a snapshot.
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With these four definitions, the degree of each inferred router can be evaluated depending on its
encompassing neighborhood and on the hypothetical presence of Layer-2 equipment. It should be
noted, too, that the four distinct degrees should fulfill the inequality router-min ≤ router-mix
≤ router-max ≤ router-exp: at worst, if the neighborhood consists of a single router, all degrees
will be strictly equal. Otherwise, the minimal degree should be inferior to the maximal degree,
the conditional degree being equal to one of both depending on the total amount of routers in a
same neighborhood and on the selected threshold. Finally, at worst, the maximal degree should be
equal to the experienced degree: since the degree is incremented for each additional router in the
neighborhood, the maximal degree is equal to the experienced degree if and only if all routers in the
neighborhood have a base degree of 1.
As a toy example, let us review the degrees of Figure 12.9. Assuming each subnet has a degree of
2, the base degrees should be: 3 for R1, 2 for R2 and 1 for I1. Their (respective) experienced degree
should therefore be equal to 6. The minimal degrees are simply the base degrees but incremented
once, therefore: 4 for R1, 3 for R2, and 2 for I1. The maximal degree is obtained by summing 2 (total
of routers in the neighborhood minus one) to the base degrees, resulting in: 5 for R1, 4 for R2, and
3 for I1. Finally, the conditional degrees will be equal to the respective maximal degrees unless the
threshold for considering Layer-2 equipment plausible is equal to 2, in which case the conditional
degrees are equal to the minimal degrees.
Figure 12.11 provides the distribution of all four different degrees based on the tripartite graphs
generated from snapshots of four distinct networks: AS3257 (GTT Communications; Tier-1), AS6461
(Zayo Group; Tier-1), AS1273 (Vodafone; Transit) and AS224 (UNINETT; Stub). All snapshots were
captured from the EdgeNet cluster in May 2021. Just like for figures discussed in Sec. 12.3.2, the
distributions depicted in Figure 12.11 are representative and do not constitute outliers among
snapshots captured for the same target networks, though they are some variations depending on
the snapshot. Note also that the threshold used for the conditional degree is 8 inferred routers in
Figure 12.11; i.e., Layer-2 equipment is considered plausible starting from 9 inferred routers. Finally,
just like with Sec. 12.3.2, many more comparable figures (including for other Autonomous Systems)
can be browsed online at the SAGE public GitHub repository 20.
Figure 12.11 shows, overall, that the experienced degree is always significantly higher than other
definitions of the router degree. Without a surprise, the distribution of the minimal degree was always
the lowest, as in all figures, 99% of the inferred routers had a minimal degree below 100. At the same
time, it was not uncommon for the experienced degree of the same proportion of inferred routers to
reach maxima of several hundreds: only the distribution for AS224 (Fig. 12.11d) went only slightly
above one hundred. Interestingly, the conditional degree influenced mostly small degree routers, as
it tended to equate the minimal degree for higher degrees. The maximal degree, on the other hand,
could shift the degree close to the experienced degree, but this really depended on the measured
target AS. In fact, AS3257 (Fig. 12.11a) and AS1273 (Fig. 12.11c) provided comparable distributions for
20Cf. https://github.com/JefGrailet/SAGE/tree/master/Python/INSIGHT/Results/.
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Figure 12.11: Router degree distribution for various Autonomous Systems.
the maximal and experienced degrees. Similar observations could be drawn for AS6461 (Fig. 12.11b)
and AS224 (Fig. 12.11d), though the former provided higher maxima, which should not be too
surprising considering its Tier-1 nature. These differences must however be nuanced with the results
of the alias resolution itself, which struggled with some difficult scenarios.
Metrics AS3257 AS6461 AS1273 AS224
#neighborhoods 5,194 3,410 1,384 622
#inferred routers 11,038 5,783 3,159 1,178
#hypothetical routers 1,048 (9.5%) 816 (14.1%) 275 (8.7%) 181 (15.4%)
#single routers 4,093 (78.8%) 2,462 (72.2%) 1,069 (77.2%) 387 (62.2%)
#single alias pair/list 1,875 (36.1%) 11,89 (34.9%) 574 (41.5%) 216 (34.7%)
Max #routers per neighborhood 445 105 639 34
Corresponding router-exp 461 114 1,289 18
Average (multiple routers) 6.3 3.5 6.63 3.37
Table 12.2: Additional metrics for the snapshots of Figure 12.11.
Table 12.2 provides various metrics about the routers inferred for all snapshots mentioned in
Figure 12.11. In particular, the first part of the table compares the total number of neighborhoods
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and inferred routers, with additional metrics quantifiying the number of hypothetical routers (cf.
Sec. 12.4.1), the number of neighborhoods eventually replaced by a single router, and finally the
number of neighborhoods whose single router corresponds to an actual alias pair/list. This last
metric is provided notably because numerous best effort neighborhoods (regardless of the snapshot)
results in a single or no IP interface to alias, both cases being replaced by a single router following
the conventions of the tripartite conversion in INSIGHT (Cf. Sec. 12.4.1). The second part provides
the largest aggregates of routers (i.e. maximum number of routers replacing a same neighborhood),
the corresponding experienced degree and the average number of routers per neighborhood (not
counting the neighborhoods replaced by single routers).
Table 12.2 shows that, in all snapshots, a majority of neighborhoods were eventually replaced
by a single router in the tripartite graph, around half of them resulting from alias resolution results
rather than a lack of identified alias candidates. However, the metrics in the second part of Table 12.2
suggests that some neighborhoods were replaced by a surprisingly large number of inferred routers.
Interestingly, the neighborhoods these extreme values correspond to are not the highest degree
neighborhoods in the selected snapshots, but rather cases where the method picked by the alias
resolution framework first developed in Chapter 2 was not suitable. In all cases, the problem is related
to IP-ID-based alias resolution. For reminders, this type of alias resolution consists of collecting
sequences of IP identifier values (the IP identifier being a field in the IP header [102]) on each
IP interface to alias and to compare them: if the sequences can be interleaved so that they are
consistently increasing, or if their behaviours (e.g., speed, monotonicity) can be compared soundly,
then the associated interfaces can be considered as belonging to the same devices. Indeed, a same
router typically uses the same IP ID counter for all its interfaces. Several tools are based on this
approach [16, 73, 113] (see also Sec. 1.3).
In the case of AS3257 and AS1273, the largest aggregates of inferred routers result from a large
number of alias candidates being fingerprinted as compatible with the Ally-like method, but resolv-
ing simulatenously so many candidates proved to be too ambitious for the framework (first described
in Chapter 2) as configured by default in SAGE. Using other alias resolution parameters and/or post-
processing the alias resolution data provided by each snapshot can however lead to the discovery of
several aliases, though the best approach to tackle these scenarios would be to create an improved
data collection mechanism which is suitable for both small- and medium-sized alias resolution
scenario (for reminders, the framework used by SAGE is tailored for small scenarios). Interestingly,
there were several profiles of fingerprints observed in the initial neighborhoods replaced by these
aggregates, hinting that were would have been several routers anyway – something which should not
be too surprising considering the associated experienced degree.
However, the largest aggregates of routers for both AS6461 and AS224, also encompassing router
interfaces deemed as compatible with the Ally-like method, are likely the consequence of the alias
resolution method itself being not suitable. In the case of AS6461, the interfaces involved in the largest
aggregate all appear to have their own IP ID counter, which may suggest they are separate routers,
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or more simply, that the parent router simply implements a separate counter for each interface.
The latter scenario actually holds true for some new routers of the ULiège network which were
installed during the course of 2021 and which implement a different IP ID counter per interface,
therefore impairing the Ally-like method provided by the framework from Chapter 2. When it comes
to AS224, the problem is similar but results from a different issue: IP ID values emitted by the alias
candidates appeared to be constant for a short period of time, and therefore could not be interpreted
as increasing sequences. In both cases, the Ally-like method cannot be used "as is": an updated
characterization of the IP ID behaviour, alternatives or additional probing would be needed to
achieve sound discovery of alias pairs/lists in today’s Internet.
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Figure 12.12: Local density (clustering) of routers in function of their degree (router-min).
Hopefully, even considering large aggregates resulting from difficult alias resolution scenarios,
the average number of inferred routers within neighborhoods turned into multiple routers remain
reasonably small but high enough to suggest the presence of Layer-2 equipment within the largest
neighborhoods, even though the distributions for AS3257 (Fig. 12.11a) and AS1273 (Fig. 12.11c) are
skewed because of some aggregates of inferred routers increasing considerably the total number
of inferred routers. In particular, the distributions of the minimal and maximal degree for AS6461
(Fig. 12.11b) shows clearly Layer-2 equipment would be advantageous for a small ratio of neighbor-
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hoods. Finally, it should be noted that the inability to use classical alias resolution methods in some
cases led to the inference of a few very large alias lists on the basis of fingerprints alone: this is why
the distributions in Fig. 12.11a are meeting by the bottom of the figure. Overall, these observations
show the tripartite model is suitable for studying the router-level while considering the potential
presence of Layer-2 equipment within a target network, though a more up-to-date and accurate alias
resolution framework is needed to build and study such graphs thoroughly.
Finally, to complement the previous degree distributions, Figure 12.12 shows the clustering
coefficients of the inferred routers found in the tripartite graphs generated for the same snapshots
as before. Due to the construction of the tripartite graphs in INSIGHT (cf. 12.12), these coefficients
are based by design on the minimal router degree, and naturally also includes the splitting of some
large neighborhoods in many (small degree) inferred routers because of alias resolution issues.
Nevertheless, the point clouds depicted by Figure 12.12 suggest, just like Figure 12.5, that the local
density of the inferred routers was just as varied as the local density of their initial neighborhoods.
In fact, it tended to be slightly higher, though this might be influenced by the existence of the
hypothetical Layer-2 vertices used to build the tripartite graphs. Again, the local density of higher
degree vertices did not seem to be synonymous of a high clustering coefficient: in fact, with the
exception of AS1273 (Fig. 12.12c), there seemed to be considerably more inferred routers having
a higher clustering coefficient than the highest degree vertex than in Figure 12.5, and this seemed
especially true for both Tier-1 ASes, i.e. AS3257 (Fig. 12.12a) and AS6461 (Fig. 12.12b). Though this
observation should be taken cautiously, this suggests that both these networks featured a more
distributed topology, which may be correlated with their classification as Tier-1 ASes. A deepened
analysis of the degree and the local density of routers in tripartite graphs is left for future work, along
with an updated alias resolution framework solving the aforementioned issues 21.
12.5 Closing comments on network graph inference and modeling
This third and final part of this thesis provides three significant contributions.
1. A novel approach to take advantage of traceroute data was discussed and evaluated in Chap-
ter 9, therefore answering research question 1 (from Sec. 8.4), which was about re-evaluating
how traceroute paths should be interpreted for topology mapping. This novel approach takes
advantage of existing subnet-level data to discover nodes at the hop-level, also called neigh-
borhoods, and relies on the final hops of a traceroute path to locate such neighborhoods
with respects to each other. Doing so, traceroute probing can be minimized and it becomes
possible to build new maps of the Internet without suffering from typical traceroute issues
which impair tools such as TreeNET [51, 55].
21For reminders, the framework used in SAGE (cf. Chapter 2) was first implemented in TreeNET around 2016-2017 [51].
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2. To address research question 2, which consisted of designing a systematic topology mapping
technique based on the (previously mentioned) new interpretation of traceroute paths, a
new topology discovery tool called SAGE [54] has been introduced and thoroughly described
in Chapter 10. Re-using the WISE methodology [52, 53], SAGE collects subnet-level data then
builds a mapping of the network in the form of a neighborhood-based directed acyclic graph
(DAG). As such, it provides a systematic network mapping scheme based on the concepts first
elaborated in Chapter 9, while also addressing several challenges, such as the detection of
convergence points (cf. Sec. 10.1.1). The detailed algorithms have been discussed to show most
algorithmic steps of SAGE (besides those inherited from WISE) could be performed in quasi-
linear time. Measurements with SAGE on groundtruth networks and in the wild could also be
analyzed to answer research question 3, on determining whether SAGE could capture accurate
pictures of networks regardless of the vantage point, in Chapter 11. Doing so, it has been
demonstrated that SAGE offers very accurate link discovery and is also capable of capturing
comparable snapshots of a same target network regardless of the vantage point.
3. Finally, an answer to research question 4, on assessing the potential of bipartite formalisms for
studying the Internet, was provided in this very chapter: two different modeling formalisms
have been described in Sec. 12.1 to transform then analyze the data first captured by SAGE.
A large collection of snapshots collected from both the PlanetLab testbed (early 2020) and
the EdgeNet cluster (second half of 2020 and 2021) were transformed via a custom Python
library, INSIGHT, to study topological properties of the measured networks. In particular, the
neighborhood – subnet bipartite model turned out to be very promising: not only it is very
easy to obtain from SAGE data, but it also allows to study the roles played by subnets in today’s
Internet, notably by assessing their degree (cf. Sec. 12.3.2.1) and finding and analyzing the
topological cycles in bipartite graphs in which they appear (Sec. 12.3.2.2). Finally, an analysis
of the neighborhood degree in the wild showed SAGE observations are consistent with previous
claims regarding the structure of the Internet (Sec. 12.3.2.3).
Contribution 3 also encompasses some early observations involving the tripartite Layer-2 – Layer-
3 – subnet model. More true to the actual components of the Internet than the neighborhood –
subnet formalism, such a model could be re-used in the future to study the router-level accurately
while assessing the potential presence of Layer-2 equipment. The current state of the research with
this model is however partially impaired by alias resolution issues, in addition to the few problems
already influencing simple bipartite graphs (cf. Sec. 12.3.2.4).
Overall, the work developed in this part of the thesis opens several new doors regarding net-
work graph inference and modeling. It notably connects the discovery of the subnet-level to the
discovery of the hop-level and the router-level, which constitutes a novel approach to topology dis-
covery 22, and also provides new applications of bipartite graphs for Internet topology modeling. For
22It could be argued, though, that TreeNET [51, 55] already did that, but this thesis significantly expands its ideas.
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reminders, a bipartite model for the Internet has already been proposed in the past [114] but relied
on data collected with IGMP probing [33], a topology discovery scheme which is now outdated (cf.
Sec. 8.2). Since SAGE relies on much more common probing techniques (i.e., mostly ICMP [101] and
traceroute [119] probing), its underlying ideas could be easily reused by the research community
to study intra-domain topologies and how they use routers, subnets and Layer-2 equipment.
Naturally, there are numerous ways to improve SAGE and related research. For instance, the
detection of convergence points could be improved, as graphs built by SAGE occasionally shows
signs of missed convergence points (cf. Sec. 11.1.2 and Sec. 12.3.2.2). As already argued in Sec. 12.4.2,
the alias resolution scheme needs an update to take account of new challenges but also to scale
better with medium-sized alias resolution scenarios (i.e., several hundreds of IP interfaces to resolve).
Finally, while this thesis only involved comparison of several definitions of the router degree to infer
the presence of Layer-2 components, other topological properties observed in the graphs could be




he Internet is a vast and complex network of computers that makes possible the transmission
of large amounts of data over the entire globe in a matter of (milli)seconds. Such a technolog-
ical achievement was made possible not only by the packet switch paradigm [15, 63, 75], but
also thanks to the open network paradigm elaborated by Kahn in 1972 [69], which led to the creation
of the first versions of the IP [102] and TCP [103] protocols in 1974 [25]. Thanks to the design of these
protocols, new computers can join the Internet and send or receive packets without any preliminary
knowledge of its architecture. Such a design also ensures that the Internet cannot be controlled in its
entirety by a central authority.
However, this design also implies that the complete and exact architecture of the Internet remains
elusive. At the highest level, the Internet works as a large number of Automonous Systems (ASes)
which are, in practice, individual networks each operated by the same organization or company,
sometimes over a specific region of the globe. Typically, each major national ISP possesses its own AS
(e.g., Proximus, a major Belgian ISP, operates AS5432). Each AS is nevertheless capable of forwarding
packets to any part of the globe by sending them to one of its (direct) neighbor ASes, each AS
advertising the routes its provides to its neighbors with the help of the BGP protocol [79].
As a consequence, while a network operator may know all the technical and architectural details
of its own network, the same operator may have no idea of what the architecture of the neighbor
ASes consists of, even though client/provider relationships between ASes may hint at what type of
architecture might be used. While this is certainly an advantage in terms of security and flexibility,
this has led to some major issues with the Internet in the past: for instance, in June 2015, a Malaysian
AS (Telekom Malaysia – AS4788) advertised a very large number of routes to its neighbor, a major
Tier-1 AS (Level3 – AS3549), which induced the latter into forwarding a large amount of its traffic
towards the former. Because the Malaysian AS did not have the architecture to handle such a large
amount of traffic, the entire Internet slowed down [115].
The fact that the full architecture of the Internet cannot be known led the scientific community
into creating an entire research topic known as Internet topology discovery. Topology discovery aims
not only at examining and preventing issues such as the global slowdown of June 2015 [115], but
also at capturing realistic data on various networks to develop new technologies (such as new com-
munication protocols) or to re-assess existing ones. To do so, the research community developped
multiple methods to study the Internet from various perspectives, among which three stand out:
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1. the router-level, i.e., how individual routers (the computers designed to route packets) are
interconnected,
2. the hop-level, i.e., which accounts for how packets are transmitted from one location to another
in respect of the forwarding observed via (Paris) traceroute [11, 119], each location consisting
of a single router or of a mesh of routers,
3. the subnet-level, i.e., how the address prefixes managed by a same network are organized in
subnets (short for subnetworks), which are sets of computers that can exchange packets with
each other without intermediate routers.
The initial purpose of this thesis was to advance the state-of-the-art of topology discovery in
respect of all three aforementioned levels. In particular, each level has been studied through the lens
of a specific sub-domain of topology discovery which is already well documented in the literature.
The discovery of the router-level was addressed by re-evaluating well known alias resolution methods
and by creating a framework which takes advantage of IP fingerprinting [121] to evaluate which
methods are the most suitable to a given scenario, each scenario being (ideally) determined through
space search reduction [51]. The problem of subnet inference (i.e., mapping the subnet-level) was
extensively studied by re-evaluating the traditional hypotheses of this domain, which resulted in
the creation of the WISE (Wide and lInear Subnet inferencE) subnet inference tool [52, 53]. Last but
not least, the discovery of the hop-level was carefully elaborated by reviewing how network paths
discovered via traceroute probing [119] could be best used for inferring the hop-level of a target
network, which motivated the design of the topology discovery tool SAGE (Subnet AGgrEgation) [54].
Despite the aforementioned research topics being, in appearance, disconnected from each other,
this thesis aimed at building bridges between them, notably by identifying the challenges they
have in common. In particular, the new solutions designed to discover the hop- and subnet-levels
were elaborated with load balancing in mind. In the modern Internet, many networks resort to
implementing complex architectures featuring multiple paths to handle increasingly large amounts
of traffic, rather than increasing the capacity of a single path, the former approach being usually more
economic. However, due to these load balancing constructions, network paths can vary considerably,
even over short timespans [12, 82].
Therefore, a first major contribution of this thesis is to advance the state-of-the-art of load
balancing aware topology discovery. The detection of the convergence points was notably discussed,
a convergence point being a router where multiple (possibly load balanced) network paths rejoin and
which can appear as multiple differing router interfaces in traceroute paths. Correctly detecting
these convergence points with the help of alias resolution is critical to achieve both consistent subnet
inference and accurate hop-level mapping of a target network. Moreover, this thesis also frequently
discussed the issue of observing traceroute paths of varying length towards the same destination,
which can constitute a challenge for both aforementioned topics. Therefore, both WISE and SAGE
implemented algorithmical solutions to be able to achieve their respective tasks while dealing with
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the effects of load balancing. Measurements in the wild with both WISE and SAGE demonstrated that
they were capable of discovering very similar data on the same target network regardless of the date
(over the span of weeks) and the vantage point, while their respective validation on two groundtruth
networks showed they could capture very accurate pictures of these networks [52–54].
This thesis has also extensively explored the topic of subnet-based topology discovery. Initially,
the research community considered the discovery of subnets to be a way to complement router-level
maps [58, 116, 118], but did not see subnets as a new tool to investigate the Internet, or at least not
before the introduction of TreeNET [55]. As discussed many times in this thesis, subnets can be a
powerful tool for topology discovery: in the context of alias resolution, aggregates of subnets located
one hop away from each other, i.e., neighborhoods, can be used to compute sets of alias candidates
that can only be aliased with each other. This form of space search reduction was used to complement
the alias resolution framework elaborated for this thesis, resulting in efficient alias resolution [51].
Research involving WISE was later used to thoroughly assess the concept of neighborhood and
to discuss its potential for building network graphs [53], which was eventually concretized with
SAGE [54]. SAGE not only builds these graphs but also maps the links they contain to the discovered
subnets, which not only complements the initial data but also opens new modeling opportunities. In
particular, a neighborhood – subnet bipartite formalism was proposed, and the potential of such a
formalism was commented on with the help of data that was captured by SAGE and subsequently



















Figure A.1: A holistic approach to topology discovery.
More broadly speaking, this thesis has all along elaborated a novel approach to topology discovery,
which could be referred to as holistic topology discovery. Instead of considering all topics of topology
discovery as separate problems, all new tools introduced by this thesis, namely WISE [52, 53] and
SAGE [54], take account of the relationships that exist between them to achieve their respective
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purpose. Though the idea of combining several topology discovery methods is not entirely new, as it
has been commented on several times in the context of alias resolution [74, 87, 113, 117], many works
from the state-of-the-art focus exclusively on specific tasks or rely on unique (and often obsolote)
probing strategies. This holds true for all topics discussed in this thesis: alias resolution [16, 73, 86],
subnet inference [116, 118] and network graph mapping [90, 91, 97, 111, 112]. In this thesis, it was
demonstrated that subnet inference can benefit from alias resolution and vice versa [51–53], that
subnet inference can kickstart network graph inference [53, 54], and that network graph inference
can benefit from alias resolution but also induce new alias resolution scenarios in turn [51, 54]. In
fact, there is only one unexplored research direction, which would consist in taking advantage of
hop-level mappings to refine subnet inference. The whole concept of holistic topology discovery is
summarized in Figure A.1, where the dashed arrow represent the unexplored research direction.
Finally, this thesis has also put a lot of emphasis on designing efficient topology mapping so-
lutions, notably by carefully designing their methodology. In particular, the first implementation
of the fingerprint-based alias resolution framework in TreeNET is significantly faster than MIDAR
when it comes to alias resolution, in addition to being more economic in terms of probes [51]. The
WISE methodology, which separates the subnet inference itself from the data collection mechanisms
that allow it, outperforms the subnet inference approach of TreeNET [55], which itself involves
ExploreNET [118], in respect of both accuracy and total runtime [52, 53]. Finally, the deployment of
both WISE and SAGE demonstrated both tools were capable of capturing complete snapshots of large
networks (e.g., Tier-1 ASes covering one or more millions of attributable IP addresses) fast enough to
reproduce the measurements on a daily basis. In particular, these regular measurements allowed
to assess their ability to capture similar data regardless of the vantage point [52–54]. While other
contemporary works have explored fast traceroute probing at the scale of the Internet [18, 65, 122],
WISE and SAGE requires more thorough exploration of the IPv4 prefixes of a target network to perform
multiple tasks (subnet inference, hop-level mapping, alias resolution) and are, at the time of writing,
some of the most exhaustive topology discovery tools [52–54].
Future work and research directions
Though most of the research work described in this thesis has been conceived to be as rigorous as
possible, there are several research directions that could be further explored to improve or refresh
the topology discovery methods that were previously presented.
First of all, the fingerprint-based framework needs to be properly updated in at least two ways.
As already discussed at the end of Sec. 12.4.2, the framework as it is currently implemented in
SAGE [48] struggles with larger scenarios of alias resolution, i.e., when there are several hundreds of
alias candidates at the same time. A better scheduling should therefore be designed to tackle these
scenarios, such that the framework could handle both small- and medium-scale problems, and not
just the former case. Several options could be explored: for instance, the initial scenario could be
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split in several sub-scenarios, and the alias pairs/lists discovered in these sub-scenarios could be
merged by re-resolving a few of their respective IP addresses. The additional alias pairs/lists could
then be used to merge the initial pairs/lists thanks to alias transitivity, i.e., the idea that for three IP
interfaces A, B and C , if A and B are alias of each other and if B and C are alias too, then A and C are
alias of each other as well (cf. Sec. 1.2).
The second way to update the framework would simply consist in re-assessing the provided alias
resolution methods. As the framework was, for the most part, designed around 2016 [51], its methods
may not be as relevant in 2021’s Internet. In particular, it became more and more apparent over time
that some routers could no longer be inferred through alias resolution methods based on the IP
identification field of the IP protocol [102]. As a reminder, these methods are essentially based on
the idea that a router will generate IP identifiers (16-bit positive integers) with the help of a counter
shared by all interfaces (16-bit positive integer, incremented at each new value), which can then be
probed each to verify if the IP identifiers appear to be generated by the same counter [16, 73, 113].
However, more recent devices sometimes implement a separate counter for each of their interfaces
rather than using the same counter for all of them. In fact, such routers are now found within the
ULiège network. Therefore, a properly updated framework should plan heuristics to detect these
difficult scenarios in order to test other methods when possible. The methods based on the IP
identification field are not the only ones that need an update: for example, the DNS-based method
could take advantage of regexes generated with the help of machine learning to spare the effort of
tuning the regexes depending on the target network [80].
One last possible improvement for the fingerprint-based alias resolution framework would simply
consist in updating the fingerprints themselves. Other properties tied to router interfaces could be
explored, and new values could be used for the IP identifier counter type, i.e., a value provided by each
fingerprint that characterizes the behaviour of the IP identifiers generated by the associated interface
(cf. Sec. 2.1.2). For example, it has been observed, from time to time, that some router interfaces
appear to generate a fixed IP identifier over a short timespan instead of generating an ascending
sequence. Updated fingerprints could account for this behaviour, and could be subsequently used to
re-assess the permeability of the Internet to alias resolution methods based on IP identifiers.
When it comes to subnet inference and, more broadly speaking, subnet-based topology discovery,
a major research direction that has not been explored (or barely) by this thesis lies in comparing
and merging measurements from multiple vantage points to obtain a more exhaustive picture of the
target network. For example, the subnets of each snapshot of a target network could be compared in
order to only keep the soundest results overall. Likewise, the neighborhood-based DAGs as built by
SAGE could be compared so that the unique links observed in each snapshot could be inserted in a
final, more complete graph, which would be more true to the target network than each individual
snapshot (as hinted at in Sec. 11.2.2).
There are two reasons why this possibility has not been explored yet: one the one hand, a major
part of the assessment of both WISE and SAGE consisted of finding similarities between snapshots
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collected from separate vantage points [52–54], and on the other hand, both tools have been designed
with the PlanetLab testbed in mind [8]. Because of the number of working PlanetLab nodes decreased
as the research work of this thesis progressed, measurement campaigns with either WISE or SAGE had
to make the most of the available nodes. In hindsight, the vantage point rotation scheme could have
been taken advantage of for this purpose, but it would not have provided as much vantage points as
mentioned in previous works involving multiple monitors. For instance, the Cheleby system, used for
Internet-scale subnet inference in 2012, involved several hundreds of PlanetLab nodes at once [70],
while only one or two dozens could be used at the time of deploying WISE (i.e., fall of 2018).
The fact that WISE/SAGE are no longer constrained by the PlanetLab testbed could also motivate
some more practical improvements over the present work. 1 Indeed, with the EdgeNet cluster [108],
which notably offers containerization via Docker [3], the algorithms of WISE and SAGE could be
easily implemented with other languages or strategies. For example, they could be implemented as
several programs: the active probing steps of WISE could be implemented as a stand-alone software
separated from the subnet inference itself, since this latter step is entirely offline. While this strategy
would probably have proven cumbersome with the PlanetLab testbed, it may be more convenient on
the EdgeNet cluster or comparable systems.
Chunking the SAGE methodology as several pieces of software, potentially interacting with each
other, might also be useful to attempt to take advantage of network graph inference to improve
the discovered subnets, an opportunity which is hinted at by Figure A.1. A possible heuristic to
achieve this would consist of detecting patterns among the subnets bordering a given neighborhood,
notably based on the distribution of the prefix length for the subnets bordering this neighborhood.
For example, if a large but dubious /24 subnet is found around a neighborhood which is otherwise
only bordered by /30 subnets, this suspicious subnet may be split into /30 subnets in order to be
consistent with the other inferred subnets.
Another unexplored research direction lies in applying the topology discovery methods described
in this thesis to IPv6. As a reminder, both WISE and SAGE are designed with IPv4 in mind, mostly
because IPv6 subnets are vastly larger than in IPv4, which means subnet inference tools can easily
exhaustively explore the address space of a given subnet. Hopefully, the WISE methodology might be
more suitable to inspire an IPv6 equivalent than previous work [116, 118], because the only hurdle
would be, in theory, the detection of responsive IP addresses within IPv6 prefixes, a topic which
is currently being investigated by the research community [19, 106]. In practice, the vastly larger
IPv6 subnets might violate some of the assumptions that justify the linear complexity of the subnet
inference of WISE (cf. Sec. 6.4), but algorithmical adaptations could solve this hypothetical issue.
Finally, the algorithmical steps that are proper to SAGE (i.e., regarding network graph inference) can,
in theory, be re-used as is in IPv6. In other words, once a practical solution for IPv6 subnet inference
is available, all the tools described in this thesis could be updated for IPv6.
Finally, it goes without saying that there is plenty of work to be done with the bipartite formalism.
1Both WISE and SAGE are 32-bit C/C++ applications whose source code is available for free on GitHub [48, 49].
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The formalism described in Chapter 12 is merely opening doors for more research, since research
with INSIGHT essentially showed what types of topological properties could be studied, but these
properties need to be better characterized. For instance, topological cycles, i.e., cycles that are not
experienced at the time of probing but appear within bipartite graphs, could be used to quantify back-
up links but also to detect load balancers, as longer cycles may simply correspond to diamonds, i.e.,
a divergence point followed by two paths converging at another device. If load balancers where to be
studied more precisely, SAGE may also be updated to incorporate some of the ideas elaborated earlier
by Augustin et al. to enumerate load balanced paths while conducting traceroute probing [14].
Last but not least, the tripartite model could be used in the future to study in detail the relationships
between routers, subnets, and hypothetical Layer-2 vertices, and in particular, how much the router-
level differs from the hop-level accounted for by the neighborhood-based DAGs built by SAGE and
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